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Venue Manipulation Obviates Geographically Bounded Claims in Venue Analysis

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a rare grant of two mandamus petitions directing the US District Court for the Western District of Texas to transfer the underlying patent infringement actions to the US District Court for the Northern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In re: Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., Case Nos. 21-139, -140 (Fed. Cir. June 30, 2021) (Dyk, J.)

Ikorongo Technology owned four patents directed to functionalities allegedly performed by applications run on the accused mobile products sold by Samsung and LG. Ikorongo Technology assigned to Ikorongo Texas—an entity formed only weeks before—exclusive rights to sue for infringement of those patents within specified parts of the state of Texas, including certain counties in the Western District of Texas, while retaining the rights to the patents in the rest of the United States.

Ten days later, Ikorongo Texas sued Samsung and LG in the Western District of Texas. Although Ikorongo Texas claimed to be unrelated to Ikorongo Technology, the operative complaints indicated that the same five individuals owned both Ikorongo Texas and Ikorongo Technology, and that both entities shared office space in North Carolina.

The day after filing the initial complaints, Ikorongo Texas and Ikorongo Technology filed first amended complaints, this time naming both Ikorongo Technology and Ikorongo Texas as co-plaintiffs, noting that together Ikorongo Texas and Ikorongo Technology owned the entire right, title and interest in the asserted patents, including the right to sue for past, present and future damages throughout the United States and the world.

Samsung and LG separately moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer the suits to the Northern District of California, arguing that “three of the five accused third-party applications were developed in Northern California, where those third parties conduct significant business activities and no application was developed or researched in Western Texas.” Samsung and LG also argued that potential witnesses and sources of proof were located in the Northern District of California.

The district court first concluded that Samsung and LG failed to establish § 1404(a)’s threshold requirement that the complaints “might have been brought” in the Northern District of California. Because Ikorongo Texas’s rights under the asserted patents were limited to the state of Texas and could not have been infringed in the Northern District of California, the district court held that venue over the entirety of the actions was improper under § 1400(b), which governs venue in patent infringement cases. Alternatively, the district court analyzed the traditional public- and private-interest factors, finding that defendants had not met their burden to show cause for transfer. Samsung filed for mandamus to the Federal Circuit.

The Federal Circuit found that the district court erroneously disregarded Ikorongo Technology and Ikorongo Texas’s attempts to manipulate venue when analyzing venue under § 1404(b). While no act of infringement of Ikorongo Texas’s geographically bounded rights took place in the Northern District of California, the Federal Circuit determined that “the presence of Ikorongo Texas is plainly recent, ephemeral, and [...]

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Unsigned, Sealed, Delivered: PTO Eliminates Handwritten Signatures for Certain OED Correspondence and Credit Card Payments

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) eliminated the requirement for original handwritten signatures on certain correspondence with the Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED) and on certain payments made to the PTO by credit card. The handwritten signature requirements of 37 CFR § 1.4(e) were deleted effective July 2, 2021.

37 CFR § 1.4(e)(1) previously required correspondence related to registration to practice before the PTO in patent cases, enrollment and disciplinary investigations, and disciplinary proceedings to be submitted with an original handwritten signature personally signed in permanent dark ink or its equivalent. 37 CFR § 1.4(e)(2) required the same for payments by credit cards where the payment was not made via the electronic filing system. Elimination of the entirety of § 1.4(e) allows the use of facsimile transmissions and S-signatures in enrollment and disciplinary matters before the OED, and for payments by credit card.




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Don’t Let Prophetic Examples Work Against You

On July 1, 2021, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued a notice reminding patent applicants that when their applications contain both prophetic and working examples, they must make a clear distinction between the two.

Prophetic examples illustrate reasonably expected results or anticipated results. They stem from experiments that have not been actually performed and are instead hypothetical simulations. In contrast, working examples result from experiments that were actually performed. In order to aid in distinguishing between the two example types within a patent application, prophetic examples should be written only in the future or present tense—not in the past tense. Prophetic examples cannot be used to meet the written description and enablement requirements for a patent application.

The PTO’s recent notice underscores the importance of the applicant’s duty to clearly distinguish between prophetic and working examples: “[k]nowingly asserting in a patent application that a certain result ‘was run’ or an experiment ‘was conducted’ when, in fact, the experiment was not conducted or the result was not obtained is fraud.”




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Federal Circuit Lacks Appellate Jurisdiction over Standalone Walker Process Claims

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ordered the transfer of a case asserting standalone Walker Process antitrust claims involving an unenforceable patent to the regional circuit, in this case the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Chandler v. Phoenix Services LLC, Case No. 20-1848 (Fed Cir. June 10, 2021) (Hughes, J.) The case originated in the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas, over which the Fifth Circuit has appellate jurisdiction. The decision to transfer was based on a subject matter jurisdiction analysis for Walker Process claims. The Federal Circuit reiterated that its precedent does not mandate exclusive Federal Circuit jurisdiction over all Walker Process cases.

In 2006, Phoenix Services and Mark Fisher (collectively, Phoenix) acquired a company called Heat On-The-Fly and its patent to protect a purported proprietary fracking process. Heat-On-The-Fly, and later Phoenix, sought to enforce the patent against numerous parties. During the patent application process, however, Heat On-The-Fly had failed to disclose numerous public uses of the fracking process prior to the application filing. In 2018, in an unrelated case, Energy Heating, LLC v. Heat On-The-Fly, the Federal Circuit, held that “failure to disclose prior uses of the fracking process rendered the . . . patent unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.” The plaintiffs in the case at hand, Ronald Chandler, Chandler MFG., Newco Enterprises and Supertherm Heating Services (collectively, Chandler), alleged that Phoenix’s continued enforcement of the patent violated Walker Process pursuant to § 2 of the Sherman Act.

Walker Process monopolization claims originate from a 1965 Supreme Court decision that recognized an antitrust cause of action under the Sherman and Clayton Acts when a party fraudulently obtains a patent for the purpose of attempted monopolization. Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. To succeed on a Walker Process claim, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements:

  • The plaintiff must show that the defendant obtained the patent through knowing and willful fraud on the US Patent & Trademark Office and enforced that patent with knowledge of its fraudulent procurement.
  • The plaintiff must be able to satisfy all other elements for a Sherman Act monopolization claim.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), the Federal Circuit retains jurisdiction over any civil case arising under any act of Congress relating to patents. In this instance, the Federal Circuit stated that Walker Process antitrust claims may relate to patents “in the colloquial use of the term,” but under 1988 Supreme Court precedent, Christianson v. Colt Indus., the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction only extends to cases where the cause of action is created under federal patent law, or where the plaintiff’s right to relief “necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law.”

Here, the Federal Circuit relied on its own 2018 precedent where it analyzed subject matter jurisdiction for Walker Process claims. Xitronix Corp v. KLA-Tencor Corp. (Xitronix I). Xitronix I involved alleged fraud by the defendants to obtain a patent. The Court acknowledged [...]

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10th Circuit Falls into Line on Exceptionality Doctrine in Lanham Act Cases

Addressing whether the term “exceptional case” in the Patent Act differs in meaning from the same term used in the Lanham Act, the US Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit upheld an award of attorneys’ fees granted under a motion filed under 15 U.S.C. 1117(a) and clarified that the exceptional case standard in the Lanham Act parallels the standard in the Patent Act. Derma Pen, LLC v. 4EverYoung Limited, et al., Case No. 19-4114 (10th Cir. June 8, 2021) (Lucero, J.)

In 2013, Derma Pen sued several companies for infringement of the “DERMAPEN” mark. Four years later, Derma Pen was granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the companies and “their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, licensees, and anyone in active concert or participation with, aiding, assisting, or enabling Defendants” from using the mark. A few months later, Derma Pen filed for an order of contempt against one of the defendants, Stene Marshall, alleging that Marshall, with the help of other actors (related parties), had been violating the earlier-issued injunction. During the subsequent proceedings, despite being the plaintiff, Derma Pen routinely failed to meet its discovery obligations, causing the related parties to file as many as six discovery motions and resulting in the imposition of sanctions on Derma Pen.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found Marshall in contempt of the injunction, but concluded that the related parties took no part in Marshall’s violation. Subsequently, the related parties moved for attorneys’ fees incurred in the contempt proceeding under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1117(a). The district court granted the motion and awarded more than $190,000 in fees based on application of the “exceptional case” standard set forth in the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2014 decision in Octane Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitness. Specifically, the district court decided that the case was “exceptional” because:

  • Derma Pen produced “no evidence of damages.”
  • “[T]he evidence showed [Derma Pen] had no right to enforce the injunction.”
  • “[T]he evidence showed that [the] trademark was abandoned.”
  • “[M]onetary sanctions were imposed on” Derma Pen for misconduct and delay during discovery.
  • Derma Pen was “entitled to no relief against the [related parties].”

Derma Pen appealed.

The 10th Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding and fees award for the related parties, noting Derma Pen’s misconduct and delay during discovery. In so doing, the Court adopted the Octane Fitness standard as applicable to cases brought under the Lanham Act.

Practice Note: The 10th Circuit noted that it was acting consistently with other circuits that have considered application of the Octane standard to fee disputes under the Lanham Act, citing LHO Chicago River, L.L.C. v. Perillo (7th Cir. 2019) (collecting cases); Xereas v. Heiss (DC Cir. 2021); and Safeway Transit LLC v. Disc. Party Bus, Inc. (8th Cir. 2020).




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Paris Court of Appeals Rejects Pharmaceutical Supplementary Protection Certificate Applications

One of the conditions for obtaining an SPC is that “the product is protected by a basic patent in force”. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) clarified to what extent a product must be identified by the claims to meet this condition in Teva, Eli Lilly, and Royalty Pharma.

In Eli Lilly, the CJEU notes that an active ingredient which is not identified in the claims of a basic patent by means of a structural or functional definition cannot be considered to be “protected by a basic patent.”

The active ingredient does not, however, have to be identified in the claims by a structural formula. A functional definition of the active ingredient may suffice if it is possible to reach the conclusion on the basis of the claims (interpreted in light of the description of the invention) that they relate “implicitly but necessarily and specifically, to the active ingredient in question.

Click here to read the full article in our latest International News.




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What You Say Can and Will be Used Against You – Prosecution History and Prior Infringement Arguments

Noting patent owner’s prior litigation statements, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a district court ruling that a clear and unmistakable disclaimer in the prosecution history affected claim construction of an asserted patent. SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No. 20-1573 (Fed. Cir. June 3, 2021) (Prost, J.)

In 2009, SpeedTrack filed suit against various online retailers alleging infringement of its patent directed to a method for accessing files in a filing system leveraging “category descriptions” to aid in organizing the files. The patent describes associating category descriptions with files using a “file information directory.” A “search filter” then searches the files using their associated category descriptions. A limitation that “the category descriptions hav[e] no predefined hierarchical relationship with such list or each other” was added during prosecution to overcome a prior art reference that leveraged hierarchical field-and-value relationships.

The district court initially adopted a proposed claim construction that lacked any reference to a field-and-value relationship, noting that the construction “account[ed] for the disclaimers made during prosecution.” Following a motion by SpeedTrack, the court concluded there was still a fundamental dispute about the scope of the claim term. After further analyzing SpeedTrack’s prosecution history, the court concluded that the history “demonstrate[d] clear and unambiguous disavowal of category descriptions based on hierarchical field-and-value systems” and issued a second claim construction order explicitly disclaiming “predefined hierarchical field-and-value relationships” from the scope of “category descriptions.” SpeedTrack subsequently stipulated to noninfringement under the second claim construction and appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit stressed that prosecution-history disclaimer can arise from both claim amendments and arguments. Here, the prosecution history showed that the applicants “repeatedly highlighted predefined hierarchical field-and-value relationships” as a difference between the prior art and the patent claims in no uncertain terms. That SpeedTrack distinguished the prior art on other grounds did not moot its disclaimer statements.

The Federal Circuit also noted that SpeedTrack argued in litigation against another defendant that the purpose of the amendment was to distinguish the category descriptions from attributes that “have a ‘hierarchical’ relationship between fields and their values.” While the Court agreed with SpeedTrack that such litigation statements were not a disclaimer on their own (since they were not the inventors’ prosecution statements), these litigation statements further supported not accepting SpeedTrack’s arguments. The Court reminded SpeedTrack that it has cautioned (in Aylus and Southwall) that “the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer ensures that claims are not ‘construed one way in order to obtain their allowance and in a different way against accused infringers.’”

After assessing SpeedTrack’s prior statements, the Federal Circuit considered whether the disclaimer was clear and unmistakable. The Court concluded it was. In rejecting SpeedTrack’s argument that prior decisions not expressly finding disclaimer supported that prosecution statements were not clear and unambiguous, the Court noted the construction had not been fully considered in those judgments. Similarly, the Court rejected the notion that the district court’s issuance of a second claim construction order showed there was no clear and [...]

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IP Ownership Considerations in Multi-jurisdictional Software Development Agreements

As a result of the healthcare sector’s growing dependence on software, health IT companies are increasingly taking advantage of globalisation to engage contractors in low wage jurisdictions to develop their user-facing software applications. This can trigger unforeseen legal risks owing to the differing laws across jurisdictions related to the ownership and transfer of intellectual property (IP) rights.

At the most extreme end, best practices in some jurisdictions are unenforceable or even impermissible in others. In view of these issues, it is strongly recommended that a company looking to take advantage of cross-border contracting for critical development eorts should carefully consider the choice of law provisions in their agreements, and engage with local counsel to ensure proper vesting of intellectual property rights.

An inability to demonstrate proper ownership of such rights can be a substantial obstacle for later financings or in corporate activities. Depending on the jurisdictions involved, a contracting company may need to concern itself with at least three types of IP in the software that is developed on its behalf: copyrights, moral or author’s rights, and patents.

Click here to read the full article in our latest edition of International News.




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Navigating the Interplay Between the ITC, PTAB and District Courts

Recent changes in intellectual property law in the US International Trade Commission (ITC), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) and federal US District Courts have had major impacts on litigation strategy and business operations. Within these venues, key changes often run parallel to each other, and understanding and maximizing the interplay between them is critical to formulizing an IP strategy. A panel of McDermott attorneys, including Charlie McMahon, Amol Parikh, Jay Reiziss and Jiaxiao Zhang, recently hosted a webinar exploring these issues in collaboration with IAM and Lexology. Click here to watch their discussion of the complexities of these related developments as well as innovative and practical insights to help you navigate them.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The rate at which the PTAB institutes petitions for Inter Partes Review (IPR) has been steadily declining, with a newer low expected this year. The falling institution rate over the last several years is attributable in part to discretionary denial under § 314(a).
  • Until 2020, there was still uncertainty behind the contours of how the PTAB’s discretionary denial would be applied when there was a co-pending district court or ITC proceeding. Last year, the PTAB designated as precedential its decision in Apple v. Fintiv, setting forth factors intended to guide the discretionary decision to institute when there are parallel proceedings.
  • Post-Fintiv, it looks less likely that litigants will be able to simultaneously pursue district court litigation and a PTAB proceeding. One of the benefits of the PTAB is the lower burden of proof to demonstrate that a patent is unpatentable. Removing this tool from the litigation toolbox could have a profound impact on defensive strategy.
  • It is still unclear how the PTAB’s Finitiv decision will apply to ITC investigations. Fitness technology companies, among others, have since asked the PTAB’s Precedential Opinion Panel (POP) to determine whether Fintiv should apply to parallel ITC investigations.
  • There have also been additional developments at the ITC related to the use of licensing to satisfy the domestic industry requirement. The pending Advancing America’s Interests Act (AAIA) would significantly change how complainants can rely upon licensing activities to establish a domestic industry.

 




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It’s Highlighted and Verified: Reversal of PTAB Non-Obviousness Decision

In a relatively unusual outcome, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision finding non-obviousness in an inter partes review (IPR). Becton, Dickinson, and Co. v. Baxter Corp. Englewood, Case No. 20-1937 (Fed. Cir. May 28, 2021) (Dyk, J.)

Becton petitioned the Board for IPR of Baxter’s pre-America Invents Act (AIA) patent, directed to a system for preparing patient-specific doses and a method for telepharmacy. The Board decided that the patent claims were not shown to be invalid as obvious, but also found that Baxter’s secondary considerations evidence was “weak.” Becton appealed based on two contested limitations: a verification limitation and a highlighting limitation. The Federal Circuit reversed the Board, concluding that the challenged claims were obvious and explained that weak evidence of secondary considerations could not overcome the strong showing of obviousness.

First, the Federal Circuit decided that the Board erred in finding that a prior art reference that taught a remote pharmacist may verify a dose preparation did not render obvious a claimed method where a remote pharmacist must verify. The reference made clear that a non-pharmacist could not further process work without the verification step. Baxter’s own expert witness conceded that, in accordance with the teachings of the prior art, a non-pharmacist would be disciplined for continuing to process dose preparation without authorization. The Court concluded there was no significant difference between the teaching in the prior art reference and Baxter’s verification requirement.

Second, the Federal Circuit decided that the Board erred in finding that the “highlighting” limitation as it relates to a set of drug preparation steps on a computer was non-obvious. In what it characterized as a “close case,” the Board decided that a prior art reference’s teachings highlighting patient characteristics when dispensing repackaged medication did not make obvious highlighting, in a drug formulation context, prompts for additional information. Citing KSR v. Teleflex, the Court explained that the “combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” The reference taught highlighting in terms of various inputs and information delivered. Becton’s expert testified that one of ordinary skill would understand from the reference that other information, such as prescription order information, could be displayed on the user interface. Baxter’s expert did not contradict Becton’s expert. Because “a person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” the Board erred in using that one reference as the only source for what one of ordinary skill would consider.

Lastly, Baxter unsuccessfully argued that under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(2), one of the patent references was ineligible as prior art. Sec. 102(e)(2) provides that a prior art reference may be a “patent granted” on another’s application filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant. Baxter argued that since the claims of the reference were cancelled after a 2018 IPR, the reference no longer qualified as a “patent granted” [...]

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