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Fourth Circuit Breathes New Life into Monopolization Suit

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit revived an antitrust suit alleging that a pharmaceutical manufacturer illegally maintained its monopoly for its innovator drug by precluding competition beyond the expiration date of the patent covering the drug. The Court found that the case was filed within the statute of limitations because the antitrust claims did not accrue until the consumers were injured by paying supracompetitive prices for the drug after the patent expired. Baltimore v. Actelion Pharm., Ltd., Case No. 19-2233 (4th Cir. Apr. 13, 2021) (Niemeyer, J.)

Actelion received an exclusive license under a patent issued in 1994 for Tracleer, the “only oral treatment for pulmonary arterial hypertension.” Although Actelion’s patent for Tracleer expired in November 2015, no competitor brought a generic version of Tracleer to market. The mayor of Baltimore and Baltimore’s Government Employees Health Association (collectively, Baltimore) alleged that Actelion intended to “preclud[e] competition from generic drug manufacturers” by orchestrating a “multi-year scheme” to prevent multiple manufacturers from attempting to bring a generic version of the drug to market. According to the complaint, from 2009 to 2012, four generic drug manufacturers repeatedly requested samples of Tracleer from Actelion to develop generic versions of the drug. Potential entrants must obtain samples of a branded drug to demonstrate that a generic drug is bioequivalent to the branded drug—in this case, Tracleer. Baltimore alleged that Actelion refused consistently, stating it had the right to elect with whom it did business. Actelion also allegedly prevented distributors from selling Tracleer samples to generic drug manufacturers.

Baltimore alleged that by precluding generic competitors from the market, Actelion was able to maintain an illegal monopoly over Tracleer for three years after its patent expired and charge inflated prices for the drug in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act and various state antitrust and consumer protection laws. Baltimore alleged that but for Actelion’s conduct, consumers would have purchased less expensive generic alternatives instead of branded Tracleer. Baltimore filed suit on November 19, 2018. The district court dismissed Baltimore’s complaint, finding that the majority of the claims were barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The district court found that the last overt anticompetitive act occurred in February 2014, when Actelion executed settlement agreements with several generic manufacturers. The district court rejected Baltimore’s argument that the claims accrued on the date of patent expiration (November 2015) or, in the alternative, from each sale of Tracleer at supracompetitive prices. Baltimore appealed.

The Fourth Circuit determined that the November 2018 suit was not time-barred by the statute of limitations. The Court found that although Actelion’s last overt anticompetitive act took place in 2014, the alleged harm to the plaintiffs did not begin until November 2015 when the patent expired. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a private right of action for violations of federal antitrust laws and states that any such action is “barred unless commented within four years after the cause of action accrued.” The Court further noted that the Supreme Court [...]

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No Estoppel in the Name of Different Interests and Claims

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that 35 USC § 314(d) did not bar its review of a Patent Trial & Appeal Board determination that a petitioner was not estopped from maintaining inter partes review (IPR) proceedings since the alleged estoppel-triggering event occurred post-institution. Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Facebook Inc., Case Nos. 19-1688, -1689 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 2021) (Chen, J.)

Facebook and WhatsApp (collectively, Facebook) filed two IPR proceedings challenging certain claims of Uniloc’s patents. Apple also filed a petition challenging a subset of claims of the patent. Facebook subsequently filed a third petition that was substantively identical to Apple’s petition and also filed a motion to join Apple’s IPR. LG Electronics filed petitions identical to Facebook’s three petitions and also filed motions to join Facebook’s IPRs. The Board instituted Facebook’s third petition and granted Facebook’s motion to join Apple’s IPR. The Board then instituted Facebook’s original IPRs and ordered the parties to “brief the applicability, if any, of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1)” against Facebook, in light of the soon-to-be-issued final written decision for Apple’s IPR. At the time, LG’s petition and motion to join Facebook’s IPRs had not been decided.

In response to the Board’s order, Facebook argued that it should not be estopped under § 315 from challenging the patentability of any claim upon the issuance of a final written decision in Apple’s IPR. Facebook argued that if the Board did find it estopped, Facebook should be able to continue as a petitioner against one of the claims, which it never challenged, in Apple’s IPR. Facebook also argued that if LG’s IPR petition was granted and LG was joined as a party to its first IPR, the IPR should proceed as to all challenged claims (regardless of whether Facebook was found estopped) because LG was not a party in Apple’s IPR. Uniloc responded, arguing that once the Board issued a final written decision in Apple’s IPR, Facebook would be estopped as to all claims challenged in its first IPR and the Board must terminate that proceeding. Uniloc also argued that allowing LG to join the IPR would create inefficiency and confusion.

The Board ultimately instituted LG’s IPR petitions and granted LG’s motion to join Facebook’s IPRs. In its Patent Owner Responses to the original Facebook IPR petitions, Uniloc argued that LG should be barred from maintaining the first Facebook IPR once the Board issued a final written decision in the Apple IPR because LG was estopped as a real party in interest (RPI) or privy to Facebook. A few months later, the Board issued a final written decision in the Apple IPR upholding the patentability of all challenged claims. The Board’s decision in the first Facebook IPR found that Facebook was estopped under § 315(e)(1) as to claims also challenged in Apple’s IPR, but not other claims since § 315(e)(1)’s estoppel provisions apply only to grounds that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised “with respect to that claim.”

In its final [...]

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First-to-File Rule Requires That Action Could Have Been Brought in Transferee Forum

After issuing a rare grant of a mandamus petition directing a district court to stay proceedings until ruling on a pending motion to transfer, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a subsequent mandamus petition to compel transfer after that district court denied the transfer. In re SK hynix Inc., Case No. 21-114 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 25, 2021) (Taranto, J.) (non-precedential). The Federal Circuit found that the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the first-to-file rule did not establish a basis for transfer because the action could not have initially been brought in the transferee forum and the patentee’s prior filings in that forum did not give consent for subsequently filed actions.

Netlist and SK hynix are competitors in the memory semiconductor space. Netlist sued SK hynix for patent infringement in the US District Court for the Western District of Texas. SK hynix moved to transfer the case to the US District Court for the Central District of California. With no ruling after eight months (while the case continued to move forward), SK hynix sought mandamus from the Federal Circuit to compel the district court to transfer the case. The Federal Circuit declined to transfer the case and instead stayed the district court proceedings until the district court ruled on the transfer motion. The district court then denied the transfer motion, rejecting SK hynix’s arguments that the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the first-to-file rule required transfer to the Central District of California. The district court also advanced the Markman hearing and trial dates. SK hynix again sought mandamus from the Federal Circuit to compel transfer and requested a stay of the district court proceedings because of the advanced Markman and trial dates.

Applying Fifth Circuit law, the Federal Circuit denied the mandamus petition, concluding that SK hynix had not shown that the district court clearly abused its discretion in denying the transfer motion. On the forum non conveniens issue, the Court found no clear abuse in the district court’s determination that SK hynix did not meet the threshold conditions for transfer under 28 USC § 1404(a), namely that the action “might have been brought” in the Central District of California or that, in the alternative, all the parties had consented to that venue for the action. As to the “might have been brought” inquiry, the Court found that the district court properly focused on whether the action might have been brought against SK hynix America, a domestic entity subject to the venue requirements of 28 USC § 1404(b) and headquartered in the Northern District of California, rather than SK hynix, a foreign entity not subject to the same venue requirements. The Court also found that SK hynix did not differentiate between the foreign and domestic SK hynix entities in its transfer motion. This was not an action that might have been brought against SK hynix in the Central District of California because SK hynix America lacked sufficient presence there to confer venue under [...]

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Old Dawg, New Tricks: Bankruptcy Successor Is Also Inter Partes Re-Exam Successor

Reversing the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that because a plaintiff was a successor in bankruptcy, it was a successor in an inter partes re-examination. The Court held that the plaintiff should be substituted for the original requestor following the sale of the original re-examination requestor’s right, title and interest in, to and under its assets to a holding company, which further assigned such assets and interests to the plaintiff. Mojave Desert Holdings, LLC v. Crocs, Inc., Case No. 20-1167 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 11, 2021) (Dyk, J.)

The dispute originated in 2012 when Crocs sued Dawgs for patent infringement. Dawgs responded by filing a third-party request for inter partes re-examination, which the US Patent & Trademark Office granted. The examiner rejected Crocs’ challenged patent claim as anticipated, and Crocs appealed to the Board.

While the appeal was pending, Dawgs filed a petition under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Dawgs moved the bankruptcy court to approve the sale of all of its assets to a recently formed entity, Dawgs Holdings, free and clear of all liens, claims and encumbrances pursuant to Bankruptcy Code. The relevant provision of the Asset Purchase Agreement assigned Dawgs Holdings:

[a]ll of [Dawgs’] right, title and interest in, to and under all of the assets, properties and rights of every kind and nature, whether real, personal or mixed, tangible or intangible (including intellectual property and goodwill) . . . .

The sale order carved out from the free and clear language “any Claims [Crocs] . . . may hold for patent infringement occurring post-Closing.” Shortly after the closing, Dawgs Holdings assigned all rights, including explicitly the claims asserted by Dawgs in the district court action and the inter partes re-examination, to Mojave.

Months later, Mojave moved the Board to change the real party-in-interest from Dawgs to Mojave. The Board dismissed and expunged the request because:

  • The sale from Dawgs to Dawgs Holdings was silent with respect to the inter partes re-examination.
  • Mojave was not a party to the inter partes re-examination proceeding.
  • Mojave did not have standing to update the real party-in-interest.
  • Mojave did not file its submission within 20 days of any change of the real party-in-interest as required by 37 CFR § 41.8(a).

Subsequently, the Board reversed the examiner’s rejection of Crocs’ patent claim, which decision Dawgs appealed to the Federal Circuit, while simultaneously filing a motion to substitute Mojave.

In granting the substitution motion, the Federal Circuit noted the broad language describing the sale of all of Dawgs’ assets to Dawgs Holdings. The Court distinguished the sale language from the sale language in other cases where a buyer in bankruptcy may only acquire “substantially all” of the assets of another entity. Because the language describing the transfer from Dawgs to Dawgs Holdings was so broad, the Federal Circuit concluded that the transfer from Dawgs Holdings to Mojave included the interests in Dawgs’ claims and its successor-in-interest requestor status in the inter [...]

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2020 IP Law Year in Review: Trademarks

Executive Summary

2020 was a year like no other, so you’d be forgiven if the year’s biggest headlines in trademark law didn’t quite catch your attention. In 2020, the US Supreme Court shaped trademark jurisprudence through a trio of notable decisions. A pandemic and shelter-in-place orders pushed more consumers to virtual marketplaces, forcing brand owners, and the courts, to take a renewed look at counterfeiting and online enforcement. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has continued its strict registrability and failure-to-function assessments, and new legislation, rules and fees were directed at cracking down on fraudulent trademark applications and clearing dead weight from the USPTO register to make room for new and growing brands. A COVID-19 stimulus package just so happened to establish the standard for obtaining injunctive relief in litigation under the Lanham Act. And the year saw industry-specific developments with the potential for broader application in the field. This report provides a summary of 2020’s notable moments in trademark law with insights and outlooks for brand owners and practitioners moving into the year ahead.

Trademarks

  1. SCOTUS on Trademarks
  2. Courts on Counterfeits in 2020
  3. More ‘Failure to Function’ Refusals in 2020
  4. Color Me Surprised: Multicolor Marks Can Be Inherently Distinctive
  5. Trademark Law Updates – Fees, Fraud and Injunction Presumptions
  6. 2020 Industry Spotlight: Trademarks in the Alcohol Beverage Market

2021 Outlook

Looking ahead, 2020’s legislation, rules and fees impacting the USPTO and the courts may add some clarity to trademark disputes in 2021, any may also inspire brand owners to examine their approaches to trademark portfolio management, watching and enforcement to maximize budgets, clear the way for brand expansion and more efficiently handle trademark disputes. In 2021, we also expect to see further developments in the fighting of counterfeits, the interplay of trademarks and expressive works and the application of failure to function refusals, especially as we continue to see trademark filings, disputes and market trends associated with an ongoing pandemic, political unrest and overdue social justice movements. Finally, in 2021, we expect to see brands remain at the forefront of representing positivity, innovation, unity and wellness, as we all work together to accelerate out of a challenging year.

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IP Implications of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021

On December 27, 2020, Congress signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, into law. The omnibus act includes new legislation affecting patent, copyright and trademark law. A brief summary of key provisions is provided below.

Patents – Section 325 Biological Product Patent Transparency

42 USC § 262(k) was amended to require that the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provide the public with more information about patented biological products. Within six months, the FDA must make the following information available to the public on its Database of Licensed Biological Products or “Purple Book,” and it must update the list every 30 days:

  • A list of each biological product, by nonproprietary name, for which a biologics license is in effect
  • The license date and application number
  • The license and marketing status (as available)
  • Exclusivity periods

The amendment requires that the holders of a license to market a biologic drug now disclose all patents believed to be covering that drug. The new law is designed to prevent errors that could delay biosimilars from coming to the market.

Copyrights – The CASE Act of 2020

The Consolidated Appropriations Act incorporates the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement (CASE) Act of 2020, as well as legislation designed to increase criminal penalties for the unauthorized digital streaming of copyright-protected content. The CASE Act includes revisions to the Copyright Act, 17 USC §§ 101 et seq., with the goal of creating a new venue for copyright owners to enforce their rights instead of having to file an action in federal court.

The Copyright Claims Board

The CASE Act established the Copyright Claims Board (a small claims court), which is designed to serve as an alternative forum where parties may voluntarily seek to resolve certain copyright claims regarding any category of copyrighted work. A party may opt out upon being served with a claim, choosing instead to resolve the dispute in federal court. A party to a proceeding before the Board may, but is not required to, be represented by a lawyer. A party may also be represented by a law student who is qualified under applicable law, and who provides such representation on a pro bono basis. The Board consists of three copyright claims officers who may conduct individualized proceedings to resolve disputes and must issue written decisions setting forth their factual findings and legal conclusions.

Procedural Matters

The Board must follow the law in the federal jurisdiction in which the action could have been brought if filed in federal court. Because jurisdictional conflicts may arise where a dispute may have been brought in multiple jurisdictions, the CASE Act provides that the Board may apply the law of the jurisdiction that the Board determines has the most significant ties to the parties and the conduct at issue.

Although formal motion practice is not permitted, discovery is allowed on a limited basis, including requests for documents, written interrogatories and written requests for admission. The Board may consider evidence, documentary and (non-expert) testimony, without the application of formal [...]

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An Early Holiday Present for Generics? Legislation Requiring Greater Disclosure by Brands Passes the Senate

Earlier this month, two bills intended to promote generic competitiveness by presenting a clearer idea of the patent landscape covering reference products passed the full Senate, albeit with amendments. These laws, if enacted, will require brand pharmaceutical companies to submit more information about their innovator products.

Potential Changes to Orange Book Listing Requirements for Non-Biologics Drugs

As part of its current obligations, an innovator product manufacturer must submit to the FDA the patent number and expiration date of any patents that claim the drug or a method of using the drug. The FDA then performs the ministerial function of listing the information in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, known as the Orange Book. The Hatch-Waxman Act permits generic manufacturers to file a counterclaim to delist a patent that they believe is improperly listed. Over the years, FDA has issued technical regulations expanding on the requirements, which under statute, are relatively sparse. However, there has been some uncertainty regarding what patents must be listed—especially in the case of drug products with innovative delivery systems.

The Orange Book Transparency Act of 2020, H.R. 1503, seeks to codify certain existing regulations and bring some certainty to the process. First, the Orange Book Act provides greater clarity on the types of patents a brand company must list. Currently, the relevant statutes require submission of patent information for “any patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the application or which claims a method of using such drug” that could be asserted based on the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug. The Orange Book Act would alter that language to require submission of patent information for patents that claim the drug substance (active ingredient), the drug product (formulation or composition), or a method of use that is included in the application (i.e., a method of use that corresponds with an approved indication/use code). All other patents—e.g., patents that cover off-label use—must not be listed.

Second, the FDA would be responsible for “specify[ing] any exclusivity period that is applicable,” including the 180-day exclusivity period for first-to-file applicants.

Finally, the Orange Book Act codifies certain existing agency requirements. Under current FDA regulations, brand manufacturers are required to promptly request delisting if they determine that a patent no longer qualifies or its relevant claims are invalidated, and within 14 days if court-ordered. The Orange Book Act would codify the duty on brand manufacturers to remove listed patents within 14 days—rather than “promptly”—when any claim of a listed patent “has been cancelled or invalidated pursuant to a final decision” by the Patent Trial & Appeal Board or a court once it is unappealable. This quick turnaround time of communicating to the public which patents have been found invalid will be key to giving generics an advantage in developing generic products and patents covering branded drug products invalid. The Orange Book Act includes a 30-day period for a brand manufacturer to list a patent after issuance; this requirement mirrors already existing FDA regulations.

While [...]

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PTAB Designates Three Opinions as Precedential

In RPX Corp. v. Applications in Internet Time, LLC, Case Nos. IPR2015-01750, -01751, -01752 (Oct. 2, 2020) (Boalick, CAPJ) (designated precedential on Dec. 4, 2020), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) terminated institution of RPX’s petitions for inter partes review (IPR) because Salesforce—served with a complaint more than one year before—should have been named as a real party-in-interest (RPI) to the proceedings. As a result, RPX’s petition was time-barred under § 315(b).

The Board’s determination came after remand from the Federal Circuit, which vacated the Board’s prior finding that Salesforce was not an RPI. (IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 8). The Federal Circuit instructed the Board to use the common law understanding of “real party-in-interest” and a “flexible approach that takes into account both equitable and practical considerations, with an eye toward determining whether the non-party is a clear beneficiary that has a pre-existing, established relationship with the petitioner.” On remand, the Board took additional discovery to examine the relationship between RPX and Salesforce, including RPX’s business model, Salesforce’s relationship with RPX, whether RPX represents Salesforce’s interests in invalidating the patents, and the significance of the fact that Salesforce and RPX had overlapping Board members. After considering the relationship, the Board found the evidence pointed clearly toward a common interest—between RPX and its members—in invalidating the patents in IPR proceedings. It found RPX could not avoid the time bar under § 315(b), or estoppel under § 315(e) for its members, by creating the appearance that RPX acts independently of its members’ interests when filing IPR petitions.

In SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., Case No. IPR2020-00734 (Oct. 6, 2020) (Melvin, APJ) (designated precedential on Dec. 4, 2020), the Board declined to address—for purposes of institution—the patent owner’s claim that the IPR petition failed to name an alleged RPI under § 312(a)(2)’s requirement that a petition “identif[y] all real parties-in-interest.” iRobot alleged that JS Global was an unnamed RPI because it was intertwined with SharkNinja’s business and was in a position to fund and exercise control over the IPR petition. The Board declined to reach a determination on the issue because it would have no impact on the proceeding, absent evidence that (1) JS Global was a time-barred or an otherwise estopped entity whose addition to the petition would result in its dismissal under § 315 or (2) SharkNinja’s omission of JS Global was done in bad faith. Even if SharkNinja was mistaken in its decision not to name JS Global as an RPI, the Board’s precedent would allow SharkNinja to correct the mistake during the proceeding.

In Apple Inc. v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, Case No. IPR2020-00854 (Oct. 28, 2020) (Quinn, APJ) (designated precedential on Dec. 4, 2020), the Board exercised its discretion to deny Apple’s motion for joinder because it would have resulted in a “serial attack” on Uniloc’s patent. Apple had previously filed an IPR petition on the same patent, alleging various grounds of invalidity. The Board denied institution because it failed to show a reasonable likelihood [...]

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“You’ve Changed!”—New Trademark and TTAB Fees Incoming

Effective January 2, 2021, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) is increasing and adding certain trademark and Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) fees. The changes come after a nearly three-year fee status quo.

The following TTAB fees will increase anywhere from $25 to $200:

  • Petition to cancel filed through the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (“ESTTA”) (now $600 per class);
  • Notice of opposition filed through ESTTA (now $600 per class);
  • Initial 90-day extension request for filing a notice of opposition, filed through ESTTA (now $200 per application);
  • Second 60-day extension request for filing a notice of opposition, filed through ESTTA (now $200 per application);
  • Final 60-day extension request for filing a notice of opposition, filed through ESTTA (now $400 per application); and
  • Ex parte appeal filed through ESTTA (now $225 per class).

New TTAB fees are also taking effect. A $100 fee per application will apply for a second request for an extension of time to file an appeal brief in an ex parte appeal filed through ESTTA (and for any subsequent extension requests). A $200 per class fee will apply for appeal briefs in an ex parte appeal filed through ESTTA. A $500 per proceeding fee will apply to requests for oral hearings.

As before, there will be no fee for a first 30-day extension request for filing a notice of opposition filed through ESTTA. The USPTO will also begin issuing partial refunds for petitions to cancel in default judgments. These refunds, however, will be available only if the cancellation involves solely an abandonment or nonuse claim, if the defendant did not appear, and if there were no filings in the proceeding other than the petition to cancel.

Additionally, USPTO trademark and TTAB filings which can be and are submitted on paper will cost more than filing their electronic counterparts.

Other key USPTO trademark fee changes include the following: TEAS standard application, now $350 per class; TEAS Plus application, now $250 per class; the processing fee for failing to meet TEAS Plus requirements, now $100 per class; Section 8 or 71 declaration filed through TEAS, now $225 per class; petition to the Director filed through TEAS, now $250; and a petition to revive an abandoned application filed through TEAS, now $150. No fee will apply for an electronically filed Section 7 request to amend a registration before submitting a Section 8 or 71 declaration, as long as the filing serves only to delete goods, services, and/or classes in the request. There will, however, now be a fee assessed for deleting goods, services, and/or classes from a registration after submitting a Section 71 or 8 declaration, but before that declaration is accepted ($250 per class if filed through TEAS). Lastly, a letter of protest will now cost $50 per application.

While the changes outlined above are key, practitioners should be mindful of potential changes to all fees applicable to their specific situation and consult the USPTO’s Final Rule, available here, to ensure [...]

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Full of Hot Air? PTAB Joinder Decisions Under § 315(c) Are Appealable

Addressing whether it has jurisdiction to review joinder decisions made by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reissued a prior decision explaining that a joinder decision is reviewable because the decision occurs after the inter partes review (IPR) proceeding institutes. Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, Case Nos. 18-1400, -1401, -1402, -1403, -1537, -1540, -1541 (Fed. Cir. Opinion Issued: Mar. 18, 2020, Opinion Reissued: Sept. 4, 2020) (Prost, C.J.) (Prost, C.J., concurring with additional views).

Windy City Innovations filed a complaint accusing Facebook of infringing four patents that collectively have 830 claims. Facebook filed a motion requesting that Windy City be forced to limit the number of asserted claims to 40 by the time of Facebook’s one-year IPR filing deadline, but the district court denied the motion. One year after it was served with the complaint, Facebook filed petitions for IPR on a subset of the 830 claims.

Five months after Facebook filed its petitions, Windy City narrowed its case to a subset of claims, including claims that were not subject to Facebook’s IPR petitions. After the PTAB instituted review based on Facebook’s petitions, Facebook immediately filed two new IPR petitions. Because the one-year time bar had passed, Facebook also filed a motion under § 315(c) to join the new IPR petitions to its now-instituted proceedings. The PTAB granted Facebook’s motion for joinder and ultimately issued a final written decision with a mixed result, cancelling some claims and finding others not unpatentable. Both parties appealed

The Federal Circuit found that the PTAB erred in allowing Facebook to use § 315(c) to join itself to its earlier-filed petitions. The Court explained that the statutory language was unambiguous, finding that the ordinary usage of “joining a person as a party to a proceeding” means that the joined party must necessarily be someone who is not already a party. The Court further explained that allowing same-party joinder would impermissibly allow the Director to join new issues to an existing proceeding. The Court found that § 315(c) only authorizes the Director to join (1) a person (2) as a party (3) to an already instituted IPR. The language does not authorize the joined party to bring new issues into the already instituted IPR proceeding. The Court found this understanding consistent with other subsections of § 315, where there is a clear distinction between § 315(c), which refers to the joinder of a person as a party, and § 315(d), which refers to the consolidation of multiple proceedings and the issues in each. The Court was sympathetic to Facebook’s policy concerns regarding patents with a large number of claims that may not be narrowed to a manageable number of asserted claims before the one-year time-bar. Nevertheless, it found that policy considerations could not overcome the unambiguous language of the statute. The Court therefore vacated the PTAB’s final written decisions as to the later-filed petitions.

After the Court issued its original opinion, Facebook filed a petition for panel rehearing, [...]

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