IP UPDATE

DMCA requirements for CMI removal not always met in AI code writing

by Jodi Benassi | Oct 1, 2026 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) claims that alleged artificial intelligence (AI) tools removed or altered copyright management information (CMI) from the programmers’ protected works. Doe et al. v. GitHub, Inc., et al., Case No. 24-7700 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 2026) (Thomas, Miller, Blumenfeld, JJ.)

GitHub operates a platform where developers can store, manage, and share software code. GitHub Copilot and OpenAI Codex are generative AI tools trained on millions of software projects available on GitHub. Copilot uses statistical patterns learned from its training data to generate code in response to user prompts. The plaintiffs are programmers who published copyrighted code in public GitHub repositories under open-source licenses that generally required attribution, including the author’s name and copyright notice.

The plaintiffs sued GitHub, Microsoft, and OpenAI, alleging that Copilot sometimes reproduced their code without the attribution, copyright notices, or license terms accompanying the code in the GitHub repositories. The plaintiffs asserted that these omissions violated § 1202(b) of the DMCA.

The district court dismissed the DMCA claim, reasoning that § 1202(b) required the allegedly infringing work to be identical to the original work from which the CMI had been removed. Because the plaintiffs alleged that Copilot generated near-identical, modified, or functionally equivalent versions of their code, the district court concluded that they had failed to state a claim. It certified for interlocutory appeal the question of whether § 1202(b) imposes an identicality requirement.

Removal or alteration of CMI

Section 1202(b) prohibits intentionally removing or altering CMI, and distributing works or copies of works knowing that CMI has been removed or altered without authority.

The plaintiffs argued that § 1202(b) does not require the defendant’s output to be literally identical to the copyrighted work. They contended that a literal-identicality rule would allow a defendant to evade the DMCA simply by making a trivial change to a copied work after removing its CMI – for example, changing one word on a page. The defendants, while conceding that literal identicality was not required, argued that § 1202(b) requires CMI to have been removed or altered from a copy of the plaintiff’s existing work. If Copilot instead generates a new or derivative work that never contained the plaintiff’s CMI, there is nothing from which CMI was “removed” or “altered.”

The Ninth Circuit rejected a literal identicality requirement and characterized “identicality” as a “misnomer.” The relevant inquiry is not whether the works are identical, but whether CMI was actually removed or altered from a copy of an existing protected work. Identicality may be evidence of removal where two works are otherwise identical, but the allegedly infringing version omits CMI contained in the original. Under those circumstances, a factfinder may reasonably infer that the CMI was removed. But literal identity is not required. Minor cosmetic changes will not necessarily defeat a claim where a defendant substantially or entirely reproduces an existing work and removes its CMI.

Applying that standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded that [...]

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Diamond in the rough: Infringement theory foreclosed by claim construction supports $3.2M fee award

by Hannah Hurley | Oct 1, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed an award of more than $3.2 million in attorneys’ fees and non-taxable expenses, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the patent owner and its exclusive licensee continued to pursue an objectively baseless infringement theory after claim construction and discovery foreclosed their position. Carnegie Institution of Washington v. Fenix Diamonds LLC, Case Nos. 24-1804; -1824 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 17, 2026) (Reyna, Taranto, Stoll, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

Carnegie Institution of Washington and its exclusive licensee, M7D Corporation, sued Fenix Diamonds for infringement of two patents directed to methods for producing lab-grown diamonds using chemical vapor deposition. The asserted claims required growing single-crystal diamonds on a growth surface with only insubstantial non-monocrystalline growth. After claim construction, Fenix produced evidence from its manufacturer, Nouveau Diamonds, showing extensive polycrystalline and nondiamond growth. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment of noninfringement.

After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their appeal following M7D’s financial collapse, the district court found the case exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285. It concluded that the plaintiffs’ infringement theory became objectively baseless once they received Nouveau’s evidence – approximately one month before the date from which the court ultimately shifted fees. The district court also exercised its inherent authority to award nontaxable expenses, including expert fees, based on what it viewed as vexatious and unreasonable litigation conduct. Among other things, the district court cited a misleading representation concerning access to a facility and the plaintiffs’ eleventh-hour abandonment of one of the asserted patents. Carnegie appealed.

Carnegie argued that its expert’s infringement theory represented a reasonable application of the district court’s claim construction rather than an attempt to relitigate it. The Federal Circuit disagreed. The district court had expressly construed the disputed “growth surface” limitation as not categorically excluding polycrystalline growth. According to the Federal Circuit, the expert’s attempt to exclude a subset of such growth effectively reintroduced a limitation that the district court had rejected. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the infringement theory was inconsistent with the governing claim construction.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Carnegie’s challenges to the scope and amount of the award. On causation, the Court explained that once a district court identifies the point at which continued litigation became objectively baseless, it need not tie each subsequent fee to a discrete act of misconduct. The district court could therefore shift all reasonable fees incurred after that point.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the imposition of joint-and-several liability on Carnegie. Although Carnegie characterized itself as a passive licensor, the Court pointed to its close and intertwined relationship with M7D, including shared counsel, joint litigation filings, and consultation rights under the license agreement. Those circumstances supported holding Carnegie responsible for the fee award along with M7D.

Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of Fenix’s request for prejudgment interest. Fenix had not sought prejudgment interest before the district court issued its exceptional-case ruling and, when Fenix later raised the issue, [...]

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Copyright Royalty Board royalty rate allocations must be explained

by Courtney Seams | Oct 1, 2026 | Copyrights

Addressing royalties under the US Copyright Act’s compulsory licensing scheme, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the Copyright Royalty Board’s royalty allocation for 2014 through 2017 and remanded for the Board to further explain how the royalty rates were calculated and allocated. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball v. Librarian of Congress, Case Nos. 24-1259; -1260 (DC Cir. Sept. 22, 2026) (Srinivasan, Childs, Rogers, JJ.) (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The compulsory licensing scheme at issue relates to cable systems that pay statutorily prescribed royalties in exchange for permission to distantly retransmit television broadcast programming. The cable systems calculate and deposit those royalties with the Register of Copyrights. If copyright claimants cannot agree on how to distribute the resulting royalty pool, the Board conducts proceedings to determine the appropriate allocation.

In phase one of the royalty calculation proceedings, the copyright claimants group themselves into categories based on the programming they own, and the Board allocates the overall royalty pot among those categories based on their relative marketplace value. In this case, the Board relied on two principal valuation methodologies, the Bortz Survey and a regression analysis, to determine the relative marketplace value of the programming categories and allocate the royalty pool among them. The Board’s phase one allocation was at issue on appeal. The Joint Sports Claimants (JSC), which included the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, along with Public Television (PTV), which included the Public Broadcasting Service, separately challenged the Board’s allocation of the royalty pool as arbitrary and capricious.

PTV argued that the Board’s reliance on an expert’s sensitivity test was arbitrary and capricious because:

It departed from the Board’s precedent without explanation.
It contradicted the evidence and nearly every expert’s testimony that minimum-fee signals retain value.
It was applied inconsistently across the copyright claimants.

In response to the first point, the DC Circuit found that the Board did not depart from precedent but instead properly changed its valuation method based on the changed circumstances in the compulsory licensing marketplace that occurred during the 2014 to 2017 time period. Regarding the second point, the Court found that the Board reasonably excluded minimum-fee cable systems because their programming preferences could not be meaningfully captured by a regression designed to measure incremental willingness to pay. As to the third point, the Court found that the Board correctly applied adjustments to certain programming groups to correct distortions in the regression data.

PTV further argued that the sensitivity test’s exclusion of cable systems that were required to carry certain programming was arbitrary and disproportionately affected PTV. The DC Circuit disagreed, explaining that the Copyright Act does not establish the marketplace value of must-carry programming, the evidence did not establish the value PTV attributed to such programming, and the Board reasonably relied on an expert’s estimate of the number of must-carry signals.

JSC argued that the Board’s reliance on an expert’s regression analysis and a Bortz Survey was arbitrary and capricious [...]

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Hallucinated help: USPTO disciplines patent attorney for failing to verify AI-generated citations

by Taylor MacDonald | Sep 24, 2026 | Patents

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued a final order approving a settlement between its Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED) and a registered patent attorney accused of professional misconduct arising from the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in patent litigation. In re Brian E. Mitchell, Proceeding No. D2026-16 (Director July 27, 2026).

Brian Mitchell, a registered patent attorney who had never appeared before the USPTO, used AI to assist in preparing a proposed claim construction chart in a patent case pending in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The AI-generated material included several incorrect or fabricated citations to the patent’s intrinsic record.

After the errors were identified, Mitchell corrected them within a day and cooperated fully with OED’s investigation. The final order noted that Mitchell “acknowledged his errors, demonstrated genuine contrition, and accepted responsibility,” and that he had no prior disciplinary history before the USPTO or other tribunals. The district court declined to impose sanctions.

Mitchell nevertheless stipulated that his conduct violated USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct governing competent representation, reasonable diligence, misrepresentation, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. According to the order, the violations arose from Mitchell’s failure to appreciate AI’s limitations (including its propensity to hallucinate) and his failure to verify the AI-generated content before submitting it to the court.

As part of the settlement, Mitchell agreed to a public reprimand, publication of the final order in OED’s electronic Freedom of Information Act Reading Room, and publication of a Notice of Public Reprimand in the Official Gazette. The notice specifically warns practitioners that AI-generated errors “are not limited to extrinsic sources such as statutes, regulations, and case law,” but may also extend to intrinsic evidence.

The order further cautioned that the disciplinary proceeding may be considered as an aggravating factor, or as rebuttal evidence, in any future USPTO disciplinary matter involving Mitchell.

Preamble with backbone: “Universal” limits spinal-implant claims

by Vincent Li, PhD | Sep 24, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment and a jury verdict of noninfringement, holding that claim preambles reciting a “universal” spinal implant were limiting and that substantial evidence supported the jury’s separate finding of noninfringement. Moskowitz Family LLC v. Globus Medical, Inc., Case No. 24-1696 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 11, 2026) (Prost, Schall, Stoll, JJ.)

Moskowitz sued Globus for infringing three patents directed generally to implant systems used in spinal-fusion surgery. The patents describe implant tools and intervertebral cages. For two of the asserted patents, the central dispute concerned the term “universal,” which appeared in the preambles of certain claims.

The district court construed the term “universal” as recited to mean “an intervertebral bone fusion spacer designed to be inserted between [vertebrae/vertebral bodies] in any region of the spine, i.e., cervical, thoracic, or lumbar, using any approach, e.g., posterior, anterior, or lateral.” Moskowitz conceded that the accused Globus products did not infringe under that construction but argued that the preambles were not limiting. The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment of noninfringement as to those patents. A jury later found that a claim of the third asserted patent was not infringed, and the district court denied Moskowitz’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL). Moskowitz appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed. As to the claims containing the “universal” language, the Court found the preambles limiting for two reasons. First, other terms in the body of the claims, such as “the intervertebral cage” and “the first integral screw guide,” relied on the preambles for antecedent basis. The Court explained that this dependence was a “strong indication that the preamble acts as a necessary component of the claimed invention.”

Second, the specifications confirmed that universality was a fundamental characteristic of the claimed inventions rather than merely an intended use. Without the preamble limitation, the claims would fail to capture that characteristic.

Moskowitz argued that “universal” should be separated from the remainder of the preamble, relying on cases in which the Federal Circuit treated different portions of a preamble differently. The Court rejected that argument, finding that “universal” was “intertwined with the remainder of the preambles” and did not merely recite an intended use. Even considered independently, universality remained a fundamental characteristic of the claimed invention, the Court explained.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Moskowitz’s argument that the district court’s construction improperly required a physically impossible “one-size-fits-all” implant. The Court explained that the patents instead described a design adaptable for use across different regions of the spine and with multiple surgical approaches. The construction did not require a single implant size or a single manner of insertion.

Turning to the patent that proceeded to trial, the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of JMOL. The asserted claim required a gripper “cooperating with” a handle. Because neither party sought construction of “cooperating,” the jury was instructed to apply the term’s plain and ordinary meaning.

Globus’ expert testified regarding that ordinary meaning and explained why the accused products did not [...]

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