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Results for "Trademark Precedent"
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Triple Trouble: Unauthorized Trademark Use among Organizations with Nearly Identical Name

by | Apr 1, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that the use of nearly identical marks by a military order, a related foundation and a funding organization was likely to cause confusion. Military Order of the Purple Heart Service Foundation, Inc. v. Military Order of the Purple Heart of the United States of America, Inc., Case No. 19-7167 (DC Cir. Mar. 16, 2021) (non-precedential).

This case involved a dispute among three entities: the Military Order of the Purple Heart of the United States of America, Inc. (Order); the Military Order of the Purple Heart Service Foundation, Inc. (Foundation); and the Military Order of the Purple Heart Service Foundation Holdings, LLC (Holdings). The Order provides charitable services to veterans, and the Foundation funds the Order’s operations. Holdings is owned by the Foundation and licensed the Order to use Holdings’ “Purple Heart” word mark in connection with charitable fundraising for specific approved projects. The funding agreement between the parties was made in 2016, and the use of the trademark was agreed to in 2017. Following a warning from the Foundation in 2018 that the Order’s funding might be reduced for 2019 because of financial problems, the Order began fundraising on its own, at times purposely diverting funds away from the Foundation while using the “Purple Heart” mark without Holdings’ permission.

The Foundation and Holdings sued the Order for breach of the 2016 funding agreement, breach of the 2017 licensing agreement, and trademark infringement. The Order filed its own suit for breach of the funding agreement. The cases were consolidated and the district court ruled that the Order’s use of the mark without permission violated the licensing agreement and two provisions of the Lanham Act. The Order appealed.

The DC Circuit agreed that the Order’s use of Holdings’ mark was in plain violation of the parties’ 2017 agreement. The agreement stated that the Order could use the mark “only in connection with charitable fundraising for specific projects that are approved by [Holdings] and are consistent with [the Order’s] mission statement.” Thus, the Order’s fundraising advertisements using the mark without permission were inconsistent with the agreement.

The DC Circuit also found that the Order’s use of the “Purple Heart” mark was likely to cause confusion. Not only are the names of these entities nearly identical, but the Order’s national commander admitted at trial that the public frequently confuses the Order and the Foundation. Citing its 1982 Foxtrap precedent, the Court concluded that consumer confusion is likely where the marks in issue are identical and the record contains evidence that the businesses are sufficiently related so as to be connected in the mind of the relevant public.



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The Naked Truth About Trademark Cancellation: Only Harm, No Proprietary Interest Required

by | Aug 5, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that a contracting party that contractually abandoned any proprietary interest in a mark may still bring a cancellation action if it can “demonstrate a real interest in the proceeding and a reasonable belief of damage.” Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, Case No. 19-1567 (Fed. Cir. July 24, 2020) (Reyna, J.) (Wallach, J., dissenting).

Australian sold condoms with the marks NAKED and NAKED CONDOMS, first in Australia in early 2000, then in the United States in 2003. Two years later, Australian learned that Naked TM’s predecessor had registered a trademark NAKED for condoms in September 2003. Australian and Naked TM communicated by email regarding use of the mark for a few years. Naked TM contended that the parties reached an agreement; Australian disagreed and said no final terms were agreed upon. Australian filed a petition to cancel the NAKED trademark registration. Ultimately, and after trial, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) concluded that Australian lacked standing because it had reached an informal agreement that Naked TM reasonably believed was an abandonment of any right to contest Naked TM’s registration of NAKED. Thus, the TTAB found that Australian lacked a real interest in the proceeding because it lacked a proprietary interest in the challenged mark. Australian appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed. First, the Court clarified that the proper inquiry was a matter of proving an element of the cause of action under 15 USC § 1064 rather than standing. The Court explained that, contrary to the TTAB’s conclusion, “[n]either § 1064 nor [its] precedent requires that a petitioner have a proprietary right in its own mark in order to demonstrate a cause of action before the Board.” Assuming without deciding that the TTAB correctly determined that Australian had contracted away its rights, the Court found that fact irrelevant. Ultimately, even though an agreement might be a bar to showing actual damages, a petitioner need only show a belief that it has been harmed to bring a petition under § 1064.

The Federal Circuit found that Australian had a reasonable belief in its own damage and a real interest in the proceedings based on a history of two prior applications to register the mark, both of which the US Patent and Trademark Office rejected on the basis that they would have created confusion with Naked TM’s mark. The Court rejected Naked TM’s argument that Australian’s abandonment of those applications demonstrated there was no harm, instead concluding that Australian’s abandonment of its applications did not create an abandonment of its rights in the unregistered mark. Moreover, as a prophylactic rationale, the Court explained that Australian’s sales of products that might be found to have infringed the challenged registration also create a real interest and reasonable belief in harm.

Judge Wallach dissented. Although he agreed that the TTAB erred by imposing a proprietary-interest requirement to bring suit under § 1064, he disagreed that Australian properly demonstrated an alternative, legitimate interest—i.e., a belief [...]

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Trademark Claim for Profit Damages Means No Jury Trial

by | Jun 11, 2020 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a denial of a jury trial demand in a trademark infringement lawsuit where only a claim of disgorgement of profits was at issue. JL Beverage Company, LLC v. Jim Beam Brands Co., Beam Inc., Case No. 18-16597 (9th Cir. May 27, 2020) (Wallace, J.) (Friedland, J., concurring).

JL sued Jim Beam for trademark infringement. JL manufactured and sold vodka in bottles featuring stylized depictions of lips. Jim Beam also sells vodka in bottles featuring stylized depictions of lips. JL alleged that consumers would confuse its “Johnny Love Vodka” lip mark with Jim Beam’s Pucker line of flavored vodka products.

After JL failed to provide a computation of actual damages during discovery, Jim Beam sought to limit the damages JL could seek at trial. The district court found that JL’s failure prevented Jim Beam from preparing a responsive case and granted Jim Beam’s motion to exclude JL’s claims for actual damages. Jim Beam further argued that JL may not recover a royalty because 1) it is not appropriate in situations, like this one, where the parties did not have a previous royalty agreement and 2) as with actual damages, JL never identified a means of calculating a reasonable royalty or produced evidence upon which a fact finder could determine such a royalty. Again, the court agreed, and limited JL’s damage claims to equitable disgorgement of Jim Beam’s profits, as provided under the Lanham Act.

Without claims for actual damages or royalties, Jim Beam moved to strike JL’s demand for a jury trial. Since the Lanham Act does not afford the right to a jury trial, the district court considered whether the Seventh Amendment affords such a right in a trademark dispute. The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” The district court found controlling law in Ninth Circuit precedent Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, which held that that the Seventh Amendment does not afford the right to a jury calculation of profits for two reasons: disgorgement is an equitable remedy, and the specific issue of profit determination cannot be said to be traditionally tried by a jury. The district court denied JL’s demand for a jury trial, held a two-day bench trial and ultimately determined that Jim Beam did not infringe JL’s marks. JL appealed the district court’s order granting Jim Beam’s motion to strike its jury trial demand and the district court’s judgment.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order and judgment, finding no error in the court’s likelihood of confusion analysis on any of the factors, nor in its denial of the jury trial.

In a concurring opinion, Judge Friedland wrote separately to address the tension between the Court’s holdings in Fifty-Six Hope Road Music (a trademark case) and Sid & Marty Krofft (a copyright case). In Krofft, the Ninth Circuit found a right to a jury trial in a copyright case where there was only a claim [...]

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Don’t SULKA: Trademark Plaintiff Must Demonstrate Intent, Ability to Use Mark

by | May 14, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a complaint seeking a declaration of trademark abandonment, finding that the plaintiff (the co-owner of an online business that sells to customers in India and Thailand) was unable to demonstrate a case or controversy absent evidence that he was prepared to immediately bring his goods to market in the United States. Abdul Rehman Karim Saleh v. Sulka Trading Ltd., et al., Case No. 19-2461 (2d Cir. Apr. 30, 2020) (per curiam).

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Supreme Court: Profit Disgorgement Available Remedy for Trademark Infringement, Willful or Not

by | Apr 30, 2020 |

Resolving a split among the circuits regarding whether proof of willfulness is necessary for an award of a trademark infringer’s profits, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a unanimous decision holding that the plain language of the Lanham Act has never required a showing of willful infringement in order to obtain a profits award in a suit for trademark infringement under §1125(a). Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., et al. Case No. 18-1233 (Supr. Ct. Apr. 23, 2020) (Gorsuch, Justice) (Alito, Justice, concurring) (Sotomayor, Justice, concurring).

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Royal Play Penalty: No Standing in the End (Zone)

by | Apr 24, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal from the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board, finding that the appellant lacked standing because it failed to allege any actual and particularized injury. Michael J. Messier v. New Orleans Louisiana Saints, LLC, Case No. 24-2271 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 14, 2025) (per curiam) (Moore, C.J.; Prost, Stark, JJ.) (nonprecedential)

Michael J. Messier claimed that he is a direct descendent of the kings of France, and that he and his family own intellectual property rights to the Fleur-de-Lis mark used by the NFL’s New Orleans Saints. Messier filed a petition with the Board for cancellation of the Saints’ Fleur-de-Lis mark. Messier’s petition contained no claim that he or his family currently use any fleur-de-lis marks in commerce or any other avenues for revenue, such as licensing. The Board dismissed the petition.

The Board held that pursuant to Sections 13 and 14 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063 and 1064, to maintain a cancellation action, Messier had to “allege a commercial interest in the registered mark or a reasonable belief in damage from the mark’s continued registration.” Messier’s original and amended petitions failed to do so. The Board noted that Messier did not own or conduct “any business under the mark, and thus he cannot allege entitlement.” Messier appealed.

The Federal Circuit determined that Messier lacked standing to bring the appeal. The Court explained that to demonstrate Article III standing for his appeal, Messier had to demonstrate actual or imminent injury that was concrete and particularized, a causal connection between the alleged conduct and the injury, and potential redressability by a favorable decision. Messier failed to meet his burden, primarily because he failed to demonstrate injury by the Saints’ use of the Fleur-de-Lis mark that went beyond “a general grievance or abstract harm.” Messier did not allege that he used a fleur-de-lis design in commerce whatsoever and thus failed to demonstrate any injury.



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PTO Reverts to Prior Post-Grant Guidelines for Cases Involving Parallel District Court Litigation

by | Mar 13, 2025 |

On February 28, 2025, the acting director of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) announced that the agency will revert to previous guidelines for discretionary denials of petitions for post-grant proceedings where there is ongoing district court litigation.

This announcement rescinds the PTO’s June 21, 2022, memorandum entitled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation.” The memorandum stated that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board “will not deny institution of an IPR or PGR under Fintiv (i) when a petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability; (ii) when a request for denial under Fintiv is based on a parallel ITC proceeding; or (iii) where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” The memorandum effectively limited the discretion granted in Fintiv, which outlined six factors for the Board to consider when making decisions on post-grant proceedings involving parallel district court litigation.

Now that the 2022 memorandum has been rescinded, parties to post-grant proceedings should refer to Board precedent, including Fintiv and Sotera Wireless v. Masimo, for guidance when there are parallel district court proceedings. In accordance with prior guidelines, the PTO’s objective is to achieve greater consistency in its decision-making processes, especially in situations where patent validity is contested both in the courts and before the Board. The PTO emphasized that any portions of future Board decisions that rely on the 2022 memorandum will not be binding or persuasive.

Practice Note: Because of this action, the Board will now enjoy greater discretion when ruling on post-grant petitions, which may result in an increase of discretionary denials.



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Case Closed: OpenAI Prevails on Secondary Meaning

by | Dec 5, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction (PI) in a trademark action under the Lanham Act, stating that the district court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous based on its finding that the plaintiff had likely acquired secondary meaning in the mark. OpenAI, Inc. v. Open Artificial Intelligence, Inc., Guy Ravine, Case No. 24-1963 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2024) (Thomas, Owens, Collins, JJ.) (per curiam) (Collins, J., dissenting) (nonprecedential).

OpenAI is the founder of ChatGPT and other artificial intelligence tools. OpenAI has used the OPENAI (no space) mark extensively in association with its goods, services, website, social media, and marketing. OpenAI first attempted to register the mark with the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) in 2016, but the PTO rejected the mark as being merely descriptive and potentially confusing with Guy Ravine’s prior-filed application for the mark OPEN AI (with a space). Ravine claimed to have used the mark as early as 2015, which would have predated OpenAI’s use of its mark. However, the PTO also rejected Ravine’s application for registration on the Principal Register under a similar rationale, and the OPEN AI mark was only accepted for registration on the Supplemental Register in 2017. Neither mark is registered on the Principal Register.

OpenAI filed a trademark action under the Lanham Act against Ravine’s company, Open Artificial Intelligence, and sought a PI, which the district court granted after finding that OpenAI had established that it had acquired distinctiveness in the mark. Ravine appealed the denial of Open Artificial Intelligence’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b) to amend or vacate that injunction.

A PI is granted when a plaintiff establishes that:

  • It is likely to succeed on the merits.
  • It is likely to suffer irreparable harm.
  • The balance of equities tips in its favor.
  • An injunction is in the public interest.

The Ninth Circuit applies a sliding scale approach, where a stronger showing of one factor could offset a weaker showing of another factor. To succeed on a trademark infringement claim, a plaintiff must show that it has a protectible ownership interest in the mark and that the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.

To evaluate the claims, the district court looked at each of the parties’ history and use of the disputed marks. The district court noted that OpenAI had used its mark in connection with its most widely used product, ChatGPT, resulting in the mark becoming a household name. The district court recognized that OpenAI’s trademark was one of the most recognized in artificial intelligence (AI) history. The district court noted that OpenAI’s website was one of the most visited websites, with almost 100 million monthly active users. In contrast, the district court found that Ravine had not established that he had used the mark in commerce prior to OpenAI’s use and even took issue with Ravine’s representations regarding his use of the mark. The district court granted [...]

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Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Advances Two Patent Reform Bills

by | Dec 5, 2024 |

This post has been updated since its original publication date.

On November 15, 2024, the US Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property advanced the Inventor Diversity for Economic Advancement (IDEA) Act, one of three significant bills it considered this year to reform the patent system. On November 21, 2024, that same subcommittee advanced the Promoting and Respecting Economically Vital American Innovation Leadership (PREVAIL) Act. No action has been taken by the subcommittee yet regarding the Patent Eligibility Restoration Act (PERA). It is unlikely any of these bills will become law before the new Congress begins on January 3, 2025.

The IDEA Act, sponsored by Senator Mazie Hirono (D-HI) and garnering bipartisan support, would require the US Patent & Trademark Office to seek demographic data from patent inventors residing in the United States on a voluntary basis. The bill also includes safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the collected information and ensure it is not used as part of the examination process, with a report to be submitted to Congress biannually.

By the time of the November 21 action, the subcommittee sent the PREVAIL Act, sponsored by Senators Christopher Coons (D-DE) and Thom Tillis (R-NC), to the full US Senate. In the words of Coons, the PREVAIL Act is intended to make proceedings before the Patent Trial & Appeal Board “cheaper, swifter, more efficient alternatives to federal district court.” The PREVAIL Act would enact substantial changes to post-grant and inter partes review proceedings at the Board, including by introducing a standing requirement, aligning standards more closely with district court standards, and strengthening estoppel provisions to prevent re-litigation of validity issues.

The substance of PERA and the PREVAIL Act have been reported on previously here and here, respectively. PERA would revise the standards related to patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which have been broadly criticized as providing insufficient predictability and certainty. PERA would overturn Supreme Court precedent by establishing specific categories of exceptions to broad patent eligibility for inventions or discoveries.

At the November 15 hearing, Coons and Tillis explained that they continue to receive feedback on PERA, which has been unsuccessfully introduced in previous years. Coons and Tillis both telegraphed optimism that PERA was moving toward being voted out of the subcommittee. After the November 21 hearing, both sponsors indicated that they hoped PERA would be voted on soon.



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How Close Are They? PTO Looking for “Significant Relationship” Between Sequential IPR Petitioners

by | May 9, 2024 |

Addressing the issue of whether to discretionally deny a petition for inter partes review (IPR) under the General Plastics factors when there is no “significant relationship” between the petitioners, the Director of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) vacated the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s decision denying institution. Videndum Prod. Sol., Inc. v. Rotolight Ltd., IPR2023-01218 (PTO-Ofc. of Dir., Apr. 19, 2024) (Vidal, PTO Dir.)

Videndum filed a petition requesting IPR challenging claims of a patent owned by Rotolight. In its Patent Owner’s Response, Rotolight argued to the Board that it should exercise its discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), citing the Board’s 2017 precedential decision in General Plastic. Prior to Videndum’s petition, the Board instituted review of the same patent at the request of another party. However, one month prior to oral argument in that proceeding, the parties to that IPR proceeding jointly moved to terminate the proceeding on the basis of a settlement. The Board granted the parties’ joint petition.

In the present case, a split Board denied Videndum’s petition for institution, reasoning that Videndum’s petition was a “follow on” of the prior proceeding, and citied General Plastic even while conceding that the “Petitioner’s reliance on [the] earlier-filed petition …, even ‘as a menu and roadmap’” is not sufficient “to create ‘a significant relationship’ that favors denial under the first General Plastic factor.” The dissent agreed on that point but argued that the “General Plastic factors as whole weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution.”

Videndum requested Director review of the Board’s denial of institution based on an abuse of discretion argument. The Director granted review.

The Director found error with the Board’s application of the General Plastic factors in situations where the second-in-time petition is not by the same party that filed the first petition or by a party having a “significant relationship” with the first filer.

The General Plastic factors generally deal with how the Board should analyze whether to institute a subsequent petition on the same patent. Factor one explicitly asks whether the two petitioners are the same. However, the application of the General Plastic factors “is not limited solely to instances when multiple petitions are filed by the same petitioner.” But, when the factors are applied to different petitioners, they have been applied to petitioners who have a “significant relationship” with each other.

Here, both the parties and the Board agreed that there is not a “significant relationship” between the two petitioners. As the Director noted, the PTO has never extended the General Plastic factors “to any cases in which the first and second petitioners do not have a significant relationship.” The Director found the Board’s unprecedented extension of the General Plastics factors to be “improper[],” vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded the case with an instruction to the Board majority to “address the merits of the Petition.”

Practice Note: Patent owners fighting institution of an IPR by a subsequent petitioner should allege facts emphasizing the relationship between the two [...]

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