The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court decision denying a motion to vacate a default judgment for lack of proper service under the Hague Service Convention, finding that where the Convention applies, it provides the exclusive means of valid service and prohibits email service in China. Kangol LLC v. Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., Ltd., Case No. 25-2205 (7th Cir. May 29, 2026) (Kirsch, Jackson-Akiwumi, Pryor, JJ.)
Kangol sued several defendants, including Hangzhou, for trademark infringement, counterfeiting, unfair competition, false designation of origin, and trademark dilution. Kangol moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and permission to serve Hangzhou by email, which the district court approved. Kangol sent an email to Hangzhou that included a link to the complaint, TRO, and additional documents, after which the parties engaged in settlement discussions.
Because Hangzhou did not appear before the district court, the court entered default judgment in favor of Kangol. Subsequently, Hangzhou filed a motion to vacate the default judgment, arguing that the judgment was void under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) because the Hague Service Convention does not permit service by email in China. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the Convention allows service by email in China. Hangzhou appealed.
Hangzhou argued that the judgment was void under Rule 60(b)(4) for lack of personal jurisdiction because email service violated the Convention. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the issue de novo and analyzed whether the Convention applied, and if so, whether it prohibits email service in China.
Before reaching the merits, the Seventh Circuit rejected Kangol’s arguments that Hangzhou had waived its service objection and that its motion to vacate was untimely. The Court explained that Hangzhou’s participation in settlement discussions did not create a reasonable expectation that it would defend the suit on the merits or otherwise constitute waiver of its jurisdictional objections. The Court also found that Hangzhou’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion was filed within a reasonable time under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1), noting that Hangzhou sought relief shortly after Kangol successfully enforced a portion of the default judgment by collecting funds from one of Hangzhou’s online accounts.
Kangol argued that the Hague Service Convention did not apply because Article 1 excludes cases in which the address of the person to be served is not known, and Kangol maintained that Hangzhou’s address could not be reliably determined despite Kangol’s efforts to do so. In evaluating whether a defendant’s address is “not known,” district courts generally require plaintiffs to undertake reasonably diligent efforts to ascertain the defendant’s mailing address. The district court, however, did not determine whether Kangol’s efforts satisfied that standard, concluding instead that it need not resolve the Convention’s applicability because, even if the Convention applied, it permitted service by email in China.
The Seventh Circuit first analyzed the text and structure of the Hague Service Convention, relying on Supreme Court precedent (including Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. US District Court for the Southern District of Iowa (1987), Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk (1988), and Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon (2017)) to conclude that, where the Convention applies, it specifies the permissible methods of service and precludes methods not authorized by its terms. Articles 11 and 19 reinforce this conclusion because they expressly preserve certain service methods authorized by agreement between the parties or by the receiving state’s domestic law, indicating that the Convention otherwise provides a closed universe of permissible service methods.
The Seventh Circuit next considered whether any provision of the Convention authorized service by email in China. Although no provision expressly permits email service, the parties disputed whether email constitutes a “postal channel” within the meaning of Article 10(a). The Court declined to resolve that question, concluding that it was unnecessary to do so because China has expressly objected to service through the methods authorized by Article 10(a). Accordingly, even assuming email could qualify as a postal channel, Article 10(a) could not authorize service by email in China.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that if the Convention applied, service by email on a defendant in China was improper because the Convention authorizes only specified methods of service and China has objected to the only provision that could arguably encompass email service. Because the district court never determined whether the Convention applied in the first instance (specifically, whether Hangzhou’s address was “known” within the meaning of Article 1) the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to resolve that threshold issue.
Practice note: Under the Hague Service Convention, parties must comply with service methods explicitly provided in the Convention, except for alternative service methods permitted by Articles 11 and 19.
