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Diamond in the rough: Infringement theory foreclosed by claim construction supports $3.2M fee award

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed an award of more than $3.2 million in attorneys’ fees and non-taxable expenses, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the patent owner and its exclusive licensee continued to pursue an objectively baseless infringement theory after claim construction and discovery foreclosed their position. Carnegie Institution of Washington v. Fenix Diamonds LLC, Case Nos. 24-1804; -1824 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 17, 2026) (Reyna, Taranto, Stoll, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

Carnegie Institution of Washington and its exclusive licensee, M7D Corporation, sued Fenix Diamonds for infringement of two patents directed to methods for producing lab-grown diamonds using chemical vapor deposition. The asserted claims required growing single-crystal diamonds on a growth surface with only insubstantial non-monocrystalline growth. After claim construction, Fenix produced evidence from its manufacturer, Nouveau Diamonds, showing extensive polycrystalline and nondiamond growth. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment of noninfringement.

After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their appeal following M7D’s financial collapse, the district court found the case exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285. It concluded that the plaintiffs’ infringement theory became objectively baseless once they received Nouveau’s evidence – approximately one month before the date from which the court ultimately shifted fees. The district court also exercised its inherent authority to award nontaxable expenses, including expert fees, based on what it viewed as vexatious and unreasonable litigation conduct. Among other things, the district court cited a misleading representation concerning access to a facility and the plaintiffs’ eleventh-hour abandonment of one of the asserted patents. Carnegie appealed.

Carnegie argued that its expert’s infringement theory represented a reasonable application of the district court’s claim construction rather than an attempt to relitigate it. The Federal Circuit disagreed. The district court had expressly construed the disputed “growth surface” limitation as not categorically excluding polycrystalline growth. According to the Federal Circuit, the expert’s attempt to exclude a subset of such growth effectively reintroduced a limitation that the district court had rejected. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the infringement theory was inconsistent with the governing claim construction.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Carnegie’s challenges to the scope and amount of the award. On causation, the Court explained that once a district court identifies the point at which continued litigation became objectively baseless, it need not tie each subsequent fee to a discrete act of misconduct. The district court could therefore shift all reasonable fees incurred after that point.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the imposition of joint-and-several liability on Carnegie. Although Carnegie characterized itself as a passive licensor, the Court pointed to its close and intertwined relationship with M7D, including shared counsel, joint litigation filings, and consultation rights under the license agreement. Those circumstances supported holding Carnegie responsible for the fee award along with M7D.

Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of Fenix’s request for prejudgment interest. Fenix had not sought prejudgment interest before the district court issued its exceptional-case ruling and, when Fenix later raised the issue, [...]

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Well Runs Dry: Summary Judgment Denial Supports Non-Exceptional Case Finding

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees, explaining that when a district court denies summary judgment and allows a plaintiff’s case to proceed, the district court effectively determines that the position of the party opposing summary judgment is not objectively baseless. OneSubsea IP UK Limited v. FMC Techs, Inc., Case No. 22-1099 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2023) (Moore, Clevenger, Dyk, JJ.)

OneSubsea and FMC compete in the subsea oil and gas exploration and extraction industry. In March 2015, OneSubsea filed a lawsuit against FMC alleging infringement of 95 claims across 10 OneSubsea patents. After the district court issued its claim construction ruling, FMC moved for summary judgment of noninfringement. OneSubsea opposed. While the summary judgment motion was pending, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board instituted inter partes review (IPR) proceedings on a subset of the asserted patents. FMC argued that while a stay of district court proceedings would be appropriate, it was unnecessary in light of its pending summary judgment motion. In August 2016, the district court denied summary judgment and stayed the case.

The case remained stayed for three years, during which time the Board invalidated 76 claims. In 2019, the district court lifted the stay. At a pre-trial hearing in 2020 discussing whether additional discovery was needed to address summary judgment, FMC doubted the need for more discovery and pointed to the 3,200 record pages illustrating differences between the designs of the accused device and the patented devices. In response, the district court stated, “And you really think I’m going to be able to grant summary judgment on that?” After the hearing, FMC renewed its summary judgment motion, which OneSubsea opposed. In reply, FMC moved to exclude the report of OneSubsea’s expert because he applied the wrong claim construction. Ultimately, the district court granted FMC’s motion to exclude and its motion for summary judgment.

In 2021, FMC moved for attorneys’ fees based on OneSubsea’s “substantively weak infringement claims” after the claim construction order was issued and “litigation misconduct.” After briefing was complete, the district court announced that the case had been reassigned to another judge following the retirement of the original assigned judge. The new judge rejected FMC’s view that OneSubsea’s case was objectively baseless and further rejected FMC’s claims of litigation misconduct. FMC appealed.

As a threshold matter, FMC argued that the Federal Circuit should apply de novo review instead of an abuse-of-discretion standard because the new judge only briefly “lived with the case” and should be disqualified from exercising discretion in deciding FMC’s attorneys’ fees motion. The Court rejected FMC’s invitation to change the standard of review, citing the substantial body of law in which appellate courts have consistently reviewed successor judges’ decisions on discretionary issues for abuse of discretion.

Turning to the merits, the Federal Circuit found that FMC’s exceptional case argument lacked merit. The Court explained that the argument disregarded the district court’s observation that FMC’s demand for a prompt favorable noninfringement judgment based [...]

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