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PTO Provides Guidance for Computer-Related Design Patent Applications

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) published a notice regarding supplemental guidance for PTO personnel examining design patent claims containing computer-generated images. 88 Fed. Reg. 80277 (Nov. 17, 2023).

The guidance clarifies how to satisfy the article of manufacture requirement under 35 U.S.C. 171 for ornamental designs relating to computer-generated icons shown on a display panel, as discussed in Section 1505.01(a)(I) of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP). According to the guidance, “the mere display of a computer-generated electronic image . . . on a display panel does not constitute statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 171.” However, a computer icon or a graphical user interface (GUI) shown on a display panel (e.g., a computer screen, monitor, computer display system, mobile phone screen or virtual/augmented reality goggles) is more than a mere display of a picture on a screen because it constitutes an integral and active component in the operation that is embodied in and/or applied to a programmed computer displaying the computer icon or the GUI. Thus, if a computer icon or GUI is properly presented and claimed (e.g., the drawing fully discloses the design as embodied in the article of manufacture), it is eligible under 35 U.S.C. 171.

In addressing the foregoing distinctions, the guidance sets forth specific standards for PTO personnel, including consideration of the complete disclosure when evaluating whether a design claim containing a computer-generated electronic image complies with the article of manufacture requirement. For example, given that computer icons or GUIs are considered to be two-dimensional images, which standing alone are surface ornamentation (i.e., an ornament, impression, print or picture), the guidance stipulates that the title and the claim should not be for a computer icon or a GUI alone, but rather an article of manufacture, such as a “display panel with a computer icon.” The guidance further provides examples of acceptable claim language and specific examination scenarios for evaluation.




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USPTO Clarifies Practice for Reviving Unintentionally Abandoned Patent Applications and Patents

The US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued a Notice clarifying its practice as to situations that will require additional information about whether a delay in seeking the revival of an abandoned application, acceptance of a delayed maintenance fee payment, or acceptance of a delayed priority or benefit claim was unintentional. 85 FED. REG. 12222 (Mar. 2, 2020).

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A Patent Without a Pulse: Provisional Rights Don’t Outlive the Patent

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal from a patent applicant seeking provisional rights on a patent that would issue only after it had already expired, finding that the applicant lacked the necessary exclusionary rights to support a claim for provisional rights. In re: Donald K. Forest, Case No. 23-1178 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 3, 2025) (Taranto, Schall, Chen, JJ.)

Donald K. Forest applied for a patent on December 27, 2016. Forest’s patent application claimed priority through a chain of earlier-filed patent applications dating back to March 27, 1995. If Forest’s patent application matured into a patent, it would have expired 20 years after the 1995 priority date (i.e., prior to the 2016 filing date). The patent examiner nevertheless examined and rejected the proposed claims. The Patent Trial & Appeal Board partially affirmed the examiner’s rejection of certain claims on grounds of obviousness and double patenting. Forest appealed.

The Patent & Trademark Office raised a threshold issue that since Forest’s application could only result in an expired patent, he lacked a personal stake in the appeal sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Forest countered that he could still acquire “provisional rights” under 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) – a limited right to royalties for certain pre-issuance activities – despite the expiration of any issued patent as it issued.

The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, explaining that since Forest could not be granted a patent until after the patent’s expiration date, he would never receive any exclusionary rights. The Court clarified that provisional rights only arise once a patent issues and crucially do not extend beyond the statutory patent term. Because Forest sought the issuance of a patent that would confer no enforceable rights – either exclusionary or provisional – the Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Federal Circuit’s primary conclusion was predicated on the principle that provisional rights are only available when a patent issues with enforceable exclusionary rights, meaning the patent must issue before its expiration date. The Court emphasized that provisional rights under § 154(d) are expressly provided “in addition to other rights provided by” the patent statute. Because this statutory language indicates that provisional rights are not standalone, the Court determined that provisional rights depend on the existence of a valid, enforceable patent.

According to the Federal Circuit, the entire purpose of provisional rights is to provide temporary relief to the patentee during the gap between publication of a patent application and issuance of a patent. However, such rights only arise if the issued patent provides enforceable rights. The Court reasoned that provisional rights are meant to encourage early publication and protect patentees from pre-issuance infringement, but only as a precursor to full patent protection.

The Court rejected Forest’s interpretation of § 154(d), explaining it would create an anomalous situation where provisional rights could survive without any corresponding enforceable rights, allowing a patentee to collect royalties on a patent that could never be asserted in infringement litigation.

Practice Note: Patent rights, whether provisional [...]

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What’s the (Re)issue? Patent Term Extensions for Reissue Patents

Addressing the calculation of patent term extensions (PTEs) under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision that under the act the issue date of the original patent should be used to calculate the extension, not the reissue date. Merck Sharp & Dohme B.V. v. Aurobindo Pharma USA, Inc., Case No. 23-2254 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 13, 2025) (Dyk, Mayer, Reyna, JJ.)

Merck owns a patent that is directed to a class of 6-mercapto-cyclodextrin derivatives. Four months after the patent issued, Merck applied to the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) for approval of sugammadex, which it intended to market as Bridion®. During FDA’s review of Merck’s new drug application (NDA), Merck filed a reissue application that included narrower claims. The reissue application issued and included all the original claims and 12 additional claims. FDA regulatory review continued throughout the examination of the reissue application and extended almost two years beyond the date the patent reissued. In all, the FDA regulatory review lasted nearly 12 years.

The Hatch-Waxman Act provides owners of patents related to pharmaceutical products a process to extend the term of their patent rights to compensate for time lost during regulatory review of their NDAs. The act contains a clause providing that “the term of a patent . . . shall be extended by the time equal to the regulatory review period . . . occur[ring] after the date the patent is issued.” Having been unable to market the invention covered by the patent for almost 12 years because of FDA’s regulatory review, Merck filed a PTE application for its reissue patent seeking a five-year extension (the maximum allowed under the act) based on the patent’s original issue date. The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) agreed and granted the five-year extension.

Between the reissue date and the PTO’s grant of the five-year extension, Aurobindo and other generic manufacturers had filed abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) seeking to market generic versions of Bridion®. Merck sued for infringement. At trial, Aurobindo argued that the PTO improperly calculated the PTE by using the original issue date instead of the reissue date because only 686 days of FDA’s regulatory review occurred after the reissue date, as opposed to the almost 12 years which had passed since the initial issue date. The district court disagreed, finding that Aurobindo’s proposed construction “would undermine the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act.” Aurobindo appealed.

Aurobindo argued that the act’s reference to “the patent” referred to the reissue patent because that is the patent for which the patentee was seeking term extension. Merck argued that the act’s text, read in light of other patent statutes and the history of patent reissue, required the opposite conclusion (i.e., a PTE based on the original issue date).

The Federal Circuit agreed with Merck, explaining that while the language of the PTE text may be ambiguous, that ambiguity may be resolved by considering the PTE text in light of the history of [...]

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A Lynk to the Past: Published Applications Are Prior Art as of Filing Date

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision finding challenged claims invalid based on a published patent application that, in an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding, was found to be prior art as of its filing date rather than its publication date. Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Case No. 23-2346 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2025) (Prost, Lourie, Stark, JJ.)

Samsung filed a petition for IPR challenging claims of a Lynk Labs patent. Samsung’s challenge relied on a patent application filed before the priority date of the challenged patent. However, the application was not published until after the priority date of the challenged patent. The Board rejected Lynk Labs’ argument that the application could not serve as prior art and determined the challenged claims to be unpatentable. Lynk Labs appealed to the Federal Circuit, raising three arguments.

Lynk Labs’ first argument was that the application could not serve as prior art because the publication date meant that it was not publicly available until after the priority date of the challenged patent. Pre-America Invents Act (AIA) law applied. Lynk Labs cited 35 U.S.C. § 311(b), restricting IPR petitioners to challenges “on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” While Lynk Labs admitted that the published application was a printed application, it denied that it was a prior art printed publication.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the issue de novo as a question of statutory interpretation. The Court noted that §§ 102(e)(1) and (2) carve out a different rule for published patent applications than the test for §§ 102(a) and (b) prior art. Under the statute, a patent application filed in the United States before an invention claimed in a later filed application qualifies as prior art if the application is published or a patent is granted on it.

Lynk Labs did not dispute that, under § 102(e)(2), an application resulting in an issued patent can be prior art, even if the patent is granted after an invention’s priority date, as long as the application is filed before the challenged invention priority date. However, Lynk Labs took issue with the fact that the Board applied the same principle, under § 102(e)(1), to applications that are published but do not become patents.

The Federal Circuit explained that the plain language of the statute permitted IPR challenges based on such applications and rejected Lynk Labs’ arguments that the statute should be interpreted differently. Lynk Labs argued that when Congress enacted § 311(b), it transplanted the term “printed publications” from case law, along with that case law’s “old soil” that established that the application would not be prior art.

In support of its argument, Lynk Labs cited case law that in its view suggested that patent applications are never prior art printed publications. However, the Federal Circuit distinguished those cases on the basis they were decided at a time before applications were published and therefore did not address published applications. Lynk [...]

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Change Between Provisional and Nonprovisional Application Is Lexicography

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court judgment of noninfringement, finding that deleting a portion of a definition between a provisional application and a nonprovisional application was evidence that the patentee intended to exclude the deleted language from the claim scope. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Priceline.com LLC and Booking.com B.V., Case Nos. 23-1176; -1177 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 9, 2024) (Chen, Mayer, Cunningham, JJ.)

DDR owns a patent directed to an e-commerce system involving “‘three main parties’ aside from the end consumer: merchants, hosts, and outsource providers.” The specification describes merchants as “the producers, distributors, or resellers of the goods to be sold through the outsource provider.”

DDR sued Priceline for infringement of four patents. In response, Priceline sought inter partes review (IPR), after which three of the challenged patents were found to be unpatentable. The Patent Trial & Appeal Board found that the fourth challenged patent was patentable over the cited prior art. Although the Board’s determination did not turn on the meaning of the term “merchants,” the Board construed “merchants” as “producers, distributors, or resellers of the goods or services to be sold.” In doing so, the Board applied the then applicable  “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard.

In the district court case, Priceline proposed that, consistent with the specification, “merchants” should be construed as only including purveyors of goods, while DDR sought to also include purveyors of services. The district court agreed with Priceline and adopted a construction that excluded services. Following the district court’s claim construction, the parties stipulated to noninfringement, agreeing that the court’s construction was case-dipositive in Priceline’s favor on the issue of infringement. DDR appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Court reviews “claim construction based on intrinsic evidence de novo and review[s] any findings of fact regarding extrinsic evidence for clear error.” With only two exceptions, the Court gives terms “their plain and ordinary meanings to one of skill in the art when read in the context of the specification or during prosecution.” The exceptions are “when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer” and “when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.”

Here, the provisional application for the asserted patent discussed merchants as both “producers of ‘goods’ in one instance, and ‘products or services’ in another.” The asserted patent did not mention services in relation to merchants, instead limiting “merchant” to purveyor of goods. The Federal Circuit found that a skilled artisan would interpret the deletion of the reference to “products or services” between the provisional application and the asserted patent as “indicat[ing] an evolution of the applicant’s intended meaning of the claim term.” The Court found that this was reinforced by the description that limited merchants to purveyors of goods.

DDR argued that incorporating the provisional application by reference into the specification resulted in “one document” and therefore no deletion took place. However, the Federal Circuit did not find this argument persuasive, explaining [...]

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What a Croc! False Claim That Product Feature Is Patented Can Give Rise to Lanham Act Violation

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded a grant of summary judgment on a false advertising claim, concluding that a cause of action under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act can arise when a party falsely claims to hold a patent on a product feature and advertises that feature in a misleading way. Crocs, Inc. v. Effervescent, Inc., Case No. 2022-2160 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2024) (Reyna, Cunningham, JJ.; Albright, District J., sitting by designation).

Crocs, the well-known maker of molded foam footwear, sued several competitor shoe distributors for patent infringement in 2006. The case was stayed pending an action before the International Trade Commission but resumed in 2012 when Croc added competitor U.S.A. Dawgs as a defendant to the district court litigation. The case was stayed twice more, from 2012 to 2016 and 2018 to 2020. In between those stays, in May 2016, Dawgs filed a counterclaim against Crocs and 18 of its current and former officers and directors, alleging false advertising violations of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The individual defendants were later dismissed from the action.

Dawgs claimed that Crocs deceived consumers and damaged its competitors by falsely describing its molded footwear material, which it calls “Croslite,” as “patented,” “proprietary,” and “exclusive.” Dawgs alleged that it was damaged by Crocs’ false advertisements and commercial misrepresentations because Crocs suggested that its competitors’ footwear material was inferior. Croslite is in fact not patented, as Crocs conceded.

Crocs argued in its motion for summary judgment that Dawgs failed as a matter of law to state a cause of action under Section 43(a) because the alleged advertising statements were directed to a false designation of authorship of the shoe products and not to their nature, characteristics, or qualities, as Section 43(a)(1)(B) requires. The district court agreed. Applying the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. and the Federal Circuit’s 2009 decision in Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten USA, Inc., the district court granted summary judgment to Crocs. It reasoned that falsely claiming to have “patented” something is similar to a false claim of authorship or inventorship, not to the types of false advertising prohibited by the Lanham Act. Dawgs appealed.

Dawgs argued that the district court’s application of Dastar and Baden to the circumstances of its case was inapposite, and the Federal Circuit agreed. In Dastar, the petitioner copied a television series in the public domain, made minor changes, and sold it as a video set, passing it off as its own. The Supreme Court held that a false claim of authorship does not give rise to a cause of action under the Lanham Act. Similarly, in Baden, the Federal Circuit found that a basketball manufacturer’s false suggestion that it was the author of the “innovative” “dual-cushion technology” in its basketballs did not give rise to a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act.

In this case, however, the Federal Circuit reasoned that Croc’s false [...]

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Later-Filed, Earlier-Expiring Patent Not an ODP Reference

Addressing invalidity due to obvious-type double patenting (ODP) based on later-filed-related patents, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s application of In re Cellect (Fed. Cir. 2023) and held that the later-filed, earlier-expiring continuation patents were not available as ODP references against the earlier-filed, later-expiring patent. Allergan USA, Inc. v. MSN Labs Private Ltd., Case No. 24-1061 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 13, 2024) (Lourie, Dyk, Reyna JJ.)

In 2015, the US Food and Drug Administration approved a new drug application for a drug sold by Allergan to treat the symptoms of irritable bowel syndrome. In 2019, Sun Pharma filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) seeking to market a generic version of the drug. Allergan then sued Sun Pharma and MSN Labs for infringement of four patents related to the drug. One of the patents, which claims a compound of the drug, had been granted almost three years of patent term adjustment (PTA) and was followed by two more patents from continuation applications in the same patent family. The other three patents all claimed tablet forms of the drug. The claims of one of the patents recited that a glidant was optional while the claims of the other two patents did not require a glidant at all.

The US District Court for the District of Delaware held a three-day bench trial and concluded that the asserted claim of the compound patent was invalid under the ODP doctrine and that the claims of the three tablet patents were invalid for lack of written description. On the issue of ODP, the district court found Allergan’s “first-filed, first-issued” distinction “immaterial.” The district court stated that “[w]hen analyzing ODP, a court compares patent expiration dates, rather than filing or issuance dates.” Allergan appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed on both issues. The Court held that the claims of the later-filed, earlier-expiring continuation patents were not available as ODP references against the first patent because the purpose of the ODP doctrine is to prevent patentees from obtaining a second patent to effectively extend the life of the first patent. The Federal Circuit explained that the district court misread Cellect as binding it to solely consider expiration dates in the ODP analysis. The Court explained that Cellect only controls to the extent that it requires a court to consider the later-filed patent’s expiration date (i.e., the expiration date after the addition of PTA) in its ODP analysis, not the expiration date that it would have shared with the reference patents in the absence of a PTA award. The panel majority emphasized that it does not follow that the later-filed patent must be invalidated by the earlier-filed reference patents simply because it expires later. The majority noted that “Cellect does not address, let alone resolve, any variation of the question presented here – namely, under what circumstances can a claim properly serve as an ODP reference – and therefore has little to say on the precise issue before us.”

The Federal Circuit also [...]

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Don’t Mess With Anna: Texas Town Schools Patent Owner on § 101

On cross-appeals from a granted Fed. R. of Civ. Pro. 12(c) motion on subject matter eligibility, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that a patent directed to a method for “assist[ing] an investigator in conducting a background investigation” did not claim patent-eligible subject matter, but that the mere assertion of the patent did not render the case “exceptional” for the purposes of attorneys’ fees. Miller Mendel, Inc. v. City of Anna, Texas, Case No. 22-1753 (Fed. Cir. July 18, 2024) (Moore, C.J.; Cunningham, Stoll, JJ.)

Miller Mendel sued the City of Anna, Texas, for infringement of claims directed to software for managing pre-employment background investigations based on the Anna police department’s use of the Guardian Alliance Technologies (GAT) software platform. Miller Mendel’s complaint asserted “at least claims 1, 5, and 15” of the patent, each of which generally recited a “method for a computing device with a processor and a system memory to assist an investigator in conducting a background investigation” comprising the steps of receiving data identifying the applicant, storing the data, transmitting an applicant hyperlink to the applicant’s email address and receiving an applicant’s response.

Anna moved for judgment on the pleadings, alleging that the patent claims were ineligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. After the district court granted the motion, Miller Mendel filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to invalidate any unasserted patent claims. The district court denied the reconsideration motion but clarified that its decision was limited to asserted claims 1, 5 and 15. Anna also filed a motion for attorneys’ fees, which the district court denied, finding that the case was not exceptional. Miller Mendel appealed the § 101 issue, and Anna cross-appealed on the unasserted claims and attorneys’ fees issues.

The Federal Circuit first addressed Miller Mendel’s argument that the district court erred in relying on a declaration filed by Anna in ruling on the Rule 12(c) motion. The Court acknowledged that a Rule 12(c) motion must be treated as one for summary judgment if matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court. However, the district court explained that the declaration was not relevant to its decision, and it did not rely on any material outside the pleadings in its § 101 analysis. Thus, the Federal Circuit found that any error in failing to explicitly exclude the declaration was harmless.

Turning next to the patent eligibility analysis, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that under Alice step one, the asserted claims were directed to the abstract idea of performing a background check. The claims and specification emphasized that the invention was a system to “help a background investigator more efficiently and effectively conduct a background investigation” by “automating a majority of the tasks of a common pre-employment background investigation so that fewer hardcopy documents are necessary.” In other words, the problem facing the inventor was the abstract idea of performing background checks more efficiently [...]

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AI Takeover: PTO Issues More Patent Eligibility Guidance for AI Inventions

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued a 2024 Guidance Update on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, Including on Artificial Intelligence, which focuses on subject matter eligibility for artificial intelligence (AI)-based inventions. 89 Fed. Reg. 58128 (July 17, 2024).

The new guidance is part of the PTO’s ongoing efforts since 2019 to provide clarity on the issue of subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and to promote responsible innovation, competition and collaboration in AI technology development as espoused in the Biden administration’s Executive Order 14110, “Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence.” The guidance follows on the heels of the PTO’s recently issued Guidance on Use of AI-Based Tools in Practice Before the PTO and Inventorship Guidance for AI-Assisted Inventions.

The new guidance aims to assist PTO examiners, patent practitioners and stakeholders in evaluating the subject matter eligibility of patent claims involving AI technology. The guidance includes three main sections:

  • Section I provides background on issues concerning patentability of AI inventions.
  • Section II provides a general overview of the PTO’s patent subject matter eligibility guidance developed over the past five years.
  • Section III provides an update to certain areas of the guidance applicable to AI inventions.

As in the prior subject matter eligibility updates and discussions, the guidance document’s analysis of subject matter eligibility focuses on the Alice two-step analysis: an evaluation of whether a claim is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., abstract ideas, natural phenomena, laws of nature), and if so, an evaluation of whether the claim as a whole integrates the judicial exception into a practical application of that exception and/or an analysis of whether the claim recites additional elements that amount to significantly more than the recited judicial exception itself. The guidance highlights a number of relevant recent Federal Circuit cases and is further accompanied by three new examples with hypothetical patent claims for assisting PTO examiners in applying the guidance to an analysis of patent claim eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

The PTO requests written comments to the guidance through the Federal eRulemaking Portal by September 16, 2024. If there is anything to be gleaned from the guidance or the current state of patentability for AI inventions, the topic will remain highly controversial and heavily debated.




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