Fair use or foul play? The AI fair use copyright line

The US District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of an artificial intelligence (AI) company, finding that its use of lawfully acquired copyrighted materials for training and its digitization of acquired print works fell within the bounds of fair use. However, the district court explicitly rejected the AI company’s attempt to invoke fair use as a defense to rely on pirated copies of copyrighted works as lawful training data. Andrea Bartz, et al. v. Anthropic PBC, Case No. 24-CV-05417-WHA (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2025) (Alsup, J.)

Anthropic, an AI company, acquired more than seven million copyrighted books without authorization by downloading them from pirate websites. It also lawfully purchased print books, removed their bindings, scanned each page, and stored them in digitized, searchable files. The goal was twofold:

  • To create a central digital library intended, in Anthropic’s words, to contain “all the books in the world” and to be preserved indefinitely.
  • To use this library to train the large language models (LLMs) that power Anthropic’s AI assistant, Claude.

Each work selected for training the LLM was copied through four main stages:

  • Each selected book was copied from the library to create a working copy for training.
  • Each book was “cleaned” by removing low-value or repetitive content (e.g., footers).
  • Cleaned books were converted into “tokenized” versions by being simplified and split into short character sequences, then translated into numerical tokens using Anthropic’s custom dictionary. These tokens were repeatedly used in training, allowing the model to discover statistical relationships across massive text data.
  • Each fully trained LLM itself retained “compressed” copies of the books.

Once the LLM was trained, it did not output any of the books through Claude to the public. The company placed particular value on books with well-curated facts, structured analyses, and compelling narratives (i.e., works that reflected well-written creative expressions) because Claude’s users expected clear, accurate, and well-written responses to their questions.

Andrea Bartz, along with two other authors whose books were copied from pirated and purchased sources and used to train Claude, sued Anthropic for copyright infringement. In response, Anthropic filed an early motion for summary judgment on fair use only under Section 107 of the Copyright Act.

To assess the applicability of the fair use defense, the court separated and analyzed Anthropic’s actions across three distinct categories of use.

Transformative training (fair use)

The authors challenged only the inputs used to train the LLMs, not their outputs. The district court found that Anthropic’s use of copyrighted books to train its LLMs was a transformative use, comparable to how humans read and learn from texts and produce new, original writing. While the authors claimed that the LLMs memorized their creative expression, there was no evidence that Claude released infringing material to the public. The court concluded that using the works as training inputs – not for direct replication, but to enable the generation of new content – favored a finding of fair use.

Format-shifting copies (fair use)

[...]

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Seeing double? Director instructs Board to resolve claim construction pre-institution

The acting director of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) vacated and remanded a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision to institute two inter partes review (IPR) petitions that challenged the same claims. The acting director determined that the two petitions primarily differed with respect to claim construction. In a decision designated as “informative,” he authorized the Board to resolve claim construction pre-institution in view of the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide’s (CTPG) direction that “one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations.” CrowdStrike, Inc. v. GoSecure, Inc., IPR2025-00068; -00070 (PTAB June 25, 2025) (Stewart, Act. Dir.) The PTO designates a decision as informative when it provides “norms on recurring issues, guidance on issues of first impression to the Board, guidance on Board rules and practices, and guidance on issues that may develop through analysis of recurring issues in many cases.”

CrowdStrike submitted two IPR petitions that challenged the same claims of GoSecure’s patent. The Board instituted both IPRs. GoSecure requested director review, asserting that instituting both petitions was an abuse of the Board’s discretion. On review, the acting director determined that the Board abused its discretion in view of the CTPG’s direction.

The acting director concluded that the two petitions did not reflect an exception to the CTPG’s direction. He determined that CrowdStrike’s petitions were primarily distinguished by the constructions applied to a claim term. The acting director explained that the Board should have construed the term at issue prior to granting institution, concluding that the Board’s institution decision amounted to improper expansion of CrowdStrike’s permitted word count and placed a substantial and unnecessary burden on the Board and GoSecure that could raise fairness, timing, and efficiency concerns. The acting director vacated and remanded the Board’s institution decision.

The acting director also instructed the Board that the patent owner should be allowed to “submit whatever arguments are necessary for the panel to make a claim construction determination” even if the patent owner has not addressed the issue.




When it comes to objective criteria of nonobviousness, nexus is looser for license evidence

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit partially reversed a decision by the Patent Trial & Appeal Board, effectively relaxing the nexus requirements for patent licenses pertaining to their usage as objective indicia of nonobviousness. Ancora Technologies, Inc. v. Roku, Inc. et. al., Case Nos. 23-1674; -1701 (Fed. Cir. June 16, 2025) (Lourie, Reyna, Hughes, JJ.) (per curium).

Ancora owns a patent directed to limiting software use on a computer through license verification. The patented technology centers on storing an “agent,” which is a license verification program, in a computer’s basic input/output system (BIOS) rather than in volatile memory. In 2021, Nintendo, Roku, and VIZIO separately filed petitions for inter partes review (IPR) challenging claims of Ancora’s patent. The Board consolidated the proceedings and ultimately found certain claims of the patent unpatentable as obvious over a combination of two prior art references: Hellman (which discloses storing license information in nonvolatile memory) and Chou (which discloses a BIOS-level security routine). Ancora appealed.

Ancora raised three issues on appeal:

  • That the Board erred in construing the claim term “agent”
  • That even if the Board correctly construed “agent,” it nonetheless erred in determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on a combination of Hellman and Chou
  • That the Board erred in its analysis of secondary considerations of nonobviousness.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s construction of “agent” to mean “a software program or routine” with no further limitations. The Court disagreed with Ancora’s argument that “agent” was limited to use in software only, primarily because neither the patent nor prosecution history provided any disclaimer of hardware. For similar reasons, the Court also disagreed with Ancora’s argument that “agent” was limited to use at the operating-system level.

On the obviousness determination, the Federal Circuit upheld the Board’s conclusion that the combination of Hellman and Chou rendered the claims prima facie obvious. The Court rejected Ancora’s argument that the Hellman/Chou combination would not provide motivation to combine since they are redundant.

The Federal Circuit disagreed with the Board’s analysis of the objective indicia of nonobviousness, particularly the treatment of Ancora’s licensing evidence. The Board found that Ancora failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the claimed invention and evidence of two objective indicia of nonobviousness: industry praise and licensing.

The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board on industry lack of nexus for the alleged praise (where the Board found that praise for the invention in a press release and an agreement between Ancora and another company offering products using the patent was directed broadly to the patent and not specifically to the challenged claims). However, the Court found that the Board erred regarding the appropriate nexus as it relates to Ancora’s licensing evidence.

The Board found that Ancora failed to show a nexus between the challenged claims and two licenses it obtained through settlement agreements in other cases. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the Board applied an overly stringent nexus standard inconsistent with precedent. While products may require detailed [...]

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Looks like estoppel, sounds like estoppel … but it’s just director discretion

The acting director of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) granted a patent owner’s request for discretionary denial and denied institution of an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding, finding that the petitioner engaged in unfair dealings by challenging a patent on which its employees were the inventors. Tessell, Inc. v. Nutanix, Inc., IPR2025-00322 (PTAB June 12, 2025) (Stewart, Act. Dir.)

Four individuals were Nutanix employees when they invented the subject matter of the challenged patent. Two of the individuals left to form Tessell and later hired the other two. Tessell, which now includes nearly all of the inventors of the challenged patent, filed a petition for IPR arguing that the claims of the patent were unpatentable. Nutanix filed a request for discretionary denial, which Tessell opposed.

The doctrine of assignor estoppel generally prevents an inventor who has sold or assigned a patent from challenging the validity of the patent. Although assignor estoppel does not apply in IPR proceedings, the acting director explained that the PTO may consider unfair dealings as a factor when determining whether to exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The acting director found that it was inappropriate for the inventors to have used PTO resources to obtain a patent only to later advocate for its unpatentability. The acting director therefore exercised discretion to deny institution.




Case closed: Commission sanctions ruling isn’t an import decision

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that a denial of sanctions at the International Trade Commission was not a “final determination” under trade law because it did not affect the exclusion of imported goods. Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. ITC and Future Link Systems, LLC, Case No. 23-1187 (Fed. Cir. June 18, 2025) (Reyna, Bryson, Stoll, JJ.)

In 2019, Future Link entered into a license agreement with MediaTek, Inc. (not a party to the present litigation), which included a provision for a lump-sum payment if Future Link filed a lawsuit against Realtek. Future Link subsequently initiated a patent infringement complaint against Realtek before the Commission. During the proceedings, Future Link settled with a third party and determined that the settlement resolved the underlying dispute, prompting it to notify Realtek and ultimately withdraw its complaint. Realtek moved for sanctions, citing the MediaTek agreement as improper, but the administrative law judge (ALJ), while expressing concern about the agreement’s lawfulness, found no evidence it influenced the complaint and denied sanctions. The Commission terminated the investigation after no petition for review of the ALJ’s termination order was filed. Realtek then petitioned the Commission to review the denial of sanctions, but the Commission declined, closing the sanctions proceeding. Realtek appealed to the Federal Circuit, not challenging the investigation’s termination but seeking an order requiring Future Link to pay a fine based on the alleged impropriety of its agreement with MediaTek.

Realtek argued that the Commission and the ALJ violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). In response, the Commission and Future Link not only defended the denial on the merits but also challenged the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction and Realtek’s standing to appeal. The Court agreed that it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6), which only authorizes review of final determinations under specific subsections of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1337). Because the Commission’s denial of sanctions under subsection (h) does not constitute a “final determination” under § 1337(c), the Court declined to address standing or the merits of the sanctions issue.

The Federal Circuit emphasized that a “final determination” within the meaning of § 1295(a)(6) refers to decisions affecting the exclusion of imported articles, such as those made under subsections (d), (e), (f), or (g) of § 1337. Realtek argued that the Commission’s denial of its sanctions request qualified as a final merits decision, but the Court disagreed, citing long-standing precedent, including its 1986 decision in Viscofan, S.A. v. ITC, that limits appellate jurisdiction to exclusion-related rulings. Because the sanctions decision had no bearing on whether products were excluded from importation, the Court held that it lacked the authority to review and dismissed the appeal.




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