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How Close Are They? PTO Looking for “Significant Relationship” Between Sequential IPR Petitioners

by Sydney E. McDermott | May 9, 2024 | Patents

Addressing the issue of whether to discretionally deny a petition for inter partes review (IPR) under the General Plastics factors when there is no “significant relationship” between the petitioners, the Director of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) vacated the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s decision denying institution. Videndum Prod. Sol., Inc. v. Rotolight Ltd., IPR2023-01218 (PTO-Ofc. of Dir., Apr. 19, 2024) (Vidal, PTO Dir.)

Videndum filed a petition requesting IPR challenging claims of a patent owned by Rotolight. In its Patent Owner’s Response, Rotolight argued to the Board that it should exercise its discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), citing the Board’s 2017 precedential decision in General Plastic. Prior to Videndum’s petition, the Board instituted review of the same patent at the request of another party. However, one month prior to oral argument in that proceeding, the parties to that IPR proceeding jointly moved to terminate the proceeding on the basis of a settlement. The Board granted the parties’ joint petition.

In the present case, a split Board denied Videndum’s petition for institution, reasoning that Videndum’s petition was a “follow on” of the prior proceeding, and citied General Plastic even while conceding that the “Petitioner’s reliance on [the] earlier-filed petition …, even ‘as a menu and roadmap’” is not sufficient “to create ‘a significant relationship’ that favors denial under the first General Plastic factor.” The dissent agreed on that point but argued that the “General Plastic factors as whole weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution.”

Videndum requested Director review of the Board’s denial of institution based on an abuse of discretion argument. The Director granted review.

The Director found error with the Board’s application of the General Plastic factors in situations where the second-in-time petition is not by the same party that filed the first petition or by a party having a “significant relationship” with the first filer.

The General Plastic factors generally deal with how the Board should analyze whether to institute a subsequent petition on the same patent. Factor one explicitly asks whether the two petitioners are the same. However, the application of the General Plastic factors “is not limited solely to instances when multiple petitions are filed by the same petitioner.” But, when the factors are applied to different petitioners, they have been applied to petitioners who have a “significant relationship” with each other.

Here, both the parties and the Board agreed that there is not a “significant relationship” between the two petitioners. As the Director noted, the PTO has never extended the General Plastic factors “to any cases in which the first and second petitioners do not have a significant relationship.” The Director found the Board’s unprecedented extension of the General Plastics factors to be “improper[],” vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded the case with an instruction to the Board majority to “address the merits of the Petition.”

Practice Note: Patent owners fighting institution of an IPR by a subsequent petitioner should allege facts emphasizing the relationship between the two [...]

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It May Be a Hairy Situation, but Detailed Declaration Sufficient Evidence of Prior Use

by Karen Gover | May 9, 2024 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s refusal to register a mark, finding that an unchallenged, detailed declaration by the opposing company’s director sufficed as substantial evidence of prior use. Jalmar Araujo v. Framboise Holdings, Inc., Case No. 23-1142 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 2024) (Lourie, Linn, Stoll, JJ.)

On December 3, 2019, Jalmar Araujo filed an application to register #TODECACHO as a standard character mark for hair combs. Framboise Holdings filed an opposition on the grounds that Araujo’s mark would likely cause confusion with its #TODECACHO design mark (below).

Framboise Holdings alleged that it owned the mark based on its prior use of it in connection with various hair products since March 24, 2017. Framboise also filed its own application for registration of its design mark on April 14, 2020, claiming the same date of first use.

On October 18, 2021, the final day on which Framboise could submit its case in chief to the Board, it moved for a seven-day extension. Four days after filing the motion, it served Araujo with the declaration of Framboise Director Adrian Extrakt. Although it was the testimony of a single interested party, the Board found Extrakt’s declaration alone to be convincing evidence of prior use. His declaration provided a list of products and dates of first use, as well as examples of the mark displayed on products in stores. After the Board sustained the opposition, Araujo appealed.

Araujo argued that the Board abused its discretion in granting Framboise an extension of the trial period, and that the Board’s finding that Framboise established prior use of the #TODECACHO design mark was not supported by substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit disagreed.

The Federal Circuit concluded that the Board had not abused its discretion in granting Framboise an extension because it identified and applied the correct good cause standard and “reasonably found good cause to grant the extension.” The Court also found that the Board was correct in finding that Extrakt’s declaration alone was sufficient evidence to support a priority date of March 24, 2017, based on evidence of the design mark’s use in connection with various hair products. The Court noted that the declaration did not simply consist of “naked general assertions of prior use,” but contained evidence. Araujo neither deposed Extrakt nor offered any evidence to dispute his claims. Hence, Extrakt’s declaration sufficed to meet the applicable preponderance of the evidence standard.

Practice Note: Oral or written testimony, even when offered by an interested party, can establish priority of use in a trademark proceeding if it is sufficiently detailed, is supported by exhibits and is convincing.

A Lesson in Laches: You Waited Too Long to Start Your Kar

by Sarah Bro | May 2, 2024 | Trademarks

After the district court, on remand, held that laches did not bar relief, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit again determined that the district court abused its discretion by not properly applying the presumption in favor of laches and issued an order to vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss a charity’s trademark infringement claims with prejudice. Kars 4 Kids Inc. v. America Can!, Case Nos. 23-1273; -1281 (3rd Cir. Apr. 17, 2024) (Bibas, Porter, Fisher, JJ.)

Kars 4 Kids and America Can! Cars for Kids are charities that sell donated vehicles to fund children’s education programs and have been engaged in a trademark dispute since 2003. Both parties have alleged federal and state trademark infringement, unfair competition and trademark dilution over their respective KARS 4 KIDS and CARS FOR KIDS trademarks. The parties were last before the Third Circuit in 2021, when the Court held that America Can was first to use its CARS FOR KIDS trademark in Texas, and Kars 4 Kids waived any challenge to the validity of America Can’s marks. In that 2021 decision, the Third Circuit also vacated the district court judgment in part and remanded the case for the district court to reexamine its laches and disgorgement conclusions, which had been decided in favor of America Can.

The Lanham Act does not contain a statute of limitations. Instead, it subjects all claims to the principles of equity. To determine whether laches bars a claim, a court considers two elements: whether the plaintiff inexcusably delayed in bringing suit, and whether the defendant was prejudiced as a result of the delay. With respect to the burden of proof for the laches claim at issue, America Can and Kars 4 Kids agreed that their Lanham Act claims were properly analogous to New Jersey’s six-year fraud statute. Therefore, because America Can first discovered the Kars 4 Kids trademark in Texas in 2003 and did not bring counterclaims until 2015, America Can was subject to a presumption that its claims were barred by laches unless it was able to prove both that its delay in filing suit was excusable and that it did not prejudice Kars 4 Kids.

On the issue of delay, the Third Circuit found that the district court erred because it did not find that America Can met its burden of establishing that its delay in bringing suit was excusable and that a reasonable person in its shoes would have waited to file suit. Instead, the district court improperly placed the burden on Kars 4 Kids to establish whether its advertisements in Texas were viewed by a sufficient number of Texans so as to put America Can on notice. As the Third Circuit explained, this was error. The district court should have held America Can to the burden of persuasion to show that it was not sufficiently aware of Kars 4 Kids’s use of its mark in Texas and to show what it did to identify and stop any potentially [...]

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Hot Mess? Second Circuit Douses Injunction Based on Weak Mark

by Kathleen Lynch | May 2, 2024 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion based on an erroneous evaluation of the strength of the “inherently descriptive” marks at issue. City of New York v. Henriquez, Case No. 23-325 (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2024) (Livingston, CJ; Walker, Carney, JJ.)

Juan Henriquez is a first responder with the Fire Department of New York (FDNY). Henriquez began organizing what he called “medical special operations conferences” (MSOCs) around the United States. In New York, he partnered with the FDNY. Six years into organizing with the FDNY, the relationship soured. Henriquez then applied to register “Medical Special Operations Conference” as a trademark. The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) rejected his application on the basis that the mark was merely descriptive. Henriquez amended his application under § 2(f) of the Lanham Act, which allows registration of descriptive marks that have been used on a “substantially exclusive and continuous basis” for at least five years. The PTO agreed to register his mark.

The FDNY and the City of New York brought suit, seeking to cancel Henriquez’s trademark. Henriquez counterclaimed for trademark infringement of his registered “Medical Special Operations Conference” mark and the related unregistered mark “MSOC”. The district court granted Henriquez a preliminary injunction and barred the FDNY from using “medical,” “special” and “operations” in its branding. The FDNY appealed.

The FDNY raised two issues on appeal: did the district court abuse its discretion by enjoining the FDNY’s use of the marks, and alternatively, did the district court grant an “overbroad” injunction?

The Second Circuit agreed with the FDNY on the first injunction issue and therefore did not reach the second.

The Second Circuit requires analysis of the eight “likelihood of confusion” factors under Polaroid when considering a preliminary injunction. While no one factor is dispositive, the strength of a mark “is especially important,” and therefore the Court is “reluctant to affirm any preliminary injunction founded upon an erroneous strength analysis.”

The Second Circuit found three “missteps” that led the district court to commit legal error by improperly categorizing Henriquez’s two marks as “at least strongly suggestive,” when in fact the marks were inherently descriptive.

First, the Second Circuit explained that the district court did not properly consider Henriquez’s past concessions about his marks. Henriquez registered his mark under § 2(f) of the Lanham Act – conceding descriptiveness. Henriquez also argued to the district court that both of his marks were valid based on secondary meaning, which is only necessary for descriptive marks. Because “[w]hat parties say about their marks matters,” the district court was wrong to ignore admissions of descriptiveness.

Second, the Second Circuit found that the district court did not properly consider the PTO’s characterization of the marks as descriptive. Courts should “accord great weight to the PTO’s conclusions” and only decline to follow those conclusions “for compelling reasons.” The Court noted that the PTO initially rejected Henriquez’s application and only granted registration under § 2(f), which [...]

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Clean Up on Aisle PTAB: Clarification of Discretionary Denial Practice

by Peter Brunovskis, PhD | May 2, 2024 | Patents

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for inter partes review (IPR) and post-grant review (PGR) proceedings before the Patent Trial & Appeal Board, seeking to codify existing precedent and guidance regarding the Board’s discretionary considerations in denying IPR or PGR petitions. 89 Fed. Reg. 28693 (Apr. 19, 2024).

The NPRM follows a 2020 request for comments and an April 2023 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) that the PTO had hoped to finalize in terms of rulemaking by fall 2023. However, proposals in the ANPR hit a snag following criticism from Congress and more than 14,500 comments from stakeholders and the public, including charges that the PTO Director was overstepping her authority.

The newly proposed rules address:

Briefing on motions for discretionary denial
Factors for discretionary denial
Termination and settlement agreements

Briefing on Motions for Discretionary Denial

A significant aspect of the proposal provides for a separate briefing schedule between a patent owner’s preliminary response (POPR) and a request for discretionary denial, which must be filed no later than one month prior to the deadline for the POPR for briefing on its merits. Under the proposal, the discretionary denial arguments would be excluded from the preliminary response unless otherwise authorized by the Board and are intended to avoid encroaching on the wordcount limits for briefing on the merits. Under the proposed briefing process, there would be a 10-page limit for a patent owner’s request for discretionary denial and for the petitioner opposition, and a five-page limit for the patent owner’s sur-reply.

Factors for Discretionary Denial

The proposed rules address denial of institution for “parallel petitions” or “serial petitions” to provide a framework for considering whether previously presented art or arguments provide grounds for denial. The proposed rules also address treatment of joinder petitions, particularly in relation to already instituted petitions. Parallel petitions are defined in the proposed rule as two or more petitions by the same petitioner challenging the same patent that are filed on or before the filing of a POPR to any of the petitions or on or before the due date for filing a POPR to the first petition. Serial petitions are defined as challenged claims of the same patent overlapping with those in a previously filed petition for IPR, PGR or covered business method patent review.

According to the proposed rules, a parallel petition would not be instituted without a good cause showing of why more than one petition is necessary. Factors for a good cause showing include:

A petitioner’s ranking of desired petitions for consideration
An explanation of differences and materiality between the petitions
The number of challenged patent claims, including those asserted by the patent owner in district court litigation
A priority date dispute
Alternative claim constructions requiring different prior art references on mutually exclusive grounds
Knowledge of asserted claims at the time of filing a petition
Complexity of the technology

Similar considerations would also apply to joinder petitions.

[...]

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Unclean Hands Aren’t Just for Toddlers

by Jacob Michael Bass | Apr 25, 2024 | Patents

In an action involving manufacturers of a self-sealing dining mat for toddlers, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding that the defendants were barred from obtaining relief on their counterclaims under the unclean hands doctrine, thereby vacating the district court’s other findings on inequitable conduct, obviousness, attorneys’ fees and costs. Luv N’ Care, Ltd. et al. v. Laurain et al., Case No. 22-1905 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2024) (Reyna, Hughes, Stark, JJ.)

Luv N’ Care and Nouri E. Hakim (collectively, LNC) filed suit against Lindsey Laurain and Eazy-PZ (EZPZ), asserting various claims for unfair competition under the Lanham Act and Louisiana law. LNC also sought declaratory judgment that EZPZ’s design patent was invalid, unenforceable and not infringed. After the suit was filed, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued Laurain a utility patent directed toward self-sealing dining mats. Laurain subsequently assigned her rights to EZPZ, which then asserted counterclaims for utility patent, design patent and trademark infringement.

Following discovery, the district court granted LNC’s motion for summary judgment, finding all claims of EZPZ’s utility patent as obvious in view of three prior art references. EZPZ moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied, indicating that a “ruling providing further reasoning will follow in due course.” Before any such ruling issued, the PTO issued an ex parte reexamination certificate confirming the patentability of the utility patent claims two days before the district court’s bench trial began.

EZPZ did not provide this reexam certificate to the district court prior to the bench trial. During the bench trial, the district court found that EZPZ had not committed inequitable conduct but that EZPZ’s litigation conduct constituted unclean hands. After the district court entered judgment, EZPZ moved for reconsideration of summary judgment based on the ex parte reexamination certificate. The district court denied this motion and found that the evidence did not compel alteration of the prior ruling that the utility patent was invalid. It also denied LNC’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. EZPZ appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the unclean hands determination but vacated the district court’s rulings on inequitable conduct, invalidity, attorneys’ fees and costs. As to unclean hands, the Court reasoned that EZPZ failed to disclose patent applications related to the utility patent until well after the close of discovery and dispositive motion practice. EZPZ also blocked LNC’s efforts to discover Laurain’s prior art searches by falsely claiming that she had conducted no such searches and that all responsive documents had been produced. It further found that EZPZ witnesses, including Laurain and EZPZ’s former outside counsel, repeatedly gave evasive testimony during depositions and at trial. The Court affirmed the district court’s determination that EZPZ’s misconduct bore an immediate and necessary connection to EZPZ’s claims for infringement because the undisclosed material was directly relevant to the development of LNC’s litigation strategy and undermined LNC’s ability to press its invalidity and unenforceability challenges. The Court found no clear error in the district court’s reasoning that [...]

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Sole Searching: Trade Dress Hopes Booted as Functional, Nondistinctive

by Keval Amin | Apr 25, 2024 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment grant in a trademark dispute, finding that the district court did not err in concluding that a subset of design elements lacked distinctiveness in the public’s view. TBL Licensing, LLC v. Katherine Vidal, Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Case No. 23-1150 (4th Cir. Apr. 15, 2024) (Quattlebaum, Gregory, Benjamin, JJ.)

TBL Licensing is commonly known as Timberland, the prominent footwear manufacturer. Timberland tried to register specific design elements of its popular boot as protected trade dress with the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO). In its application, Timberland provided a detailed written description of the boot design elements it sought to register as protectable trade dress. Timberland also included a drawing of these design elements.

The PTO rejected Timberland’s application, finding that the design was functional and lacked distinctiveness. Timberland appealed to the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board, which affirmed. Timberland then challenged the Board’s decision in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the PTO because Timberland’s design was functional and had not acquired distinctiveness. Timberland appealed.

Timberland argued that the district court improperly segmented the design during its functionality analysis. Timberland argued that the district court failed to meaningfully consider the design as a whole, and even if it did, the court erred in considering specific factors, including the availability of alternative designs and the design’s simplicity in manufacturing. The court also relied on inapposite patents and advertisements as evidence to support its functionality finding, an analysis that Timberland argued was improper.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. While acknowledging the potential error in the district court’s failure to analyze the design holistically, the Court ultimately found that the limited design elements Timberland sought to register lacked secondary meaning – a crucial element for trade dress protection. The Court employed a secondary meaning analysis to assess public perception of Timberland’s design and considered various factors, including advertising expenditures, consumer studies, sales success, unsolicited media coverage, attempts at imitation and length of exclusive use.

Applying each factor, the Fourth Circuit determined that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the design elements lacked distinctiveness. The Court explained that the district court highlighted flaws in Timberland’s consumer survey, noting suggestive questions and a lack of focus on the claimed design features. The district court also emphasized that Timberland’s advertising expenditures did not effectively link the claimed design features with Timberland in consumers’ minds. Timberland’s arguments regarding sales success, media coverage and attempts at plagiarism were also found insufficient to establish secondary meaning. Lastly, the presence of similar-looking boots from other manufacturers undermined Timberland’s claim of exclusivity in using the design.

Lacking direct consumer survey evidence, the Fourth Circuit determined that Timberland’s circumstantial evidence failed to [...]

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PTO Proposes New Guidelines for Director Review in Board Proceedings

by Jake B. Vallen | Apr 25, 2024 | America Invents Act, Patents

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) proposed new rules governing the process for Director review of Patent Trial & Appeal Board decisions in America Invents Act (AIA) proceedings. Rules Governing Director Review of Patent Trial and Appeal Board Decisions, 89 Fed. Reg. 26,807 (proposed Apr. 16, 2024) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) proposes adding 37 C.F.R. § 42.75, which includes rules addressing the following issues:

Limited Availability of Director Review. The NPRM proposes that Director review in AIA proceedings would only be available to a party from institution decisions, final written decisions or panel decisions granting rehearing of a decision on institution or a final written decision. However, the Director would have authority to review any interlocutory decisions rendered in reaching such decisions. The NPRM also proposes that the Director may sua sponte review institution decisions, final written decisions or decisions granting rehearing.

Timing, Format and Content of Requests for Director Review. The NPRM proposes that requests for Director review would have to be sought within the time period set forth by 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), comply with the formatting and length requirements of 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(a) and 42.24(a)(1)(v), and would not be allowed to introduce new evidence. Any sua sponte Director review would have to be initiated within 21 days after the deadline to seek rehearing.

Effect of Director Review. The NPRM proposes that a decision on institution, a final written decision or a decision granting rehearing would become final agency action unless Director review was timely sought or timely initiated sua sponte or a request for Director review was denied.

Director Review Process. The NPRM proposes that Director review would not stay the underlying proceeding, but if the Director grants review, the review would conclude with the issuance of a decision or order that provides the reasons for the Director’s disposition of the case. A party would be permitted to appeal a Director review decision of either a final written decision or a decision granting rehearing of a final written decision (not institution decisions or decisions granting rehearing of institution decisions) to the Federal Circuit in accordance with the procedures set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(c) and 319. A request for Director review would be treated as a request for rehearing and would reset the time for appeal until Director review was resolved.

Delegation. The NPRM proposes that delegation of Director review would be permitted, subject to conditions set forth by the Director.

Communications With the PTO. The NPRM proposes that communications from a party concerning a specific Director review request or proceeding would have to copy counsel for all parties. Other than authorized amicus briefings, communications from third parties would not be allowed.

Comments are due by June 17, 2024, and can be submitted through the federal eRulemaking portal here.

New Guidance Addresses Use of AI Systems, Tools in Practice Before the PTO

by Peter Brunovskis, PhD | Apr 18, 2024 | Technology

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued new guidance on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) tools in practice before the PTO. The new guidance is designed to promote responsible use of AI tools and provide suggestions for protecting practitioners and clients from misuse or harm resulting from their use. This guidance comes on the heels of a recent memorandum to both the trademark and patent trial and appeal boards concerning the applicability of existing regulations addressing potential misuse of AI and recent guidance addressing the use of AI in the context of inventorship.

Patent practitioners are increasingly using AI-based systems and tools to research prior art, automate the patent application review process, assist with claim charting, document reviews and gain insight into examiner behavior. The PTO’s support for AI use is reflected in patent examiners’ utilization of several different AI-enabled tools for conducting prior art searches. However, because AI tools are not perfect, patent practitioners are potentially vulnerable to misuse or misconduct. Therefore, the PTO’s new guidance discusses the legal and ethical implications of AI use in the patent system and provides guidelines for mitigating the risks presented by AI tools.

The guidance discusses the PTO’s existing rules and policies for consideration when applying AI tools, including duty of candor, signature requirement and corresponding certifications, confidentiality of information, foreign filing licenses and export regulations, electronic systems’ policies and duties owed to clients. The guidance also discusses the applicability of these rules and policies with respect to the use of AI tools in the context of document drafting, submissions, and correspondence with the PTO; filing documents with the PTO; accessing PTO IT systems; confidentiality and national security; and fraud and intentional misconduct.

AI tools have been developed for the intellectual property industry to facilitate drafting technical specifications, generating responses to PTO office actions, writing and responding to briefs, and drafting patent claims. While the use of these tools is not prohibited, nor is there any obligation to disclose their use unless specifically requested, the guidance emphasizes the need for patent practitioners to carefully review any AI outputs generated before signing off on any documents or statements made to the PTO. For example, when using AI tools, practitioners should make a reasonable inquiry to confirm that all facts presented have evidentiary support, that all citations to case law and other references are accurately presented, and that all arguments are legally warranted. Any errors or omissions generated by AI in the document must be corrected. Likewise, trademark and Board submissions generated or assisted by AI must be reviewed to ensure that all facts and statements are accurate and have evidentiary support.

While AI tools can be used to assist or automate the preparation and filing of documents with the PTO, care must be taken to ensure that no PTO rules or policies are violated and that documents are reviewed and signed by a person, not an AI tool or non-natural person. AI [...]

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Late Expert Report Dooms Copyright Case

by Karen Gover | Apr 18, 2024 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit weighed in for a third time on an eight-year copyright battle, this time finding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s proposed expert or granting summary judgment to the defendant with respect to a copyright claim related to software. RJ Control Consultants, Inc., et al. v. Multiject, LLC, et al., Case No. 23-1591 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2024) (Siler, Cole, Mathis, JJ.)

This case concerns a copyright infringement claim filed by Paul Rogers through his company RJ Control Consultants (RJC) against his former friend Jack Elder, sole owner of Multiject. Multiject engineers and sells industrial accessories related to plastic injection molding. Rogers developed technical diagrams and software source code for a rotary turntable control system for Multiject. After Elder obtained copies of the code and drawings, he fired Rogers and hired a different company, RSW, to implement the technology. Rogers obtained copyright registrations for the code and drawings and filed suit against Elder, Multiject and RSW for copyright and trademark infringement, as well as certain state law claims.

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on RJC’s copyright infringement and trademark infringement claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. RJC appealed the dismissal of its copyright infringement claim. In December 2020, in RJ Control I, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision regarding the technical drawings but reversed and remanded the copyright claim to the district court, finding that the software technology was complex and required an expert to answer material questions related to the functionality of the code.

On remand, the district court established deadlines for expert disclosures and for filing dispositive motions and motions challenging experts. Both parties timely served expert disclosures in which they identified the names of their respective experts, but neither side produced an expert report with their disclosures.

In April 2021, the district court extended the discovery and motions deadlines but not the expert disclosure deadline. The defendants moved to exclude RJC’s expert on the grounds that RJC failed to properly disclose the expert because RJC did not produce an expert report. The defendants also filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ motions, finding that RJC “failed to put forth any expert evidence that identifies any specific portions of the code that they claim are protectible.” RJC appealed.

The Sixth Circuit dismissed the second appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, finding that the district court’s decision was not final because the court had not disposed of Multiject and Elder’s counterclaim (RJ Control II). The case was remanded again. On remand, the district court dismissed the then-pending counterclaim. RJC appealed again.

RJC argued that the Sixth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to decide RJ Control I, just as it did in RJ Control II, because at that time the counterclaim remained pending in district court. The Court agreed and vacated its decision in RJ Control I, but then affirmed [...]

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