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Virtually Done: Computer Visualization Patents Are Ineligible for Protection

by Courtney Seams | Apr 18, 2024 | Patents

Addressing subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that patents related to computer visualizations of medical scans were patent ineligible. AI Visualize, Inc. v. Nuance Communications, Inc., Case No. 22-2019 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 4, 2024) (Moore, Reyna, Hughes, JJ.)

AI Visualize asserted four related patents, each having a substantially similar specification and the same title, against Nuance Communications. The patents are generally directed at systems and methods for users to virtually view a volume visualization dataset (a three-dimensional collection of data representing the scanned area of an MRI) on a computer without having to transmit or locally store the entirety of the dataset.

Nuance moved to dismiss the case, asserting that the claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter and invalid under § 101. The district court applied the two-step Alice inquiry to the claims, which the parties had grouped into three representative claims:

Claims where a web application directs the server to check what frames of a virtual view are stored locally and creates any additional frames necessary to create and display the virtual view of the medical image.
Claims with the further requirement that any previously requested virtual view be given a unique key, which the server checks for (and displays if the key exists) prior to completing the steps of the independent claim.
Claims without the requirement of checking to see if any images are stored locally.

In applying part one of Alice, the district court concluded that the asserted claims were directed to the abstract idea of “retrieving user-requested, remotely stored information” and not, as AI Visualize argued, to improvements in computer functionality. The district court then applied Alice step two and considered each of the three representative claims. The district court concluded that none of the claim limitations transformed the claims into patent-eligible applications of an abstract idea. Ultimately, the district court determined that all asserted claims were patent ineligible under § 101. AI Visualize appealed.

The Federal Circuit also applied the Alice analytical framework. Applying Alice step one, the Court considered whether the focus of the claimed advance was on an improvement in computer technologies, rather than the use of computers, and whether the claim limitations described a claimed advance over the prior art. The Court upheld the district court’s finding under Alice step one (i.e., that all three types of asserted claims were directed to an abstract idea) because the steps of obtaining, manipulating and displaying data, when claimed at a high level of generality, constitute an abstract concept. The Court did not agree with AI Visualize’s arguments that the creation of the virtual views is a technical solution to a technical problem because it requires the creation of “on the fly” virtual views at the client computer. In doing so, the Court refused to import details from the specification into the claims.

Applying Alice step two, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that [...]

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ITC Shines Light on DI: Complainant Can’t Aggregate Investments Across Patents, Prongs

by Alexander P. Ott | Apr 11, 2024 | Patents

Addressing a determination by its chief administrative law judge (CALJ) finding a violation of § 337, the US International Trade Commission reversed and held that the complainant had not satisfied the economic prong of the domestic industry (DI) requirement by aggregating its investment across multiple asserted patents. Certain Replacement Automotive Lamps (II), Case No. 337-TA-1292 (USITC Mar. 22, 2024).

In late 2021, Hyundai filed a complaint seeking an investigation under 19 U.S.C. § 337 based on alleged infringement of 21 design patents, each covering a different automotive headlamp or taillamp. In response, two of the proposed respondents filed a request seeking early disposition of the economic prong of the domestic industry under the Commission’s 100-day program. Hyundai filed a response opposing the 100-day program request based on the complexity of the issues. The Commission instituted the investigation and denied the 100-day program request, but when setting the procedural schedule, the CALJ scheduled an early evidentiary hearing on the economic prong of the domestic industry pursuant to the Commission’s pilot program for interim initial determinations. Following that initial hearing, the CALJ issued an interim initial determination finding that Hyundai had satisfied the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement. After the full evidentiary hearing, the CALJ issued a final initial determination finding a violation of § 337 by the respondents based on infringement of all asserted patents. The Commission decided to review both the initial and final determinations.

On review, the Commission reversed the finding that the complainant had satisfied the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement. As the Commission explained, where DI products do not have overlapping protection across common asserted patents, a complainant must treat each product as requiring a separate DI showing. The Commission cannot aggregate investments in articles covered by one patent with investments in articles only covered by a different patent. Here, because each DI product practiced only one of the asserted design patents, to satisfy the economic prong Hyundai was required to demonstrate that the investments in each product were independently significant. The Commission also held that investments in plant and equipment (§ 1337(a)(3)(A)) cannot be combined with employment of labor or capital (§ 1337(a)(3)(B)) and concluded that Hyundai had mistakenly aggregated its investments from both prongs.

Commissioner Schmidtlein filed an opinion concurring with the outcome but declining to join the majority opinion based on her view that it went beyond what was necessary to dispose of the investigation.

PTO Stands by Patent Fee Increases

by Amol Parikh | Apr 11, 2024 | Patents

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued a notice of rulemaking announcing proposed patent fee increases beginning next year. 89 Fed. Reg. 23226 (April 3, 2024). The proposed increases are generally consistent with the PTO’s May 2023 proposal.

The Notice states that the PTO needs the proposed fee adjustments to provide sufficient revenue to recover costs of patent operations in future years. To that end, the PTO proposes to set or adjust 455 patent fees, including 73 new fees. Complete information about the fee adjustments, including the Notice, is available on the PTO’s website.

The fee increases include higher amounts for routine fees necessary to obtain a patent, including filing, search, examination and issue fees. Excess claim fees will also increase to $200 for each claim over 20 and $600 for each independent claim over three. There will also be an escalating fee structure for terminal disclaimers, ranging from $200 if filed before the first office action to $1,400 if filed after the PTO grants the patent. The fees for filing requests for continued examination (RCE) will now use a tiered fee structure and will increase to $1,500 for the first RCE, $2,500 for the second RCE and $3,600 for the third RCE. Patent Trial & Appeal Board fees will increase by about 25%, and a new fee of $400 will be required for a Request for Director Review of a Board decision.

Written comments on proposed patent fees must be submitted by June 3, 2024, through the Federal eRulemaking Portal.

PTO to Patent Examiners: Make Interpretation of Means-Plus-Function Claims Clear in the Record

by Peter Brunovskis, PhD | Mar 28, 2024 | Patents

On March 18, 2024, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued a memorandum to patent examiners addressing means-plus-function and step-plus-function claim limitations and how to clearly articulate, in the prosecution record, the PTO’s interpretation of such claim limitations. The goal of the memorandum is to ensure consistency in connection with the examination of such limitations, provide both the applicant and the public with notice regarding the claim interpretation used by the patent examiner, and provide the applicant an opportunity to advance a different claim interpretation early in the prosecution.

As stated in 35 U.S.C. §112(f), “[a]n element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” The memorandum does not suggest any changes in interpretation of the statute.

One aspect of the memorandum is to remind examiners of the resources and guidance available when examining means-plus-function and step-plus-function claim limitations, specifically MPEP §§ 2181-2187 and refresh training. In accordance with the guidance, the primary steps when examining such claim elements include:

Determining whether a claim limitation invokes § 112(f)
Ensuring the record is clear with respect to invoking § 112(f)
Evaluating the description necessary to support a § 112(f) claim limitation under §§ 112(a) and (b).

To determine whether a claim limitation invokes §112(f), the guidance instructs examiners to employ the three-prong analysis set forth in MPEP § 2181, subsection I. Using this analysis, recitation of the terms “means” or “step” in association with functional language, rather than structure, material or acts for performing that function, should be interpreted as claim limitations invoking § 112(f). However, where these terms are accompanied by structure, materials or acts for performing the function, § 112(f) is not invoked. On the other hand, a limitation reciting functional language along with a generic placeholder term instead of “means,” which fails to recite sufficiently definite structure for performing the function, would nonetheless invoke § 112(f), according to a proper analysis. Examples of such generic placeholders include “mechanism for,” “module for,” “device for,” “unit for,” “component for,” “element for,” “member for,” “apparatus for,” “machine for” and “system for.”

An important caveat in the memorandum states that “[e]stablishing the interpretation of § 112(f) limitations in writing during prosecution is critical in supporting the agency goal of establishing a clear prosecution record.” The guidance advises examiners that form paragraphs are available in support of meeting this objective, which serve to inform “the applicant, the public, and the courts . . . as to the claim construction the examiner used during prosecution. This further informs the applicant, the public, and the courts (and the PTO for any post-grant review procedures) as to how the examiner searched and applied prior art based on the examiner’s interpretation of the claim.”

The memorandum further emphasizes the need to [...]

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Patenting Web Advertising? Ask Alice, I Think She’ll Know

by Daniel Sternberg | Mar 14, 2024 | Patents

In a wide-ranging opinion, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity for lack of patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with respect to claims directed to web-based advertising. Chewy, Inc. v. International Business Machines, Corp., Case No. 22-1756 (Fed. Cir. March 5, 2024) (Moore, Stoll, Cunningham, JJ.)

Chewy filed suit against International Business Machines (IBM) seeking a declaration that Chewy’s website did not infringe multiple patents related to web-based advertising. IBM responded by filing infringement counterclaims. After claim construction and discovery, the district court granted Chewy’s motions for summary judgment of invalidity for lack of patent eligible subject matter with regard to the asserted claims of one patent and noninfringement of the asserted claims of a second patent.

The claims of the first patent relate to providing a targeted advertisement from an “information repository” to a user based on the user’s internet search. In affirming the district court, the Federal Circuit first determined that, under Alice step 1, “[t]he claims broadly recite correlating advertisements with search results using a generic process.” The Court noted that the claims “merely recite the concept of identifying advertisements based on search results, without any specificity as to how this is accomplished,” and are directed to “the abstract idea of identifying advertisements based on search results.”

Turning to Alice step 2, the Federal Circuit found that the claims used a generic database and conventional processing steps, and “claimed use of a conventional repository for storing advertisements and associated search results in a well-known way.” Because “the claims recite the generic process for obtaining search results from a search query and using the search results to identify advertisements,” they failed under Alice step 2 and did not claim patent eligible subject matter under § 101.

Regarding the second asserted patent, the district court construed the claim term “selectively storing advertising objects at a store established at the reception system” as requiring the “advertising objects” to be “pre-fetched” and retrieved before the user requested a page on a website. Because it was undisputed that “Chewy retrieves advertisements in response to a user requesting a page” and not before, the district court ruled that Chewy’s website did not meet this claim limitation. Looking to the intrinsic claim construction evidence, the Federal Circuit held that the district court’s claim construction was amply supported by the specification and prosecution history and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement. Of note, the Court explained that the specification made multiple references to pre-fetching as being part “of the present invention” and therefore limited the scope of the claims.

With respect to one asserted claim of the second patent, which did not include the limitation at issue, the district court found that Chewy’s website did not practice the limitation of “establishing characterizations for respective users based on the compiled data” because “the record undisputedly showed they deliver advertisements based on the page the user is currently viewing, [...]

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Senate Holds Hearing on Legislative Initiative to Address Patent Eligibility

by Christopher M. Bruno and Kavya Rallabhandi | Feb 1, 2024 | Patents

Seeking to undo the current jurisprudence “mess” on the issue of patent eligibility, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Intellectual Property heard testimony on January 23, 2024, on the Patent Eligibility Restoration Act (PERA) (text here). PERA seeks to address the uncertainty and unpredictable outcomes created by the 2014 Supreme Court of the United States decision in Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l.

PERA is the latest iteration of 35 USC § 101 patent eligibility reform that Senators Thom Tillis (R-NC) and Chris Coons (D-DE) have been introducing for years. Although the language has been tweaked over time, the bill’s purpose is to eliminate “[a]ll judicial exceptions to patent eligibility” and in their place codify several categories of inventions as unpatentable, such as mathematical formulas; processes that are substantially economic, financial, business, social, cultural or artistic; processes that are mental or purely natural; unmodified human genes; and unmodified natural materials.

The January 23 hearing featured eight witnesses, divided into two panels. The first panel included:

Andrei Iancu, former US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) director
Richard Blaylock, testifying on behalf of Invitae Corporation
Courtenay Brinckerhoff, partner at Foley & Lardner
Phil Johnson, steering committee chair at the Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform.

The second panel included:

The Honorable David Kappos, former PTO director
Adam Mossoff, professor at the Antonin Scalia Law School
Mark Deem, operating partner of Lightstone Ventures
David Jones, executive director of the High-Tech Inventors Alliance.

Harkening back to prior panels, the testimony was largely in favor of reform considering what many characterized as inaction by all other stakeholders. Senators and witnesses alike recognized that legislative reform is likely the only way to gain clarity on § 101 considering the Supreme Court’s failure to take up more than 100 certiorari petitions seeking review, many with the Solicitor General’s endorsement.

During the first panel, Blaylock testified that PERA would improperly provide patent eligibility to new uses of natural phenomena, such as genetic material, and therefore “would stifle innovation and harm patient care in the fields of diagnostic genetic testing and precision medicine.” Iancu testified in response that “all human invention is the manipulation of nature towards practical uses by humans on this planet . . . and it should be eligible for a patent.” Brinckerhoff’s testimony also opposed Blaylock’s view; she explained that considerable research and development is needed to develop new uses for isolated natural products and would be disincentivized without patent eligibility. Brinckerhoff highlighted an important theme at the hearing: “PERA would bring eligibility back in line with other countries” by permitting patents on methods of detecting new diagnostic markers, thus maintaining international competitiveness. Lastly, Johnson testified that “[j]ust because something is eligible doesn’t mean it’s patentable” and stressed the importance of using §§ 102, 203 and 112 as additional filters to determine patentability.

During the second panel, venture capitalist Deem testified that “the United States is failing many of our most innovative startups” because [...]

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Struggling to Master the Alice Two-Step: Search Result Display Ineligible for Patent Protection

by Kathleen Lynch | Jan 18, 2024 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a lawsuit involving two software patents directed toward enhancements to search result displays, finding that both patents claimed subject matter that is ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. IBM v. Zillow Group, Inc., Case No. 22-1861 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 9, 2024) (nonprecedential) (Prost, Hughes, JJ.) (Stoll, J., dissenting).

IBM sued Zillow for infringing five patents. Claims from two of the patents were dismissed. For the remaining three patents, Zillow filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that all three patents were ineligible under § 101. The district court granted Zillow’s motion to dismiss, finding the asserted claims ineligible. IBM appealed.

Only two of the patents were subject to the appeal. The first patent was directed to a graphical user interface that improves search and selection based on user input to produce better results, and the second patent was directed to improvements in how to display search results to users.

IBM raised two arguments on appeal:

The district court erred in dismissing both patents, because the complaint and IBM’s inventor declaration were enough to show patent eligibility and—at minimum—survive the pleading stage.
The district court failed to resolve a claim construction dispute over a term in the second patent.

The Federal Circuit began by providing a primer on the Alice two-step process for evaluating patent eligibility. For step one, courts must “determine whether a patent claim is directed to an unpatentable law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea.” When the patent involves software, claims are ineligible where they merely describe a process or system that uses a computer as a tool applied to an otherwise abstract idea. For step two, courts must analyze whether the claims simply describe an abstract method. If the claims instead go further and transform an otherwise abstract idea into something new via an “inventive concept,” then the subject matter may be patentable.

Turning to the appeal, the Federal Circuit first addressed whether IBM’s complaint and inventor declaration should have been enough to establish subject matter eligibility at the pleading stage for either patent. Applying the Alice two-step test, the Court found that they were not and upheld the district court’s dismissal.

For the first patent directed to a graphical user interface, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the patent had three clear indicia of abstractness. First, the process could be done with pen and paper. Second, the claim language was result-oriented. Third, the patent focused on intangible information. The Court also found that the claims did “not disclose any technical improvement” to computer software. Thus, the claims failed at Alice step one. The Court found that IBM fared no better at step two, explaining that IBM’s argument for an inventive process hinged on the inventor declaration, which made no reference to the patent’s actual claim language. The Court explained that “[s]imply including allegations of inventiveness in a complaint, detached from what is claimed or discussed in [...]

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Same Applicant, Similar Claims Support Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Rejection

by Jake B. Vallen | Jan 4, 2024 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board obviousness-type double patenting rejection, finding that an unexpected mechanism of action does not render the known use of a known compound nonobvious. In re: Institut Pasteur, Case No. 22-1896 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2023) (Taranto, Clevenger, Stoll, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

Institut Pasteur filed a patent application directed to peptides derived from human basic proline-rich lacrimal protein and claimed, among other things, a method for treating pain comprising of administering 10 to 300 mg/day of the peptide for seven days. The examiner rejected the claims for obviousness-type double patenting over another patent application filed by Pasteur, which was directed to diagnostic and therapeutic uses of human basic proline-rich lacrimal protein and peptides derived therefrom.

Pasteur appealed to the Board, which affirmed the examiner’s rejection. Rather than appeal the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit, Pasteur sought continued examination of the application and modified the claims to specify that the method of treatment was for human patients, was in a dose of 1 mg/kg to 2 mg/kg at 10 to 300 mg/day, and should not induce pharmacodependence or tolerance in the patient. The examiner rejected the amended claims for obviousness-type double patenting over the same application. On appeal, the Board issued another decision agreeing with the examiner. Pasteur appealed this decision.

Pasteur argued that the Board’s second decision was unsupported by substantial evidence because the Board applied a legally flawed prima facie obviousness analysis and disregarded the secondary indicia of nonobviousness presented in a declaration submitted by Catherine Rougeot, the named inventor of the application.

The Federal Circuit disagreed with Pasteur and affirmed the Board’s rejection. As for Pasteur’s argument that the Board disregarded the differences between the claims of the patent application and the claims of the other application, the Court noted that the Board “explained why each claim limitation was obvious in light of the [other application].” With respect to Pasteur’s argument that the Board improperly relied on inherency when finding one limitation of the filed application to be satisfied, the Court concluded that “[i]t is settled that inherency may supply a missing claim limitation in an obviousness analysis.”

As for Pasteur’s challenge to the Board’s consideration of the secondary indicia of nonobviousness presented in the Rougeot declaration, the Federal Circuit found that the Board’s analysis was supported by substantial evidence. The Court made clear that Pasteur failed to prove that the benefits claimed by the application were unexpected compared to the closest prior art since unexpected mechanisms of action do not ipso facto make the known use of known compounds nonobvious. The Court also noted that Federal Circuit precedent did not demand a finding of nonobviousness simply because one limitation was found to be satisfied through inherency. The Court was similarly unpersuaded by the long-felt need described in the Rougeot declaration because any need for the subject matter claimed by the patent application was already satisfied by the subject matter claimed by the other [...]

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PTO Creates Separate Design Patent Bar

by Amol Parikh | Dec 7, 2023 | Patents

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) published its final rule, creating a separate design patent bar where admitted design patent practitioners will practice in design patent proceedings only. (88 Fed. Reg. 78644 (Nov. 16, 2023).)

Prior to this rulemaking, there was a single patent bar for those who practice in patent matters before the PTO, including in utility, plant and design patent proceedings. PTO regulations previously required that all patent bar practitioners pass a registration exam and possess specific and stringent scientific and technical qualifications, such as an engineering degree or substantial course work in physics, biology, chemistry or the like.

The new rule creates a separate design patent bar that still requires members to pass the current registration exam but permits applicants to have a bachelor’s degree, master’s degree or PhD in any of the following areas from an accredited college or university:

Industrial design
Product design
Architecture
Applied arts
Graphic design
Fine/studio arts
Art teacher education.

The new rules expanding the patent bar admission criteria are intended to encourage broader participation and to keep up with the ever-evolving technology and related teachings that qualify someone to practice before the PTO. Practitioners currently admitted before the PTO will not be impacted by the change and can continue to prosecute utility, plant and design patents.

The rule will take effect on January 2, 2024.

PTO Provides Guidance for Computer-Related Design Patent Applications

by Peter Brunovskis, PhD | Nov 30, 2023 | Patents

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) published a notice regarding supplemental guidance for PTO personnel examining design patent claims containing computer-generated images. 88 Fed. Reg. 80277 (Nov. 17, 2023).

The guidance clarifies how to satisfy the article of manufacture requirement under 35 U.S.C. 171 for ornamental designs relating to computer-generated icons shown on a display panel, as discussed in Section 1505.01(a)(I) of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP). According to the guidance, “the mere display of a computer-generated electronic image . . . on a display panel does not constitute statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 171.” However, a computer icon or a graphical user interface (GUI) shown on a display panel (e.g., a computer screen, monitor, computer display system, mobile phone screen or virtual/augmented reality goggles) is more than a mere display of a picture on a screen because it constitutes an integral and active component in the operation that is embodied in and/or applied to a programmed computer displaying the computer icon or the GUI. Thus, if a computer icon or GUI is properly presented and claimed (e.g., the drawing fully discloses the design as embodied in the article of manufacture), it is eligible under 35 U.S.C. 171.

In addressing the foregoing distinctions, the guidance sets forth specific standards for PTO personnel, including consideration of the complete disclosure when evaluating whether a design claim containing a computer-generated electronic image complies with the article of manufacture requirement. For example, given that computer icons or GUIs are considered to be two-dimensional images, which standing alone are surface ornamentation (i.e., an ornament, impression, print or picture), the guidance stipulates that the title and the claim should not be for a computer icon or a GUI alone, but rather an article of manufacture, such as a “display panel with a computer icon.” The guidance further provides examples of acceptable claim language and specific examination scenarios for evaluation.

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