35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
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Computer metadata corroborates conception

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision finding that Google failed to establish unpatentability of challenged claims because the patent owner successfully antedated the asserted prior art reference using inventor testimony corroborated by metadata. Google LLC v. Valtrus Innovations Ltd., Case No. 2024-1945 (Fed Cir. Oct. 19, 2026) (Hughes, Cunningham, Burroughs, JJ.)

Valtrus owns a patent directed to methods for merging search results from multiple search engines. Google petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of the patent, asserting four grounds for obviousness. Each ground relied on the same primary prior art reference, Bushee. Although Bushee was filed about five weeks before the application for Valtrus’ patent, the patent was governed by pre-America Invents Act (AIA) law. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) permitted Valtrus to antedate Bushee by establishing conception before Bushee’s filing date and reasonably continuous diligence from just before that date until Valtrus filed its patent application.

Valtrus submitted an inventor declaration, original invention disclosure documents, and associated Microsoft Word metadata to establish conception before Bushee’s filing date. The Board found that the disclosure documents and metadata corroborated the inventor’s testimony, and that Valtrus had demonstrated reasonably continuous diligence through the filing of its patent application. The Board determined that Bushee was not prior art under pre-AIA § 102(e) and that Google had failed to establish the unpatentability of any challenged claim. Google appealed.

Reviewing the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence, the Federal Circuit affirmed. Google argued that the invention disclosure documents and accompanying metadata could not independently corroborate the inventor’s testimony because both were entirely within the inventor’s control. The Federal Circuit disagreed, relying on its 2025 decision in Global Health Solutions v. Selner, which recognized that automatically generated metadata is independent of an inventor’s own statements and documents. Assuming without deciding the metadata’s authenticity, the Court explained that the Microsoft Word metadata was not authored by the inventor and contained authorship and timestamp information consistent with his asserted conception date. The Court distinguished such metadata from unwitnessed inventor-created documents, which cannot independently corroborate conception testimony, and noted Google’s acknowledgment at oral argument that corroboration need not come from a human source. Applying the rule of reason, the Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the disclosure documents and metadata corroborated the inventor’s testimony.

Google also challenged the Board’s finding that the inventor exercised reasonably continuous diligence in reducing the invention to practice. The Federal Circuit explained that although reasonable diligence must be established throughout the critical period, it need not be perfectly continuous, and evidence of activity on each day of the diligence period is unnecessary if the record provides a satisfactory explanation for any gaps. Google disputed only the approximately 11 business days between August 8 and August 27, 2001, when the patent application was filed. The Court found substantial evidence supporting diligence during that period, including the time required to mail the last inventor’s signed [...]

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Detour Ahead: New Approach to Assessing Prior Art Rejections Under § 102(e)

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit established a more demanding test for determining whether a published patent application claiming priority to a provisional application is considered prior art under pre-America Invents Act (AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as of the provisional filing date, explaining that all portions of the published patent application that are relied upon by the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) to reject the claims must be sufficiently supported in the provisional application. In re Riggs, Case No. 22-1945 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 24, 2025) (Moore, Stoll, Cunningham, JJ.)

Several inventors who work for Odyssey Logistics filed a patent application directed to logistics systems and methods for the transportation of goods from various shippers by various carriers across different modes of transport (e.g., by rail, truck, ship, or air). PTO rejected the application under § 102(e) in view of Lettich, which claimed the benefit of a provisional application (Lettich provisional), and as obvious in view of Lettich in combination with the Rojek reference.

The inventors appealed the Lettich rejections to the Patent Trial & Appeal Board, arguing that Lettich did not qualify as prior art under § 102(e). The Board initially agreed with the inventors, but the Examiner assigned to the application requested a rehearing, asserting that the Board applied the incorrect standard for § 102(e) prior art. The Board ultimately issued its decision on the Request for Rehearing, stating that it had jurisdiction over the Examiner’s request and that the Examiner’s arguments regarding Lettich’s status as prior art under § 102(e) “[we]re well taken.” The Board amended its original decision “to determine that Lettich is proper prior art against the instant claims.” The Board then reviewed and affirmed the Examiner’s anticipation and obviousness rejections. The inventors appealed.

The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the Board’s decision. With respect to whether Lettich qualified as § 102(e) prior art, the Court found that the Board’s analysis was incomplete. The Court concluded that the Board correctly applied the test set forth in the Federal Circuit’s 2015 decision in Dynamic Drinkware v. National Graphics by determining that the Lettich provisional supported at least one of Lettich’s as-published claims. However, the Court found that this test was insufficient because all portions of the disclosure that are relied upon by the PTO to reject the claims must also be sufficiently supported in the priority document. Although the PTO asserted that the Board had conducted this additional analysis, the Federal Circuit disagreed and vacated and remanded for the Board to determine whether the Lettich provisional supported the entirety of the Lettich disclosure that the Examiner relied on in rejecting the claims.




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