Hallucinated help: USPTO disciplines patent attorney for failing to verify AI-generated citations

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued a final order approving a settlement between its Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED) and a registered patent attorney accused of professional misconduct arising from the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in patent litigation. In re Brian E. Mitchell, Proceeding No. D2026-16 (Director July 27, 2026).

Brian Mitchell, a registered patent attorney who had never appeared before the USPTO, used AI to assist in preparing a proposed claim construction chart in a patent case pending in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The AI-generated material included several incorrect or fabricated citations to the patent’s intrinsic record.

After the errors were identified, Mitchell corrected them within a day and cooperated fully with OED’s investigation. The final order noted that Mitchell “acknowledged his errors, demonstrated genuine contrition, and accepted responsibility,” and that he had no prior disciplinary history before the USPTO or other tribunals. The district court declined to impose sanctions.

Mitchell nevertheless stipulated that his conduct violated USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct governing competent representation, reasonable diligence, misrepresentation, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. According to the order, the violations arose from Mitchell’s failure to appreciate AI’s limitations (including its propensity to hallucinate) and his failure to verify the AI-generated content before submitting it to the court.

As part of the settlement, Mitchell agreed to a public reprimand, publication of the final order in OED’s electronic Freedom of Information Act Reading Room, and publication of a Notice of Public Reprimand in the Official Gazette. The notice specifically warns practitioners that AI-generated errors “are not limited to extrinsic sources such as statutes, regulations, and case law,” but may also extend to intrinsic evidence.

The order further cautioned that the disciplinary proceeding may be considered as an aggravating factor, or as rebuttal evidence, in any future USPTO disciplinary matter involving Mitchell.




Preamble with backbone: “Universal” limits spinal-implant claims

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment and a jury verdict of noninfringement, holding that claim preambles reciting a “universal” spinal implant were limiting and that substantial evidence supported the jury’s separate finding of noninfringement. Moskowitz Family LLC v. Globus Medical, Inc., Case No. 24-1696 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 11, 2026) (Prost, Schall, Stoll, JJ.)

Moskowitz sued Globus for infringing three patents directed generally to implant systems used in spinal-fusion surgery. The patents describe implant tools and intervertebral cages. For two of the asserted patents, the central dispute concerned the term “universal,” which appeared in the preambles of certain claims.

The district court construed the term “universal” as recited to mean “an intervertebral bone fusion spacer designed to be inserted between [vertebrae/vertebral bodies] in any region of the spine, i.e., cervical, thoracic, or lumbar, using any approach, e.g., posterior, anterior, or lateral.” Moskowitz conceded that the accused Globus products did not infringe under that construction but argued that the preambles were not limiting. The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment of noninfringement as to those patents. A jury later found that a claim of the third asserted patent was not infringed, and the district court denied Moskowitz’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL). Moskowitz appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed. As to the claims containing the “universal” language, the Court found the preambles limiting for two reasons. First, other terms in the body of the claims, such as “the intervertebral cage” and “the first integral screw guide,” relied on the preambles for antecedent basis. The Court explained that this dependence was a “strong indication that the preamble acts as a necessary component of the claimed invention.”

Second, the specifications confirmed that universality was a fundamental characteristic of the claimed inventions rather than merely an intended use. Without the preamble limitation, the claims would fail to capture that characteristic.

Moskowitz argued that “universal” should be separated from the remainder of the preamble, relying on cases in which the Federal Circuit treated different portions of a preamble differently. The Court rejected that argument, finding that “universal” was “intertwined with the remainder of the preambles” and did not merely recite an intended use. Even considered independently, universality remained a fundamental characteristic of the claimed invention, the Court explained.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Moskowitz’s argument that the district court’s construction improperly required a physically impossible “one-size-fits-all” implant. The Court explained that the patents instead described a design adaptable for use across different regions of the spine and with multiple surgical approaches. The construction did not require a single implant size or a single manner of insertion.

Turning to the patent that proceeded to trial, the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of JMOL. The asserted claim required a gripper “cooperating with” a handle. Because neither party sought construction of “cooperating,” the jury was instructed to apply the term’s plain and ordinary meaning.

Globus’ expert testified regarding that ordinary meaning and explained why the accused products did not [...]

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Sold but not shown: Private sale does not always constitute public disclosure

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that a commercial sale did not qualify as a “public disclosure” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(B) where the sale did not make the relevant aspects of the invention available to the public. NCS Multistage Inc. v. Nine Energy Service, Inc., Case No. 25-1000 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2026) (Cunningham, Reyna, Hughes, JJ.)

NCS Multistage sued Nine Energy Service for infringing claims of a patent directed to a “float tool” used in the oil and gas industry to help run casing strings to the bottom of a wellbore. The claimed invention uses a rupture disc to seal the casing during installation and rupture once the casing is positioned, avoiding the need to drill out plugs.

At trial, Nine argued that a prior-art device (the TDP-PO tool, which a third party, TCO, sold to Apache in August 2012) anticipated the asserted claims. NCS responded that its own earlier sale of an AirLock device to Tundra in July 2012 constituted a “public disclosure” under § 102(b)(1)(B), thereby removing the later Apache sale from the prior art. The jury returned a verdict in favor of NCS on both infringement and no invalidity. Nine appealed.

The Federal Circuit disagreed with NCS, concluding that the AirLock sale was not a public disclosure as a matter of law. Relying on its 2024 decision in Sanho Corp. v. Kaijet Technology Int’l Ltd, Inc., which interpreted the same “publicly disclosed” language in § 102(b)(1)(B), the Court explained that placing an invention “on sale” does not necessarily mean that the invention has been publicly disclosed. NCS privately sold the AirLock to a single customer. The device was delivered inside a sealed black tube that had to be cut open to inspect its internal components. There was no evidence that receipt of the tube made the claimed features available to the public, including the rupture disc’s configuration and its relationship to the casing string’s internal diameter. Although the transaction was not subject to a nondisclosure agreement, there was likewise no evidence that the invention’s relevant features were communicated beyond Tundra, and NCS’s own technical materials were marked confidential. On those facts, the Court concluded that the AirLock sale did not qualify as a public disclosure under § 102(b)(1)(B).

The Federal Circuit also reversed two claim construction rulings. First, it found that the term “internal diameter” has a single meaning (i.e., a measured diameter across the width of the casing string) and rejected the district court’s construction permitting the term to refer either to that measurement or to an inner surface. Second, the Court found that the term “casing string” should not be limited to casing measuring at least 4.5 inches because the specification’s permissive language did not establish either lexicography or disavowal.

The claim construction errors, together with the erroneous treatment of the AirLock sale, required a new trial on infringement and invalidity. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

Practice note: Patent owners seeking to invoke [...]

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License to litigate: Exclusive licensee may sue without patent owner

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed dismissal of a patent and copyright infringement action, finding that an exclusive license remained in force, transferred all substantial rights in the asserted patents, and permitted the licensee to sue without joining the patent owner. TexasLDPC Inc. v. Broadcom Inc., Case No. 25-1074 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2026) (Moore, Chen, Bissoon).

TexasLDPC exclusively licensed a portfolio of low-density parity check (LDPC) technology patents and related copyrights from Texas A&M University. The agreement granted TexasLDPC broad rights to make, use, sell, sublicense, and enforce the licensed technology, as well as to recover damages for infringement. Texas A&M retained limited rights, including rights for research and educational purposes, certain rights associated with a preexisting Marvell license, and approval rights over assignment.

After TexasLDPC was unable to secure customers or sublicensees, it shifted its business toward patent and copyright enforcement and sued Broadcom, Avago, and LSI for infringement.

The district court dismissed the action on two grounds. First, it concluded that the exclusive license automatically terminated when TexasLDPC abandoned commercial development and became an enforcement-focused entity, reasoning that TexasLDPC had “cease[d] its business operations.” Second, the district court held that, even if the exclusive license remained in effect, TexasLDPC had not received all substantial rights in the asserted patents and therefore could not sue without joining Texas A&M, which had asserted sovereign immunity and refused to join the lawsuit. TexasLDPC appealed.

The Federal Circuit rejected both of the district court’s conclusions and reversed.

As to termination, the Federal Circuit found that patent enforcement qualified as a contemplated “business operation” under the agreement. Several provisions expressly treated enforcement as part of TexasLDPC’s “commercially reasonable efforts,” and the agreement separately granted TexasLDPC the right to bring infringement actions and retain infringement recoveries. The Court therefore concluded that TexasLDPC did not cease its business operations merely because it stopped pursuing commercialization and focused instead on enforcement.

The Federal Circuit next found that the agreement transferred all substantial rights in the asserted patents. Considering the agreement as a whole, the Court emphasized TexasLDPC’s exclusive rights to make, use, and sell licensed products; sublicense the technology; bring infringement actions; and collect damages without Texas A&M’s approval. Although Texas A&M retained certain rights, including limited practice rights and the ability to enforce against Marvell, the Court found those reservations insufficient to defeat TexasLDPC’s status as the holder of all substantial rights. TexasLDPC therefore had standing to sue in its own name without joining Texas A&M.

Finally, the Federal Circuit found that Texas A&M was not otherwise a required party under Rule 19. The district court had reasoned that Texas A&M’s absence could impair access to potentially relevant discovery. The Federal Circuit rejected that rationale, explaining that “Rule 19 is not a discovery tool.” The fact that an absent party may possess relevant evidence does not, standing alone, make that party necessary where the court can otherwise accord meaningful relief.




Federal Circuit: Unjust enrichment available as damages theory for trade secret misappropriation

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a judgment limiting a trade secret plaintiff to a reasonable royalty based on the parties’ licensing history, finding that unjust-enrichment damages are available under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) and Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act (MUTSA). The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that liability for misappropriating a combination trade secret requires proof that the defendant knew each specific element comprising the combination. Versata Software, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., Case Nos. 24-1140; -1206; -1234 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 10, 2026).

Ford licensed Versata’s Automotive Configuration Manager (ACM) software, which helped Ford configure vehicles for manufacturing. When the parties were unable to agree on an extension of their licensing agreement, Ford released its own configuration software, PDO, which it had developed while still licensing Versata’s software. Versata asserted claims for breach of contract and trade secret misappropriation under the DTSA and the MUTSA. Versata alleged that Ford misappropriated three interdependent “combination” trade secrets within ACM: Grid, Buildability, and Workspaces.

Before trial, the district court excluded Versata’s damages expert’s proposed unjust-enrichment analysis, concluding that Versata’s trade secret damages had to be measured by reference to the parties’ licensing history. The court permitted Versata to submit revised reasonable-royalty models but excluded two models because they incorporated the value Ford obtained from using the trade secrets rather than relying solely on the parties’ licensing history.

A jury later found that Ford misappropriated all three ACM trade secrets and breached the parties’ agreement. It awarded Versata approximately $22 million for trade secret misappropriation and $82 million for breach of contract. The district court subsequently reduced the trade secret award to zero and the contract award to $3 million. Versata appealed, and Ford cross-appealed the finding of trade secret liability.

Unjust-enrichment damages

Versata argued that the district court improperly prevented it from seeking unjust-enrichment damages and instead required its damages to be based on the parties’ licensing history. The Federal Circuit agreed.

Applying Sixth Circuit law, the Federal Circuit explained that the plain language of both the DTSA and the MUTSA expressly permits a plaintiff to recover unjust enrichment caused by trade secret misappropriation to the extent that enrichment is not accounted for in calculating actual loss. The statutes separately permit a reasonable royalty “in lieu of” damages measured by other methods. The Court found that Versata was entitled, as a matter of law, to pursue unjust-enrichment damages.

The Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion that the parties’ licensing history required Versata’s damages to be measured by a reasonable royalty. Although prior Sixth Circuit decisions had upheld royalty-based awards derived from licensing history, those cases did not establish that a plaintiff was prohibited from pursuing unjust enrichment.

Nor was unjust enrichment available only where damages could not otherwise be measured. The Federal Circuit emphasized that the statutory language expressly allows a plaintiff to pursue unjust-enrichment damages. Because the district court’s contrary ruling affected Versata’s damages case throughout the litigation, the Federal Circuit vacated the judgment [...]

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