Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) Archives

Paint It White: No Sovereign Immunity in Economic Espionage Case

by Hannah Hurley | May 8, 2025 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of foreign sovereign immunity to a Chinese company accused of stealing trade secrets related to the production of proprietary metallurgy technology. United States v. Pangang Grp. Co., Ltd., Case No. 22-10058 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2025) (Wardlaw, Collins, Bress, JJ.)

Pangang is a manufacturer of steel, vanadium, and titanium. E.I. du Pont de Nemours (DuPont) had a proprietary chloride-route technology used for producing TiO₂, a valuable white pigment used in paints, plastics, and paper. Pangang allegedly conspired with others to obtain DuPont’s trade secrets related to TiO₂ production through economic espionage in order to use the stolen information to start a titanium production plant in China. The US government filed a criminal lawsuit.

In defense, Pangang invoked the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and federal common law, arguing that it was entitled to foreign sovereign immunity from criminal prosecution in the United States because it was ultimately owned and controlled by the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In a prior appeal, the Ninth Circuit had found that Pangang failed to make a prima facie showing that it fell within the FSIA’s domain of covered entities. On remand, the district court again rejected Pangang’s remaining claims of foreign sovereign immunity, including its claims based on federal common law.

While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Turkiye Halk Bankasi v. United States clarified that common law, not the FSIA, governs whether foreign states and their instrumentalities are entitled to foreign sovereign immunity from criminal prosecution in US courts. This led to a rebriefing of the present appeal to focus on the now-controlling issues concerning the extent to which Pangang enjoys foreign sovereign immunity under federal common law. Under federal common law, an entity must satisfy two conditions to enjoy foreign sovereign immunity from suit:

It must be the kind of entity eligible for immunity.
Its conduct must fall within the scope of the immunity conferred.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that Pangang did not make a prima facie showing that it exercised functions comparable to those of an agency of the PRC and therefore was not eligible for foreign sovereign immunity from criminal prosecution. The Court also found that “[t]he mere fact that a foreign state owns and controls a corporation is not sufficient to bring the corporation within the ambit of [sovereign immunity].” Since Pangang’s commercial activities were not governmental functions, there was no evidence that sovereign immunity should be applied. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity.

Absent Proof of Government Ownership on an EEA Sovereign Immunity Defense is All Black and White

by Jodi Benassi | Aug 5, 2021 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment, charging four Chinese companies with violations of the criminal provisions of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) and finding no sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in view of the defendant’s commercial activities and failure of proof. United States of America v. Pangang Group Company Ltd. et al., Case No. 19-10306 (9th Cir. July 26, 2021) (Collins, J.)

No company in China had been able to develop a clean and efficient technology to produce titanium dioxide, a white pigment used in products such as paints, sunscreen, lotions, paper and plastics. A group of related Chinese steel companies (collectively, the Pangang companies) wanted to obtain such technology.

In the United States, after many years of research and development, DuPont had managed to develop a process to produce titanium dioxide and was unwilling to sell or license the technology to Chinese companies. Chinese government officials approached US businessman and former DuPont research engineer Walter Liew to obtain DuPont’s trade secrets. Liew agreed to become a corporate spy and managed to gain access to DuPont’s technology. Liew unlawfully transferred the trade secrets to the Pangang companies. The Pangang companies also conspired with unknown computer hackers to access DuPont’s computers to further steal DuPont’s trade secrets.

The Pangang companies were indicted on one count of conspiring to commit economic espionage for the benefit of a foreign government or instrumentality to steal DuPont’s trade secrets and one count of attempting to commit such economic espionage in violation of the EEA. The Pangang companies pleaded not guilty and moved to dismiss a criminal indictment for violations of the EEA, arguing that they were “instrumentalities” of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and were entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA. The district court denied the motion, holding that the Pangang companies were not immune in light of the FSIA’s commercial activity and waiver exceptions. The Pangang companies appealed.

The Ninth Circuit found that the Pangang companies failed to show that they were instrumentalities of a foreign sovereign within the meaning of the FSIA. For a company to be considered a foreign instrumentality under FSIA, a government must own the majority shares in the company. The indictment included several allegations about the ownership structure of the Pangang companies. The indictment alleged that the Pangang Group Company was a “state-owned enterprise controlled by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council” (SASAC), a “special government agency” of the PRC. The other Pangang companies were alleged to be direct or indirect “subsidiaries” of the Pangang Group Company. The Ninth Circuit found that the allegations, taken as true, affirmatively negated the premise that the other Pangang companies could be considered agencies or instrumentalities of the PRC because the indictment described all three of these entities as being “subsidiaries” of the fourth defendant (i.e., the Pangang Group Company). Because the corporate law [...]

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Advertising Falls within Commercial Activity Exception to Sovereign Immunity

by Paul Devinsky | Jun 18, 2020 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss a copyright infringement suit on the ground of sovereign immunity, holding that advertising activity in the United States on behalf of a sovereign government falls within the commercial activity exception to sovereign immunity. Pablo Star Ltd. v. Welsh Gov’t, Case No. 19-1262 (2d Cir. June 8, 2020) (Lynch, J.).

Pablo Star is a company registered under the laws of Ireland and the United Kingdom. The Welsh government is a political subdivision of the United Kingdom. Pablo Star sued the Welsh government, along with multiple New-York-based media companies working with the Welsh government, for copyright infringement. Pablo Star alleged infringement of its copyrights in photographs that the Welsh government used in online and printed materials advertising Welsh-themed events in New York and promoting tourism to Wales. The Welsh government moved to dismiss, asserting sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which provides for presumptive immunity of a foreign state in federal court. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the commercial activity exception to the FSIA applied because the acts of the Welsh government that resulted in Pablo Star’s claims constituted commercial activity, and the activity had substantial contact with the United States. The Welsh government sought an interlocutory appeal.

The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the Welsh government abrogated its sovereign immunity by engaging in commercial activity that had substantial contact with the United States. On the commercial activity prong, the Court rejected the argument that the Welsh government’s conduct was governmental, rather than commercial, because it promoted tourism to Wales. The Court explained that an activity is deemed commercial based on its nature rather than its purpose. Activity is commercial if a foreign state performs the types of actions typical of a private party engaging in commerce. A state’s motives, including motives without profit or to fulfill sovereign objectives, are irrelevant. The Welsh government’s assertion that it acted as a sovereign government to promote Welsh culture and tourism conflated the act with its purpose. The broader characterization of promoting tourism also did not distinguish the activity from functions regularly undertaken by private entities because the profit motive was irrelevant. Because the publication of advertising materials is an activity regularly performed by private-sector businesses, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the Welsh government engaged in commercial activity.

The Second Circuit also distinguished Pablo Star’s claims from those in cases where sovereign immunity applied. Claims dismissed on the ground of sovereign immunity lacked a sufficient nexus between a party’s injury and the governmental entity’s commercial activity. They instead stemmed from functions unique to government, such as detention and punishment or the employment of civil service personnel. Pablo Star’s copyright infringement claim, by contrast, directly resulted from the Welsh government’s commercial conduct, including its unauthorized use of photographs in advertising materials promoting Welsh culture and tourism.

On the substantial contact prong, the Second Circuit agreed that the [...]

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