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De Minimis Defense Doesn’t Protect Minimal Use of Concededly Infringing Material

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant in a copyright case based on a “minimal usage” or de minimis use defense. Richard N. Bell v. Wilmott Storage Services, LLC, et al., Case Nos. 19-55882, -56181 (9th Cir. July 26, 2021) (Wardlaw, J.) (Clifton, J., and Choe-Groves, J., concurring).

Richard Bell took a photo of the Indianapolis skyline and published it on various websites. Eleven years later, he registered the photo with the US Copyright Office. Bell later conducted an online reverse image search of his photo to identify potential infringers and subsequently filed more than 100 copyright infringement lawsuits. One of the sites on which Bell found the photo was VisitUSA.com. The image was only available to those who had conducted a reverse image search or knew the precise web address to the photo. Wilmott Storage Services purchased VisitUSA.com in 2012. In 2018, Bell notified Wilmott that it was displaying the photo without his permission. Wilmott removed the photo in response to Bell’s request. In 2019, Wilmott continued to display a copy of the photo, but at a slightly different address than before. Wilmott explained that its webmaster was supposed to remove the photo but instead only changed the file name. Wilmott subsequently removed the photo.

Bell sued Wilmott for copyright infringement in 2018, asserting that Wilmott infringed his right to “display the copyrighted work publicly” by making it accessible to the public on Wilmott’s server. Assuming infringement, Wilmott filed for summary judgment based on the affirmative defenses of de minimis use, fair use and the statute of limitations. The district court granted summary judgment to Wilmott on the de minimis use defense. Although Wilmott conceded that an identical copy of the photo was hosted on its server, the district court found no infringement. Bell appealed.

The Ninth Circuit noted that it had not previously addressed the issue of whether one “publicly displays” a work where it is accessible only to members of the public who either possess the specific pinpoint address or who perform a particular type of online search—here, a reverse image search. Applying Ninth Circuit precedent from Perfect 10, the Court concluded that Wilmott publicly displayed the photo.

The Ninth Circuit also found that there was no place for an inquiry into whether there was de minimis copying because the “degree of copying” was total since the infringing work was an identical copy of the copyrighted photo. The Court explained that it and a majority of other circuits do not view the de minimis doctrine as a defense to infringement but rather as an answer to the inquiry whether an infringing work and copyrighted work are substantially similar so as to make the copying actionable. The Court reiterated that the de minimis defense applies to the amount of copying, not to the extent of the defendant’s use of the infringing work. The Court also explained that the de minimis copying defense is [...]

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Injunctive Relief Available Even Where Laches Bars Trademark Infringement, Unfair Competition Damage Claims

The US Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed a district court’s conclusion that laches barred an advertising and marketing company’s claims for monetary damages for trademark infringement and unfair competition, but remanded the case for assessment of injunctive relief to protect the public’s interest in avoiding confusion between two similarly named companies operating in the advertising sector. Pinnacle Advertising and Marketing Group, Inc. v. Pinnacle Advertising and Marketing Group, LLC, Case No. 19-15167 (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 2021) (Branch, J.)

Pinnacle Advertising and Marketing Group (Pinnacle Illinois) is an Illinois-based company and owner of two registered trademarks including the name “Pinnacle.” Pinnacle Illinois learned of a Florida-based company operating under almost the same name that was also in the advertising and marketing space—Pinnacle Advertising and Marketing Group (Pinnacle Florida) —through potential clients and a magazine’s accidental conflation of the two unrelated companies. Several years later, Pinnacle Illinois sued Pinnacle Florida for trademark infringement, unfair competition and cybersquatting. Pinnacle Florida filed a counterclaim seeking to cancel Pinnacle Illinois’s trademark registrations and also alleged that Pinnacle Illinois’s claims were barred by the doctrine of laches.

Following a jury trial, the district court granted Pinnacle Florida’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Pinnacle Illinois’s cybersquatting claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Pinnacle Illinois on its claims for trademark infringement and unfair competition, awarding Pinnacle Illinois $550,000 in damages. The district court then granted Pinnacle Florida’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on its laches defense, concluding that Pinnacle Illinois’s trademark infringement and unfair competition claims were barred by laches because it waited more than four years to bring suit after it should have known that it had a potential infringement claim against Pinnacle Florida. The district court also cancelled Pinnacle Illinois’s registrations because it concluded that Pinnacle Illinois’s marks were merely descriptive and lacked secondary meaning. Pinnacle Illinois appealed.

Pinnacle Illinois argued that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Pinnacle Illinois’s claims were barred by laches, and that even if laches did bar Pinnacle Illinois’s claims for money damages, the district court should have considered whether injunctive relief was proper to protect the public’s interest in avoiding confusion between the two companies. Pinnacle Illinois also argued that the district court erred when it cancelled its registrations without regard to the jury’s findings of distinctiveness and protectability or the presumption of distinctiveness afforded to its registered marks.

The 11th Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that laches barred Pinnacle Illinois from bringing its trademark infringement and unfair competition claims for monetary damages. Pinnacle Illinois sued after the Florida four-year statute of limitations had passed, and the Court found that the company was not excused for its delay because it did not communicate with Pinnacle Florida about the infringement until it filed suit. Pinnacle Florida also suffered economic prejudice because it invested significant time and money, including around $2 million, in developing its business under [...]

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Fairness Is the Limit for Asserting False Advertising Claims

Addressing whether Lanham Act claims for false advertising or false association under § 43(a) (15 USC § 1125(a)) are subject to a statute of limitations, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the sole time limit on bringing such claims is the equitable doctrine of laches. Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, Case No. 18-2183 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 2021) (Floyd, J.)

The facts of the underlying dispute are straightforward. Bayer has sold the pain reliever naproxen as FLANAX in Mexico since 1972 and in the United States as ALEVE. Belmora began selling naproxen under the name FLANAX in the United States in 2004, where it used similar packaging and described the drug as one sold successfully in Mexico. Both companies tried to register the mark with the US Patent & Trademark Office, where proceedings unfolded. Ultimately, in April 2014, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board cancelled Belmora’s trademark registration, finding that Belmora had blatantly misused FLANAX by drawing on the popularity of Bayer’s Mexican product. Two months later, Bayer brought claims against Belmora under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and California unfair competition law in the US District Court for the Central District of California. The suit was transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia, where Belmora moved to dismiss, arguing that § 43(a) and state law claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Bayer replied that § 43(a) had no statute of limitations, and that the time to bring the state law claims had been tolled during the Board’s proceedings. The district court granted both of Belmora’s motions, and the appeal followed.

Because there is no express statute of limitations for a § 43(a) claim, the question before the Court was whether to assume that Congress intended that the most analogous state law statute of limitations apply, or to apply either the most analogous federal statute or common law laches doctrine. “Conclud[ing] that § 43(a) is one such federal law for which a state statute of limitations would be an unsatisfactory vehicle for enforcement,” the Court held that laches was more appropriate, for primarily two reasons. First, the statutory text provides that § 43(a) damages are subject to the principles of equity, which would include the doctrine of laches. Second, the Court found persuasive the law of the Third, Seventh and Ninth Circuits, which each apply laches as to restrict the timeliness of as § 43(a) action. That said, the Court emphasized that on remand, the district court should consider the period for bringing a similar state action as part of the laches analysis, especially because the Fourth Circuit employs a presumption that claims brought after the expiration of the most-analogous statute-of-limitations are barred by laches.

The Court noted that Bayer could overcome a presumption of laches, and cited three factors for the district court to consider:

  • Bayer’s knowledge (or lack thereof) of Belmora’s adverse use
  • Whether Bayer’s delay was inexcusable or unreasonable
  • Whether Belmora had been unduly prejudiced by [...]

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Missed Shot: Lawsuit Against Related Company Doesn’t Toll Prescriptive Period

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to dismiss claims under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (LUTPA), finding that a dispute against a related company did not toll the statute of limitations. Carbon Six Barrels, LLC v. Proof Research, Inc., Case No. 22-30772 (5th Cir. Sept. 29, 2023) (Clement, Elrod, Willett, JJ.)

Proof Research and Carbon Six Barrels both manufacture gun barrels made of carbon fiber. Proof was the first of the parties to enter the market and in 2013 trademarked the unique mottled appearance of its barrels. In 2016, Proof discovered that Carbon Six intended to manufacture and sell similar-looking carbon-fiber barrels and sent a cease-and-desist letter. Carbon Six began production in 2017, sourcing barrel blanks from its sister company McGowen Precision Barrels. Proof filed a trademark infringement suit against McGowen, instead of Carbon Six, in the District of Montana. McGowen initiated a separate proceeding in the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board to cancel Proof’s trademark and was successful in doing so.

After the Board cancelled Proof’s trademark, Carbon Six sued Proof in the Middle District of Louisiana alleging that Proof fraudulently registered its trademark, violated LUTPA, and defamed Carbon Six during the initial litigation and Board proceeding. McGowen brought a similar suit in the District of Montana. Proof asserted several defenses in the lawsuit filed by Carbon Six, including a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that Carbon Six’s claims were both untimely and legally insufficient. The district court denied Proof’s other defenses but granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, finding that Carbon Six’s claims were time-barred by Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period and that Carbon Six’s LUTPA claim was also legally insufficient. Carbon Six appealed.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed, explaining that LUTPA has a one-year prescriptive period and that there was no doubt that the violations alleged by Carbon Six occurred more than a year before Carbon Six filed suit in early 2022. The Court reviewed all actions that could potentially give rise to liability under LUTPA and stated that even if any of these acts could give rise to liability, all actions occurred more than a year before Carbon Six’s suit.

Carbon Six attempted to rely on the continuing tort doctrine, alleging that the acts continuously violated LUTPA up until the Board cancelled Proof’s trademark in May 2021. Reviewing Louisiana law, the Fifth Circuit determined that the general principle of a continuing tort is a conduct-based question “asking whether the tortfeasor perpetuates the injury through overt, persistent, and ongoing acts.” The Court agreed with the district court that LUTPA’s prescriptive period is not suspended if a perpetuator of fraud fails to correct false statements, as that proposition would transform almost every business dispute into a continuing tort. The Fifth Circuit also determined that the district court’s conclusion that Carbon Six could not recover for Proof’s lawsuit against McGowan was correct, because the law supported the position that a sister corporation cannot sue on behalf [...]

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A Single Picture Database Is Worth a Thousand Statutory Damages Awards

In the latest appeal of a copyright infringement dispute, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s finding that the copyright owner’s photographs were not part of a single compilation for purposes of awarding statutory damages. VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., Case Nos. 22-35147; -35200 (9th Cir. June 7, 2023) (McKeown, Fletcher, Gould, JJ.)

VHT is a professional real estate photography studio that real estate brokerages and listing services hire to photograph properties. VHT retouches the photographs, saves them in its photo database and licenses them to its clients for marketing purposes. In 2015, VHT sued Zillow for copyright infringement based on Zillow’s display of VHT photographs on its real estate listing website and on its Digs home design website. The district court found that Zillow was not liable for displaying VHT photographs on its real estate listing website or for displaying untagged, unsearchable VHT photographs on its Digs home design website. However, the district court found that Zillow’s display of tagged, searchable VHT photographs on Digs constituted infringement and that the searchability functionality was not fair use.

The parties cross-appealed, and the Ninth Circuit considered the issue of infringement in a 2019 decision (Zillow I). In this prior appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that Zillow’s display of VHT photographs on its real estate listing website was not copyright infringement, while Zillow’s display of searchable VHT photographs on its Digs home design website constituted infringement and was not fair use. The Ninth Circuit also reversed the jury’s finding that Zillow had willfully infringed 2,700 searchable VHT photographs displayed on Digs and remanded for consideration of whether the searchable photographs were a compilation for purposes of awarding statutory damages. On remand, the district court found that the photographs were not a compilation and awarded statutory damages of $200 for each innocently infringed photograph and $800 for each remaining photograph.

The district court also considered the impact of the Copyright Act’s preregistration requirement and Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street (Supreme Court, 2019) on VHT’s ability to sue. In accordance with Ninth Circuit precedent holding that registration is made when the Copyright Office receives a completed registration application, VHT had sued Zillow for copyright infringement after applying for copyright registration. However, the works were not registered until after the suit was filed. Just 11 days before Zillow I was decided, in Fourth Estate, the Supreme Court held that registration is made when the Copyright Office has registered a copyright after examination—not when the application is filed. Zillow argued that VHT’s claims should be dismissed because VHT did not satisfy the preregistration requirement. The district court excused the exhaustion requirement because dismissal would result in a massive waste of resources. The parties again cross-appealed.

Preregistration and Fourth Estate

Addressing the preregistration issue, the Ninth Circuit agreed that dismissal was not required. The decision to excuse compliance with a non-jurisdictional exhaustion requirement is based on whether the claim is wholly collateral to the substantive [...]

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Heart-to-Heart on Reduction to Practice: When It Comes to Testing, How Much Is Enough?

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision that the patent owner successfully demonstrated that the claimed heart catheter invention was conceived and reduced to practice prior to the effective date of the reference, by record evidence of adequate testing to demonstrate that the invention would work for its intended purpose. Medtronic, Inc. v. Teleflex Innovations S.Á.R.L., Case Nos. 21-2356; -2358; -2361; -2363; -2365 (Fed. Cir. May 24, 2023) (Moore, C.J.; Lourie, J.) (Dyk, J., dissenting).

Teleflex Innovations owns five patents directed to guide extension catheters that use a tapered inner catheter that runs over a standard coronary guidewire to reduce the likelihood that a guide catheter will dislodge from the coronary artery’s opening. All of the patents are related and share a common specification. Around the time of the challenged patents’ priority date, the applicant was working to develop two commercial variants of similar technology: the “rapid exchange” (or “RX”) version of the GuideLiner product, which Teleflex claims practices the challenged patents, and an “over-the-wire” (or “OTW”) variant, which does not practice the challenged patents.

Medtronic petitioned for inter partes review (IPR), challenging all five patents on the basis that they were predated by a patent to Itou. During the IPR proceedings, Teleflex claimed that conception and reduction to practice occurred prior to Itou’s priority date and submitted several declarations and exhibits such as lab notebooks, internal company memoranda, presentations, invoices, sales orders, photographs, engineering drawings and documents from outside patent counsel in support of its contentions. Ultimately, the Board found that Itou did not constitute prior art and therefore Medtronic had failed to demonstrate that the challenged claims were unpatentable. Medtronic appealed.

On appeal, Medtronic did not challenge conception but argued that the Board’s findings on actual reduction to practice and reasonable diligence toward constructive reduction to practice should be reversed. To establish an actual reduction to practice, the patent owner must show that the inventors constructed an embodiment that met all the limitations of the claimed invention and determined that the invention would work for its intended purpose. Medtronic’s arguments were based on the grounds that the Board erred in three ways:

  1. Incorrectly identifying the intended purpose of the claimed invention
  2. Not requiring comparative testing to demonstrate that the invention worked for that purpose
  3. Relying solely on uncorroborated inventor testimony.

On the first issue, Medtronic argued that the Board incorrectly found an over-broad intended purpose of the claimed invention by relying too heavily on extrinsic evidence. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that while “the patents themselves are the most important” evidence, “it is appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence, particularly when it does not contradict the patents themselves.” The Court went on to conclude that the intended purpose here was broader than the narrow purpose argued by Medtronic (relating to difficult occlusions)—“[t]he very title of the patents themselves, ‘Coaxial Guide Catheter for Interventional Cardiology Procedures,’ describes the purpose of the claimed inventions, and it is undisputed that the [...]

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Neither Narrow Proposed Claim Construction nor Work Product Claim Justify Withholding Material Factual Information

The Patent Trial & Appeal Board of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) canceled all challenged claims across five patents because the patent owner failed to meet its duty of candor by selectively and improperly withholding material information that was inconsistent with its patentability arguments. Spectrum Solutions, LLC v. Longhorn Vaccines & Diagnostics, LLC, IPR2021-00847; -00850; -00854; -00857; -00860 (PTAB May 3, 2023) (Braden, Yang, Derrick, Pollock, APJs) (per curiam) (Braden, APJ concurring).

The Board instituted inter partes reviews (IPRs) against five Longhorn patents based on petitions filed by Spectrum. During the proceedings, Longhorn filed motions to amend, after which the Board issued preliminary guidance suggesting that Spectrum established a reasonable likelihood that the proposed substitute claims were unpatentable. Longhorn engaged Assured Bio Labs (ABL) to conduct biological testing that would support its arguments distinguishing a prior art reference, but Longhorn made attorney work product objections in Spectrum’s ABL depositions and withheld testing data inconsistent with its arguments on the patentability of the original and proposed substitute claims. The Board subsequently allowed additional questioning on certain ABL testing, after which Spectrum filed a motion for sanctions, requesting judgment against Longhorn, a finding that the prior art reference taught the claim limitations and precluding Longhorn from contesting the finding, and an award to Spectrum of compensatory expenses, including attorneys’ fees.

The Board determined that sanctions of adverse judgment as to all challenged claims was appropriate because Longhorn failed to meet its duty of candor and good faith. The Board explained that parties have a duty of candor and good faith before the Board that requires any factual contentions to be well supported by evidence. Parties have “a duty to disclose to the [PTO] all information known . . . to be material to patentability.” (37 C.F.R. §1.56(a).) Information is material to patentability when it is “not cumulative to information already of record or being made of record in the application and . . . it refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in . . . asserting an argument of patentability.” Taking a position contrary to any known fact while shielding factual information from the Board violates the duty of candor and good faith to the PTO, even if the party may otherwise withhold the information as being immaterial to patentability or privileged.

The Board criticized Longhorn’s proposed claim constructions as too narrow and contrary to the express language in both the original and proposed substitute claims. The Board explained that although Longhorn was free to maintain arguments grounded on Longhorn’s claim constructions, that did not excuse Longhorn’s duty of candor and good faith dealing, including disclosing material information relating to the Board’s preliminary claim constructions. Longhorn could not “simply withhold information” that the PTO would find material to patentability and should instead contest the Board’s constructions at trial.

The Board also explained that Longhorn took an overly strict view of what was material to claim patentability and a lax view as to the duty of candor [...]

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UK High Court Issues Landmark Global FRAND Rate Decision

The UK High Court of Justice issued its long-anticipated decision establishing a global Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) royalty rate for a patent portfolio essential to 3G, 4G and 5G cellular technologies. InterDigital Tech. Corp. et al. v. Lenovo Group Limited, Case No. HP-2019-000032, [2023] EWHC 529 (Pat) (Mar. 16, 2023) (Mellor, J.)

InterDigital owns a portfolio of standard essential patents (SEPs) that have been declared essential to the European Telecommunications Standard Institute’s (ETSI) 3G, 4G and 5G cellular technology standards. InterDigital sought to license the SEPs to Lenovo, which implements these cellular standards in its mobile phones, tablets and PCs. After the parties could not agree on the terms under which Lenovo should take a license, InterDigital filed a lawsuit. The High Court held several technical trials in which it found that Lenovo infringed certain of the patents.

Based on the result of the technical trials, the High Court determined that InterDigital had established the right to a FRAND determination of its portfolio. The parties presented two issues regarding FRAND. The first issue was whether the InterDigital license offer was FRAND, and if not, what terms would be FRAND for a license to Lenovo of the InterDigital patent portfolio. The second issue was whether InterDigital was entitled to an injunction based on the parties’ negotiation conduct, including whether InterDigital acted as a willing licensor and whether Lenovo acted as a willing licensee.

The High Court concluded that Lenovo should pay InterDigital a FRAND rate of $0.175 per cellular unit for a worldwide license to InterDigital’s portfolio. The $0.175 rate yields a lump sum payment of $138.7 million for sales from 2007 to the end of 2023. The Court’s FRAND rate determination was closer to Lenovo’s offered rate of $0.16/unit than to InterDigital’s demand of $0.498/unit.

In determining the appropriate FRAND rate, the High Court analyzed whether InterDigital’s proposed rate was comparable to the rate in InterDigital’s other license agreements for SEPs. InterDigital argued that its license offer to Lenovo was consistent with “program rates” under which it had already licensed its SEPs to other companies. The Court, however, rejected InterDigital’s program rates as comparable because the other licenses included volume discounts ranging from 60% to 80% of InterDigital’s program rate. InterDigital argued that Lenovo was not entitled to the same type of steep volume discount and, therefore, those licenses with discounts applied were not comparable licenses for Lenovo. The Court disagreed, finding that the volume discounts applied to those licenses “do not have any economic or other justification” and that their primary purpose was to “shore up InterDigital’s chosen program rates.” The Court further observed that the primary effect of the volume discount in the other licenses was to discriminate against smaller licensees, which is exactly what FRAND is supposed to avoid.

InterDigital tried to bolster its argument that its program rate was FRAND by applying a top-down cross-check. The top-down approach starts with the cumulative value of all royalties that should be paid on FRAND [...]

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Sleep Better: Amendments Proposed during IPR Deemed Proper and Valid

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s (Board) finding that proposed amendments made during an inter partes review (IPR) are valid and proper despite the inclusion of changes not related to patentability issues raised in the petition. Nat’l Mfg., Inc. v. Sleep No. Corp., Case No. 21-1321 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 2022) (Stoll, Schall, Cunningham, JJ.)

We’ve likely all seen the commercials promising a proven quality of sleep. Sleep Number is the owner of numerous patents, including several directed to methods for adjusting “the pressure in an air mattress ‘in less time and with greater accuracy’ than previously known.” The patents state this is achieved by taking pressure measurements at the valve enclosure and applying a pressure adjustment factor that is iteratively revised using an “adjustment factor error.” The patent states that this method allows for monitoring the pressure of the air mattress without the need to turn off the pumps.

American National Manufacturing challenged the validity of the patents in an IPR proceeding, claiming that most were rendered obvious by the prior art of Gifft in view of Mittal and Pillsbury and that six of the dependent claims requiring a “multiplicative pressure adjustment factor” would have been obvious in further view of Ebel. Gifft disclosed an air-bed system using valve assembly pressure to approximate the air chamber pressure and Mittal and Pillsbury both disclosed using additive offsets to improve accuracy. Ebel disclosed using both additive and multiplicative components to accurately measure the actual pressure in an inflating or deflating air bag.

The Board agreed with American National that it would have been obvious to combine Gifft, Mittal and Pillsbury and that the resulting combination rendered most of the claims obvious, but it also noted that the combination failed to show that a “skilled artisan would have applied Ebel’s multiplicative factors” to the prior art. However, in each proceeding Sleep Number filed a motion to amend the claims contingent on a finding that the challenged claims were unpatentable. The proposed claims included the “multiplicative pressure adjustment factor” that the Board had determined was not unpatentable along with other non-substantive changes.

American National took issue with these amendments, arguing they were legally inappropriate, non-enabled because of an error in the specification and lacked written description support. The Board disagreed. American National appealed. Sleep Number cross-appealed the Board’s finding of obviousness.

The Federal Circuit found that the proposed amendments were not improper even though some of the changes were non-substantive changes to address consistency issues. The Court pointed out that “once a proposed claim includes amendments to address a prior art ground in the trial, a patent owner also may include additional limitations to address potential § 101 or § 112 issues, if necessary.” The Court rejected American National’s argument that permitting such amendments creates an “asymmetrical” and “unfair” proceeding “by allowing the patent owner and the Board to address concerns that may be proper for [an] examination or reexamination proceeding, but that [...]

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And the Band Played On: Reviewing Rule 54(b) Partial Summary Judgment Based on Who Did What to Whom and When

In a case where the cast of characters on both sides of the v. evolved during the lead-up to the litigation as the litigants negotiated third-party deals and formed new entities, the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (characterizing the matter as the “entrepreneurial equivalent of musical chairs”) affirmed a dismissal of a trade secret claim against a foreign defendant but not against the related US entity, and found that the case qualified under Rule 54(b) for the “narrow exception” to the finality rule. Amyndas Pharmaceutical, SA v. Zealand Pharma A/S, Case No. 21-1781 (1st Cir. Sept. 2, 2022) (Barron, Selya, Kayatta, JJ.)

Amyndas is a Greek company with a US affiliate. It is a biotechnology firm that researches and develops therapeutics targeting a part of the immune system known as the complement system. One area of Amyndas’s research deals with “complement inhibitors.”

Amyndas’s research yielded compstatin, a peptide that selectively inhibits the C3 protein (which plays a role in activating the complement system). Amyndas also developed a related peptide (AMY-101) that targets that protein. Amyndas owns trade secrets and confidential information related to this work.

Zealand Pharma, a Danish biotechnology firm, contacted Amyndas about a potential partnership for the development of complement-related therapeutics. The firms entered into a confidential disclosure agreement (CDA) regarding information-sharing “for the purposes of evaluating a possible business/services relationship between the parties and their respective Affiliates.” Amyndas started giving Zealand Pharma access to confidential information (including confidential information about AMY-101). The firms also entered into a second CDA—with added protections—for “the evaluation or formation of a possible business and/or services and/or collaborative relationship.”

Both CDAs included an identical “Governing Law” provision stipulating that the CDAs would “be interpreted and governed by the laws of the country (applicable state) in which the defendant resides” and a forum-selection clause stipulating that “any dispute arising out of th[e CDA] shall be settled in the first instance by the venue of the defendant.”

Zealand Pharma also began its own research program focused on complement therapeutics. It did not inform Amyndas of this initiative. Although negotiations continued, the firms ultimately decided not to collaborate. Amyndas later terminated its information-sharing relationship with Zealand Pharma.

Zealand Pharma later formed Zealand US, a Delaware corporation. Without Amyndas’s knowledge or consent, Zealand Pharma also filed two European patent applications for compstatin analogues and later an international patent application designating the United States and claiming priority to the earlier  EU applications.

After the international applications were published, Amyndas learned that they described “compstatin analogues that are capable of binding to C3 protein and inhibiting complement activation,” which had been the focus of Amyndas’s research and a subject of Amyndas’s confidential information-sharing with Zealand Pharma.

The other defendant, Alexion, is an established player in the complement therapeutics field and a proprietor of Soliris, a complement inhibitor that targets a protein in the complement system. Soliris is approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and previously was the only FDA-approved and clinically available [...]

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