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Exploring the latest in intellectual property law
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Personal jurisdiction: Are cease-and-desist letters enough?

by | Apr 30, 2026 |

In a decision clarifying how certain pre litigation enforcement efforts can establish personal jurisdiction, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Lanham Act and tortious interference claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that cease and desist letters sent into the jurisdiction satisfied the minimum contacts requirement and did not offend due process. Frida Kahlo Corporation v. Mara Cristina Teresa Romeo Pinedo, Case No. 24-10293 (11th Cir. Apr. 17, 2026) (Luck, Lagoa, Abudu, JJ.)

Frida Kahlo and Frida Kahlo Investments (collectively, Kahlo) manage and license a portfolio of trademarks and publicity rights associated with the artist Frida Kahlo. Kahlo sued Familia Kahlo and Mara Cristina Teresa Romeo Pinedo (collectively, Pinedo) alleging tortious interference and Lanham Act violations arising from Pinedo’s efforts to halt a traveling Frida Kahlo exhibition and related merchandise.

Central to the dispute were cease and desist letters sent by Pinedo to Kahlo’s Florida based business partners. The letters asserted that Pinedo held superior rights to Frida Kahlo’s name, likeness, and trademarks and threatened legal action if the recipients continued their involvement with Kahlo. Kahlo alleged those claims were false and caused business partners to withdraw or hesitate, disrupting Kahlo’s licensing relationships.

Kahlo filed suit in Florida. Pinedo moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Florida’s corporate shield doctrine protected Pinedo from jurisdiction and that, in any event, Pinedo lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Florida. Kahlo appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding first that the corporate shield doctrine did not bar jurisdiction over Pinedo. The Court focused on the language of the cease and desist letters, which expressly identified Pinedo as the “heiress of the painter Frida Kahlo” and stated that the letters were sent “in our capacity as representatives of Mara Cristina Teresa Romeo Pinedo.” The Court found that those representations showed that Maria Pinedo was acting in her personal capacity, not merely as a corporate agent. As a result, the corporate shield doctrine, which can protect corporate officers from jurisdiction based solely on acts performed for a corporation, did not apply. Because the doctrine was inapplicable, Pinedo was subject to Florida’s long arm statute, which permits jurisdiction where a nonresident commits a tortious act outside the state that causes injury within Florida.

The Eleventh Circuit next addressed whether exercising specific personal jurisdiction would comport with due process. The Court answered in the affirmative, explaining that Pinedo intentionally directed conduct into Florida by sending cease and desist letters to Florida entities. The alleged tortious interference claims arose directly from those communications, satisfying the relatedness requirement for specific jurisdiction.

The Eleventh Circuit also found purposeful availment because Pinedo plausibly alleged an intentional tort, the letters were expressly sent to Florida entities, and it was reasonable for Pinedo to anticipate having to defend itself in Florida based on its actions.

Finally, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Pinedo failed to make a compelling case that exercising jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and [...]

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Settled means settled: Broad settlement release equates to res judicata

by | Apr 16, 2026 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment decision, concluding that an intellectual property owner’s claims were barred by the scope of a settlement agreement resolving earlier state court litigation between the parties. Clear Touch Interactive, Inc. v. The Ockers Co. et al., Nos. 25-1304, 25-1374 (4th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026) (Wynn, Harris, JJ.) (Rushing, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Clear Touch, a designer and manufacturer of interactive technology products, entered into exclusive reseller agreements with information and communications technology reseller Ockers in 2014. After Clear Touch revoked Ockers’ exclusivity in 2017, Ockers began developing a competing product called TouchView. Clear Touch terminated Ockers as a reseller in 2019. The following year, Ockers filed suit in South Carolina state court alleging breach of contract and asserting various tort, trade secret, defamation, and civil conspiracy claims.

In June 2021, the parties resolved the state court action through a settlement agreement that dismissed the case with prejudice and included a broad mutual release of all claims and counterclaims – known or unknown – that were brought or could have been brought and that arose out of or related to the subject matter of the lawsuit.

Despite that settlement, Clear Touch filed a federal action one month later against Ockers, two of its officers (John J. Houser and Jason Houser), and TouchView Interactive, asserting claims for trademark infringement, trade secret misappropriation, and unfair competition based on the TouchView product. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the settlement agreement and the state court’s dismissal with prejudice barred Clear Touch’s claims.

The district court initially allowed some claims to proceed, including certain Lanham Act claims and claims against TouchView Interactive, but dismissed the remainder. After discovery, however, the court revisited the preclusion issue and granted summary judgment to Ockers and its officers, concluding that all of Clear Touch’s remaining claims were barred by res judicata. The district court also granted summary judgment to TouchView Interactive, finding it to be a shell entity with no commercial activity. Following a jury verdict in favor of Ockers, Clear Touch appealed.

Clear Touch challenged the district court’s res judicata determination, arguing both substantive error and procedural error under Rule 54(b). The Fourth Circuit rejected both arguments. Substantively, the Fourth Circuit held that Clear Touch failed to create a genuine dispute regarding the settlement agreement’s plain language or the parties’ mutual intent to release all claims, including those that could have been brought, arising from the same operative facts. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Clear Touch, the federal claims were precluded because they could have been asserted as counterclaims in the prior state court action, which had been dismissed with prejudice.

Procedurally, the Fourth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to revisit its earlier rulings. Rule 54(b) permits revision of nonfinal orders when new evidence emerges or a legal error becomes apparent. Here, supplemental evidence showed that Clear Touch [...]

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Baseball was very good to Roberto: Lanham Act permits claims against government officials in personal capacity

by | Jan 29, 2026 |

In a decision addressing the intersection of trademark law, sovereign immunity, and constitutional takings, the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit partially revived Lanham Act claims brought by the heirs of baseball legend Roberto Clemente against senior officials of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. While affirming dismissal of claims against the Commonwealth itself and related public entities, the Court concluded that certain Lanham Act claims against individual government officials in their personal capacities were plausibly alleged and not barred by qualified immunity at the pleading stage. Clemente Props., Inc. v. Pierluisi-Urrutia, Case No. 23-1922, 2026 WL 125574 (1st Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) (Barron, Lipez, Thompson, JJ.)

The plaintiffs, Clemente’s sons and affiliated entities, alleged that Commonwealth officials improperly used Clemente’s name and likeness on commemorative license plates and registration tags without authorization. Proceeds from the program were directed toward a public initiative intended to replace an earlier Clemente-founded project. Plaintiffs claimed trademark infringement, false endorsement, false advertising, and dilution under the Lanham Act, as well as a taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants moved to dismiss on immunity grounds and for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motions in full. Plaintiffs appealed.

The First Circuit reversed in part. The Court rejected the district court’s conclusion that the use of Clemente’s name and image was not “in connection with” goods or services under the Lanham Act. The Court explained that commemorative license plates and tags qualify as goods, and the fact that they were issued by a government entity did not remove them from the statute’s commercial scope. The Court also pointed to the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark ID Manual, which expressly recognizes license plates as registrable goods, and found no persuasive basis for excluding fundraising activities supporting the Roberto Clemente Sports District Fund from trademark scrutiny.

The First Circuit further concluded that plaintiffs adequately alleged commercial injury within the Lanham Act’s zone of interests and plausibly pleaded likelihood of confusion, including the mistaken impression that the Clemente family endorsed or financially benefited from the initiative. Accordingly, dismissal of Lanham Act claims under Section 32 (trademark infringement), Section 43(a) (false endorsement), and Section 43(c) (dilution) was improper with regard to officials sued in their personal capacities.

Sovereign immunity remained a shield for the Commonwealth, the Convention Center District Authority, and officials sued in their official capacities. However, the First Circuit concluded that qualified immunity did not bar the personal-capacity Lanham Act claims at the pleading stage and thus vacated dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.

The First Circuit affirmed dismissal of the false advertising claim, determining that plaintiffs failed to allege that defendants’ statements constituted commercial advertising or promotion as required under Section 43(a)(1)(B). The Court also affirmed dismissal of the Takings Clause claim, concluding that alleged infringements of intangible intellectual property do not support a categorical physical-taking theory and cannot be analyzed using frameworks applicable to physical occupation or appropriation.

Finally, the First Circuit deemed waived any [...]

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Solidarity: Union’s commercial use may be Lanham Act violation

by | Sep 18, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s dismissal of a Lanham Act action, finding that this case was not the rare instance where there was no plausible likelihood that a reasonably prudent consumer would be confused about the origin of the goods that allegedly bore the distinctive marks at issue. Trader Joe’s Co. v. Trader Joe’s United, Case Nos. 24-720; -2826 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2025) (Sanchez, Thomas, Donato, JJ.)

Trader Joe’s, a US grocery store chain, owns the red typeface logoTrader's Joe's TypeFace Logo and sells reusable tote bags and other branded goods bearing its marks. Trader Joe’s United (TJU), a labor union representing certain Trader Joe’s employees, markets (for profit) various products via its website, including reusable tote bags. Its website header features a logo that uses the distinctive red typeface and the concentric circle design in Trader Joe’s logo. The image below shows totes from Trader Joe’s (left) and TJU (right).

Trader's Joe's Tote Bags

TJU allegedly began using Trader Joe’s marks in commerce, and Trader Joe’s sent TJU a cease-and-desist letter. Trader Joe’s noted that its demand was directed solely at TJU’s commercial use of the marks on merchandise sold to consumers on the TJU website, not the reference to Trader Joe’s to identify the union or discuss the union’s cause.

Trader Joe’s sued TJU, asserting several claims, including trademark infringement, and sought to permanently enjoin TJU from using Trader Joe’s trademarks in connection with the sale of commercial merchandise on the TJU website. Trader Joe’s also sought the destruction of all infringing merchandise and recovery of damages. TJU moved to dismiss, arguing that Trader Joe’s filed its trademark infringement complaint in retaliation over an ongoing labor dispute and asserting that there was no plausible likelihood that a consumer would believe that products sold on TJU’s website were sponsored, endorsed, or approved by Trader Joe’s.

Applying the Sleekcraft likelihood-of-confusion factors, the district court agreed with TJU and noted several differences between the marks. The district court also explained that Trader Joe’s does not sell many of the products sold on TJU’s website, including buttons, t-shirts, and mugs. The district court concluded that confusion about the origin of these products was unlikely for a reasonable consumer because TJU’s website clearly identified itself as a website of a labor union and was openly critical of Trader Joe’s labor practices. Trader Joe’s appealed.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that when the allegations were viewed in the light most favorable to Trader Joe’s, the district court erred when applying the fact-specific likelihood-of-confusion test. To prevail on a trademark infringement claim, Trader Joe’s would need to establish that it had a protectible ownership interest in the mark and that TJU’s use of the mark was likely to cause consumer confusion. To determine whether a reasonably prudent consumer [...]

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When is a word too common to trademark? Asking for a four-letter friend

by | Sep 4, 2025 |

In response to artist and entrepreneur Erik Brunetti’s ongoing efforts to register FUCK as a trademark for various goods and services, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s refusal to register the term but agreed with the Board’s position on the registrability of widely used “all-purpose words.” The Court ordered the remand because it found the Board’s reasoning insufficiently clear and lacking a coherent standard. In re Brunetti, Case No. 23-1539 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 2025) (Dyk, Reyna, JJ.) (Lourie, J., dissenting).

Brunetti filed four intent-to-use applications to register FUCK as a trademark for goods, including sunglasses, jewelry, and backpacks, and services such as retail store offerings. The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) refused registration, asserting that the term failed to function as a trademark under Sections 1, 2, 3, and 45 of the Lanham Act and citing its widespread use as a commonplace expression conveying varied sentiments.

The Board affirmed the PTO’s decision, concluding that FUCK was “arguably one of the most expressive words in the English language” and that consumers were accustomed to seeing it used by various sources on similar goods. The Board reasoned that such ubiquity rendered the term incapable of serving as a source identifier. It rejected Brunetti’s constitutional arguments and distinguished the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Iancu v. Brunetti, which invalidated the PTO’s refusal to register the mark FUCK on grounds of immorality. Brunetti appealed.

The Federal Circuit agreed that the Board had properly considered third-party use and the expressive nature of the term. However, the Court found the Board’s decision wanting in clarity and consistency. It criticized the Board’s failure to articulate a workable standard for when “all-purpose word marks” such as FUCK can function as trademarks, especially in light of other registrations for similarly ubiquitous terms such as LOVE and even FUCK itself for snow globes and gummy candies.

The Federal Circuit emphasized that the Board must engage in reasoned decision-making under the Administrative Procedure Act and provide sufficient guidance for future cases. The Court therefore vacated the decision and remanded for further proceedings.

Despite the remand, the Federal Circuit dismissed Brunetti’s argument that the PTO had retaliated against him for his prior Supreme Court victory in Iancu v. Brunetti. Brunetti claimed that the timing of the refusals (following his successful challenge to the PTO’s immoral/scandalous bar) suggested retaliation. The Court found this argument unpersuasive, noting that Brunetti offered no evidence beyond timing, and that the Board’s analysis remained viewpoint-neutral and focused on whether the mark functioned as a source identifier.

Judge Lourie dissented, arguing that the Federal Circuit should have affirmed the Board’s refusal on grounds that the term FUCK is too ubiquitous and expressive to function as a source identifier for the goods and services in question. He emphasized that the word’s widespread use across varied emotional contexts prevents consumers from associating it with a specific brand. From Judge Lourie’s perspective, FUCK on its own [...]

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Standing: Don’t get owned by incorrect trademark ownership

by | Sep 4, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a trademark and unfair competition suit, ruling that the plaintiff did not own the asserted trademark. The Court also held that the owner of the trademark failed to ratify the action and therefore the plaintiff did not have standing to assert unfair competition claims. Ripple Analytics Inc. v. People Ctr., Inc., Case No. 24-490 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2025) (Park, Nathan, Perez, JJ.)

In March 2018, the US Patent & Trademark Office granted Ripple Analytics a federal trademark for RIPPLE in connection with human resources software. The following month, Ripple assigned all rights to its intellectual property to co-founder Noah Pusey via an assignment agreement. Around the same time, People Center applied to register RIPPLING for similar software. It later abandoned the application but continued to operate under the Rippling name.

Ripple sued People Center in 2020 for trademark infringement and unfair competition. During discovery, Ripple produced the assignment agreement. People Center responded by moving to amend its answer, seeking dismissal for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest and requesting summary judgment.

The district court found that Pusey, not Ripple, was the real party in interest and dismissed the case because Pusey had not ratified the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17. It also dismissed the unfair competition claims for lack of standing and denied Ripple’s motion to amend the complaint as futile. Ripple appealed.

The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding that Ripple had “unambiguously” assigned all intellectual property rights, including the trademark at issue, to Pusey, making him the real party in interest. The Court emphasized that the assignment agreement transferred all of Ripple’s “claims, causes of action, and rights to sue,” regardless of when those claims arose. Ripple argued that Pusey satisfied Rule 17 by ratifying the pleadings and agreeing to be a plaintiff. The Court rejected this argument, noting that Pusey’s declaration stating his involvement in the case and strong interest in its outcome did not amount to an agreement to be bound by the suit, a requirement for ratification.

The Second Circuit determined that Ripple’s Lanham Act unfair competition claims failed because they were based on the inaccurate assertion that Ripple owned the RIPPLE mark. The Second Circuit also upheld the district court’s denial of Ripple’s motion to amend its complaint, explaining that the assignment agreement expressly barred Ripple from bringing suit.

Practice note: Before initiating trademark litigation, practitioners should conduct thorough due diligence on ownership to avoid standing issues. Defendants should consider initiating early discovery on ownership of the rights being asserted.



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It’s not monkey business: NFTs can be trademarked

by | Jul 31, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that a non-fungible token (NFT) is a “good” under the Lanham Act but reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for trademark infringement because the owner did not prove as a matter of law that the defendants’ use was likely to cause confusion. The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the defendants’ counterclaim for declaratory relief regarding copyright ownership. Yuga Labs, Inc. v. Ryder Ripps and Jeremy Cahen, Case No. 24-879 (9th Cir. July 23, 2025) (Bade, Forrest, Curiel, JJ.)

Yuga Labs is the creator of the Bored Ape Yacht Club (BAYC) NFT collection. Yuga created this collection through a smart contract recorded on the blockchain Ethereum. Each BAYC NFT has a cartoon of a bored ape and a sequential unique identifier called an ape ID. Per its terms and conditions, BAYC NFT consumers receive commercial and personal rights free of royalty fees.

Ryder Ripps and Jermey Cahen created the Ryder Ripps Bored Ape Yacht Club (RR/BAYC) using the same ape images and ape IDs. The collection was also hosted on an Ethereum blockchain smart contract. They criticized Yuga for “using neo-Nazi symbolism, alt-right dog whistles, and racist imagery” and alleged that they created RR/BAYC as satire and criticism. Ripps made the RR/BAYC smart contracts’ names “Bored Ape Yacht Club” and made the smart contract symbol “BAYC.” Ripps’ website includes an artist statement that the artwork is a “new mint of BAYC imagery.” NFT marketplace websites for RR/BAYC displayed a large header “Bored Ape Yacht Club” and in a smaller text “@ryder_ripps.”

Yuga sued Ripps and Cahen for several claims, including trademark infringement based on a false designation of origin theory, false advertising, and cybersquatting. In response, the defendants asserted that Yuga did not have enforceable trademark rights, and even if it did, the defendants’ use was protected by fair use and the First Amendment. The defendants asserted several counterclaims, including knowing misrepresentation of infringing activity under the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), and sought declaratory judgment of no copyright ownership.

The district court granted Yuga’s motion for summary judgment on its false designation of origin and cybersquatting claims. Yuga withdrew its remaining claims, so the trial proceeded only for equitable remedies on the false designation of origin and cybersquatting. At trial, the district court found that Yuga’s BAYC marks were unregistered trademarks. The district court awarded Yuga disgorgement of the defendants’ profits, maximum statutory damages, and attorneys’ fees after finding that the case was exceptional due to the defendants’ willful infringement, bad faith intent to profit, and litigation conduct. The defendants were also permanently enjoined. The defendants appealed the grant of summary judgment and sought vacatur of the remedies.

The Ninth Circuit first addressed the defendants’ argument that NFTs are not goods protected by the Lanham Act. The Court concluded that NFTs are goods under the Lanham Act based on a US Patent & Trademark Office report that determined them as such. The Court also [...]

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Sound the alarm: Fourth Circuit affirms $190 million verdict based on deceptive trade practices

by | Jul 31, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a $190 million verdict based on deceptive trade practices, concluding that the district court performed well within its discretion in making the procedural ruling and that the jury verdict was fully supported by the evidence. CPI Security Systems, Inc. v. Vivint Smart Home Inc., Legacy Vivint Smart Home, Inc., Case No. 24-1120 (4th Cir. July 22, 2025) (Benjamin, Berner, Niemeyer, JJ.)

CPI Security Systems and Vivint Smart Home are competitors in the home security industry. CPI sued Vivint in 2020 alleging violation of the Lanham Act and North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), and the common law torts of unfair competition and tortious interference with contracts. CPI’s claims were based on allegations that Vivint used deceptive tactics for door-to-door sales that caused CPI customers to confuse Vivint’s salespeople with CPI representatives. CPI alleged that those customers “unwillingly found themselves with Vivint’s alarm systems installed in their homes and with contractual obligations to both Vivint and CPI.”

During trial, CPI presented testimony from customers who had been solicited by Vivint salespeople. The customers all testified to deceptive tactics. For example, one customer testified that a Vivint representative told her Vivint was acquiring CPI and that she would therefore “no longer have CPI for [her] security company.” The customer was “scared and worried” and signed a contract with Vivint. Another customer testified that a Vivint sales representative claimed to be “with CPI” and was “one of the guys that installed [his] CPI system.”

CPI presented additional evidence to show that these practices were “widespread and systematic,” and that Vivint sales representatives had similarly targeted customers of other competitors. Vivint was aware of the conduct, because, for example, “16 state attorneys general had brought enforcement actions against Vivint for its sales agents’ conduct.”

The jury found in favor of CPI and awarded a combination of compensatory and punitive damages totaling nearly $190 million. Vivint appealed.

Vivint argued that CPI failed to prove reliance on the false statements made to CPI customers, which it claimed was an essential element of a UDTPA claim. Vivint argued that CPI itself must have relied on the false statements, rather than just the customers. The Fourth Circuit rejected Vivint’s argument, in part because:

  • The UDTPA “is broader and covers more than” fraud.
  • CPI’s claim was “grounded on unfair competition.”
  • Unfair competition claims do not require a showing of reliance.

Vivint also argued that CPI had not presented sufficient evidence to support the damages award. CPI had presented evidence to support four distinct categories of damages, and the jury did not specify which category or categories were included in each award. The Fourth Circuit explained that CPI was not required “to show an exact dollar amount with mathematical precision” and had presented evidence that “considered as a whole, was sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably estimate that CPI’s [compensatory] damages were $49.7 million.”

Vivint argued that “at minimum, judgment should be vacated and [...]

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Clean bill of health: Only domestic activities count when analyzing likelihood of confusion

by | Jul 24, 2025 |

Affirming a summary judgment decision finding no trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the district court properly focused on domestic activity with regard to the allegedly infringing trademark. Doctor’s Best, Inc. v. Nature’s Way Products, LLC, Case No. 24-2719 (9th Cir. July 15, 2025) (Paez, Ikuta, Nelson, JJ.) (Ikuta, J., concurring).

Doctor’s Best (DB) manufactures nutritional supplements under the mark NATURE’S DAY at its California facility. Although the products bear English labels compliant with US regulations, they are marketed and sold exclusively in China, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Nature’s Way Products (NWP), owner of the long-standing US trademark NATURE’S WAY, opposed DB’s attempt to register NATURE’S DAY in the United States, citing potential consumer confusion. After NWP sent a cease-and-desist letter, DB preemptively sued for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. NWP counterclaimed for trademark infringement under Sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act.

In June 2023, the Supreme Court held in Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc. that the Lanham Act’s infringement provisions apply only to domestic “use in commerce.” DB moved for summary judgment, arguing that its only domestic activity – transporting products within the US – did not create a likelihood of confusion among US consumers. The district court agreed, finding that DB’s domestic transport of Nature’s Day products was insufficient to support a claim of infringement. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that this conduct would confuse US consumers and granted summary judgment in favor of DB. NWP appealed.

NWP argued that any domestic use in commerce, however minimal, triggered the full likelihood-of-confusion analysis, even if confusion occurred abroad. The Ninth Circuit rejected this interpretation, holding that Abitron requires courts to first identify domestic use before evaluating confusion. The Court found that DB’s manufacturing and transport activities were the only relevant domestic conduct.

Turning to likelihood of confusion, the Ninth Circuit applied the eight-factor test set forth in its 1979 decision in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats:

  • Strength of the mark
  • Proximity or relatedness of the goods
  • Similarity of the marks
  • Evidence of actual confusion
  • Marketing channels used
  • Type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser
  • Defendant’s intent in selecting the mark
  • The likelihood of expansion of the product lines

Reviewing the Sleekcraft factors, the Ninth Circuit concluded that no genuine dispute existed as to the likelihood of confusion. DB’s products were sold exclusively overseas while NWP’s products were sold only in the US. The Court emphasized that confusion must occur among domestic consumers to be actionable under the Lanham Act, and that did not occur here.

In a concurring opinion, Judge Ikuta agreed with the outcome but clarified that DB’s transport of products constituted a domestic use in commerce. However, she found no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether that use caused domestic confusion, reiterating that Abitron excludes extraterritorial confusion from the analysis.



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Damages on Default Judgment Not Barred by Absence of Precise Amount in Complaint

by | May 8, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court decision, allowing collection of actual damages in a default judgment where the complaint only sought damages “in an amount to be determined at trial.” AirDoctor, LLC v. Xiamen Qichuang Trade Co., Ltd., Case No. 24-215 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2025) (Friedland, J.) (Berzon, Kennelly JJ., concurring) (per curiam).

AirDoctor produces and sells air purification products, including branded filters designed specifically for its machines. In 2022, AirDoctor discovered that Xiamen Qichuang Trade had sold tens of thousands of unauthorized replacement filters that were marketed as compatible with AirDoctor products. These filters were allegedly labeled with AirDoctor’s registered trademarks, including AIRDOCTOR and ULTRAHEPA, without permission. AirDoctor asserted that these actions constituted trademark infringement, false advertising, and unfair competition under the Lanham Act and related state laws.

AirDoctor filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages “in an amount to be determined at trial.” Xiamen did not respond or appear in the litigation, and the court entered a default judgment against it. AirDoctor subsequently moved for approximately $2.5 million in actual damages, calculated based on the number of infringing units sold, along with $50,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. The district court entered a default judgment in Air Doctor’s favor but declined to award damages or attorneys’ fees. The court reasoned that Fed. R. Civ. Pro 54(c) barred monetary relief in default judgments unless the complaint demanded a specific sum. Since AirDoctor’s complaint did not include a precise dollar amount, the court concluded that granting the requested monetary relief would exceed what was demanded in the pleadings and thus violate Rule 54(c). AirDoctor appealed.

The issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether the district court erred in interpreting Rule 54(c) to prohibit an award of actual damages in a default judgment where the complaint requested “damages in an amount to be determined at trial” but did not specify a fixed damages amount. Xiamen did not appear on appeal either.

The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Rule 54(c) does not require a complaint to state a specific sum of damages for a court to award actual damages after a default judgment. The Court emphasized that the rule’s purpose is to prevent awards that are fundamentally different in kind or amount from those for which the defendant had been put on notice by the complaint, not to deny recovery when the type of relief was clearly identified, even if the amount was not. The Court noted that AirDoctor had clearly requested actual damages in its complaint and had indicated that the precise amount would be determined later, which was sufficient to give Xiamen fair notice of the relief sought. Relying on its 1974 decision in Henry v. Sneiders, the Court reaffirmed that actual damages may be awarded in default cases even if the complaint does not state a dollar figure, as long as the damages are of the same kind as those demanded.

The Ninth Circuit clarified that Rule [...]

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