Results for "Trademark Precedent"
Subscribe to Results for "Trademark Precedent"'s Posts

Recipe for Rejection: Trademark Application Burnt by Specimen Flaws

The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board issued a precedential decision affirming a refusal to register a mark because there was no direct association between the specimen and the applied-for services. In re Gail Weiss, Serial No. 88621608 (July 31, 2024, TTAB) (Cataldo, Goodman, Pologeorgis, ATJ)

Gail Weiss applied to register the mark GABBY’S TABLE on the Principal Register for “computerized online retail store services in the field of food, cooking utensils, cookware, culinary arts cookbooks, magazines, and videos, and lifestyle books, magazines, and videos.” Weiss submitted a specimen of use that consisted of “website marketing and advertising.” The Examining Attorney refused registration on the grounds that the specimen failed to show the mark in use in commerce in connection with the identified services. The Examining Attorney argued that the specimen only showed a list of items recommended for purchase, but the website did not offer the consumer retail store services to purchase the goods. Instead, the website included a “buy now” button that redirected customers to third-party websites that offered to retain store services to consumers. Weiss appealed.

The issue before the Board was whether the specimen demonstrated a direct association between the GABBY’S TABLE mark and the online retail store services identified in the application. The Board found that the specimen did not meet this requirement as it only provided referrals to third-party websites where the products could be purchased. The Board also noted that the specimen lacked the essential elements of online retail store services, such as a virtual shopping cart, pricing, shipping information or any other indicia of online retail store services. The Board also found that the third-party stores provided commissions to affiliate websites like those in the specimen but did not constitute providing online retail store services. The Board therefore affirmed the refusal to register.

Practice Note: This decision highlights the necessity for applicants to provide specimens that demonstrate the use of the mark in connection with the identified services.




read more

Due Diligence Deficit Sinks Fraud Claims in Trademark Battle

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an independent action asserting “fraud on the court” based on the finding that the alleged fraud on the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) should have been uncovered by the exercise of due diligence in a prior action. Marco Destin Inc. v. Levy et al., Case No. 23-1330 (2d Cir. Aug. 8, 2024) (Jacobs, Sack, Sullivan, JJ.)

In 2007, L&L Wings filed a lawsuit against Marco Destin and related entities (collectively, Marco Destin) in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting claims of breach of contract and trademark infringement related to Marco Destin’s unauthorized use of L&L’s unregistered trademark WINGS on beach apparel. Although L&L and Marco Destin entered into an allegedly valid temporary licensing agreement in 1998, L&L alleged that Marco Destin continued to use the mark after the agreement expired in 2006. Post-discovery, L&L revealed a recent trademark registration for the WINGS mark, causing L&L and Marco Destin to enter a stipulated order of settlement and dismissal in 2011. Marco Destin paid L&L $3.5 million, ceased using the WINGS mark, and agreed to never bring an action based on the WINGS mark or the 1998 temporary licensing agreement.

More than a decade later, Marco Destin sued L&L again in the Southern District of New York for “fraud on the court” and “fraud” and demanded vacatur, sanctions and damages due to key facts revealed in a separate unrelated Eastern District of North Carolina action. In relevant part, it was discovered that L&L was not the owner of the WINGS mark. Rather, an entity named Shepard Morrow owned the WINGS mark and licensed it to L&L for a brief period in the 1990s. L&L stopped paying the required licensing fees to Shepard Morrow and improperly licensed the unregistered WINGS mark to other entities (including Marco Destin). As a result, the Eastern District of North Carolina granted sanctions against L&L for failing to disclose Shepard Morrow’s trademark registration and license agreement, and L&L’s WINGS mark registration was cancelled as a consequence of L&L’s false representations to the PTO. L&L moved to dismiss Marco Destin’s New York complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the “fraud on the court” claim was an independent action for relief from a judgment under Rule 60(d)(3) and Marco Destin had a reasonable opportunity to discover L&L’s false representations during the initial litigation. Marco Destin appealed.

The Second Circuit affirmed, reviewing the dismissal of an independent action for fraud on the court under FRCP 60(d)(3) for abuse of discretion. A party challenging a judgment may file either a timely motion within a fixed time window – one year under FRCP 60(b)(3) – or an independent action any time after that pursuant to FRCP 60(d)(3). Independent actions require a more demanding showing of fraud (such as fraud on the court itself) than a timely motion, and generally claimants seeking equitable relief through independent [...]

Continue Reading




read more

What Makes a Trademark Case “Exceptional” in the Fifth Circuit?

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a senior party mark but found that the district court committed clear error in finding that a similar junior party mark was valid. The Fifth Circuit also found that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to the senior user. Appliance Liquidation Outlet, L.L.C. v. Axis Supply Corp., Case No. 23-50413 (5th Cir. June 21, 2024) (Smith, Haynes, Douglas, JJ.)

Appliance Liquidation Outlet (ALO), a decades-old appliance store in San Antonio, Texas, brought a trademark action under the Lanham Act and Texas law (which in all relevant aspects tracks the Lanham Act) against Axis Supply Corporation, another San Antonio appliance store that opened in 2021. Axis’s store and social media prominently featured the phrase “Appliance Liquidation”:

ALO noted that Axis’s opening happened to coincide with an influx of customers conflating ALO with Axis. ALO’s storefront had prominently displayed a banner reciting “Appliance Liquidation Outlet” for years:

Although ALO had never registered its mark, ALO had long engaged in a variety of promotional activities to raise brand recognition, including partnering with local sports teams and holding antique exhibitions and car shows.

Soon after Axis opened its store, ALO experienced a rush of customers who failed to differentiate between the stores and believed that ALO operated both. ALO requested that Axis stop using “Appliance Liquidation” and sued Axis in state court when Axis refused. Axis removed the dispute to the federal district court. After a bench trial, the district court held for ALO, enjoining Axis from using “Appliance Liquidation” and “Appliance Liquidation Outlet” and causing confusion between the two businesses. The district court also awarded attorneys’ fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) to ALO, finding that Axis’s decision to change its name only a week before trial (about 1.5 years into the dispute) amounted to litigating in an unreasonable manner. Axis appealed.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Axis had infringed ALO’s “Appliance Liquidation Outlet” mark but assigned clear error to the district court’s finding that “Appliance Liquidation” was valid mark. The Fifth Circuit also found that the district court had abused its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to ALO.

With respect to the marks’ validity, the Fifth Circuit noted that both marks were unregistered and thus were not presumptively valid. The Court found that the record did not support the conclusion that “Appliance Liquidation” was a source identifier and thus found that it was not a valid mark. However, the Fifth Circuit was satisfied that “Appliance Liquidation Outlet” served as a source identifier. The Court found that although “Appliance Liquidation Outlet” was descriptive, the evidence established that San Antonian consumers perceived the mark as conveying information about ALO, not merely reflecting a class of services or businesses, and [...]

Continue Reading




read more

SHAZAM! CAPTAIN CANNABIS Registration Defeated by Prior Analogous Trademark Use

Addressing the issue of analogous trademark use, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board designated precedential a September 6, 2022, decision in which the Board cancelled a registration for CAPTAIN CANNABIS based on the petitioner’s evidence of prior use that was “analogous to trademark use.” Laverne John Andrusiek v. Cosmic Crusaders LLC and Lewis J. Davidson, Cancellation No. 92064830 (TTAB Jan. 3, 2024) (Wolfson, Lynch, Larkin, ATJs).

Laverne John Andrusiek claimed to have first created a comic book featuring the title character, Captain Cannabis, during the 1970s. Although Laverne’s sales of comic books under the CAPTAIN CANNABIS mark did not begin until 2017, he promoted his Captain Cannabis character much earlier. For example, Laverne stated that he attended a trade show in New Orleans in 1999 where he distributed flyers describing an adult animated series “in development” featuring the character Captain Cannabis. That same year, Laverne registered the captaincannabis.com domain name, where he alleges he operated a website promoting and selling Captain Cannabis products. In 2006, Laverne claims to have printed 5,000 copies of a comic book that included a Captain Cannabis character and to have first sold those comic books via an online retailer, where sales continued through 2017.

Cosmic Crusaders registered CAPTAIN CANNABIS for “comic books” in Class 16. The subject application was filed on April 2, 2014, and issued on July 28, 2015. Laverne petitioned to cancel this registration in 2016 under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, claiming that use of this mark was likely to cause confusion with his prior common-law use of the identical mark in connection with identical goods. Cosmic Crusaders did not contest that contemporaneous use of both marks would be likely to cause confusion, and there was no dispute that the marks were not distinctive. Therefore, the only issue for the Board to determine was priority.

To establish priority, Laverne had to show (by a preponderance of the evidence) that he owns a trademark previously used in the United States that has not been abandoned. Because priority was based on common-law use in this case, Laverne was also required to establish prior actual trademark use or prior use analogous to trademark use, “such as use in advertising brochures, trade publications, catalogues, newspaper advertisements and Internet websites that created a public awareness of the designation as a trademark identifying Petitioner as the source of the relevant goods.”

Analogous use does not require “survey evidence or other direct evidence of the consuming public’s identification of the CAPTAIN CANNABIS mark with [Andrusiek] as the source of comic books or related goods such as DVDs and animated videos.” Rather, Laverne had to show that he had used the CAPTAIN CANNABIS mark in the US in a way that was “sufficient to create an association in the mind of the relevant consumers between the mark and the goods, followed by actual trademark use of the mark within a ‘commercially reasonable time.’”

The Board found that Laverne’s CAPTAIN CANNABIS mark was reasonably well known within the niche [...]

Continue Reading




read more

It’s a Hard Rock Life: Guitar-Shaped Hotel Warrants Trademark, but Hilton Doesn’t

In a twin set of precedential opinions, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board laid the foundation for determining whether building designs can be trademark protected as service marks. In re Palacio Del Rio, Inc., Ser. Nos. 88412764; 88437801 (TTAB May 25, 2023) (Shaw, Goodman, Hudis, ATJs); In re Seminole Tribe of Florida, Ser. No. 87890892 (TTAB May 25, 2023) (Taylor, Greenbaum, Johnson, ATJs).

The subjects of the opinions were the designs of the Hilton Palacio del Rio in San Antonio, Texas, and the Seminole Hard Rock Hotel & Casino in Hollywood, Florida. The Board concluded that the former was nondistinctive trade dress, whereas the latter constituted protectable trade dress. For reference, the two designs at issue appear below:

In the Hilton case, Hilton sought separate registrations for the three-dimensional design of the “River” and “Street” sides of its hotel building due to their “unique and readily recognizable design,” consisting of a pattern of alternating protruding and receding rectangular shapes created by the assembly of the hotel’s modular guest rooms. Similarly, Seminole Tribe argued that its guitar-shaped building was akin to product packaging that can be protected under trade dress.

In both cases, the Board anchored its analysis in Supreme Court precedent in Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana (1992) and Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros. (2000), but with a different result in each case. As an initial matter, in both the Hilton and Seminole cases, the Board confirmed that a building structure, if inherently distinctive and not mere product design, could constitute protected trade dress. The Board analogized a hotel’s design to product packaging, which dispensed with the need to show secondary meaning.

Where the outcomes diverged, however, was the distinctiveness of the buildings that the two entities sought to protect. In the Hilton case, the Board determined that the record did not demonstrate that the Palacio del Rio’s building design was sufficient to differentiate it from competitor hotels. Although Hilton submitted customer declarations claiming that the Rio’s design was unique, the Board did not credit such evidence on the grounds that the customers did not have personal knowledge about what was commonplace in the hotel industry and that the declarations were substantively scant.

In the Seminole case, the Board found that the record reflected that no other hotel had the Hard Rock’s unique guitar design. Analogizing to In re Frankish Enterprises (TTAB 2015), in which a monster truck was found distinguishable from all other monster truck designs of record, the Board concluded that the guitar design was inherently distinctive.

Practice Note: Now that hotels have cracked the door open for building design trademarks, it remains to be seen whether other types of unique buildings will follow suit. As the two cases collectively demonstrate, developing a supportive record—i.e., one founded by compelling evidence of uniqueness—is likely necessary to secure a trade dress for building design.

[...]

Continue Reading



read more

PTO Introduces Trademark Decisions and Proceedings Search Tool

On February 17, 2023, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) announced the launch of the new Trademark Decisions and Proceedings Search Tool. This tool allows users to filter and search expungement and reexamination proceedings, administrative orders and sanctions, and precedential director decisions. Under the Expungement and Reexamination Proceedings tab, users can find all petitions filed by third parties requesting expungement or reexamination, as well as director-initiated proceedings and reexaminations. The Administrative Orders and Sanctions tab includes administrative and sanctions orders issued under the authority of the PTO Director against parties found to violate PTO trademark rules of practice or terms of use for PTO websites and filing systems.  Decisions on petitions to the PTO Director will be added to the search tool later in 2023.

The Trademark Decisions and Proceedings Search Tool can be found here.




read more

No Standing to Invalidate Trademark without Threat of Infringement Suit

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that when a party obtains a declaratory relief finding that it does not infringe a trademark, it no longer has Article III standing to pursue invalidation of the mark. San Diego County Credit Union v. Citizens Equity First Credit Union, Case Nos. 21-55642; -55662; -56095; -56389 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2023) (Bea, Ikuta, Christen, JJ.)

Citizens Equity First Credit Union (CEFCU) registered a trademark for the term “CEFCU. NOT A BANK. BETTER,” and further claimed to own a nearly identical common-law trademark for “NOT A BANK. BETTER.” In 2014, San Diego County Credit Union (SDCCU) obtained a registration for “IT’S NOT BIG BANK BANKING. IT’S BETTER.” CEFCU petitioned the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board to cancel SDCCU’s registration, claiming that it covered a mark that was confusingly similar to CEFCU’s registered and alleged common-law marks.

SDCCU sought declaratory relief in the district court seeking a noninfringement finding of CEFCU’s registered and common-law marks, an invalidity finding of CEFCU’s registered and common-law marks, and a finding that CEFCU falsely or fraudulently registered its mark. CEFCU unsuccessfully filed motions to dismiss for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. SDCCU persuaded the district court that during the course of the cancellation proceedings, it became apprehensive that CEFCU would sue SDCCU for trademark infringement. The district court granted SDCCU’s motion for summary judgment on noninfringement and CEFCU’s motion for summary judgment on SDCCU’s fraudulent registration claim. The parties agreed to dismiss the claim that CEFCU’s registered mark was invalid. The only issue remaining was SDCCU’s count seeking declaratory relief to invalidate CEFCU’s common-law mark. After a bench trial, the district court determined that CEFCU’s common-law mark was invalid, entered final judgment and awarded SDCCU attorneys’ fees. CEFCU appealed.

In an appeal that raised a “bevy of issues,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court lacked Article III jurisdiction to invalidate CEFCU’s common-law mark following the grant of summary judgment in favor of SDCCU on its noninfringement claims. Citing the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in MedImmune v. Genentech and Ninth Circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit applied the “reasonable apprehension” test to determine whether a controversy exists in a declaratory judgment action regarding trademark infringement. Under this test, a party has standing to seek declaratory relief of noninfringement if the party demonstrates “a real and reasonable apprehension that [the party] will be subject to liability” if the party’s course of conduct continues. Concrete threats of a trademark infringement suit are not required to create live controversy to provide standing to seek declaratory relief action.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that justiciable controversy existed at the pleading stage, pointing to CEFCU’s cancellation petition, CEFCU’s testimony that it was just a “matter of time” before actual confusion occurred in California, and CEFCU’s affirmative refusal to stipulate that SDCCU was not infringing CEFCU’s marks. However, once the district court rendered its declaratory judgment of noninfringement, the record lacked any evidence that an ongoing threat of liability was causing [...]

Continue Reading




read more

Strings Attached: No Amendment for Trademark Application in Inter Partes Opposition Proceeding

The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) designated as precedential a decision denying a motion to amend and granting partial summary judgment based on a mistaken identification that did not match the goods sold using the trademark. Fender Musical Instruments Corporation v. Win-D-Fender, LLC, Opp. No. 91272326 (TTAB Sept. 22, 2022) (designated precedential Jan. 12, 2023) (Wolfson, Heasley, Cogins, ATJs) (By the Board).

Win-D-Fender applied for a trademark to register the mark EN-D-FENDER for “musical instruments.” Fender opposed this registration on grounds of nonuse, likelihood of confusion and dilution by blurring and filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground of nonuse. Win-D-Fender then filed a motion to amend the identification of goods in its application from “musical instruments” to “musical instrument accessories, namely, an ambient wind foot joint guard for flute family instruments.”

The Board first considered Win-D-Fender’s motion to amend. Under the relevant trademark rules, an application that is subject to an inter partes proceeding may only be amended if the other party consents (Fender did not) and the Board gives approval, or if the Board grants a motion to amend.

Win-D-Fender filed its application via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). In a TEAS application, only the goods listed in the proper field can be considered for the identification of goods and broadening the scope of the identification is not permitted. In Win-D-Fender’s application, the only goods listed in the “Identification” field were “musical instruments.” Win-D-Fender argued that its application included a miscellaneous statement reading, “For Musical Instrument Accessories namely a wind guard mounted to a flute.” The Board determined, however, that the description was not in the proper field and therefore was not considered in the identified goods. The Board explained that the TEAS Plus instructions warn applicants to not use the TEAS Plus “Identification” field if it does not contain an accurate listing of the goods and services and to instead use the TEAS Standard filing option. The Board noted that although the identification of “musical instruments” may have been a mistake, it is settled that an established identification cannot later be expanded. The Board concluded that Win-D-Fender was limited to amendments that would narrow or clarify the type of “musical instruments.”

Win-D-Fender also argued that musical instrument accessories would fall under the general umbrella of musical instruments. The Board stated that while musical instruments may use accessories, the accessories themselves are not musical instruments and are not encompassed in the “musical instrument” class. The Board, therefore, denied the motion to amend the identification of goods.

The Board next considered Fender’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of nonuse. An application based on use of the mark in commerce is void if the mark was not used in commerce in connection with the goods identified in the application. As the Board had already decided, Win-D-Fender’s mark was limited to musical instruments and did not include accessories. Fender specifically pointed to an interrogatory response in which Win-D-Fender stated that the products sold under the [...]

Continue Reading




read more

Press # For Options, but Not for a Trademark Registration

In a precedential opinion addressing the most fundamental requirement for trademark protection, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) affirmed the US Patent & Trademark Office’s (PTO) refusal to register a “#” based mark on the ground that it fails to function as a mark. In re Pound Law, LLC, Ser. No. 87724338 (TTAB Nov. 9, 2022) (Adlin, Lynch, Larkin, ATJ)

Pound Law, claiming acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act, sought to register #LAW as a mark for providing legal services and legal referral services to consumers seeking a lawyer where legal representation or referral is initiated by phone. During prosecution, the Examining Attorney refused registration on the ground that #LAW failed to function as a service mark, reasoning that a consumer would only understand that dialing #LAW would put them in contact with some legal service provider, but not specifically Pound Law. Pound Law appealed.

Pound Law argued that the Examining Attorney improperly applied a per se rule against mnemonic or vanity telephone number marks as being incapable of functioning as a mark identifying the source of goods or services. In response, the Examining Attorney asserted that the PTO refused registration only after engaging in a specimen-based determination tailored to the #LAW mark. The Examining Attorney argued that, based on the manner of using the mark with a telephone, a consumer would regard #LAW only as a means of contacting Pound Law and concluded that #LAW does not indicate the source of legal services to be rendered, only a means by which legal services might be obtained.

To assess whether #LAW conveys an informational message or functions as a source identifier, the Board considered whether the nature of #LAW affects consumer perception of the asserted mark. The Board cited examples #LAW or #law being used throughout the legal industry, including as a hashtag in social media content. The Board reasoned that, in the context of social media, a hashtag functions as a searchable keyword, not as a source identifier. Pound Law argued that it ran radio advertisements vocalizing #LAW as “pound law” to explain to consumers that the asserted mark is not a hashtag.

The Board did not find Pound Law’s evidence persuasive, explaining that Pound Law’s radio advertising was insufficient to instill Pound Law as the source of the legal services in a consumer’s mind since “there is no correct pronunciation of a trademark, and consumers may pronounce a mark differently than intended by the brand owner.” The Board also pointed to evidence of Pound Law’s “extensive visual-only advertising,” which does not distinguish the use of an octothorpe as specifically a pound sign on a telephone keypad as opposed to a hashtag used on social media platforms. The Board concluded that many consumers would understand and pronounce #LAW as a hashtag (i.e., vocalized as “hashtag law”) “given the prevalence of social media and hashtags.” On this point, the Board highlighted “quite persuasive” evidence of numerous examples from the record showing third parties—e.g., law firms, legal [...]

Continue Reading




read more

The Saddest Hour? Closing Time for Trademark Cancellation Petition

In a precedential decision, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) denied a petition to cancel a trademark registration based on priority. The Board explained that the petitioner bears a higher burden of proof to show prior use when it has amended its trademark application during prosecution to allege an earlier use date. JNF LLC v. Harwood Int’l Inc., Cancellation No. 92070634 (TTAB Sept. 21, 2022) (Wellington, Greenbaum, Heasley, ATJ)

On October 6, 2014, Harwood International applied to register the standard character mark HAPPIEST HOUR on the Principal Register for “bar and restaurant services.” The application matured into a registration on July 26, 2016. Almost two years later, on May 1, 2018, JNF applied to register the mark THE HAPPIEST HOUR in standard characters on the Principal Register for “restaurant and bar services.” In its application, JNF claimed to have first used the mark anywhere and in commerce “at least as early as 10/00/2014.” The examining attorney assigned to JNF’s application issued an office action citing Harwood’s HAPPIEST HOUR registration as a bar to registration. JNF then amended its claimed date of first use to September 7, 2014. JNF subsequently filed a petition to cancel Harwood’s registration and further requested suspension of its application pending disposition of the cancellation proceeding. Harwood answered the petition and admitted that its registered mark HAPPIEST HOUR was cited as confusingly similar to JNF’s THE HAPPIEST HOUR application but denied that JNF had established prior rights to the mark.

The Board explained that for priority purposes, Harwood may rely on the filing date of the underlying application that matured into its involved registration. The Board further explained that JNF bears the burden of proving that its mark was “previously used in the United States,” before Harwood’s constructive filing date of October 6, 2014. The Board also noted that while a petitioner must ordinarily prove its priority entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence, in the circumstances of this case, the burden was heavier. Because JNF alleged a first use date of “at least as early as 10/00/2014” when it filed its application to register THE HAPPIEST HOUR, the date presumed for purposes of examination was the last day of the month, October 31, 2014—several weeks after Harwood’s constructive use date of October 6, 2014.

As the Board explained, although JNF subsequently amended its date of earliest use, that amendment came with a cost. The Board explained that where an applicant has stated an earliest use date under oath but then amends the oath and attempts to show an earlier date, the applicant is under a heavier burden of proof: clear and convincing evidence. Citing to Federal Circuit precedent, the Board further explained that the original allegation of first use date may be considered to have been made against interest at the time of filing. The Board found that this rationale applied with even greater force in the current situation because the alleged dates were very close to Harwood’s constructive use date and because JNF only [...]

Continue Reading




read more

BLOG EDITORS

STAY CONNECTED

TOPICS

ARCHIVES