Addressing the constitutional limits of preindictment delay in a trade secret and wire fraud prosecution arising from alleged misuse of proprietary unemployment insurance software, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit clarified both the standard of review for due process claims based on delay and the substantive threshold required to dismiss an indictment on that basis. United States of America v. David Gerald Minkkinen, Case No. 23-4443 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 2026) (Wynn, Richardson, Rushing, JJ.)

Between 2009 and 2013, David Minkkinen and Sivaraman Sambasivam worked at a business management consulting firm, where they helped develop a proprietary unemployment insurance software platform called uFACTS. In 2013 they both joined Sagitec, where they participated in building a new unemployment claims system for the Maryland and West Virginia Consortium. In 2016, state employees identified references in Sagitec materials that suggested possible use of the prior company’s intellectual property, prompting a federal investigation. Investigators examined whether other former employees transferred design documents or source materials to Sagitec. While some individuals acknowledged retaining prior project materials, they disputed ownership or claimed the materials were only used as templates. The investigation was prolonged and complicated by the unexpected deaths of key witnesses.

In August 2022, Minkkinen and Sambasivam were indicted on charges including trade secret misappropriation, wire fraud, and false statements. Efforts by the defendants to obtain historical project documents were hindered by routine document destruction policies at state agencies. The government also later filed a superseding indictment focused on alleged misuse of the prior company’s proprietary files. The defendants moved to dismiss for unconstitutional preindictment delay, arguing that the loss of witness testimony and documents prejudiced their defense. The district court agreed in part, finding the missing evidence highly significant and the government’s justification for the lengthy investigation insufficient, and dismissed 10 of 14 counts. The government appealed.

The Fourth Circuit determined that in reviewing a claim of unconstitutional preindictment delay, it would apply clear-error review of the district court’s factual findings and de novo review to its legal conclusions. The Court further determined that the specific issue at stake here (i.e., whether the prosecution offended “fundamental conceptions of justice” and society’s sense of “fair play and decency”) was a mixed question of law and fact that should be reviewed de novo. The Court reasoned that the second prong of the preindictment delay test requires courts to apply a broad constitutional standard by balancing the government’s justification for delay against prejudice to the defendant, and appellate courts have a special role in defining the limits of constitutional standards through case-by-case adjudication. Accordingly, the Court concluded it would apply de novo review to the district court’s ultimate due process determination regarding the dismissed counts.

The Fourth Circuit determined that the district court erred in dismissing counts based on unconstitutional preindictment delay. Applying the second prong of the due process analysis, the Court concluded that the government’s delay was attributable to a prolonged good-faith investigation and not to any improper motive, tactical advantage, or [...]

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