IP UPDATE
Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
IP UPDATE
Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
Results for "Patent precedent"
Subscribe to Results for "Patent precedent"'s Posts

New Claim Construction in Patent Owner’s Post-Initiation IPR Response? Sure, Charge Away

By on Aug 17, 2023
Posted In

Addressing the issue of new claim constructions presented by a patent owner after the institution of inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that a petitioner is entitled to argue and present evidence under the new construction so long as it relies on the same prior art embodiments used in the petition. Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., Case No. 22-1532 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 2023) (Dyk, Lourie, and Taranto, JJ.)

Medtronic owns two patents directed to the transcutaneous charging of implanted medical devices via inductive coupling between a primary coil in an external charger and a secondary coil in the implanted device. The relevant claims of each patent require the external charger’s power to be automatically varied based on “a value associated with the current passing through the internal power source” (the value limitation) and “a measured current associated with the current passing through the internal power source” (the measured current limitation).

Axonics filed two IPR petitions challenging Medtronic’s patents, arguing that the claims were anticipated by three prior art references. Axonics’s petitions did not propose any express claim constructions, but its claim charts stated that the measured current limitation simply narrows the “value” in the value limitation to “measured current” and does not require a separate measurement. Under this “one-input” construction, both limitations would be satisfied if the external power source automatically varied its power output based on the implanted device’s current. In its preliminary response, Medtronic agreed that while claim construction was not necessary, the prior art failed to anticipate the claimed device under the one-input construction. In its institutional decision, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board agreed that “no term requires express construction.”

In its patent owner response, Medtronic (for the first time) advanced a new claim construction, arguing that the value limitation and the measured current limitation required separate inputs (the two-input construction). In Axonics’ reply, it defended the one-input construction and further argued that the three prior art references also disclosed the claimed device under the two-input construction. In support of its reply, Axonics submitted a supplemental expert declaration citing additional disclosures in the prior art references pertaining to the same embodiments relied upon in the petition. Medtronic argued that it would be prejudicial for the Board to consider Axonics’ new reply arguments without providing Medtronic an opportunity to submit a supplemental expert declaration. Medtronic, however, did not seek leave to submit a new declaration.

In its final written decision, the Board adopted the two-input construction and declined to consider Axonics’ arguments and evidence under the new construction, considering them to be improper reply arguments. Axonics appealed.

The Federal Circuit acknowledged that a petition is required to identify “in writing and with particularity…the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds.” To that end, a petitioner may not submit new evidence or arguments in a reply that could have been raised earlier but may respond to new arguments [...]

Continue Reading



Reissue Boat Won’t Float: “Original Patent” Rule Sinks New Floating Grill Claims

By on Jul 20, 2023
Posted In

Addressing the same invention requirement for reissue patents, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision to reject an overly broad reissue application. In re Float‘N’Grill LLC, Case No. 22-1438 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2023) (Prost, Linn, Cunningham, JJ.)

Float‘N’Grill (FNG) owned a patent directed to a floating device that supports a grill so that users can grill food while in water. The patent’s specification lays out a single embodiment, illustrated in Figure 1 below, which includes a float (20) that has two supports (46, 48), each of which “includes a plurality of magnets” (60) so that the grill can be removably attached to the float:

FNG filed a reissue application that claimed new ways to “more generically” removably attach a grill to the float. In rejecting the reissue claims, the Examiner found that three of the new requested claims required zero magnets, three claims required one magnet, and one claim did not specifically require magnets but referred to a magnet in the preamble. This was in contrast to the issued patent’s only embodiment, which required multiple magnets. The Examiner, therefore, rejected the reissue claims for failure to meet the “original patent” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 251. The Board affirmed. FNG appealed.

The question on appeal was whether FNG’s newly requested claims complied with § 251. The Federal Circuit explained that the only path to expanding the coverage of an issued patent is through a reissue application, which is subject to § 251’s limitations. Pertinent here, § 251 requires reissue claims to be directed to the same invention disclosed in the original patent. Citing Supreme Court and Federal Circuit decisions, the Court described the “original patent” requirement as a question of whether the issued patent’s disclosed invention “on its face, explicitly and unequivocally describe[s] the invention as recited in the reissue claims.”

Turning to FNG’s reissue claims, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board, finding that the new claims were not directed to the same invention as the original patent and thus failed to satisfy § 251. The Court explained that the specification of FNG’s issued patent had just one embodiment, which featured “a plurality of magnets” to removably attach a grill to the floating device. The reissue claims, however, contemplated more general attachments without magnets.

FNG argued that its claims were acceptable under § 251 because the magnets were a “non-essential embodiment” of the invention. The Federal Circuit disagreed for four reasons:

  1. An element of a patent may be deemed essential even if the patent does not explicitly state as much. Thus, the magnets were essential to FNG’s original patent, even if not labeled so.
  2. It is irrelevant that a person of skill in the art may know to replace an original patent element with “some other undisclosed mechanism” to reach the same result. Here, a new way to attach a grill to the [...]

    Continue Reading


Hanging Patentability on Written Description Cannot Be Truss-ted

By on May 4, 2023
Posted In

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a Patent Trial & Appeal Board finding that the claims of a patent for a truss hanger were invalid for lack of written description because they claimed an undisclosed range despite the predictable nature of the technology. Columbia Insurance Company v. Simpson Strong-Tie Company Inc., Case Nos. 21-2145; -2157 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 2023) (Prost, Hughes, JJ.) (Moore, C.J., dissenting) (non-precedential).

Truss hangers secure support beams to wall frames in buildings. These hangers normally accommodate layers of fire-resistant sheathing by cutting out the sheathing that overlaps with the hanger, but this can reduce fire resistance. Columbia owns a patent claiming a truss hanger that extends through the sheathing and does not decrease fire resistance. The extension for the sheathing, illustrated below, must be “sized large enough to permit two layers of ⅝ inch thick sheathing to be received between the rear edge plane and the back flange plane, but too small to permit three layers of ⅝ inch thick sheathing to be received.”

Simpson petitioned for a post-grant review of the patent at the Board. That proceeding resulted in a mixed decision. The Board found in favor of Simpson that certain original claims and certain substitute claims of the patent were unpatentable for lack of written description and that certain claims were obvious over the prior art. However, it found in favor of Columbia with regard to one claim. Both parties appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s findings regarding written description. The claimed extension portion covered a range of extension sizes between the upper limit (three layers of five-eighths-inch-thick sheathing) and lower limit (two layers of five-eighths-inch-thick sheathing). The Court affirmed the Board’s finding that nothing in the specification covered the claimed upper limit. Columbia argued that a skilled artisan would read the claims to cover exactly two layers of five-eighths-inch-thick sheathing, but the Court found that this claim construction argument was forfeited because it was raised for the first time on appeal and, even if it weren’t, it was incorrect because it was akin to rewriting the claims.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Board’s finding that certain claims were obvious, concluding that the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence. The Court rejected Columbia’s argument that the Board’s claim construction violated the Administrative Procedure Act because the construction adopted by the Board was similar enough to Simpson’s proposed construction and not raised sua sponte.

Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that the claim on which Simpson appealed was not indefinite because the term “large enough to permit the drywall to be received” informs a skilled artisan with reasonable certainty that the scope of this claim includes any extension portion sized larger than the smallest commonly known sheathing size. The Court also found that the claim was not obvious because the Board correctly interpreted the claim language “extend [...]

Continue Reading



Disclaiming Claim Scope: Could the Patentee Have Anticipated This?

By on Apr 6, 2023
Posted In

In the most recent decision in the Apple/VirnetX saga, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a remand ruling from the Patent Trial & Appeal Board finding the challenged claims of VirnetX’s patents unpatentable. VirnetX Inc. v. Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd., Case No. 2020-2271 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 30, 2023) (Moore, C.J.; Hughes, Stark, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

VirnetX owns two patents relating to a “secure mechanism for communicating over the internet.” The patents relate to a system in which a DNS module “intercepts . . . and determines whether [a] request is for a secure site.” The system creates a VPN if the proxy determines that the request is for a secure site. If the proxy determines that the request is not for a secure site, it forwards the request to a conventional DNS.

Mangrove, Apple and Black Swamp (collectively, Mangrove) petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) challenging various claims of the patents. The Board found that all the challenged claims were unpatentable as anticipated by Kiuchi or obvious in view of Kiuchi and other references. VirnetX appealed to the Federal Circuit (Mangrove Appeal). In that appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that, contrary to the Board’s finding, when VirnetX distinguished Aventail during reexamination of one of the patents, VirnetX disclaimed “a system in which a client computer communicates with an intermediate server via a singular, point-to-point connection.” As a consequence of the prosecution disclaimer, the Court found that the claims “require[s] direct communication between the client and target computers.” The Court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the case for the Board to determine further factual questions regarding Kiuchi because “substantial evidence does not support the Board’s finding that the C-HTTP name server of Kiuchi performs the functions of the claimed DNS proxy module.”

Following the Mangrove Appeal, the Board again found that Kiuchi—the only prior art reference at issue in the present appeal—discloses a “secure network” for the transfer of patient information in a hospital setting and teaches a “direct-communication VPN between the client and target.” As a result, the Board concluded that Kiuchi anticipates all the challenged claims. VirnetX again appealed.

The Federal Circuit first addressed the Board’s conclusion that “Kiuchi teaches a direct-communication VPN and is therefore within the scope of the claims of VirnetX’s … patent, and not an indirect-communication VPN, which would have brought Kiuchi within the scope of VirnetX’s disclaimer.” The Court agreed with the Board that “Kiuchi discloses direct communication that satisfies the claimed VPN.” Specifically, “Kiuchi’s user agent does not communicate with the client-side proxy using a singular, point-to-point connection because the user agent addresses the desired endpoint, and the VPN provides the required message routing for the user agent to receive a response from the desired endpoint.” Moreover, the Court reasoned that Kiuchi’s proxy servers forward data packets and that Kiuchi teaches “the ability to address data to a particular computer,” consistent with the scope of the claims.

Next, the Federal Circuit addressed the Board’s [...]

Continue Reading



Claim Duality: Multiple Dependent Claims Can Be Both Patentable and Unpatentable

By on Mar 9, 2023
Posted In

Addressing, for the first time, the issue of patentability of multiple dependent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, fifth paragraph, the Director of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) granted rehearing and modified the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s (Board) Final Written Decision after finding that the patentability of a multiple dependent claim should be considered separately as to each of the claims from which it depends. Nested Bean, Inc. v. Big Beings US Pty. Ltd. et al., IPR2020-01234 (PTO Feb. 24, 2023) (Vidal, Dir.) (precedential).

Nested filed a petition for inter partes review challenging claims 1 through 18 of a patent owned by Big Beings. Claims 1 and 2 were independent, and claims 3 to 16 were multiple dependent claims, which depended directly from either claim 1 or 2. The Board granted institution and ultimately issued a Final Written Decision finding that Nested did not establish that claims 1, 17 and 18 were unpatentable, but that Nested had established that claims 2 through 16 were unpatentable.

Big Beings filed a Request for Director review, noting that each of claims 3 to 16 were multiple dependent claims that depended from both claims 1 and 2. Big Beings argued that because the Board found that Nested failed to show that claim 1 was unpatentable, the Board should have also found that Nested failed to show that claims 3 through 16, as depending from claim 1, were unpatentable. The Director granted review.

35 U.S.C. § 112, fifth paragraph, states, in relevant part, “[a] multiple dependent claim shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the particular claim in relation to which it is being considered.” Big Beings argued that the statute requires the Board to separately consider the patentability of alternative dependencies of a multiple dependent claim. Nested responded by arguing that the statute should be read so that if any version of a multiple dependent claim is found unpatentable over the prior art, then all versions of the claim should be found unpatentable.

The Director found that this was an issue of first impression. Relying on 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(c) and 35 U.S.C. § 282, the Director concluded that “a multiple dependent claim is the equivalent of several single dependent claims. Thus, in the same way that the unpatentability of multiple single dependent claims would each rise or fall separately, so too should the dependent claims covered by a multiple dependent claim.” The Director also noted that the Federal Circuit in Dow Chemical and Dayco Products explained that “not addressing claim validity on an individual basis is an error and contravenes 35 U.S.C. 282[.]” The PTO Director concluded, quoting the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), that “a multiple dependent claim must be considered in the same manner as a plurality of single dependent claims.”



Patenting a Nice Cool Glass of Nicotinamide Riboside? Claims Covering Milk Invalid under § 101

By on Feb 23, 2023
Posted In

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that claims covering a naturally occurring composition were not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 merely because one component of the composition had been “isolated.” ChromaDex, Inc. v. Elysium Health, Inc., Case No. 2022-1116 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2023) (Chen, Prost, Stoll, JJ.)

ChromaDex sued Elysium (a former ChromaDex customer) for infringement of its patent directed to dietary supplements containing nicotinamide riboside (NR). Elysium moved for summary judgment, arguing that the asserted claims were invalid under the § 101 prohibition against patenting natural phenomena. After the district court granted summary judgment, ChromaDex appealed.

The asserted claims were directed to a composition comprising:

  • Isolated NR
  • One or more of tryptophan, nicotinic acid or nicotinamide
  • One of 22 carriers
  • Increased NAD+ biosynthesis after eating.

Both parties conceded that milk satisfies every element of the asserted claims with the exception that its NR is not “isolated.” Both parties also conceded that milk is a naturally occurring material and thus not patent eligible under § 101.

On these facts, the issue presented was whether the claim limitation that the NR must be “isolated” (which does not occur in nature) was sufficient to make the claims patent eligible. The Federal Circuit responded “no.”

The Federal Circuit analyzed the asserted claims under two tests: the “markedly different characteristics” test set out in Chakrabarty, and the Alice two-step test (unsure whether Chakrabarty remains controlling precedent).

Under the Chakrabarty test, a claimed composition is not a natural phenomenon if it has “markedly different characteristics” from what occurs in nature. The Federal Circuit found that ChromaDex’s claimed composition had no markedly different characteristics from natural milk. While ChromaDex argued that isolation potentially allowed for unnaturally high concentrations of NR, the claims did not require such concentrations. The claims included compositions structurally and functionally identical to milk and therefore failed the “markedly different characteristics” Chakrabarty test.

Proceeding to the two-part Alice test, under step 1 the Federal Circuit found that the claims were directed to a product of nature because there were no structural differences between the claimed composition and natural milk. Under step two, the Court found that there was no “inventive step” because the claims were merely directed to increasing NAD+ biosynthesis, which was a natural principle that resulted from drinking milk.

Practice Note: During claim drafting, care should be taken to avoid claims that encompass all structural and functional components of a naturally occurring material.



Delayed Disclaimer: Patent Owner Arguments Made during IPR Not a Claim Limiting Disclaimer in That Proceeding

By on Nov 29, 2022
Posted In

Repeating a conclusion from an earlier non-precedential opinion in VirnetX, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) need not accept a patent owner’s arguments as a disclaimer in the very same inter partes review (IPR) proceeding in which those arguments are made. CUPP Computing AS v. Trend Micro Inc., Case Nos. 2020-2262, 2020-2263, 2020-2264, at *11 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2022) (Dyk, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

CUPP Computing is the owner of three related patents each entitled “systems and methods for providing security services during power management mode.” After CUPP sued Trend Micro for patent infringement, Trend Micro filed petitions for IPR against all three patents, asserting that several claims of CUPP’s patents were obvious over two prior art references. The Board instituted all three IPR and found all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious. CUPP appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s conclusions. The principal issue concerned CUPP’s argument that the Board erred in claim construction. In CUPP’s view, all of the evidence required the claimed “security system processor” be remote from a “mobile device processor.” The Court rejected CUPP’s arguments. Starting with the claims, the Court found that they simply required that the two processors be different. Although some claims required the security system to send a wake signal to or communicate with the mobile device, that language did not support CUPP’s remoteness construction. As the Court explained, just as an individual can send a note to oneself via email, a unit of the mobile device can send signals to and communicate with the same device. Indeed, some of the claims teach communication via an internal port of the mobile device, which was consistent with a preferred embodiment disclosed in the specification in which the two processors could be within the same mobile device.

The Federal Circuit then addressed CUPP’s disclaimer arguments. The Court agreed with the Board that CUPP’s statements made during the original prosecution were far from clear and unmistakable, being susceptible to several reasonable interpretations that are contrary to CUPP’s construction. The Court also agreed with the Board that CUPP’s arguments during the Trend Micro IPRs do not qualify as a disclaimer for purposes of claim construction. While a disclaimer made during an IPR proceeding is binding in subsequent proceedings, the “Board is not required to accept a patent owner’s arguments as disclaimer when deciding the merits of those arguments.”

As the Federal Circuit explained, expanding the application of disclaimers to the proceedings in which they are made—as CUPP proposed—is rife with problems. IPR proceedings are more similar to district court litigation than they are to initial examination, and it is well established that disclaimers in litigation are not binding in the proceeding in which they are made. Further, CUPP’s proposal would effectively render IPR claim amendments unnecessary, as patent owners would be free to change the scope of their claims retrospectively without regard to the protections provided by the IPR claim amendment process, such as [...]

Continue Reading



Remote Employees Support Patent Venue

By on Oct 13, 2022
Posted In

In a per curiam opinion, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to direct the district court to dismiss or transfer the underlying case based on improper venue. In doing so, the Court pointed to remote workers residing in the district to find satisfaction in the venue statute. In re Monolithic Power Systems, Inc., Case No. 22-153 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2022) (Lourie, Chen, Stark, JJ.) (per curiam) (Lourie, J., dissenting)

Bel Power brought suit in the Western District of Texas alleging that Monolithic infringed Bel Power’s patents by selling power modules used in electronic devices. Monolithic had four remote employees working from home in the district. Monolithic moved to dismiss or transfer to the Northern District of California, arguing that because it was a Delaware corporation without property in the district, venue was not proper under § 1400(b). The district court denied both requests, finding that Monolithic maintained a business presence in the district as contemplated by § 1400(b) by soliciting employment in the district and providing employees with equipment used at or distributed from their homes as part of their employment responsibilities.

In denying the motion to transfer, the district court found that Monolithic had not established that the Northern District of California was clearly more convenient. Monolithic filed for mandamus seeking to overturn either ruling.

The Federal Circuit denied relief. With regard to venue, the Court reasoned that “the district court’s ruling does not involve the type of broad, fundamental, and recurring legal question or usurpation of judicial power that might warrant immediate mandamus review.” Instead, the Court credited the factual findings regarding the amount of equipment Monolithic provided to one of its employees in the district for “the sole purpose” of allowing him “to conduct testing and validation as part of his job,” and ruled that post-judgment appeal would be an adequate alternative means for attaining relief. On the issue of transfer (reviewed under regional circuit law), the Court denied for failure to establish a clear abuse of discretion, noting that this “is not a case in which there is only one correct outcome.”

Judge Lourie dissented, arguing that “[m]ost basically, Monolithic lacks a regular and established place of business in the Western District of Texas, as the statute requires in order for it to be sued there.” In his view, “we should not stand back and let the requirements of the statute be eroded by the details of what an employee stores in his or her home.” He noted that judicial efficiency counsels against allowing cases to be tried in venues not permitted by the statute only to be retried in a proper venue. Judge Lourie reasoned that the circumstances relied on by the district court, including job advertisement and storage of product and equipment in the venue, were not meaningfully different from those of Celgene v. Mylan Pharms (Fed. Cir, 2021), where venue was deemed improper. He noted that “[t]he [...]

Continue Reading



CAFC Pulls Final Loose Thread in Nike-Adidas Patent Row

By on Sep 22, 2022
Posted In

Issuing a third and final decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision invalidating the last remaining claim of a Nike footwear textile patent. Nike, Inc. v. Adidas AG, Case No. 21-1903 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 2022) (Prost, Chen, Stoll, JJ.) (non-precedential)

Adidas filed for inter partes review of a patent owned by Nike relating to a knitted shoe upper. After lengthy litigation, including two prior appeals to the Federal Circuit, all claims of the Nike patent were invalidated except for one substitute claim. In its second appeal, Nike successfully argued that the Board did not provide Nike an opportunity to respond to a patentability issue raised sua sponte by the Board, which included reference to a knitting textbook. On remand from the second appeal, the parties were given the opportunity to brief the Board on this new reference and argue which party bears the burden of persuasion for the patentability issue raised sua sponte by the Board.

On the merits, the Board determined that the knitting textbook did teach the disputed limitation, agreeing with adidas that a skilled artisan would have understood the textbook to teach the contested limitation, and that there was adequate reason to combine the textbook’s teachings with those of the other prior art references. The Board also concluded that the burden of persuasion must fall on the Board itself when it raised the patentability issue sua sponte. Nike appealed, arguing that the Board effectively placed the burden of persuasion on Nike.

The Federal Circuit first addressed the burden of persuasion as it relates to the grounds first raised by the Board. The Court found that the Board juxtaposed its arguments with adidas’s and that they both relied on the same disclosures and arguments. Because the Board and adidas’s arguments mirrored each other, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the petitioner or the Board bears the burden of persuasion. The Court also rejected Nike’s argument that the Board effectively shifted the burden to Nike by stating in its opinion that Nike’s arguments were “unpersuasive” and “inadequate.” The Court cited to its 2016 holding in In re Magnum Oil Tools International, in which it explained that the Board’s language is not the concern but rather the actual placement of the burden of persuasion. The Court found that both the Board and adidas met the burden, and that the burden was not shifted to Nike.

Turning to the Board’s obviousness determinations, the Federal Circuit rejected all of Nike’s arguments. First, Nike argued that the knitting textbook did not teach the claimed method of creating apertures in the fabric by omitting stitches. The Court found that the Board relied on specific disclosures in the reference describing the use of empty needles to product “loop displacement.” Nike also argued that there was no motivation to combine the textbook reference with the other two references and that the Board could not rely on “common sense” [...]

Continue Reading



Arthrex, Still Without Director Review, Gets Constitutional Review from Patent Commissioner

By on Jun 2, 2022
Posted In

A panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the Patent Commissioner, on assuming the role of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director, can constitutionally evaluate the rehearing of Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) inter partes review (IPR) decisions. The panel concluded that neither Appointments Clause jurisprudence nor the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) impeded the Commissioner from exercising the PTO Director’s authority. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. et al., Case No. 18-2140 (Fed. Cir., May 27, 2022) (Moore, C.J.; Reyna, Chen, JJ.)

Approximately one year ago, Arthrex succeeded in the Supreme Court of the United States on its argument that the Appointments Clause of the Constitution was violated unless a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed officer (such as the PTO Director) could review the Board’s final IPR decisions. (United States v. Arthrex, Inc.) The case returned to the PTO on remand. At the time, the position of PTO Director was vacant, and there was no acting director. Pursuant to the FVRA, the Commissioner of Patents (a position filled by the Secretary of Commerce) exercised the PTO Director’s authority to review Board decisions and ultimately rejected Arthrex’s challenge to the Board’s unpatentability determination. Arthrex appealed.

Arthrex contended that the Commissioner could not constitutionally exercise the PTO Director’s IPR review authority without running afoul of the Appointments Clause, that the FVRA barred the Commissioner’s exercise of authority and that the Commissioner violated separation of powers. Arthrex also challenged the ruling on the merits. None of these challenges were successful.

First, the Federal Circuit concluded that Arthrex reinforced long-settled Supreme Court precedent that an inferior officer could exercise a principal officer’s authority constitutionally on a temporary basis without violating the Appointments Clause. Here, the Court concluded that the Commissioner’s exercise of the PTO Director’s IPR review authority until a new director was installed presented no problem.

Second, the FVRA provides a statutory framework for the exercise of a principal officer’s duties under certain circumstances, which, if the law applied, would not have allowed the Commissioner to review IPR decisions. However, the Federal Circuit explained that the FVRA narrowly governs only those duties of an officer that are statutorily non-delegable (i.e., which US Congress has required to be exercised personally by the officer). According to the Court, such provisions did not apply here because nothing demonstrated that the PTO Director’s newly created authority to review IPR decisions was non-delegable.

Third, the Federal Circuit rejected Arthrex’s argument that the Commissioner’s service as the PTO Director violated the line of precedent that limits Congress’ ability to circumscribe the president’s removal authority for superior officers. Arthrex contended that the Commissioner, a non-superior officer, could be removed only for “misconduct or nonsatisfactory performance” and therefore could not fill the role of the PTO Director. The panel disagreed, explaining that the president could name an acting director “with the stroke of a pen,” and so the limits on removing the Commissioner from his role as Commissioner [...]

Continue Reading



BLOG EDITORS

Paul Devinsky

Amol Parikh

STAY CONNECTED

Subscribe

TOPICS

ARCHIVES