The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that a district court abused its discretion by striking several of the plaintiff’s trade secrets, concluding that the court improperly relied on Rule 12(f) and failed to support dismissal as a discovery sanction under Rule 37. The Court emphasized that the fact-specific question of “reasonable particularity” in Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) cases is generally reserved for summary judgment or trial, not for resolution at the discovery stage. Quintara Biosciences, Inc. v. Ruifeng Biztech, Inc., et al., Case No. 23-16093 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2025) (VanDyke, Johnstone, JJ., Christensen, Dist. J.)
Quintara and Ruifeng are DNA sequencing analysis companies that engaged in a business arrangement. The relationship soured when Quintara alleged that Ruifeng locked Quintara out of its office, took possession of its equipment, and hired Quintara employees. Quintara sued Ruifeng under the DTSA for misappropriating nine trade secrets.
During discovery, Ruifeng moved for a protective order to pause proceedings until Quintara identified its trade secrets with reasonable particularity, as required by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 2019.210, the California version of the DTSA. The district court agreed with Ruifeng and ordered Quintara to disclose each allegedly misappropriated trade secret with reasonable particularity. Quintara filed an amended trade secret disclosure, but Ruifeng found it deficient and again moved to halt discovery. To resolve the impasse, the district court gave Ruifeng a choice: either accept the disclosure and proceed with discovery, or move to strike the disclosure, withhold discovery, and risk consequences if the motion failed. Ruifeng chose the latter and moved to strike Quintara’s trade secrets in the disclosure under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(f).
Citing its broad discretion over discovery and Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 16, the district court granted Ruifeng’s motion, holding that Quintara failed to comply with § 2019.210. As a result, the court struck nine of the 11 trade secrets from the disclosure, effectively dismissing Quintara’s misappropriation claims as to those trade secrets. Quintara appealed.
The question before the Ninth Circuit was when in the litigation, and with what level of particularity, a plaintiff under the DTSA must identify its alleged trade secrets. The Court began by noting that CUTSA requires a plaintiff to identify the alleged trade secret with “reasonable particularity” before discovery begins. In contrast, the federal DTSA imposes no such requirement regarding the timing or scope of trade secret identification. Instead, DTSA cases proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which do not require plaintiffs to specify their trade secrets with particularity at the outset of the case. The Court explained that under the DTSA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the claimed trade secret is described with sufficient particularity to distinguish it from general knowledge in the industry or from the specialized knowledge of those skilled in the trade. At an early stage of litigation, particularly when no discovery has yet occurred, it is not fatal to a plaintiff’s claim if the trade secret disclosure uses hedging language or leaves room to expand its identifications later. The Court explained that whether a plaintiff has identified a trade secret with sufficient particularity under the DTSA is a question of fact, typically suited for resolution at summary judgment or trial. The Court found that in striking Quintara’s trade secrets, the district court improperly relied on the California procedural rule that does not govern federal trade secret claims.
The Ninth Circuit further determined that even if Quintara’s trade secret disclosure could be construed as a pleading, the district court did not identify any “strikable” material under Rule 12(f). The Ninth Circuit noted that even assuming that some of Quintara’s disclosures failed to meet the district court’s “reasonable particularity” order, this alone did not constitute the kind of extreme circumstance that would justify dismissal under Rule 26 or 16. Because Rule 12(f) did not support striking any of Quintara’s trade secrets, the district court’s order amounted to an abuse of discretion.
