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Chilly Adventures: Design Patent Prior Art Comparison Applies to Article of Manufacture

Addressing a matter of first impression concerning the scope of prior art relevant to a design patent infringement analysis, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that “to qualify as comparison prior art, the prior-art design must be applied to the article of manufacture identified in the claim.” Columbia Sportswear North America, Inc. v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc., Case Nos. 21-2299; -2338 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 15, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Hughes, JJ.)

Columbia owns a design patent that covers an ornamental design of a heat reflective material. Seirus markets and sells products (e.g., gloves) made with material that it calls HeatWave. An image of Columbia’s patented design and Seirus’s HeatWave material appear below:

Columbia Patented Design

Seirus HeatWave

Columbia sued Seirus for infringement. After the district court granted summary judgment of infringement, Seirus appealed to the Federal Circuit. The Court issued its decision in Columbia I, concluding that the district court improperly declined to consider the effect of Seirus’s logo in its infringement analysis and resolved certain issues that should have been left to the jury. The Court therefore vacated summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

On remand, the district court held a trial. Before trial, the district court limited admissible comparison prior art to “wave patterns of fabric,” declined to instruct the jury that “prior art” referred to prior designs of the claimed article of manufacture, and declined to instruct the jury that it did not need to find that any purchasers were deceived or that there was any actual or likelihood of confusion among consumers in the marketplace. Seirus was permitted to admit three prior art references that disclosed fabric, and Columbia was precluded from distinguishing the references by arguing that they did not disclose heat reflective material. The jury returned a verdict of noninfringement. Columbia appealed.

Among other things, Columbia challenged the exclusion of evidence and jury instructions concerning comparison prior art, and the jury instructions implicating Seirus’s logo.

The Federal Circuit began by discussing the appropriate prior art comparison in the context of design patent infringement. Citing its 2008 en banc decision in Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, the Court explained that under the ordinary-observer test governing design patent infringement, prior art can help highlight distinctions and similarities between the claims and the accused design. For instance, when a claimed design is close to a prior art design, small differences between the accused design and the claim design are likely to be important. Conversely, if an accused design copied a particular feature of the claimed design that departs from the prior art, the accused design is likely to be regarded as deceptively similar to the claimed design, and thus infringing.

The question of first impression before the Federal Circuit was the proper scope of comparison prior art that may be [...]

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The End Is Not So Near: Patent Term Adjustments Count in Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Determinations

Addressing for the first time how patent term adjustments (PTAs) interact with obviousness-type double patenting (ODP), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that when members of a patent family have different expiration dates due to PTAs, the earlier expiring family members can be used as a basis for an ODP invalidity challenge against the later expiring family members. In re Cellect, LLC, Case Nos. 2022-1293; -1294; -1295; -1296 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 2023) (Lourie, Dyk, Reyna, JJ.)

Cellect owns several patents directed to devices with image sensors, such as personal digital assistant devices and phones. Each patent claims priority from a single application. None of the patents were subject to a terminal disclaimer, and each was granted PTA under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) because of PTO delay during prosecution. Had the patents not been granted PTA, each one would have expired on the same date as the original application.

After Cellect sued for infringement, the defendant requested ex parte reexaminations and asserted that the patents were unpatentable based on ODP. During the reexaminations, the Examiner “determin[ed] that the challenged claims were obvious variants of Cellect’s prior-expiring reference patent claims” because “although the ODP invalidating reference patents form a network across the four ex parte reexamination proceedings, all invalidated claims can be traced back to the single family member [now expired] patent that did not receive a grant of PTA.” The Patent Trial & Appeal Board affirmed the Examiner’s finding. Cellect appealed.

The Federal Circuit began with the inquiry for determining unpatentability based on ODP and whether, in that context, a patent’s expiration date includes a duly granted PTA under 35 U.S.C. § 154. While the Court recognized that the relevant expiration date for an ODP analysis where a patent received a patent term extension (PTE) is the pre-PTE expiration date, the Court concluded that, in the context of patents that have received PTAs, the relevant expiration date for analyzing ODP is the expiration date accounting for the PTA regardless of whether a terminal disclaimer has been filed. The Court reasoned that when determining whether claims are unpatentable for ODP, PTA and PTE, they “should be treated differently” because each is governed by different statutes that were designed to address different circumstances. While both PTAs and PTEs were intended to recover lost patent terms, PTAs were designed to extend patent terms because of administrative delays in patent processing and preclude the extension of a patent term past a terminal disclaimer. PTEs were designed to extend a patent term because of regulatory delays in product approval and are not foreclosed by a terminal disclaimer. As such, the Court reasoned that not contemplating a PTA when analyzing ODP would “frustrate the clear intent of Congress” because “when a terminal disclaimer has been entered in a patent subject to PTA, no patent (or claim) may be extended beyond the disclaimed expiration date.”

The Federal Circuit next considered whether examiners are required to consider “equitable concerns” such as good faith when [...]

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Disgorgement of Profits Appropriate Remedy for Breach of Contract, Trademark Infringement

In a trademark infringement and breach of contract case involving real estate companies with a shared name, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the trademark owner, including almost $43 million in profit disgorgement. Dewberry Engineers v. Dewberry Group, Case Nos. 22-1622; -1845 (4th Cir. Aug. 9, 2023) (Gregory, Thacker, JJ.) (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting).

Dewberry Engineers and Dewberry Group (formerly Dewberry Capital) operate in the same states, and both provide commercial real estate services. Dewberry Engineers started in the mid-1950s as a civil engineering and surveying firm in northern Virginia. Over time, its business expanded to include real estate development services such as architecture and site development. Dewberry Group similarly provides real estate development services through its affiliates, including the Dewberry Hotel in Charleston, South Carolina.

In 2006, Dewberry Group sent Dewberry Engineers a cease-and-desist letter, asserting that Dewberry Group had “senior common law rights” to use “Dewberry” in real estate. In response, Dewberry Engineers sued Dewberry Group for infringing its federally registered DEWBERRY trademark. That litigation ended in 2007 when the parties entered a confidential settlement agreement (CSA). Among other things, the CSA stated that Dewberry Group:

  • Would not challenge Dewberry Engineers’ trademark registrations
  • Could use its “Dewberry Capital” name except in enumerated geographical areas where it instead must use “DCC”
  • Would use no logo other than its “column” logo.

In 2017, Dewberry Group rebranded and attempted to register DEWBERRY GROUP and other marks, which the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) repeatedly rejected.

In 2020, Dewberry Engineers filed suit claiming breach of contract and trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and Virginia common law. The district court granted summary judgment to Dewberry Engineers on the contract claim, finding that Dewberry Group had violated the unambiguous CSA by changing its logo, among other offenses. The district court also granted summary judgment to Dewberry Engineers on its trademark infringement claim, finding that Dewberry Engineers’ mark was not only valid, it was incontestable since it had been in continuous use for more than five years. The district court also found that the likelihood-of-confusion factors favored infringement. The district court entered a permanent injunction against Dewberry Group’s use of “Dewberry” and granted Dewberry Engineers its attorneys’ fees and profit disgorgement. Because the court believed the tax information Dewberry Group provided did not show the true “economic reality” of the close relationship between Dewberry Group and its affiliates, the disgorgement calculation also included some of Dewberry Group’s affiliated companies’ profits. Dewberry Group appealed, challenging the summary judgment grant, the permanent injunction and the monetary awards.

The Fourth Circuit began by noting that there was “uncontroverted evidence” that Dewberry Group used the DEWBERRY trademark, used a logo other than its column logo and failed to use “DCC” in restricted areas, all in breach of the undisputedly valid CSA. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s finding that Dewberry Group breached the CSA.

The Fourth Circuit next addressed the trademark infringement claim. The Court rejected [...]

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Not on the Merits: Claim Preclusion Doesn’t Bar Inducement Claims After Direct Infringement Case

Applying Seventh Circuit law to determine whether the dismissal of patent infringement claims should be upheld on the basis of claim preclusion, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court ruling that the claims were precluded by res judicata. Inguran, LLC v. ABS Global, Inc., Case No. 22-1385 (Fed. Cir. July 5, 2023) (Lourie, Bryson, Reyna, JJ.)

At the district court, ABS argued that a previous infringement suit brought by Inguran precluded it from bringing the instant suit. At issue was whether the previous suit asserting direct infringement of Inguran’s “GSS technology” used to create “single-sexed semen straws” barred the current suit, which alleged that ABS induced third parties to infringe upon the same technology by entering into licensing agreements with these third parties. The district court agreed with ABS. Inguran appealed.

To successfully assert claim preclusion under Seventh Circuit law, a party must meet the following three-factor test:

  1. An identity of the parties or their privies in the first and second lawsuits
  2. An identity of the cause of action
  3. A final judgment on the merits in the first suit.

The Federal Circuit’s analysis focused on the second requirement. In determining whether there was an identity of the cause of action, the Court examined whether the second claim was based on the same set of transactional facts as the earlier litigation between the parties. In patent infringement cases, the general rule is that res judicata does not bar the assertion of new rights acquired during the previous action, which could have been litigated but were not (i.e., claims that arose while the litigation was ongoing but after the original complaint was filed).

The Federal Circuit determined that the transactional facts between the present case and the previous litigation were different because the cases respectively centered around theories of induced infringement by third parties and direct infringement. As the Court noted, “The evidence needed to support these two claims (induced infringement vs direct infringement) is different.” To allege and prove induced infringement, Inguran needed to establish additional facts beyond what it asserted in the previous case to show direct infringement. As the Court noted, an “induced infringement claim rests on evidence and elements beyond those required by direct infringement.” Although minimal evidence regarding the activities of the third parties was part of the record in the previous litigation, the parties ultimately stipulated that direct infringement occurred. The issue of induced infringement, however, was never presented to the jury.

The Federal Circuit held that although both cases implicated similar facts, including extensive discussions of the “GSS technology,” the direct infringement allegations could not reasonably serve to bar later allegations regarding the actions of third-party licensees. The Court accepted Inguran’s argument that any induced patent infringement claim it might have brought at the time of the earlier case would have been based on speculation: “[w]e agree with ST that it could not have asserted an inducement claim during ABS I.” The Court therefore rejected the district [...]

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DC Circuit to Disputes Ancillary to Patent Matters: “You Can’t Sit with Us”

For the first time, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed whether appeals of discovery orders ancillary to a patent suit are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The DC Circuit joined its sister circuits and held in the affirmative. Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft Zur Förderung Der Angewandten Forschung E.V. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., Case No. 22-7001 (DC Cir. Feb. 17, 2023) (Srinivasan, Henderson, JJ., Edwards, Sr. J.)

In February 2017, Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft Zur Förderung commenced a civil action for patent infringement against Sirius XM Radio in the District of Delaware. During discovery, Fraunhofer subpoenaed for deposition Sirius XM’s former Chief of Marketing Officer, My-Chau Nguyen, a resident of Washington, DC.

After Nguyen failed to appear for her deposition, she filed a motion in the US District Court for the District of Columbia to quash the subpoena. Fraunhofer responded with a cross-motion to compel Nguyen’s deposition and a motion for sanctions. The DC district court denied Nguyen’s motion to quash, ordered her to sit for deposition, found her in contempt for failing to appear for deposition in the first instance, and expressed an intent to award sanctions upon Fraunhofer’s submission of documentation reflecting fees and costs. Fraunhofer appealed to the DC Circuit.

The DC Circuit first addressed whether it had jurisdiction to consider Nguyen’s challenge to the district court’s order compelling her deposition in light of the fact that Nguyen’s deposition had already been taken at the time of appeal. The Court held that Nguyen’s challenge was moot because “[n]umerous courts have held that an appeal from enforcement of a subpoena becomes moot once the party has complied with the subpoena.” Therefore, the Court reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Nguyen’s subpoena challenge because she had already complied with the subpoena at the time of the appeal.

Next, the Court addressed whether it had jurisdiction to assess the merits of Nguyen’s challenge to the district court’s finding of contempt and intent to award sanctions. The Court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider these issues.  The Court explained that because “the underlying litigation between Fraunhofer and Sirius XM in the District of Delaware arises under an Act of Congress relating to patents[,]” Nguyen’s discovery dispute in the DC district court was “ancillary to a patent suit.” The DC Circuit reasoned that only the Federal Circuit is vested with jurisdiction over appeals “arising under . . . any Act of Congress related to patents[.]” (28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).) Holding similarly to other circuits, the Court concluded that because Nguyen’s discovery dispute was ancillary to a patent matter, the ability to decide the merits of her appeal was solely within the province of the Federal Circuit.

The DC Circuit found that it did not have the authority to transfer Nguyen’s challenges to the Federal Circuit, however. The DC Circuit concluded that it was forced to dismiss rather than transfer because “this appeal could not have been brought [...]

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Patenting a Nice Cool Glass of Nicotinamide Riboside? Claims Covering Milk Invalid under § 101

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that claims covering a naturally occurring composition were not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 merely because one component of the composition had been “isolated.” ChromaDex, Inc. v. Elysium Health, Inc., Case No. 2022-1116 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2023) (Chen, Prost, Stoll, JJ.)

ChromaDex sued Elysium (a former ChromaDex customer) for infringement of its patent directed to dietary supplements containing nicotinamide riboside (NR). Elysium moved for summary judgment, arguing that the asserted claims were invalid under the § 101 prohibition against patenting natural phenomena. After the district court granted summary judgment, ChromaDex appealed.

The asserted claims were directed to a composition comprising:

  • Isolated NR
  • One or more of tryptophan, nicotinic acid or nicotinamide
  • One of 22 carriers
  • Increased NAD+ biosynthesis after eating.

Both parties conceded that milk satisfies every element of the asserted claims with the exception that its NR is not “isolated.” Both parties also conceded that milk is a naturally occurring material and thus not patent eligible under § 101.

On these facts, the issue presented was whether the claim limitation that the NR must be “isolated” (which does not occur in nature) was sufficient to make the claims patent eligible. The Federal Circuit responded “no.”

The Federal Circuit analyzed the asserted claims under two tests: the “markedly different characteristics” test set out in Chakrabarty, and the Alice two-step test (unsure whether Chakrabarty remains controlling precedent).

Under the Chakrabarty test, a claimed composition is not a natural phenomenon if it has “markedly different characteristics” from what occurs in nature. The Federal Circuit found that ChromaDex’s claimed composition had no markedly different characteristics from natural milk. While ChromaDex argued that isolation potentially allowed for unnaturally high concentrations of NR, the claims did not require such concentrations. The claims included compositions structurally and functionally identical to milk and therefore failed the “markedly different characteristics” Chakrabarty test.

Proceeding to the two-part Alice test, under step 1 the Federal Circuit found that the claims were directed to a product of nature because there were no structural differences between the claimed composition and natural milk. Under step two, the Court found that there was no “inventive step” because the claims were merely directed to increasing NAD+ biosynthesis, which was a natural principle that resulted from drinking milk.

Practice Note: During claim drafting, care should be taken to avoid claims that encompass all structural and functional components of a naturally occurring material.




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Delayed Disclaimer: Patent Owner Arguments Made during IPR Not a Claim Limiting Disclaimer in That Proceeding

Repeating a conclusion from an earlier non-precedential opinion in VirnetX, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) need not accept a patent owner’s arguments as a disclaimer in the very same inter partes review (IPR) proceeding in which those arguments are made. CUPP Computing AS v. Trend Micro Inc., Case Nos. 2020-2262, 2020-2263, 2020-2264, at *11 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2022) (Dyk, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

CUPP Computing is the owner of three related patents each entitled “systems and methods for providing security services during power management mode.” After CUPP sued Trend Micro for patent infringement, Trend Micro filed petitions for IPR against all three patents, asserting that several claims of CUPP’s patents were obvious over two prior art references. The Board instituted all three IPR and found all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious. CUPP appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s conclusions. The principal issue concerned CUPP’s argument that the Board erred in claim construction. In CUPP’s view, all of the evidence required the claimed “security system processor” be remote from a “mobile device processor.” The Court rejected CUPP’s arguments. Starting with the claims, the Court found that they simply required that the two processors be different. Although some claims required the security system to send a wake signal to or communicate with the mobile device, that language did not support CUPP’s remoteness construction. As the Court explained, just as an individual can send a note to oneself via email, a unit of the mobile device can send signals to and communicate with the same device. Indeed, some of the claims teach communication via an internal port of the mobile device, which was consistent with a preferred embodiment disclosed in the specification in which the two processors could be within the same mobile device.

The Federal Circuit then addressed CUPP’s disclaimer arguments. The Court agreed with the Board that CUPP’s statements made during the original prosecution were far from clear and unmistakable, being susceptible to several reasonable interpretations that are contrary to CUPP’s construction. The Court also agreed with the Board that CUPP’s arguments during the Trend Micro IPRs do not qualify as a disclaimer for purposes of claim construction. While a disclaimer made during an IPR proceeding is binding in subsequent proceedings, the “Board is not required to accept a patent owner’s arguments as disclaimer when deciding the merits of those arguments.”

As the Federal Circuit explained, expanding the application of disclaimers to the proceedings in which they are made—as CUPP proposed—is rife with problems. IPR proceedings are more similar to district court litigation than they are to initial examination, and it is well established that disclaimers in litigation are not binding in the proceeding in which they are made. Further, CUPP’s proposal would effectively render IPR claim amendments unnecessary, as patent owners would be free to change the scope of their claims retrospectively without regard to the protections provided by the IPR claim amendment process, such as [...]

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File Like an Eagle: ANDA pH Specification Rules Infringement Inquiry

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding of noninfringement in a Hatch-Waxman case under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) and § 271(a)-(b). The Court found that the alleged infringer’s abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) specification controlled the § 271(e)(2) infringement inquiry, and that there were no clear errors by the district court that would warrant reconsideration of the § 271(a)-(b) ruling. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. et al. v. Eagle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Case No. 21-2342 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 18, 2022) (Moore, Prost, Hughes, JJ.)

Par is the maker of Vasostrict®, a vasopressin injection product used to treat patients with critically low blood pressure. Par sued Eagle, an ANDA filer seeking to market a generic version of Vasostrict®, asserting infringement of two Orange Book-listed patents. The claims of both asserted patents required a vasopressin composition with a rounded pH between 3.7 and 3.9 (i.e., a pH between 3.65 and 3.94 before rounding). Par argued that Eagle infringed because Eagle’s ANDA sought approval for a product with a pH of 3.64, just 0.01 beneath the claimed range, and because “real-world” evidence purportedly showed that the pH of Eagle’s product drifts up over time. Accordingly, Par asserted infringement under § 271(e)(2), based on the filing of Eagle’s ANDA, and also sought a declaratory judgment that Eagle’s planned generic product would infringe under § 271(a)-(b). The district court disagreed. Par appealed.

Turning first to the issue of infringement under § 271(e)(2), the Federal Circuit explained that because drug manufacturers are bound by strict statutory provisions to sell only those products that comport with their ANDAs, if an ANDA defines a proposed generic drug in a manner that directly addresses the issue of infringement, the ANDA controls the infringement inquiry. The Court stated, however, that if an ANDA specification does not speak clearly and directly to the question of infringement, courts may look to other relevant evidence, such as data or samples the ANDA filer has submitted to the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA), to assess whether a proposed product will infringe.

The Federal Circuit found that in Eagle’s case, “the inquiry begins and ends with Eagle’s ANDA specification.” Eagle’s ANDA contained both a release specification, requiring the generic product to have a pH range of 3.4–3.6 (i.e., up to 3.64 before rounding) at the time of distribution, and a stability specification, requiring that same pH range throughout the entirety of the product’s shelf life. Par argued that the stability specification was irrelevant to the infringement inquiry because the FDA cannot ensure that every product Eagle sells complies with the stability specification. The Court disagreed, finding that the district court did not clearly err in ruling that Eagle’s ANDA defined a product outside the scope of Par’s claims.

As to Par’s declaratory judgment claim under § 271(a)-(b), the Federal Circuit found that the district court did not commit clear error in its consideration of Par’s infringement arguments. The district court considered but did not find compelling Par’s evidence of an upward pH drift in Eagle’s post-release pH data [...]

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Can’t Hide Behind Minor Clerical Error to Escape Willful Infringement Verdict

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision correcting a clerical error in a claim. Pavo Solutions LLC v. Kingston Technology Company, Inc., Case Nos. 21-1834 (Fed. Cir. June 3, 2022) (Lourie, Prost, Chen, JJ.)

The Pavo patent is generally directed to a “flash memory apparatus having a single body type rotary cover.” CATR Co., later substituted by Pavo, sued Kingston for infringing the Pavo patent. Supported by the patent specification and prosecution, the district court judicially corrected the claim language in its claim construction order to read “pivoting the cover with respect to the flash memory main body,” not “pivoting the case with respect to the flash memory main body” (change emphasized). Pavo’s damages expert, Bergman, presented a profit-based model of reasonable royalty damages, relying on an earlier settlement agreement between CATR and IPMedia to arrive at a profit split of 18.75%, amounting to 40 cents/unit for Kingston. The jury returned a verdict of willful infringement and awarded Pavo a 20% reasonable royalty.

Judicial Correction

The Federal Circuit addressed and affirmed three issues on appeal, the first being that the district court approximately corrected an obvious minor clerical error in the claims. Correction is appropriate “only if (1) the correction is not subject to reasonable debate based on consideration of the claim language and the specification and (2) the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims.” In deciding whether a particular correction is appropriate, a court “must consider how a potential correction would impact the scope of a claim and if the inventor is entitled to the resulting claim scope based on the written description of the patent.”

The Federal Circuit decided that the error was clear from the full context of the claim language, supported by the specification, and did not broaden the claim scope. Additionally, the correction was not subject to reasonable debate. Judicial correction “is merely giving to it the meaning which was intended by the applicant and understood by the examiner.” Kingston’s alternative correction would just reverse the order in which the structural components appear in the claim.

The prosecution history also did not suggest a different interpretation of the claim. The applicant and the examiner consistently characterized the claims as describing pivoting the case within the cover, which both the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) and the court recognized. Each reviewing body understood the nature and scope of the invention consistent with correcting “case” to “cover.” Kingston argued that the Board denied the applicant’s request to correct the language, but the denial was on procedural grounds.

Willfulness

Second, the Federal Circuit determined that Kingston could form requisite intent to support a willful infringement verdict despite its arguments that it reasonably relied on not infringing the claims as originally written, and it could not anticipate that a court would later correct the claims. However, “reliance on an obvious minor clerical error in the claim language is not a defense to willful infringement.” By definition, [...]

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Time Bar Dismissal Saves Patent Found Unpatentable

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal, finding it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision to vacate an institution decision of inter partes review (IPR) based in part on the Board’s time bar evaluation. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Bennet Regulator Guards, Inc., Case No. 21-1759, (Fed. Cir., May 13, 2022) (Lourie, Stoll, JJ.) (Newman, J. dissenting)

This is the third time this case has been before the Federal Circuit. On July 18, 2012, Bennett served Atlanta Gas with a complaint alleging infringement of its patent. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. More than two and a half years after service of the complaint, Atlanta Gas filed an IPR petition. Bennett argued that Atlanta Gas’s IPR petition was time barred, but the Board disagreed, instituted review of all claims and found every claim unpatentable in a final written decision. After receiving the final decision, Bennett sought sanctions for Atlanta Gas’s failure to notify the Board of Atlanta Gas’s changed parentage. On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s final written decision, finding the IPR time barred under 35 U.S.C. §315(b). (Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co.). The Supreme Court thereafter issued its decision in Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Tech, where it held that time bar determinations are not reviewable. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s unpatentability decision, did not address the time bar decision and remanded the case back to the Board to finalize its order on sanctions (Bennett II). On remand, the Board vacated its institution decision in light of the US Patent & Trademark Office’s (PTO) changed policy on time bar evaluations and declined to award the requested sanctions. Atlanta Gas appealed.

The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Atlanta Gas argued that the Board’s decision was a final sanctions decision that is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) and that any portion of the Board’s determination beyond the sanctions award violated the Court’s mandate in Bennett II. Bennett countered that the Court lacked jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) and the Supreme Court’s Thryv decision and that the Board’s decision was not inconsistent with the Bennett II mandate. The Court agreed, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the Board’s decision was based in part on its time bar evaluation and, therefore, was not purely a sanctions decision. Additionally, the Court found that the time bar determination was within the scope of the mandate, albeit mooting its determination of unpatentability.

Judge Newman dissented. In her view, the sanctions order was the only issue on appeal. She also pointed out the inconsistency with the Bennett II mandate, noting the contradiction in the Federal Circuit currently mooting the unpatentability decision with the Bennett II decision finding the patent unpatentable. She explained that denial of appellate review could be seen as authorizing the Board to vacate its final decisions [...]

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