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Funked out: Sixth Circuit finds copyright ownership claim accrues upon plain and express repudiation

by Tyler Jackson | Jun 11, 2026 | Copyrights

Addressing when a copyright ownership claim accrues under the Copyright Act, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed a summary judgment grant, finding that genuine disputes of material fact remained as to whether a musician’s estate timely asserted joint ownership rights in certain sound recordings. The Court explained that an ownership claim accrues only when one party plainly and expressly repudiates another party’s ownership. Est. of Worrell v. Thang, Inc., Case No. 25-1863 (6th Cir. May 27, 2026) (Boggs, Batchelder, Moore, JJ.)

George Bernard (Bernie) Worrell, Jr. and George Clinton were members of Parliament-Funkadelic (P-Funk), the influential funk collective that began in the 1950s. Worrell collaborated with Clinton and P-Funk for approximately a decade before leaving the group in the 1980s. During that period, Worrell and Clinton allegedly operated under several informal and disputed agreements, including a purported 1976 agreement under which Worrell allegedly assigned ownership of certain sound recordings to Thang, Inc. (a company owned by Clinton) in exchange for royalty payments. The parties disputed whether the agreement was ever validly executed, and Worrell allegedly was not consistently paid under it.

After Worrell died in 2016, his estate sued Thang in New York state court in 2019 for breach of contract. Thang prevailed, arguing that Worrell did not possess a countersigned copy of the 1976 agreement. In that litigation, Clinton submitted sworn testimony stating that Thang never signed the agreement and that Clinton himself did not sign either the original or a copy.

Two years later, the estate sued Thang in federal district court, seeking a declaration that Worrell jointly owned the sound recordings he created with P-Funk and requesting an accounting of royalties. The district court granted summary judgment to Clinton and Thang, finding that the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations barred the estate’s claims. The estate appealed.

The Sixth Circuit explained that a copyright ownership claim accrues only once and must be brought within three years of accrual. Following its own precedent and the approach of other circuits, the Court reiterated that an ownership claim accrues when there has been a “plain and express repudiation” of ownership by one party against another. The Court emphasized that the repudiation inquiry is fact-intensive and subject to equitable considerations.

Applying that standard, the Sixth Circuit found genuine disputes of material fact as to when, if ever, Clinton and Thang plainly and expressly repudiated Worrell’s alleged co-ownership. The Court reasoned that because the New York court had determined that Thang never executed the 1976 agreement, which was the agreement that purportedly exchanged Worrell’s ownership rights for royalty payments, a fact finder could conclude that Worrell never gave up his joint ownership rights in the recordings. The Sixth Circuit also found that the parties’ decades-long conduct in relation to the agreement complicated the limitations analysis and precluded summary judgment.

The Sixth Circuit also considered whether the estate had presented sufficient evidence of joint authorship. Under the Copyright Act, a joint work is one prepared by two or more authors [...]

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Transformative documentary use, work made for hire doctrine defeat copyright claims

by Lisette Donewald | May 14, 2026 | Copyrights

Elaborating on the application of the fair use doctrine in the documentary context, the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment after determining that seven of the eight works at issue were works made for hire and that the defendant’s use of the eighth work constituted fair use under all four statutory factors. Whyte Monkee Productions, LLC v. Netflix, Inc., Case No. 22-6086 (10th Cir. Apr. 30, 2026) (Holmes, Hartz, Carson, JJ.)

The dispute arose from Netflix’s use of video footage in its documentary series Tiger King. The footage was filmed by Timothy Sepi, who later claimed copyright ownership through his company, Whyte Monkee Productions. Whyte alleged that Netflix infringed its copyrights by including eight videos in the series.

Netflix argued that the first seven videos were made for hire because Sepi created them while he was employed by the Greater Wynnewood Exotic Animal Park. The district court agreed, crediting evidence that filming was part of Sepi’s job responsibilities and noting significant inconsistencies between Sepi’s 2016 and 2021 deposition testimony regarding his employment and role in creating the footage.

The eighth video, which was the only one not created within the scope of Sepi’s employment, was a 24-minute recording of a funeral. Netflix used approximately 66 seconds of the funeral video in Tiger King. The district court agreed with Netflix that this was fair use. Whyte appealed.

Whyte advanced new arguments on appeal challenging the work made for hire status of the first seven videos. The new arguments differed meaningfully from those presented to the district court. The Tenth Circuit found that the new arguments were waived because Whyte failed to raise the theories below or argue for plain error on appeal. Thus, the Court declined to consider them and affirmed summary judgment as to the first seven videos.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling regarding the eighth video that all four fair use factors favored Netflix.

Factor one: Transformative use and justification

The Tenth Circuit’s analysis of the first factor (the purpose and character of the use) emphasized that the central question is whether the secondary use has a distinct purpose or character, not merely whether it adds new meaning. The Court explained that the original funeral video functioned as a memorial recording while Tiger King repurposed the footage to illustrate and comment on Joe Exotic’s personality, specifically his performative behavior and megalomania. That difference in purpose rendered the use transformative.

The Court clarified the role of “justification” and “targeting” in transformative use analysis. Where a secondary use has a sufficiently distinct purpose or character, no independent justification, such as parody or direct commentary on the original work, is required. Targeting the original work is necessary only where the secondary use does not otherwise establish meaningful transformativeness. This analysis tempers overly rigid interpretations of the Supreme Court’s Warhol v. Lynn decision and preserves flexibility for documentary and contextual uses.

The Court further determined that although Tiger King was a commercial [...]

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It’s not a trap: A shared copyright license can still be exclusive

by Keval Amin | May 14, 2026 | Copyrights

Addressing statutory standing under the Copyright Act, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, holding that a license is not rendered nonexclusive merely because the copyright owner retained certain rights or previously granted nonexclusive licenses. Great Bowery Inc. v. Consequence Sound LLC, Case No. 24-12482 (11th Cir. May 5, 2026) (Jordan, Newsom, Corrigan, JJ.)

In 2014, a photographer entered into an artist agreement granting Great Bowery the exclusive right to license and market certain photographs. The photographer retained the ability to provide those works to select third parties for limited projects. Around the same time, Condé Nast invited the photographer to shoot the cast and crew of new Star Wars films and obtained a nonexclusive license to publish the photographs in Vanity Fair magazine.

When photographs from Vanity Fair’s Star Wars feature later appeared on Consequence Sound’s website, Great Bowery sued Consequence Sound for copyright infringement.

During discovery, Great Bowery relied on a 2018 authorization letter from the photographer permitting Great Bowery to enforce her copyrights on her behalf. The district court denied Great Bowery’s untimely motion to amend the complaint to add the photographer as a coplaintiff and granted summary judgment for Consequence Sound. The district court concluded that Great Bowery lacked statutory standing under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) because it did not hold an exclusive copyright interest. Great Bowery appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of leave to amend, explaining that while third party infringers generally may not challenge technical deficiencies in a copyright transfer, they are permitted to dispute whether a purported transfer actually conveyed any exclusive rights. Because Consequence Sound challenged the substance of Great Bowery’s alleged ownership rather than the adequacy of the writing, Great Bowery bore the burden of establishing standing, and Consequence Sound was entitled to contest it.

On the merits, however, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment, holding that the district court misapplied governing law on exclusive licenses. The district court had concluded that Great Bowery’s license was necessarily nonexclusive because the photographer retained certain usage rights and had previously granted Condé Nast a nonexclusive publication license. According to the Eleventh Circuit, that reasoning misunderstood the divisibility of copyright interests.

The Eleventh Circuit explained that copyright rights enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 106, such as reproduction, distribution, and public display, are divisible and independently transferable. As a result, a copyright owner may retain or grant some rights while conveying others exclusively. The presence of retained rights or prior nonexclusive licenses does not categorically defeat exclusivity as long as the licensee possesses at least one exclusive § 106 right sufficient to confer standing under § 501(b).

Applying that principle, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that Condé Nast’s preexisting nonexclusive license necessarily precluded Great Bowery’s exclusive rights. A nonexclusive license grants only permission to use copyrighted material and does not transfer ownership of any portion of the copyright. Thus, the photographer remained free to transfer exclusive ownership interests to [...]

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Unauthorized streaming of foreign TV programming dishes up copyright infringement liability

by Lauren Hong | Apr 23, 2026 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a judgment for an exclusive licensee arising from unauthorized streaming of Arabic language television programming into the United States. The Court’s ruling reinforces both the strength of registered foreign works and the limits on an accused infringer’s ability to challenge ownership and transfer agreements. Dish Network L.L.C. v. Fraifer, Case No. 24-10223 (11th Cir. Apr. 9, 2026) (Branch, Abudu, Kidd, JJ.)

DISH had exclusive US rights to distribute and publicly perform certain Arabic language television channels (protected channels). DISH’s rights derived from agreements with MBC FZ LLC, which provides five of the protected channels. Fraifer operated UlaiTV and AhlaiTV, selling set top boxes and using internet infrastructure to capture live broadcasts abroad and retransmit them to customers in the United States via content delivery networks (CDNs) without DISH’s authorization. After a bench trial, the district court found direct copyright infringement. Fraifer appealed.

Fraifer raised three arguments on appeal, all of which the Eleventh Circuit rejected.

First, Fraifer argued that DISH failed to establish valid ownership of the copyrighted works, which were first published in the United Arab Emirates. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. The Court concluded that MBC’s US copyright registrations were entitled to the statutory presumption of validity. Because DISH was not the author of the works, the Court examined whether DISH had sufficiently established MBC’s initial ownership. Fraifer argued that the works were “joint works” under UAE law, which would undermine MBC’s sole ownership. But the Court concluded that the television programs were better characterized as “collective works,” since the various creative contributions (writing, music, directing, and other artistic elements) were inseparable in the final audiovisual products.

That classification mattered because under UAE copyright law, the entity directing the creation of a collective work may exercise the relevant rights absent an agreement to the contrary. The Eleventh Circuit also declined to entertain a late-raised challenge to the validity of the registrations, noting that Fraifer had failed to preserve invalidity as an affirmative defense. As a result, MBC was entitled to the statutory presumption of ownership, which DISH could rely on.

Second, Fraifer contended that MBC had not validly transferred exclusive rights to DISH. Even assuming arguable defects in the written conveyances, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Fraifer lacked standing to raise the issue. Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act is designed to resolve disputes between copyright owners and transferees, not to provide accused third party infringers with a defense where neither the owner nor the transferee disputes the transfer. Because MBC and DISH agreed on the status of the rights, Fraifer could not dispute the transfer.

Finally, Fraifer challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting direct infringement. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, finding that the record supported the finding of direct infringement based on Fraifer’s use of encoders to ingest live broadcasts and push copyrighted programming onto its streaming system for customer viewing. The Eleventh Circuit also upheld the district court’s evidentiary rulings, including the admission of expert testimony, monitoring [...]

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Blackbeard’s revenge: State sovereign immunity ends long running copyright battle

by Sarah Bro | Feb 12, 2026 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a 2021 district court ruling and vacated a subsequent 2024 ruling in a decade-long legal battle over copyright infringement claims related to the pirate Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s Revenge shipwreck, concluding the claims were barred under state sovereign immunity. Allen v. Stein, Case No. 24-1954 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2026) (Niemeyer, King, Harris, JJ.)

Background

The dispute stems from Frederick Allen and Nautilus Productions’ allegations that the state of North Carolina and its officials infringed on Allen’s copyrights for photographs and videos of the shipwreck recovery project.

Allen initially filed suit in 2015, alleging that North Carolina officials infringed his copyrights by using his footage without authorization and enacting legislation (dubbed “Blackbeard’s Law”) that designated such materials as public records. The district court largely dismissed Allen’s claims in 2017 on sovereign immunity grounds, but the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on the validity of the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA) in 2018, concluding that Congress had not validly abrogated state sovereign immunity for copyright claims. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision in Allen v. Cooper (2020), confirming that states are immune from copyright infringement suits under the CRCA.

Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling, Allen sought to reopen the case in 2021, relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and introducing a new constitutional theory based on United States v. Georgia (2006). The district court allowed Allen to amend his complaint and proceed with his claims under the “Georgia theory,” which argues for case-by-case abrogation of state sovereign immunity for conduct that violates the Fourteenth Amendment. In 2024, the district court denied North Carolina’s sovereign immunity defense for Allen’s copyright infringement claims under this theory, allowing the case to proceed. North Carolina appealed.

Fourth Circuit decision

The Fourth Circuit reversed the 2021 district court decision and vacated the 2024 ruling, finding that the district court abused its discretion in reopening the litigation. The Fourth Circuit explained that Rule 60(b)(6) was the only applicable procedural mechanism for reconsideration because the case had been fully resolved in 2020 following the Supreme Court’s decision and Allen’s voluntary dismissal of the remaining defendant. The Court emphasized that Rule 60(b)(6) requires “extraordinary circumstances,” which were not present in this case. Allen’s failure to raise the Georgia theory earlier in the litigation did not meet this standard.

The Fourth Circuit also criticized the district court’s reliance on Rule 54(b), which applies to interlocutory orders, rather than Rule 60(b), which governs final judgments. The Court noted that the district court’s 2021 decision was based on erroneous legal premises and failed to properly evaluate the timeliness, merits, and prejudice factors required under Rule 60(b).

Pendent appellate jurisdiction

A key aspect of the Fourth Circuit’s decision was its exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the 2021 district court ruling, even though it was not directly appealable. The Fourth Circuit determined that the 2021 decision was “inextricably intertwined” with the appealable 2024 ruling on sovereign immunity because the [...]

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Striking a chord: Ninth Circuit revives copyright suit over liturgical music

by Hannah Hurley | Sep 11, 2025 | Copyrights

In a copyright case involving liturgical music, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded a district court summary judgment after finding triable issues of fact regarding access and similarity between two musical compositions. The Court upheld the exclusion of the plaintiff’s late-disclosed evidence on access. Ambrosetti v. Or. Cath. Press, et al., Case No. 24-2270 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (Thomas, Smith, Rayes, JJ.)

Vincent Ambrosetti, a prolific composer of sacred music, alleged that Bernadette Farrell copied his 1980 composition “Emmanuel” when writing her 1993 hymn “Christ Be Our Light.” Both works are widely used in Catholic liturgy, and Farrell’s song has become a staple in worship settings around the globe. Ambrosetti claimed that Farrell had access to “Emmanuel” through her association with Oregon Catholic Press (OCP), which published her work and had received copies of Ambrosetti’s music in the 1980s. He also pointed to striking musical similarities between the two compositions.

The district court excluded key evidence (letters from OCP’s then-publisher Owen Alstott acknowledging receipt of Ambrosetti’s music) as a sanction for late disclosure and barred Ambrosetti from arguing that Farrell accessed “Emmanuel” through those letters. Without that theory of access, and finding no striking similarity, the district court granted summary judgment for OCP. Ambrosetti appealed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the letters, finding that the sanctions were not “claim dispositive” since Ambrosetti could still pursue other theories of access and striking similarity. However, the panel reversed the summary judgment ruling, concluding that triable issues of fact existed as to whether Farrell had access to “Emmanuel” based on her and Alstott’s attendance at music conventions where Ambrosetti performed.

The Ninth Circuit also found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether “Emmanuel” and “Christ” were substantially similar. According to Ambrosetti’s expert, 23 similarities in pitch, rhythm, and melodic development supported a finding of substantial similarity, with the district court noting that while individual elements may not be protectable, the unique combination could be. In vacating the summary judgement, the Ninth Circuit noted that summary judgment is “not highly favored” in copyright cases involving musical works where the evidence relied on is primarily competing expert testimony.

The Ninth Circuit upheld the exclusion of Alstott’s letters as a discovery sanction but found a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of access remained, thus precluding summary judgement.

Wrestling with prevailing defendant’s post-trial fee request in copyright dispute

by Christian Tatum | Aug 21, 2025 | Copyrights, Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees to the defendant after it prevailed at trial in a copyright infringement suit, concluding that the district court adequately addressed the Supreme Court’s Fogarty factors and did not abuse its discretion. Booker T. Huffman v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., et al., Case No. 22-40072 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025) (Richman, Elrod, Oldham, JJ.) (Oldham, J., dissenting) (nonprecedential).

Booker Huffman, a retired professional wrestler, alleged that Activision’s “Prophet” character in Call of Duty: Black Ops IV infringed his G.I. Bro comic book poster. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Activision. Activision then sought attorneys’ fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505, arguing that Huffman’s claims were frivolous, objectively unreasonable, and brought in bad faith, citing a lack of supporting evidence and substantial proof of independent creation. The district court found that the claims involved unsettled areas of law and were neither frivolous nor objectively unreasonable. Applying the factors the Supreme Court outlined in Fogarty v. Fantasy (1994), the district court concluded that an award of attorneys’ fees was not warranted. Activision appealed.

Activision argued that the district court failed to follow Fifth Circuit precedent, which holds that fee awards are “the rule rather than the exception” for prevailing parties in copyright actions. Activision contended that Huffman’s claims were meritless due to a lack of evidence establishing access, striking similarity, or causation. The Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments, emphasizing that there is no automatic entitlement to fees and that the district court’s six-page Fogerty analysis was more thorough than in other cases in which the Fifth Circuit has sustained lower court fee decisions. The Fifth Circuit highlighted that the district court carefully analyzed whether Huffman’s claims were objectively unreasonable, noting that the case implicated areas of unsettled law. The panel emphasized the district court’s denial of Activision’s pretrial motions, the evidence supporting Huffman’s access and similarity, and the district court’s evaluation of the evidentiary record.

The Fifth Circuit also rejected Activision’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by failing to analyze each of the Fogerty factors separately, finding that the judge recited the parties’ arguments for the relevant factors and that it could be inferred that the district court did not find Activision’s arguments persuasive. Throughout its analysis, the Court emphasized that a district court’s attorneys’ fees decision is reviewed only for abuse of discretion and not to relitigate the merits.

Judge Oldham dissented, concluding that Huffman’s claims were “speculation piled on fantasy piled on a pipe dream” and that overwhelming evidence of independent creation made the suit clearly unreasonable. Judge Oldman would have awarded fees to compensate Activision for defending against what he characterized as a baseless $32 million claim and to deter similarly unmeritorious lawsuits in the future.

To kill a derivative: Licensee has no post-termination copyright control

by Richard (Rick) Evans | Aug 7, 2025 | Copyrights

Addressing a dispute concerning two derivative stage adaptations of Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of declaratory relief, finding that the plaintiff did not infringe any copyright interest in derivative works following the termination of the defendant’s exclusive licensing grant. Atticus Limited Liability Company v. The Dramatic Publishing Company, Case No. 23-1226 (2d Cir. July 29, 2025) (Wesley, Chin, Perez, JJ.)

In 1969, Harper Lee granted Dramatic an exclusive license to create and license a derivative work stage adaptation of To Kill a Mockingbird for non-first-class productions (e.g., amateur and community theater). Lee terminated that grant in 2011 under the Copyright Act’s termination provisions, effective in 2016. In 2015, Lee granted exclusive rights to develop and perform a second derivative stage adaptation to Atticus.

In 2019, Dramatic initiated arbitration against Lee’s estate asserting continued exclusive rights to non-first-class productions despite the termination. The arbitrator ruled in favor of Dramatic. Subsequently, Atticus, which was not a party to the arbitration, sought declaratory judgment that performances of its play did not infringe any rights held by Dramatic. The district court ruled in favor of Atticus and awarded Atticus more than $200,000 in attorneys’ fees. Dramatic appealed the judgment and the parties cross-appealed the award of fees.

Dramatic argued that its exclusive right to stage non-first-class productions of To Kill a Mockingbird survived Lee’s termination of the 1969 grant under the Copyright Act’s derivative works exception. The Second Circuit rejected this argument, finding that Dramatic improperly equated its rights in the derivative work with ownership rights in the original copyrighted work. While Dramatic could continue using its play under the original grant, it could not prevent the creation or authorization of new adaptations. Those exclusive rights belonged to Lee and reverted to her upon termination of the grant.

Dramatic also argued that:

Lee’s grant to Atticus was invalid because it preceded the effective termination date of Dramatic’s grant.
Atticus’ claim was untimely.
Atticus’ claims were barred by res judicata based on the earlier arbitration.

The Second Circuit disposed of each of these arguments, explaining that:

The grant date was irrelevant because Dramatic no longer held exclusive rights.
The statute of limitations did not toll because Atticus’ claim was for noninfringement, not ownership.
The claims were not barred by res judicata because Atticus was not a party to the arbitration.

Regarding the award of attorneys’ fees, the Second Circuit agreed that Dramatic’s statute of limitations and res judicata defenses were objectively unreasonable, justifying a fee award, but found no basis for fees based on an alleged forfeiture of Dramatic’s statute of limitations defense since it was properly raised in the answer, even if not included in its opposition to Atticus’ pre-answer motion for summary judgment. The Court further found that Atticus was not entitled to attorneys’ fees for Dramatic’s limited discovery efforts to determine Atticus’ involvement in the arbitration or for the current appeal. Accordingly, the [...]

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Que sera, sera: No declaratory relief after songwriter’s heir terminated copyright assignments

by Taylor MacDonald | Jul 17, 2025 | Copyrights

Addressing the intersection of a trust beneficiary’s rights to royalties and an heir’s copyright termination rights under 17 U.S.C. § 203, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the beneficiary’s request for declaratory relief for failure to state a claim. Tammy Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc. and Travilyn Livingston, Case No. 24-5263 (6th Cir. Jul. 7, 2025) (Readler, Siler, Clay, JJ.)

Jay Livingston was a prominent 20th century songwriter. In 1985, he established a family trust that granted the beneficiaries royalties from nearly 250 songs and transferred his reversionary copyright interests in the songs to the trust. The copyright interest was reversionary because in 1984, Livingston executed a contract that began assigning copyright interests in the songs to a company whose legal successor would become Jay Livingston Music. That contract laid the groundwork for successive agreements that would each transfer a specific song to the company. By 2000, Livingston had assigned his interests in each song to Jay Livingston Music.

In 2000, Livingston signed a second overarching contract, extending the company’s rights to the full duration of each song’s copyright protection. The songs’ copyrights expire around 2050. In 2003, after Livingston passed away, a California probate court ordered that the trust no longer held any rights in his copyright interests beyond the royalties.

In 2015, Travilyn Livingston (Livingston’s only child) terminated the assignment to Jay Livingston Music of 32 songs under § 203(a)(2)(B) of the Copyright Law, reverting all rights to Travilyn. Tammy Livingston, Travilyn’s daughter, sued Travilyn in 2022, requesting declaratory relief stating either that the termination notices Travilyn used were invalid or that Tammy remained entitled to royalties from the 32 songs under state law. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. Tammy appealed.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court. The Sixth Circuit considered whether Livingston executed the 2000 contract as an individual or a trustee and to what extent that affected the validity of the assignment extensions. The Court determined that the probate court’s 2003 order had preclusive effect and that Livingston had signed the 2000 contract in his individual capacity. Therefore, the company – not the trust – held the valid assignments in 2015 when Tammy terminated them.

Tammy argued that Travilyn could only terminate the assignments if they had been transferred to a third party in 1984. Tammy claimed that Travilyn did not own the company when the 1984 contract was executed and that Livingston thus granted the rights to himself as the owner of the company. The Sixth Circuit was unpersuaded by this argument because the 1984 agreement stated that Travilyn owned the company on the date of execution. Tammy next argued that the district court committed reversable error when it stated that Travilyn owned the company “sometime before” the 1984 contract’s execution rather than on the day, as the contract itself stated. The Court found that this misstatement did not rise to reversible error.

Finally, to support her [...]

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Supreme Court to consider whether ISPs can be liable for contributory copyright infringement

by Amol Parikh | Jul 10, 2025 | Cert Alert

The Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to review whether an internet service provider (ISP) can be liable for copyright infringement for providing an internet connection that leads to piracy. Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, Case No. 24-171 (Supr. Ct. June 30, 2025) (certiorari granted). The questions presented are:

Whether the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred in holding that a service provider can be held liable for “materially contributing” to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access without proof that the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote it.
Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in holding that mere knowledge of another’s direct infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).

In Sony Music Entm’t., et al. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., Case No. 21-1168 (4th Cir. Feb. 20, 2024), the Fourth Circuit upheld a jury verdict finding Cox liable for contributory copyright infringement, rejecting Cox’s arguments that its service was also used for lawful activity and that its contribution must amount to aiding and abetting the infringement. The Court, however, reversed the jury’s verdict of vicarious liability, finding that Cox did not profit from its subscribers’ acts of infringement and thus did not meet the legal prerequisite for that form of secondary liability.

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