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E-I-E-I-No patents for data harvesting

Addressing patent eligibility and attorneys’ fees, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that five farming data patents were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, but vacated and remanded the district court’s unexplained determination that the case was not exceptional. AGI SureTrack LLC v. Farmers Edge Inc., Case Nos. 24-1730; -1830 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 2, 2026) (Moore, Mayer, Lourie, JJ.)

AGI SureTrack owns five patents directed to capturing farming operation data in real time using passive data collection devices attached to farming equipment while the equipment performs farming operations. The claimed systems process and share the collected data through an online farming data exchange system or server. AGI sued Farmers Edge and Farmers Edge (US) for patent infringement.

At summary judgment, the district court found the asserted patents invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101, concluding that the claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. The district court also ruled that the case was not exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285 for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees. AGI appealed the invalidity ruling, and Farmers Edge cross-appealed the no-exceptionality ruling.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the § 101 ruling under the two-step Alice framework. At Alice step one, the Federal Circuit found that AGI’s claims were directed to the abstract idea of collecting, analyzing, and transmitting farming data. The Court explained that claims using conventional computer components to collect, analyze, and present data (activities that can be characterized as mental processes) are directed to an abstract idea. The Court rejected AGI’s argument that the patents claimed an unconventional hardware and software system that solved interoperability problems among distinct brands of farming equipment. The claim language did not recite such a technological solution, and the specification described the invention as a way to track, store, and profit from farming operation data.

The Federal Circuit also rejected AGI’s reliance on claims involving detection of communication protocols and the use of stored “implement profiles” to decode farming equipment information. In the Court’s view, those limitations merely combined abstract concepts and did not change the character of the claims as being directed to data collection, processing, and transmission.

At Alice step two, the Federal Circuit found no inventive concept sufficient to transform the abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. The claims relied on generic computer components performing conventional functions. The Court explained that although the claimed automation may have increased the speed and efficiency of collecting and analyzing farming data, improved speed from automation alone does not supply an inventive concept. Considering the claim elements individually and as an ordered combination, the Court concluded that the patents did not claim a patent-eligible application for tracking and collecting farming data.

The Federal Circuit reached a different result on attorneys’ fees. The district court had ruled that the case was not exceptional under § 285 but provided no explanation for that determination. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, explaining that while district courts need not always provide extensive reasoning, they must provide enough [...]

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Patentee that retains exclusionary rights has constitutional standing notwithstanding broad license grant

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court decision dismissing a patent infringement suit for lack of constitutional standing, concluding that patentees that retain exclusionary rights, even after granting a broad license, maintain Article III standing. A.L.M Holding Company v. Zydex Industries Private Ltd., Case No. 25-1317 (Fed. Cir. May 19, 2026) (Chen, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.)

A.L.M. and Ergon co-own six patents directed to warm-mix asphalt technology. Prior to filing suit, the patentees entered into a licensing agreement with Ingevity Corporation, granting Ingevity an exclusive, worldwide, royalty-bearing license to manufacture, import, use, and sell products covered by the patents. The agreement also provided for shared control of infringement actions and an equal split of any resulting recoveries and costs. Despite the breadth of the license, the patentees retained certain rights, including the ability to make, import, and use the licensed products.

A.L.M. filed suit against Zydex. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the patentees lacked constitutional standing because the license transferred away sufficient exclusionary rights, leaving A.L.M. without a cognizable injury under Article III.

Reviewing the issue de novo, the Federal Circuit reversed. The Court framed the proper inquiry for constitutional standing as whether the plaintiff retains an exclusionary interest in the asserted patents. The Court explained that, absent a transfer of all exclusionary rights, a patentee generally maintains the concrete injury necessary to satisfy Article III.

The Federal Circuit emphasized that the constitutional standing inquiry is distinct from the question of statutory standing under 35 U.S.C. § 281. While statutory standing concerns whether a party is entitled to bring suit under the Patent Act and may be cured by joinder of necessary parties, constitutional standing requires a threshold showing of injury in fact and cannot be remedied after the fact.

Applying that framework, the Federal Circuit found that the plaintiffs retained sufficient exclusionary interests. In particular, the patentees preserved rights to royalties and maintained a degree of control over sublicensing, including a veto right. These retained interests demonstrated that the patentees had not transferred all substantial rights in the patents and therefore continued to suffer a legally cognizable injury from alleged infringement.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs satisfied Article III standing requirements and reversed the district court’s dismissal.

Practice note: On the same day that the Federal Circuit issued its decision in A.L.M. Holdings, the same panel also issued a nonprecedential decision in Recor Medical, Inc. v. Medtronic Ireland Manufacturing Unlimited Co., in which it stated, “[i]n a precedential opinion we issued today in a different appeal addressing constitutional standing, A.L.M. Holding Co. v. Zydex Industries Private Ltd., No. 25-1317 (Fed. Cir. May 18, 2026), we held that the patent owner in that case had constitutional standing because it retained a right to sue for patent infringement that was not rendered illusory by the rights it granted to its licensee. Because Medtronic Ireland’s retained rights are materially the same as the patent owner’s in A.L.M., we hold that Medtronic [...]

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Patent disclosure erases trade secret protection

Addressing the boundary between patent disclosures and trade secret protection, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a jury’s findings of trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract, and improper inventorship, concluding that the asserted “trade secrets” were generally known and therefore not protectable under California law. The Court affirmed, however, a $1 million statutory damages award for trademark counterfeiting. International Medical Devices, Inc. v. Cornell, Case Nos. 25 1580; 1605 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 17, 2026) (Dyk, Reyna, Taranto, JJ.)

International Medical Devices, Menova International, and Dr. James Elist (collectively, the plaintiffs) manufacture and sell the Penuma® cosmetic penile implant. The plaintiffs sued Dr. Robert Cornell and associated individuals and entities after Cornell attended a Penuma® surgical training session under a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) and later helped develop a competing implant. The plaintiffs asserted claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of the NDA, trademark counterfeiting based on unauthorized use of the Penuma® mark, and invalidity of two cosmetic implant patents for failure to name Elist as an inventor.

A jury found for the plaintiffs on all claims. After a bench trial on remedies, the district court awarded more than $17 million in trade secret and exemplary damages, entered a permanent injunction, and awarded $1 million in statutory damages for counterfeiting. Cornell appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed the trade secret verdict in its entirety, concluding that none of the asserted trade secrets were protectable under California law. The Court concluded that the alleged technical trade secrets were disclosed in publicly available patents and thus were “generally known” as a matter of law.

In doing so, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the long-standing principle that “that which is disclosed in a patent cannot be a trade secret.” Once information enters the public domain through patent disclosures, it cannot later be reclaimed as confidential business information through trade secret law.

The plaintiffs’ remaining alleged trade secret (a list of surgical instruments) fared no better. The Federal Circuit found that the list had been emailed to the defendants without any confidentiality designation or obligation, defeating any claim that reasonable measures were taken to maintain its secrecy.

Because the plaintiffs failed to identify any confidential information beyond the alleged trade secrets, the Federal Circuit also reversed the breach of contract verdict. The NDA expressly excluded information that was “generally available to the public,” and the Court found that an NDA cannot transform public domain information into protected confidential material.

The Federal Circuit reached a different conclusion on trademark counterfeiting, however, and affirmed the jury’s finding and the $1 million statutory damages award. The Court explained that the evidence showed that Cornell had advertised and offered Penuma® implants without authorization. Cornell argued that the Penuma® mark was registered only for goods, not services, and therefore could not support a counterfeiting claim tied to surgical procedures. The Court rejected that argument, concluding there was sufficient evidence that Cornell offered the Penuma® implant itself as a good, not merely a medical service.

Finally, the Federal Circuit [...]

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Public use, even without explicit public disclosure, is patent bar under pre-AIA § 102(b)

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of invalidity under the pre-America Invents Act (AIA) on sale bar, holding that a third party sale to the public of a product embodying a patented method and apparatus can trigger invalidity even where details of the invention were not expressly disclosed. Definitive Holdings v. Powerteq, Case No. 24-1761 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 14, 2026) (Moore, Dyk, Cunningham, JJ.)

Definitive Holdings sued Powerteq alleging infringement of a patent directed to methods and systems for reprogramming engine controllers. With a priority date of March 30, 2001, the patent was subject to pre-AIA law. Powerteq moved for summary judgment of invalidity under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), arguing that a nonparty, Hypertech, had sold a product (the PP3) that embodied all limitations of the asserted claims more than one year before the patent’s priority date.

Rather than disputing the underlying facts, Definitive challenged the admissibility of the evidence on which Powerteq relied. Definitive argued that the deposition testimony of Hypertech’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, the PP3 source code, and expert testimony relying on that source code were inadmissible. The district court rejected those arguments and granted summary judgment of invalidity, concluding that the third party sales triggered the on sale bar. Definitive appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the summary judgment ruling de novo, applying Tenth Circuit law.

Definitive first argued that the district court improperly relied on testimony from Hypertech’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Hypertech CEO and owner Jay Ramsay. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that Ramsay’s testimony was based on his personal knowledge and thus was sufficient to authenticate Hypertech’s sales records and establish that Powerteq’s expert analyzed source code from the PP3 product.

The Court explained that a reasonable juror could conclude that Ramsay had personal knowledge of Hypertech’s recordkeeping practices and sales activities. Because those portions of the testimony were sufficient to support summary judgment, the Court declined to address whether other portions of the 30(b)(6) testimony were properly considered and how the Tenth Circuit generally treats Rule 30(b)(6) testimony at summary judgment.

Definitive next argued that the PP3 source code and related expert testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay. The Federal Circuit disagreed. The Court explained that while comments or annotations in source code could, in some circumstances, qualify as hearsay statements, the operative source code itself functions as a set of commands or instructions. As such, it is not offered for the truth of any assertion. The Court therefore found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering expert testimony describing the functioning of the source code when granting summary judgment.

Finally, Definitive contended that the on sale bar did not apply because Hypertech’s sales of the PP3 did not publicly disclose how to perform the patented method, even if the PP3 embodied all claim limitations and was sold more than one year before the priority date.

The Federal Circuit rejected Definitive’s argument, emphasizing that Hypertech’s sales directly conveyed to the public the ability to practice the [...]

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Ticket to ride: USPTO requires counsel for foreign patent applicants

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) adopted a final rule requiring foreign-domiciled patent applicants and patent owners to be represented by a registered US patent practitioner, signaling a meaningful procedural shift aimed at harmonization, efficiency, compliance, and fraud prevention. 91 Fed. Reg. 13510 (Mar. 20, 2026).

The USPTO explained that the rule is intended primarily to address recurring compliance and fraud concerns, such as false or improper certifications, including micro entity certifications, and other filings that misrepresent eligibility for fee reductions or expedited treatment. Because registered US practitioners are subject to the USPTO’s Rules of Professional Conduct and disciplinary authority, the agency views mandatory representation as a more reliable accountability mechanism.

The USPTO also cited practical administrative considerations, indicating that foreign pro se filings are more likely to be procedurally deficient and therefore consume disproportionate examination and processing resources, particularly when application papers are not in condition for publication or examination upon receipt.

The final rule clarifies how the requirement will operate in practice. While a foreign domiciled applicant may still obtain a filing date without a practitioner’s signature, any subsequent papers will not be entered unless signed by a registered US patent practitioner. This includes application data sheets, micro entity certifications, petitions, amendments, and other key prosecution documents. In some circumstances, the consequences for noncompliance may be significant. For example, if an unsigned application data sheet is treated merely as a transmittal letter, inventorship, priority, or benefit claims may not be properly established at filing, necessitating corrective petitions and additional cost. Likewise, requests that must be made at filing, such as nonpublication or prioritized examination requests, may be forfeited if not properly signed.

The USPTO emphasized that the rule is procedural rather than substantive. It does not alter the standards of patentability or the requirements for securing a filing date. The rule applies to all filings received on or after its effective date, regardless of the application’s effective filing date. The USPTO also noted that an applicant that believes it has been incorrectly designated as foreign domiciled may respond to that determination even before retaining counsel, although conclusory or unsupported assertions are unlikely to succeed.

Practice note: Foreign applicants and patent owners should now assume that US practitioner involvement is essential to preserve rights and avoid preventable procedural defects.




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Manufactured host cells markedly different from naturally occurring cells may be patent eligible

Addressing subject matter eligibility in the life sciences context, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s summary judgment ruling that certain claims directed to genetically engineered host cells were patent ineligible as directed to a natural phenomenon. The Federal Circuit found that the claimed cells contained recombinant nucleic acid molecules that were markedly different from anything occurring in nature and therefore were patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. REGENXBIO Inc. v. Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc., Case No. 24-1408 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 20, 2026) (Dyk, Hughes, Stoll, JJ.)

REGENXBIO owns a patent directed to genetically engineered host cells containing a recombinant nucleic acid molecule (adeno-associated virus (AAV) rh.10 sequences). These host cells are human made and do not exist in nature. The recombinant nucleic acid molecule is created by chemically splicing together nucleic acid sequences from two different organisms. REGENXBIO sued Sarepta, alleging infringement of its patent. Both parties moved for summary judgment on whether the asserted claims were patent eligible under Section 101. The parties did not assert that claims were ineligible as an abstract idea but rather debated whether the claims disclosed natural products.

The district court analogized the claims to those considered in the 1949 Supreme Court decision in Funk Brothers Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, where two strains of bacteria from two different organisms were merely put together. The district court concluded that the invention, “taking ‘two sequences from two different organisms and put[ting] them together,’” amounted to merely packaging natural products together and found the asserted claims ineligible. REGENXBIO appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (2013), the Federal Circuit explained that the relevant inquiry was whether the claimed composition as a whole possessed “markedly different characteristics” from what occurs in nature. The Court emphasized that the claimed recombinant nucleic acid molecules were not naturally occurring and cannot form in nature without human intervention. The claims required a recombinant molecule encoding both an AAV vp1 capsid protein and a heterologous sequence, created by combining genetic material from different sources.

The Federal Circuit explained that like the engineered bacterium in Chakrabarty, the claimed host cells here were “not nature’s handiwork” but a product of human ingenuity. And like the cDNA claims upheld in Myriad, the recombinant molecules represented something “distinct from” naturally occurring DNA. In contrast to Funk Brothers, where the bacteria performed exactly as they did in nature and were merely packaged together, the claimed host cells here contained a newly engineered molecule that did not exist in nature and that enabled gene therapy applications.

The Federal Circuit also noted that the claimed compositions had the potential for significant utility, specifically in gene delivery and gene therapy, further distinguishing them from the ineligible claims in Funk Brothers. Although the claims did not expressly recite a specific therapeutic use, the Court explained that potential utility may be considered in evaluating whether a composition is markedly [...]

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Tied up: Federal Circuit affirms antitrust verdict in patent case

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding that Ingevity engaged in unlawful tying under the Sherman Act by conditioning licenses to its patent on customers’ purchase of its unpatented products that were staple items of commerce. Ingevity Corp. v. BASF Corp., Case No. 24-1577 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 11, 2026) (Lourie, Prost, Cunningham, JJ.)

Ingevity sued BASF for patent infringement. BASF denied infringement, challenged the patent’s validity and enforceability, and asserted counterclaims for unlawful tying under federal antitrust law, alleging that Ingevity conditioned licenses to the patent on customers’ agreement to purchase Ingevity’s unpatented products. The district court granted summary judgment of invalidity and denied motions for summary judgment on BASF’s antitrust claims.

At trial, the jury found that Ingevity unlawfully tied licenses for the patent to sales of its unpatented products and awarded BASF antitrust damages. Ingevity moved for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial, arguing that its conduct was protected under the Patent Act because its unpatented products were “nonstaple goods” (i.e., goods lacking substantial non-infringing uses) and that its actions were immune under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The district court denied those motions, and Ingevity appealed, challenging the jury’s tying liability finding, the rejection of Ingevity’s immunity defenses, and the damages award.

The Federal Circuit first addressed Ingevity’s statutory patent misuse defense under 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), which permits patentees to control nonstaple goods lacking substantial noninfringing uses. The Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Ingevity’s unpatented products were staple articles of commerce because the record showed actual and substantial noninfringing uses in air-intake systems. Business records, customer purchases, and technical evidence provided a sufficient basis for the jury to find that the products had recurring, practical noninfringing applications, defeating Ingevity’s reliance on § 271(d).

The Federal Circuit also rejected Ingevity’s immunity arguments. The Court determined that Ingevity forfeited its reframed immunity theory on appeal because it differed materially from the argument presented in the case below. In the alternative, the Court explained that conditioning patent licenses on the purchase of staple goods constitutes commercial tying conduct beyond mere patent enforcement communications and is not protected by either the Patent Act or the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Accordingly, immunity did not shield Ingevity from antitrust liability.




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Here’s an abstract idea: Patent eligibility depends on what is claimed, not unclaimed disclosure

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s rejection of Netflix’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 challenge, finding that claims directed to tailoring content specifications for wireless devices were patent ineligible. GoTV Streaming, LLC v. Netflix, Inc., Case Nos. 24-1669; -1744 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 9, 2026) (Prost, Clevenger, Taranto, JJ.)

GoTV sued Netflix for direct and induced infringement of three related patents directed to server-based tailoring of content for wireless devices. The district court dismissed the induced infringement claims and rejected Netflix’s § 101 challenge. A jury found infringement of one of the asserted patents and awarded $2.5 million in damages. Netflix appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s indefiniteness ruling as to a key term of the representative patents and adopted GoTV’s proposed construction of that claim term: “discrete low level rendering command.” Based on its construction, the Court concluded that the asserted claims were directed to an abstract idea and lacked an inventive concept under Alice. The Court concluded that the claims merely recited the abstract idea of using a generic template tailored to a user’s device constraints and relied on conventional computer and network functions without specifying a concrete technological improvement. The Federal Circuit determined that the claims failed both steps of the Alice framework and were invalid under § 101.

Although its § 101 holding resolved the case in Netflix’s favor, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment of no inducement and its denial of GoTV’s motion for a new trial on damages, explaining that GoTV had presented substantial arguments on those issues, before directing entry of final judgment for Netflix.

Practice note: The Federal Circuit noted that the ineligibility analysis depends on the claim language at issue, not whether there may be a patent eligible invention disclosed in the specification. Although the prosecution history may be intrinsic evidence for claim construction, recitation of the problems faced by the inventor and the inventive solution cannot be relied on to argue unclaimed details of the invention to render an abstract idea patent eligible.




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Relax, design patent claim scope doesn’t include functional elements

Addressing the issue of functional versus ornamental features, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of noninfringement, concluding that no reasonable juror could find the accused product’s design substantially similar to the patented design once functional features were properly excluded. Range of Motion Prods. v. Armaid Co., Case No. 23-2427 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2026) (Cunningham, Hughes, JJ.) (Moore, J., dissenting).

Range of Motion Products (RoM) owns a design patent titled “Body Massaging Apparatus.” RoM sued Armaid Company, alleging that its Armaid2 product infringed RoM’s patent. Armaid owns an expired utility patent (prior art to the RoM patent) titled “Limb Massager” (Armaid1) that embodies elements of the Armaid2 design. The relevant drawings from the product and patents are below.

Source: Range of Motion Prods. v. Armaid Co., Case No. 23-2427 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2026), Slip Op. at 14.

The district court granted summary judgment in Armaid’s favor, concluding that after properly filtering out functional elements, no reasonable jury could find the Armaid2 design substantially similar to the RoM’s design patent. RoM appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed claim construction de novo, the underlying factual findings for clear error, and the summary judgment determination de novo. Applying the ordinary observer test as articulated in Egyptian Goddess, the majority found that several prominent features of the claimed design, most notably the clam shaped arms, were functional. The Court relied on RoM’s own marketing materials, which described the arm shape as providing leverage, and the fact that Armaid’s prior utility patent had claimed similar features.

After excluding those functional elements, the Federal Circuit assessed whether an ordinary observer familiar with the prior art would be deceived into believing the accused design was the same as the patented design based solely on their ornamental aspects. Consistent with post-Egyptian Goddess precedent, the analysis proceeded in two steps: determining whether the designs were “plainly dissimilar,” and if not, comparing the designs in light of the prior art.

The majority concluded that the designs were plainly dissimilar, citing differences in arm shape and the manner in which the fixed arm connects to the hinge. The panel majority further stated that even if the designs were not plainly dissimilar, a comparison against the prior art would yield the same result. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed summary judgment of noninfringement.

The decision is notable for Chief Judge Moore’s dissent. The dissent argued that both the district court and the majority improperly usurped the jury’s role by resolving what should have been a fact question, which is whether the designs were substantially similar in overall appearance. More broadly, the dissent criticized the Federal Circuit’s evolution of the ordinary observer test, contending that Egyptian Goddess shifted the inquiry away from the Supreme Court’s substantial similarity framework established in Gorham Co. v. [...]

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Can’t patent idea of using asynchronous data streams during web conferencing

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a patent infringement suit, holding that the asserted web conferencing claims were directed to an abstract idea, lacked any inventive concept, and were therefore not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. Section 101. US Patent No. 7,679,637 LLC v. Google LLC, Case No. 24-1540 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 22, 2025) (Moore, CJ.; Hughes, Stoll, JJ.)

The patent owner accused Google of infringing a patent that describes systems for web conferencing that allow users to view and manipulate multiple data streams asynchronously, for example by reviewing earlier content while a live presentation continues. The representative claims recited client applications for presenting and observing participants, and some claims recited a server application and a “time scale modification component” to maintain audio quality at different playback speeds. Google moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were ineligible under Section 101. The district court agreed and denied leave to amend on the rationale of futility. The patent owner appealed.

Reviewing de novo, the Federal Circuit applied the two-step Alice framework. At step one, the Court concluded that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of allowing users to manipulate and review data streams in a web conferencing environment. The Court found that the claims recited desired results, such as asynchronous viewing, without explaining how those results were achieved or identifying any specific technological improvement. The patent owner argued that the claims were not result oriented because they recited two client applications, but the Court found that the claims still failed to describe any technical mechanism for performing the claimed functions.

The patent owner also pointed to alleged “functional claiming” in Google’s own patents, but the Federal Circuit noted that the eligibility of unrelated patents was irrelevant. The Court further rejected the notion that the mere existence of factually distinguishable Google-owned patents somehow amounted to a sweeping concession by Google that all patents involving functional claiming approaches were necessarily patent eligible.

Turning to step two, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claims lacked an inventive concept. The specification described the client applications and the time scale modification component as conventional components performing their ordinary functions. The patent owner largely repeated its step one arguments, which the Court found insufficient to supply an inventive concept.

Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected the patent owner’s argument that dismissal at the pleading stage was premature. Because the asserted patent was ineligible as a matter of law and the patent owner identified no factual allegations that could alter the Section 101 analysis, any amendment would have been futile.




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