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Complete inventive entity required to avoid “by another” prior art under pre-AIA § 102(e)

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s decision finding claims directed to cladribine regimens for treating multiple sclerosis unpatentable as obvious. The Court clarified that a disclosure can only be excluded as prior art under pre-AIA § 102(e) if it reflects the collective work of the same inventive entity as the challenged patent. Merck Serono S.A. v. Hopewell Pharma Ventures, Inc., Case No. 25-1210 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 30, 2025) (Hughes, Linn, Cunningham, JJ.)

Merck holds patents covering methods for treating multiple sclerosis using specific oral cladribine dosing regimens. Hopewell Pharma filed inter partes review (IPR) petitions challenging these patents, asserting that the claims were obvious in light of two prior art references disclosing similar cladribine dosing schedules.

Merck argued that one reference, Bodor, was not prior art because one of the named inventors on the challenged patents, De Luca, allegedly contributed to the six-line dosing disclosure in Bodor. The Board rejected this argument, finding that Merck failed to provide corroborated evidence of De Luca’s inventive contribution and concluding that the Bodor disclosure was “by another.” The Board ultimately found all claims unpatentable as obvious over the two prior art references. Merck appealed.

On appeal, Merck contended that the Board erred by applying a “bright-line rule” requiring complete identity of inventive entities to exclude a reference as not “by another.” The Federal Circuit disagreed, reaffirming the long-standing principle from In re Land (CCPA 1966): Any difference in inventive entity, whether by adding or omitting inventors, renders the prior disclosure “by another” under pre-AIA § 102(e).

The Federal Circuit explained that when a patent results from collaboration among joint inventors, a reference can be excluded only if the relied-upon portions of the reference represent the collective efforts of the same inventive team named as inventors in the patent. While evidence from fewer than all inventors may suffice, it must demonstrate that the disclosure embodies their joint contribution. Thus, even partial overlap of inventors does not prevent the earlier disclosure from being prior art.

Merck also argued that the Board’s interpretation conflicted with language in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), which suggests that the work of “at least one joint inventor” could avoid prior art treatment. The Federal Circuit rejected this claim, noting that the MPEP cites Land and defines “by another” as “a different inventive entity.” Because this rule has been long established, the Court concluded that Merck had sufficient notice and was not deprived of a fair opportunity to respond.

Finally, Merck asserted that the Board failed to apply the “rule of reason” when assessing whether De Luca contributed to Bodor. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the Board properly considered all evidence, including declarations, meeting minutes, and testimony, and reasonably concluded that De Luca’s alleged role was not corroborated or significant enough to make him a co-inventor.

Practice note: This decision reinforces that under the pre-AIA statute, the phrase “by another” requires complete identity of the inventive entity to [...]

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Co-Authorship ≠ Co-Inventorship but Can Be Supportive of Inventive Contribution

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision because it failed to resolve fundamental testimonial conflict relating to inventive contribution and complete the Duncan Parking analysis. Google LLC v. IPA Technologies Inc., Case Nos. 21-1179; -1180; -1185 (Fed. Cir. May 19, 2022) (Dyk, Schall, Taranto, JJ.)

Under Duncan Parking, analyzing whether a reference patent is “by another” requires the following three steps:

  1. Determining what portions were relied on as prior art to anticipate the claim limitations at issue
  2. Evaluating the degree to which those portions were conceived by another
  3. Deciding whether that other person’s contribution is significant enough to render them a joint inventor of the applied portions of the reference patent.

SRI International filed two patent applications in 1999 related to the software-based Open Agent Architecture (OAA) and listed Martin and Cheyer as the inventors. In March 1998, an academic paper describing the OAA project was published and named these inventors and Moran as co-authors (Martin reference). During prosecution, the examiner identified the Martin reference as prior art and rejected the claims. SRI asserted that the Martin reference was not prior art because it was made by the same inventive entity as the patents. The patents were granted and assigned to IPA.

Google petitioned the Board for inter partes review of the patent claims. Google argued obviousness in view of the Martin reference and asserted that since the authors of the Martin reference (Martin, Cheyer, Moran) were not the same as the named inventive entity (Martin, Cheyer), the Martin reference was prior art “by others.” The Board instituted review but decided that Google did not meet its burden to provide sufficient support in establishing the correct inventive entity of the claimed subject matter and concluded that Moran’s testimony was insufficiently corroborated. Google appealed.

First, the Federal Circuit discussed the differences between burdens of persuasion and production and responded to Google’s argument that the Board improperly imposed a burden of proof. The Court found no error in the Board requiring Google to establish that the Martin reference was prior art “by another” by showing that Moran made a significant-enough contribution to qualify as a joint inventor on the relevant portions of the Martin reference.

Second, the Federal Circuit explained that the issue in this case was not the lack of corroboration for Moran’s testimony but rather whether his testimony should be credited over Cheyer and Martin’s conflicting testimony. The Court explained that to address joint inventorship under Duncan Parking, Moran “must have made an inventive contribution to the portions of the reference relied on and relevant to establishing obviousness.” Moran’s testimony could support co-inventorship of portions in the Martin reference relied on by Google and relevant to the challenged claims.

The Federal Circuit explained that although most corroboration cases involve issued patents, corroboration is also required for testimony that an individual is an inventor of a potentially invalidating, non-patent prior art reference. The record contained “more [...]

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