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Patenting Web Advertising? Ask Alice, I Think She’ll Know

In a wide-ranging opinion, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity for lack of patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with respect to claims directed to web-based advertising. Chewy, Inc. v. International Business Machines, Corp., Case No. 22-1756 (Fed. Cir. March 5, 2024) (Moore, Stoll, Cunningham, JJ.)

Chewy filed suit against International Business Machines (IBM) seeking a declaration that Chewy’s website did not infringe multiple patents related to web-based advertising. IBM responded by filing infringement counterclaims. After claim construction and discovery, the district court granted Chewy’s motions for summary judgment of invalidity for lack of patent eligible subject matter with regard to the asserted claims of one patent and noninfringement of the asserted claims of a second patent.

The claims of the first patent relate to providing a targeted advertisement from an “information repository” to a user based on the user’s internet search. In affirming the district court, the Federal Circuit first determined that, under Alice step 1, “[t]he claims broadly recite correlating advertisements with search results using a generic process.” The Court noted that the claims “merely recite the concept of identifying advertisements based on search results, without any specificity as to how this is accomplished,” and are directed to “the abstract idea of identifying advertisements based on search results.”

Turning to Alice step 2, the Federal Circuit found that the claims used a generic database and conventional processing steps, and “claimed use of a conventional repository for storing advertisements and associated search results in a well-known way.” Because “the claims recite the generic process for obtaining search results from a search query and using the search results to identify advertisements,” they failed under Alice step 2 and did not claim patent eligible subject matter under § 101.

Regarding the second asserted patent, the district court construed the claim term “selectively storing advertising objects at a store established at the reception system” as requiring the “advertising objects” to be “pre-fetched” and retrieved before the user requested a page on a website. Because it was undisputed that “Chewy retrieves advertisements in response to a user requesting a page” and not before, the district court ruled that Chewy’s website did not meet this claim limitation. Looking to the intrinsic claim construction evidence, the Federal Circuit held that the district court’s claim construction was amply supported by the specification and prosecution history and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement. Of note, the Court explained that the specification made multiple references to pre-fetching as being part “of the present invention” and therefore limited the scope of the claims.

With respect to one asserted claim of the second patent, which did not include the limitation at issue, the district court found that Chewy’s website did not practice the limitation of “establishing characterizations for respective users based on the compiled data” because “the record undisputedly showed they deliver advertisements based on the page the user is currently viewing, [...]

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Read the Fine Print: Covenant Not to Sue “At Any Time” Terminated Upon License Expiration

Illustrating the importance of carefully drafting and reviewing language in a covenant not to sue, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the plain language of a covenant permitted a licensor to sue a licensee for breach of contract only after termination of the contract. AlexSam, Inc. v. MasterCard Int’l., Inc., Case No. 22-2046 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 28, 2024) (Lourie, Chen, Stoll, JJ.) (non-precedential).

In 2005, AlexSam and MasterCard entered into a patent licensing agreement that guaranteed AlexSam ongoing royalties under two of its patents that involved pre-paid cards used with point-of-sale devices. The agreement included a covenant not to sue, in which AlexSam agreed to “not at any time initiate, assert, or bring any claim . . . against MasterCard . . . relating to Licensed Transactions arising or occurring before or during the term of this Agreement.” The agreement also included a Term and Termination provision, which recited that the agreement would remain in full force for the life of the licensed patents unless a party breached, at which time, if the party failed to cure, the non-breaching party would have the right to terminate the agreement. The patents expired on July 10, 2017.

In May 2015, two years before the licensed patents expired, AlexSam sued MasterCard for breach of contract in the district court, claiming that MasterCard had not properly paid the royalties per transaction under the agreement. Separately, in March 2017, MasterCard filed a petition for Covered Business Method (CBM) Review, asking the Patent Trial & Appeal Board to review the patentability of the licensed patents. AlexSam argued that MasterCard lacked standing under 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a), which required that MasterCard first be sued or charged with infringement of the patent on which it sought review. The Board determined that MasterCard lacked standing to bring the review. The Board also noted that it “need not, and do[es] not, address the question of whether [AlexSam’s] breach of contract claim in the New York Action itself violates the covenant not to sue.”

MasterCard moved for and was granted summary judgment in the district court on the grounds that AlexSam’s arguments before the Board regarding the covenant not to sue judicially estopped it from asserting its breach of contract claims. AlexSam filed its first appeal, and the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, finding that it had abused its discretion in crediting AlexSam with a position it never actually took before the Board. The Court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the covenant not to sue prohibited a claim for royalties. MasterCard again moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the covenant not to sue barred AlexSam’s claim for unpaid royalties. AlexSam again appealed.

In this second appeal, AlexSam argued that the covenant not to sue in the 2005 License Agreement did not bar suit for breach of nonpayment of royalties since AlexSam would then have no remedy against a failure by MasterCard to pay [...]

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Optimizing Obviousness: Routine Optimization Can Fill in Prior Art Gaps

In an appeal from a Patent Trial & Appeal Board finding of invalidity, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the result-effective variable doctrine can apply even when there is no overlap between a claimed range and a prior art range. The Court also held that before denying a motion to amend, the Board must address every element of proposed claims, and that a party cannot challenge the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director Review procedure if it cannot show prejudice. Pfizer Inc. v. Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., Case No. 19-1871 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 5, 2024), (Lourie, Bryson, Stark, JJ.)

Sanofi filed five inter partes review (IPR) petitions targeting a patent owned by Pfizer and directed to immunogenic glycoconjugates of Streptococcus antigens (i.e., combinations of sugar molecules found on the surface of Streptococcus bacteria capable of provoking an immune response). The challenged independent claim recited conjugates having a sugar from the 22F Streptococcus serotype and a molecular weight falling within a claimed range. Dependent claims further limited the independent claim by requiring combinations of specific sugars.

Sanofi challenged the claims based on a combination of two references: GSK-711 and Merck-086. GSK-711 described vaccines using sugars from 22F, and Merck-086 described immunogenic compositions using Streptococcus sugar conjugates. While neither reference disclosed the molecular weight of a 22F conjugate, the Board found that the molecular weight of a conjugate was a “result-effective variable” – i.e., a variable that affected the efficacy of the result – and thus it would have been obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) to optimize the molecular weight of a 22F-based conjugate to achieve the claimed molecular weight range. The Board also found that the dependent claims would have been obvious, as GSK-711 disclosed the additionally claimed sugars. Pfizer filed a motion to amend to add new claims, but the Board denied the motion. Pfizer also requested Director Review of the Board’s decision, but the Director denied the request.

Pfizer appealed to the Federal Circuit alleging that the Board improperly applied the result-effective variable doctrine, that the Board improperly denied Pfizer’s request to amend the claims, and that the Director’s denial of review violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding of invalidity, affirmed in part and remanded in part the issue of the proposed claim amendment, and finally held that any violation of the APA was harmless.

The Federal Circuit started with an analysis of the result-effective variable doctrine. Pfizer argued that the result-effective variable doctrine could not apply when there was no disclosure of an effective range in the prior art. Therefore, because neither GSK-711 nor Merck-086 disclosed an effective molecular weight range for a 22F conjugate, and because the relationship between molecular weight and efficacy was unpredictable, the independent claim was not obvious. The Court disagreed.

The Federal Circuit explained that, when there is a gap between the prior art and the claims, the relevant [...]

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That’s So Metal: Narrow Limitation Doesn’t Contradict Broader One

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s indefiniteness determination, finding that two claim limitations – one broad and one narrow – were not contradictory since it was possible to meet the requirements of both. Maxell, Ltd. v. Amperex Technology Limited, Case No. 23-1194 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2024) (Prost, Taranto, Chen, JJ.)

Maxell owns a patent directed to a rechargeable lithium-ion battery. Maxell filed suit against Amperex alleging infringement. Following claim construction proceedings, the district court found the claims to be indefinite based on two limitations in the independent claim that recited the variable M1. The relevant claim limitations read:

1- wherein M1 represents at least one transition metal element selected from Co, Ni and Mn, [. . .]

2- wherein the content of Co in the transition metal M1 of the formulae (1) and (2) is from 30% by mole to 100% by mole[.]

The district court found that these two limitations contradicted each other because limitation 1 recited Co (cobalt) as an optional transition metal selected from a Markush group for M1, whereas limitation 2 recited a minimum Co content of 30% in M1. The district court reasoned that the claims were indefinite because limitation 1 did not require the presence of cobalt, whereas limitation 2 did. In its claim construction order, the district court stated that simultaneous recitation that a claim element is both optional and required is a “contradiction on its face.” Maxell appealed.

The Federal Circuit found no contradiction between the two limitations, explaining that “[i]t is perfectly possible for a selected [M1] to satisfy both of these limitations.” The Court reasoned that in the context of Maxell’s patent, it was of no import that the two requirements (i.e., that M1 must comprise cobalt, nickel (Ni) or manganese (Mn), and that M1 must comprise at least 30% cobalt) were recited in separate clauses. It was enough that both limitations could be simultaneously satisfied. The Court further reasoned that the inclusion of two requirements in a claim did not create an otherwise nonexistent contradiction because the claim language must be read as a whole and not merely on a limitation-by-limitation basis. The Court also looked to the prosecution history to provide context for the ordering of the claim limitations at issue and explained that limitation 2 was added during prosecution to overcome a prior art reference that primarily used nickel as a transition metal.

The Federal Circuit explained that contrary to the district court’s characterization, the subject claim limitations did not grant options. Instead, they stated requirements that must be met to fall within the scope of the claimed invention. The Court noted that, rather than contradicting limitation 1, limitation 2 narrowed it. If limitation 2 had been recited in a dependent claim, there would be no contradiction, notwithstanding that proper construction of a dependent claim requires importation of all limitations from the claims from which it depends. The same conclusion applied when both limitations were present [...]

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I Hear Ya – No Intent to Deceive, No Inequitable Conduct

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding that the asserted patents were not unenforceable for inequitable conduct, determining that statements made by counsel to the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) to revive an abandoned application were not shown to have been made with deceptive intent. Freshub, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No. 2022-1391 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 26, 2024) (Reyna, Taranto, Chen, JJ.)

Freshub sued Amazon for infringement of patents directed to voice processing technology. Amazon denied infringement and defended on the basis that the patents should be declared unenforceable based on inequitable conduct by Freshub’s parent company, Ikan Holdings, during prosecution of the application at the PTO. Amazon alleged that Ikan improperly revived an earlier-abandoned parent application from which the asserted patents descend.

The predicate facts are as follows: In June 2011, the PTO issued a final office action rejecting the claims of the parent application. Ikan failed to respond to the office action, rendering the application abandoned in January 2012. In January 2017, Ikan petitioned the PTO to revive the application. In support of its revival petition, Ikan’s counsel asserted that “[t]he entire [five-year] delay in filing the required reply . . . was unintentional.” “[R]elying on petitioner’s duty of candor and good faith,” the PTO granted the petition, eventually resulting in issuance of the three patents-in-suit.

At trial, a jury found that Amazon did not infringe the asserted patents. The district court subsequently conducted a bench trial on inequitable conduct and found that Amazon had failed to prove inequitable conduct by clear and convincing evidence. Freshub appealed, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Amazon infringed. Amazon cross-appealed, seeking reversal of the district court’s inequitable conduct ruling.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination of failure to prove inequitable conduct, finding that Amazon had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that Ikan misrepresented or omitted material information with the specific intent to deceive the PTO. The Court focused its analysis on deceptive intent, finding that the district court did not commit clear error in rejecting Amazon’s inequitable conduct defense.

The Federal Circuit noted that the record was minimal due to the passage of time and the limited testimonial and documentary evidence available, as well as the many unchallenged claims of attorney-client privilege. Nevertheless, both parties presented evidence concerning Ikan’s intent between 2012 and 2017.

To support its position, Freshub relied on the 2017 statement by Ikan’s counsel asserting that Ikan’s delay in filing its reply to the PTO’s final office action was unintentional. The Federal Circuit found this evidence probative, even without the presentation of additional evidence to further explain why the period of non-response was so long. On the other hand, Amazon presented specific evidence that it contended demonstrated deceptive intent. For example:

  • The 2017 statement to revive the parent application was made by the same counsel that prosecuted the application at the time of its 2012 abandonment.
  • Ikan’s counsel [...]

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Consider Invention When Assessing Support for Claimed Range

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part a Patent Trial & Appeal Board finding that the claims at issue were either invalid under 35 U.S.C. §112 as unsupported by written description or obvious under 35 U.S.C. §103. RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc. v. Philip Morris Products S.A., Case No. 22-1862 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 9, 2024) (Chen, Stoll, Cunningham, JJ.)

RAI owns a patent with claims directed to “electrically powered smoking devices that provide an inhalable vapor by heating tobacco or other substances without significant combustion.” Philip Morris challenged the patent in a post-grant review (PGR).

The Board issued a final written decision concluding that two dependent claims, which recited limitations requiring a heating member with “a length of about 75% to about 85% of a length of the disposable aerosol forming substance,” lacked § 112 written description support. The specification disclosed ranges of 75% – 125%, 80% – 120%, 85% – 115% and 90% – 110%. The Board explained that written description support was lacking because “the claimed range is different from and substantially narrower than the specific ranges disclosed in the specification.”

The Board found that the remaining claims were unpatentable as obvious based on a combination of prior art references where the heater found in one reference, Robinson, was replaced with the heater from another, Greim. Robinson explained that its heating element could be altered and acknowledged design choices, thus inviting skilled artisans to select an alternate appropriate heating element. Greim disclosed certain advantages to its heater. Thus, the Board found that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to replace Robinson’s heater with that of Greim, rendering the claims obvious. RAI appealed.

Citing its expert, RAI argued that the ranges disclosed in the specification all centered around 100%, so that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would not “conclude that the inventors possessed a range that went no higher than 85%[.]” The Federal Circuit began by summarizing a line of numerical range cases, including:

  • In re Wertheim (CCPA 1976), which found that a described range of 25% – 60%, with examples of 36% and 50%, supported a claim directed to a range of 35% – 60%.
  • In re Blaser (CCPA 1977), which found that a described range of 60° – 200° C supported a claim reciting a range of 80° – 200° C.
  • Kolmes v. World Fibers Corp. (Fed. Cir. 1997), which found that a described range of 4 – 12 turns per inch, and preference for 8 turns per inch, supported claims directed to 8 – 12 turns per inch.
  • In re Baird (CCPA 1965), which found that a relatively unexplained disclosure of 32 – 176° F did not support claims directed to a range from 40° to “at least as low as” 60° F.
  • Indivior UK v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories (Fed. Cir. 2021), which found that:
    • Disclosure of ranges of at least 25%, at least 50% and “any” value [...]

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I Hear Ya: Claim Terms Not as Narrow as Features in Specification

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a district court’s final judgment of noninfringement, finding that the district court improperly narrowed the constructions of certain claim terms to particular features recited in the specification. Promptu Sys. Corp. v. Comcast Corp., Case No. 22-1939 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 16, 2024) (Moore, Prost, Taranto, JJ.)

Promptu filed a lawsuit against Comcast alleging infringement of two patents. The patents describe and claim subject matter generally related to voice recognition but have materially different specifications. The first patent describes using remote voice recognition systems to deliver content in response to a user’s speech request (content delivery patent), while the second patent describes using remote voice recognition systems to control a user’s television set based on a user’s speech command (control patent).

The content delivery patent’s representative claim recites a method for using a “back channel containing a multiplicity of identified speech channels from a multiplicity of user sites presented to a speech processing system at a wireline node in a network supporting at least one of cable television delivery and video delivery” as well as a “method of operating at least part of a speech recognition system coupled to a wireline node in a network [for] processing a multiplicity of received identified speech channels to create a multiplicity of identified speech content.” Meanwhile, the claim of the control patent recites “a centralized multi-user voice operated television control system, comprising . . . a centralized processing station configured to receive and process second output from a multitude of television set top boxes by applying voice recognition.”

During the underlying district court proceeding, the district court adopted claim constructions proposed by Comcast. Based on those claim constructions, Promptu stipulated to and moved for entry of a final judgment of no infringement. After the district court granted Promptu’s motion, Promptu appealed.

Promptu challenged the district court’s construction of three claim limitations from the content delivery patent (“back channel,” “multiplicity of received identified speech channels” and “speech recognition system coupled to a wireline node”) and one claim limitation from the control patent (“centralized processing station”). In accordance with long-standing precedent, the Federal Circuit reviewed claim construction by affording the words of the claims their ordinary meaning in the context of the claims and specification.

The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court erred by narrowly construing “back channel” in the content delivery patent as being limited to a “fixed band of frequencies or time slot(s) for transmitting signals to a speech processing system or engine” because nothing in the claim language or the specification required limitation to a “fixed band of frequencies or time slot.” To the contrary, the specification of the patent disclosed the back channel broadly while recognizing the possibility of using different protocols and formats along different subsections of the path or route from user site to speech recognition system. Given the breadth of the techniques for the back channel disclosed in the specification, the Court found no reason to narrow the claims [...]

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PTO on AI Inventorship: Will the Real Natural Human Inventors Please Stand Up?

On February 13, 2024, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued a notice with examination guidance and request for comment regarding inventorship in applications involving artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted inventions. The guidance reinforces the patentability of AI-assisted inventions and sets forth preliminary guidelines for determining inventorship with a focus on human contributions in this process.

The PTO released the guidance in response to President Biden’s Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence (October 30, 2023). The executive order mandated that the PTO, within 120 days, present “guidance to USPTO patent examiners and applicants addressing inventorship and the use of AI, including generative AI, in the inventive process, including illustrative examples in which AI systems play different roles in inventive processes and how, in each example, inventorship issues ought to be analyzed.”

As in any inventorship determination for non-AI-generated inventions, “AI-assisted inventions must name the natural person(s) who significantly contributed to the invention as the inventor or joint inventor, even if an AI system may have been instrumental in the creation of the claimed invention.” As is the case for all inventions, the threshold question for inventorship in AI-assisted inventions is who made a “significant contribution” to the conception of at least one claim of the patent. For this evaluation, the Pannu factors (Federal Circuit 1998, Pannu v. Iolab Corp.) for inventorship should be considered.

With specific reference to AI-assisted inventions, the notice provides a non-exhaustive list of principles based on the Pannu factors for AI inventorship determinations:

  • Use of AI systems is not a barrier to inventorship. Use of an AI system does not negate a natural person making a significant contribution to an AI-assisted invention. To be an inventor, a natural person must have significantly contributed to each claim in a patent application or patent.
  • Recognizing a problem or obtaining a solution may be insufficient. The mere recognition of a problem or having a general goal or plan to pursue or obtain a solution from the AI input does not rise to the level of conception. The way in which a person constructs a prompt in view of the problem for eliciting a particular solution may be important for qualifying that person as an inventor.
  • Reduction to practice alone is insufficient. Reducing an invention to practice alone does not constitute a “significant contribution,” nor does the mere recognition and appreciation of the AI system output rise to the level of inventorship, especially where the output would be apparent to those of ordinary skill. By contrast, a significant contribution may exist where a person makes a significant contribution to the output or conducts a successful experiment from the output to create an invention.
  • Developing an essential building block of an AI system may be sufficient. A person developing an essential building block of an AI system to address a specific problem, where the building block is instrumental in eliciting a solution from the output, may be a proper inventor.
  • “Intellectual domination” over [...]

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Uncle Sam Can March In: Government Licenses Under Bayh-Dole Aren’t Subject to “Strict Timing Requirements”

In an appeal from the US Court of Federal Claims, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a determination that 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4), a provision of the Bayh-Dole Act, operates to provide a license to the government for federally funded research based on work that occurred prior to the effective date of a funding agreement. University of South Fl. Board of Trustees v. United States, Case No. 22-2248 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 9, 2024) (Reyna, Taranto, Stoll, JJ.)

University of South Florida (USF) owns a now-expired patent directed to transgenic mice expressing a certain gene causing an accelerated pathology for Alzheimer’s disease. The patent’s subject matter was conceived while the two named inventors worked at USF, but both inventors transitioned their work to the Mayo Clinic prior to the first actual reduction to practice of the claimed invention. The mice remained at USF, under the care of USF professors, while the named inventors continued to oversee the project from Mayo. The first actual reduction to practice occurred while the inventors were at Mayo.

While the named inventors were still at USF, one inventor submitted a grant application to the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The NIH awarded the inventors (while they were still at USF) a grant covering the mouse project. After the inventors moved to Mayo but prior to the award grant, the designated grantee changed from USF to Mayo. In November 1997, Mayo and USF entered into a subcontract whereby Mayo would pay USF for grant-covered work occurring at USF.

USF sued the United States alleging infringement of the mouse patent by a third party with the government’s authorization and consent. The third party was producing and using mice covered by the patent for the government. The US asserted a license defense under the Bayh-Dole Act, which gives the government a license to practice certain federally funded inventions. The Claims Court granted judgment to the US under its license defense, determining that USF operated pursuant to an implied contract with Mayo based on the understanding that Mayo would use funding from the NIH grant to pay USF for work done there. The Claims Court therefore determined that USF was a contactor with an implied subcontract that was a funding agreement under Bayh-Dole. Since the invention was therefore invented by a government contractor operating under a funding agreement, it was a “subject invention” that was first actually reduced to practice under a government contract. Therefore, under Bayh-Dole, the government was entitled to a license. USF appealed, arguing that the invention was not a “subject invention” within the meaning of § 202(c)(4) of Bayh-Dole.

USF argued that to trigger § 202(c)(4), a funding agreement must be in place at the time of the relevant work and there was no implied agreement in April 1997, the time the work that led to the reduction to practice commenced. The Federal Circuit determined that the November 1997 subcontract was adequate to support entitlement to claim a government license under § [...]

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We Meant It – No Incorporation by Reference

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a sua sponte order regarding the impermissibility of incorporating by reference arguments from one brief into another, especially when doing so causes the brief to exceed the permitted word count. Promptu Sys. Corp. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, Case No. 22-1093 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 16, 2024) (Moore, CJ; Prost, Taranto, JJ.) (per curiam).

On January 11, 2024, the Federal Circuit heard oral arguments in four related cases involving Promptu and Comcast. During oral argument, the Court asked counsel for the appellee to submit a brief within 10 days, totaling no more than 10 pages, to show why he should not be sanctioned for attempting to incorporate by reference multiple pages – almost 2,000 words – of argument from the brief in one case into another, thereby causing the brief to exceed the word limit.

The Federal Circuit recounted that it has “repeatedly held” that incorporating by reference to exceed word count is not permitted, citing its holdings on this issue in Microsoft v. DataTern (2014) and more recently in Medtronic v. Teleflex Life Sciences (2023). Appellee counsel responded that he was unaware of the Microsoft decision until the appellant’s reply brief had already been filed. The Court accepted his assertion but noted with disapproval that the precedential Microsoft decision admonished “the exact same law firm before us now for the exact same behavior,” and that once made aware of the Microsoft decision, counsel did nothing to remedy the impropriety.

Practice Note: The Federal Circuit did not award sanctions against appellate counsel but sternly warned future litigants that it is improper to incorporate by reference arguments from one brief into another unless in compliance with Fed. R. App. P. 28, and that such incorporation is never permitted if it results in exceeding the applicable word limit. The Court stated that going forward, such a violation “will likely result in [an award of] sanctions.”




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