trademark infringement Archives

trademark infringement

Don’t Ruin Today’s CNS with Yesterday’s Problems

by Benjamin Ediger, Ph.D. | Aug 10, 2023 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court’s trademark invalidity finding based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction because a covenant not to sue (CNS) issued by the trademark owner precluded any reasonably expected future injury that the alleged infringer might incur. Nursery Decals & More, Inc. v. Neat Print, Inc., Case No. 22-10065 (5th Cir. Aug. 1, 2023) (Haynes, Engelhardt, JJ.; deGravelles, Dist. J., sitting by designation) (per curiam).

Neat Print and Nursery Decals sold novelty t-shirts on online marketplaces. In 2018, Neat Print notified one of the online marketplaces that Nursery Decals’ products allegedly infringed Neat Print’s trademarks. In response, the online marketplace sent Nursery Decals a final warning threatening a site ban for any future violations. Nursery Decals complied with the warning and also preemptively pulled its products from other online marketplaces.

Nursery Decals sued Neat Print in the Northern District of Texas. Most of Nursery Decals’ claims were directed to invalidating Neat Print’s trademarks or obtaining a noninfringement judgment. Nursery Decal also included three claims seeking damages. One was a federal claim for fraud on the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO). The other two claims were Texas law claims based on tortious interference with an existing business relationship and a prospective business relationship. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment on all of the trademark-related claims, ordering the PTO to cancel all of the disputed trademarks.

Prior to the district court’s summary judgment grant, Neat Print tried to avoid summary judgment by filing a CNS along with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the CNS did not moot the case. The district court explained that Neat Print’s CNS did not address Nursery Decals’ past and potential future injuries (i.e., Nursery Decals’ damages claims). The district court also found that Neat Print’s CNS did not meet the high standard set forth in the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Already, reasoning that Neat Print’s CNS left the door open for future take-down notices based on the disputed trademarks.

Neat Print amended its CNS to address take-down notices. It then filed a motion to reconsider its motion to dismiss in light of the modified CNS. The district court orally denied the motion at the pretrial conference and ordered that the case proceed to trial. The jury ultimately found no liability on both claims. After the trial, the district court issued a written opinion explaining that it rejected Neat Print’s motion for reconsideration because Nursery Decals had a legally cognizable injury that supported subject matter jurisdiction. While Neat Print had defeated all of Nursery Decals’ damages claims, Neat Print appealed the district court’s judgment with respect to the trademark claims, arguing that the district court failed to properly evaluate subject matter jurisdiction on a claim-by-claim basis in view of Neat Print’s CNS.

The Fifth Circuit agreed with Neat Print, finding that the district court committed two errors. First, the district [...]

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Burst That Bubble: Specific Knowledge Necessary to Prove Contributory Trademark Infringement

by Sarah Bro and Kathleen Lynch | Aug 3, 2023 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed contributory trademark infringement for the first time, finding that specific knowledge is required for liability to attach. Y.Y.G.M. SA, DBA Brandy Melville v. Redbubble, Inc., Case Nos. 21-56150; -56236 (9th Cir. July 24, 2023) (Callahan, Nelson, Thomas, JJ.)

Brandy Melville manufactures clothing and home goods and owns multiple trademarks, including the Brandy Melville Heart and LA Lightning marks. Redbubble is an online marketplace where individual artists upload designs for printing on demand on various articles and Redbubble handles payment, manufacturing and shipping.

In 2018, on two consecutive days, Brandy Melville notified Redbubble of infringing products on its marketplace. Redbubble removed them. One year later, Brandy Melville sued Redbubble for trademark infringement. The district court granted summary judgment to Redbubble on several of its claims. The case then went to trial on Brandy Melville’s contributory infringement and counterfeiting claims. The jury found Redbubble liable for contributory counterfeiting of the Brandy Melville Heart and LA Lightning marks, contributory infringement of those marks and contributory infringement of various unregistered trademarks. However, the court granted Redbubble judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) as to the contributory counterfeiting claim for the Heart mark. Brandy Melville moved for a permanent injunction, attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest. The district court denied each of Brandy Melville’s motions.

Redbubble appealed the denial of JMOL on contributory infringement claims and the finding of willful contributory counterfeiting of the LA Lightning mark. Brandy Melville appealed the grant of JMOL on contributory counterfeiting of the Brandy Melville Heart mark and the denial of permanent injunction, attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest.

Addressing Redbubble’s appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered contributory infringement and contributory counterfeiting together. The issue of the applicable standard in questions of contributory liability was novel for the Ninth Circuit. The Lanham Act provides a cause of action when a party intentionally induces trademark infringement or when the party continues to supply products to a third party, despite knowing or having reason to know that the third party is engaging in trademark infringement. This case dealt with the latter.

In other contexts, the Ninth Circuit has applied the “knows or has reason to know” standard as satisfying the willful blindness (in lieu of actual knowledge) element. Willful blindness requires a subjective belief that infringement is likely occurring and deliberate actions were taken to avoid knowledge of that infringement. Redbubble argued that willful blindness requires specific knowledge, while Brandy Melville argued that there is a duty to take reasonable corrective action once a party obtains general knowledge of infringement. The Court noted that for contributory copyright infringement, specific knowledge is not required. In keeping with its sister circuits, the Court held that “willful blindness for contributory trademark liability requires the defendant to have specific knowledge of infringers or instances of infringement.” The Court, therefore, vacated and remanded for the district court to reconsider Redbubble’s JMOL motion under this standard for contributory trademark infringement.

The Ninth Circuit next considered Brandy Melville’s appeal, beginning [...]

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Wild and Untamed Trademarks: Madrid Protocol Grants Right of Priority as of Constructive Use Date

by Katherine Pappas | Apr 28, 2022 | Trademarks

Addressing for the first time the question of enforceability of a priority of right in a trademark granted pursuant to the Madrid Protocol where the registrant’s actual use in commerce began after the allegedly infringing use, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the Madrid Protocol grants priority as of the constructive use date, but to prevail on an infringement action based on that superior right of priority, the registrant must still establish the requisite likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act. Lodestar Anstalt v. Bacardi & Co., Case No. 19-55864 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2022) (Baldock, Berzon, Collins, JJ.)

Under the Madrid Protocol, applicants with trademarks in another country may obtain an “extension of protection” (generally equivalent to trademark registration) in the United States without needing to first use the mark in US commerce. Instead, the grant may be based on an applicant’s declaration of bona fide intent to use its mark in the United States.

In 2000 and 2001, Lichtenstein-based company Lodestar developed a brand of Irish whiskey called “The Wild Geese,” which was marketed in the US as “The Wild Geese Soldiers & Heroes.” Around 2008 and 2009, Lodestar developed the idea for the “Untamed” word marks, and in 2009 the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) accepted for filing two applications on behalf of Lodestar seeking extension of protection under the Madrid Protocol for the internationally registered “Untamed” word marks. The PTO published the marks for opposition, then granted the extensions of protection in 2011. In 2013, Lodestar developed a rum under The Wild Geese Soldiers and Heroes brand that used the Untamed word mark on the label. The rum was shown at the April 2013 Rum Renaissance Trade Show in Florida, where consumers sampled the rum. The rum was also featured in print advertisements associated with the trade show. But by June 2013, Lodestar had “decided to park the USA rum project as [it was] getting better returns in other markets.”

In 2012, Bacardi began developing the ad campaign “Bacardi Untameable.” Before launching the campaign, Bacardi ran a trademark clearance search that turned up Lodestar’s “Untamed” trademarks. From 2013 to 2017, Bacardi ran its “Bacardi Untameable” campaign. In response, Lodestar began promoting a then-nonexistent product “Untamed Revolutionary Rum” in an effort “to complement the Wild Geese Rum and also to combat Bacardi’s attempts to take over our Untamed mark.” In January 2015, the first Untamed Revolutionary Rum was sold to US retailers. In August 2016, Lodestar sued Bacardi for trademark infringement, arguing injury based on reverse confusion, as well as associated claims for unfair competition. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bacardi. Lodestar appealed.

The Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred on the threshold question of whether Lodestar’s Revolutionary Rum should be considered in the analysis of likelihood of confusion. The district court had found that the relevant products were those existing prior to launch of Bacardi’s campaign (excluding the later-created Revolutionary Rum). The Court found [...]

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TTAB Cancellation Proceedings Not Preclusive in District Court, Even Between Same Parties

by Paul Devinsky | Sep 30, 2021 | Trademarks

Addressing the preclusive effect of judgments by tribunals with limited jurisdiction, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that trademark cancellation proceedings before the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (TTAB) do not have preclusive effect against trademark infringement lawsuits in federal district courts. Beasley v. Howard, Case No. 20-1119 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 2021) (Chagares, J.)

In 1969, Beasley started a band named The Ebonys. In the mid-1990s, Howard joined the band, and in 1997, Beasley obtained a New Jersey state service mark for “The Ebonys.” Several years later, Beasley and Howard parted ways. In 2012, Howard registered “The Ebonys” as a federal trademark with the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO).

In 2013, Beasley filed a petition with the TTAB to cancel Howard’s mark, arguing that Howard had defrauded the PTO. The TTAB rejected Beasley’s 2013 petition. In 2017, Beasley filed a second petition with the TTAB, again arguing that Howard had defrauded the PTO and for the first time arguing that Howard’s mark could be confused with Beasley’s separate “The Ebonys” mark. The TTAB rejected Beasley’s 2017 petition, this time on claim preclusion grounds, finding that Beasley should have asserted his likelihood-of-confusion claim in his 2013 petition. Beasley did not appeal either dismissal.

In 2019, Beasley initiated a lawsuit in federal district court, requesting that the court vacate Howard’s mark, award Beasley monetary damages and permit Beasley to register his own “The Ebonys” mark with the PTO. The district court dismissed Beasley’s complaint, finding that claim preclusion applied because the complaint turned on the same factual and legal arguments litigated in the 2017 petition, even though Beasley did not seek damages in the 2017 petition. Beasley appealed.

The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal, concluding that the TTAB’ s cancellation proceedings did not preclude Beasley from bringing his § 43(a) infringement claim in the district court. The Court noted that the TTAB has limited jurisdiction to determine the right to register a trademark and does not have authority to consider questions of infringement, unfair competition, injunctions or damages. It reasoned that because the TTAB does not have jurisdiction to award any remedy beyond cancellation of the mark, a broader § 43(a) cause of action for deceptive use in commerce, as alleged by Beasley, could not have been brought in a TTAB cancellation proceeding.

The Third Circuit also rejected Howard’s argument that Beasley should have brought trademark cancellation claims in the district court in the first instance, noting that even though a federal district court has authority to order a cancellation, a TTAB petition is the primary means of securing a cancellation, and that forcing Beasley to litigate in the district court in the first instance would “encourage[] litigants to sit on their claims and undermine[] the Lanham Act’s adjudicative mechanisms.”

Practice Note: In the Third Circuit, plaintiffs are encouraged to bring their trademark cancellation claims before the TTAB in the first instance, rather than waiting to bring their trademark cancellation and trademark infringement claims together before [...]

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Reverse Confusion Suit Not Ironclad, but SmartSync Lives On

by Joshua Revilla | Apr 29, 2021 | Trademarks

In a split decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for trial in an action brought under the Lanham Act in order to resolve material issues of fact on likelihood of confusion/reverse confusion factors that remain in dispute. Ironhawk Technologies, Inc. v. Dropbox, Inc., Case No. 19-56347 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2021) (Smith, J.) (Tashima, J., dissenting)

Ironhawk developed computer software designed to transfer data efficiently in “bandwidth-challenged environments” and has marketed the software since 2004 using the name “SmartSync.” Ironhawk registered the SmartSync mark in 2007. In 2017, Dropbox launched a feature entitled “Smart Sync,” which allowed users to see and access files in their Dropbox cloud storage accounts without taking up space on their hard drive. Ironhawk sued Dropbox for trademark infringement and unfair competition in 2018, alleging that that Smart Sync intentionally infringed upon Ironhawk’s SmartSync trademark and was likely to cause confusion among consumers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dropbox, concluding that “a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude that Dropbox’s use of Smart Sync is likely to cause consumer confusion.”

Ironhawk appealed, focusing primarily on its reverse confusion theory of infringement. Reverse confusion occurs where consumers dealing with the holder of the senior mark (Ironhawk) believe they are dealing with the junior (Dropbox). This occurs when someone who is only aware of the well-known junior (Dropbox) comes into contact with the lesser-known senior (Ironhawk) and incorrectly believes the senior is the same as, or affiliated with, the junior user because of the similarity of the two marks.

The Ninth Circuit first defined the relevant consumer market. This issue revolved around whether the relevant market should be limited to Ironhawk’s only active customer, the US Navy, or whether it should include commercial customers. Dropbox argued that the market should be limited to the Navy and that consequently the relevant consumer would be less likely to be confused as to the source or affiliation of SmartSync. In terms of procurement, it was undisputed that the Navy exercised significant care and effort. However, Ironhawk argued that it previously had a commercial customer, and that it actively markets and pursues business with other commercial businesses. The Court held that because Ironhawk had a previous commercial customer and had made recent attempts to acquire more commercial accounts, a reasonable jury could include the potential commercial customers in the relevant market.

The Ninth Circuit next turned to the “highly factual inquiry” of the eight Sleekcraft factors:

Strength of the mark
Proximity of the goods
Similarity of the marks
Evidence of actual confusion
Marketing channels used
Type of goods and likely level of care exercised by purchaser
Defendant’s intent in selecting the mark
Likelihood of expansion of the product lines.

For the first three factors, the Ninth Circuit found that a reasonable jury could find that:

Dropbox’s mark was commercially strong and would be able to swamp Ironhawk’s reputation.
The Smart [...]

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That’s So Metal: Ninth Circuit Confirms Standard of Review for Finding Unclean Hands on Summary Judgment

by Sarah Bro | Mar 4, 2021 | Trademarks

In a trademark infringement dispute over the brand name “METAL,” the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit resolved an issue of first impression in holding that when reviewing a grant of summary judgment on an unclean hands defense in a trademark infringement case, the correct standard of review is abuse of discretion. Metal Jeans, Inc. v. Metal Sport, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-55923 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 2021) (VanDyke, J.) (Wardlaw, J., concurring).

Metal Jeans, an apparel brand claiming ownership of the trademark METAL, brought an infringement claim against Metal Sport, a powerlifting brand with a similar stylized mark that was also used on certain apparel items. In the district court, both parties sought summary judgment on the issue of likelihood of consumer confusion with respect to Metal Sport’s use of the METAL trademark in view of Metal Jeans’ rights in the brand name. The district court determined that material facts on the issue of infringement remained in dispute, and denied both parties’ motions on the merits. However, the district court granted a separate motion for summary judgment filed by Metal Sport claiming that Metal Jeans was barred from pursuing its infringement claim on grounds of unclean hands, while rejecting Metal Jeans’ counter-defense that Metal Sport also acted with unclean hands.

Metal Jeans appealed the unclean hands judgment, which presented an issue of first impression to the Ninth Circuit, namely the standard of review when a district court concludes that a party has acted with unclean hands. The Ninth Circuit noted that its two trademark decisions addressing unclean hands never specified the standard of review applied, and so turned to other cases in which it reviewed district courts’ application of similar equitable doctrines. With this background, the Court found abuse of discretion to be the correct standard of review.

In a separate decision memorandum, the Ninth Circuit explained that to successfully allege unclean hands, a defendant must show that the plaintiff’s conduct (1) is inequitable and (2) relates directly to the subject matter of its claims. The court also noted that factual questions related to the defense of unclean hands may only be resolved on summary judgment if evidence presented by both sides would permit the trier of fact to come to only one conclusion.

The Ninth Circuit assessed the six alleged instances of misconduct on the part of Metal Jeans, which included facts alleging that Metal Jeans provided varying accounts of how it acquired the METAL trademark and provided inaccurate or false information to the US Patent & Trademark Office, along with allegations that Metal Jeans sourced certain products from China despite its use of an “American Made” slogan. The Court determined that many of the factual allegations of unclean hands did not relate directly to Metal Jeans’ trademark infringement claims, nor did such allegations appear to have caused any harm or demonstrate malintent on the part of Metal Jeans.

Applying the abuse of discretion review standard, the Ninth Circuit determined that the district court’s findings [...]

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No More Bites at the Apple: Intervening Junior User Can Force You to Get Your Head Out of the Cloud(s)

by Paul Devinsky | Feb 4, 2021 | Trademarks

Addressing how a mark’s intervening junior user’s success can affect a senior user, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a grant of summary judgment in favor of the junior user and the issuance of a permanent injunction for any commercial use of the disputed terms by the senior user. RXD Media, LLC v. IP Application Dev. LLC, Case No. 19-1461 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 2021) (Keenan, J.) (joined by Gregory, J., and Floyd, C.J.)

RXD and Apple (here embodied also in IP Application Development, a company formed and wholly owned by Apple for the purpose of registering the “ipad” mark) have shared a long history of trademark litigation, initiated by RXD, over the use of the “ipad” mark. Prior to this appeal, the district court ruled in favor of Apple on summary judgment and permanently enjoined RXD from commercially using the terms “ipad” or “ipod.”

RXD claimed that the district court failed to account for RXD being the “first user” of the “ipad” mark; that Apple did not establish a distinctive, secondary meaning of “ipad” before RXD’s use; that Apple failed to show a likelihood of consumer confusion based on both parties’ use of “ipad”; and that the district court erred in rejecting RXD’s claim that “two of Apple’s trademark applications were void because Apple lacked a bona fide intent to use the ‘ipad’ mark for the services listed in those applications.” The Fourth Circuit, however, was not convinced.

The Fourth Circuit found that even if RXD was technically the senior user of the mark at issue, its expanded, “wholly altered” use of the mark, which now focused on “cloud storage” services and for which it now claimed protection, was not entitled to such protection, because the use occurred “on the heels of Apple’s [i.e., the intervening junior user’s] commercial success in releasing” the iPad. By that point, Apple had already “experienced undeniable commercial success, ha[d] promoted its products through regular advertising using the mark, and ha[d] obtained extensive media coverage regarding its ‘iPad’ device.” As such, the Court concluded that Apple’s “ipad” mark was strong and distinctive, noting that consumers were likely to and had already experienced confusion regarding the “ipad” mark. The Court further concluded that, because RXD was a “proven infringer” of the mark, injunctive relief ordered by the district court in favor of Apple was justified. Finally, the Court rejected RXD’s intent argument, stating that Apple was not required to prove a bona fide intent to use the mark for services it did not identify in its relevant trademark applications—Apple’s development of “cloud storage” services, while not explicitly named in Apple’s trademark applications, was encompassed by “the context of the strength of Apple’s brand” and was within the “breadth of [its] products and services.”

Practice Note: Practitioners should take careful note of how their clients use their mark, even if such use can be technically classified as “senior,” and how the mark evolved over time and whether it happened to change coinciding [...]

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More Than a Feeling: No Fees for Frivolous Claim Where “Perceived Wrongs Were Deeply Felt”

by Thomas DaMario | Jul 1, 2020 | Copyrights, Trademarks

Addressing the appropriateness of the district court’s decision to deny attorneys’ fees relating to a copyright claim it labeled “frivolous,” the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial, despite the strong presumption in favor of awarding fees. Timothy B. O’Brien LLC v. Knott, Case No. 19-2138 (7th Cir. June 17, 2020) (Flaum, J).
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Supreme Court: Profit Disgorgement Available Remedy for Trademark Infringement, Willful or Not

by Sarah Bro | Apr 30, 2020 | Trademarks

Resolving a split among the circuits regarding whether proof of willfulness is necessary for an award of a trademark infringer’s profits, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a unanimous decision holding that the plain language of the Lanham Act has never required a showing of willful infringement in order to obtain a profits award in a suit for trademark infringement under §1125(a). Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., et al. Case No. 18-1233 (Supr. Ct. Apr. 23, 2020) (Gorsuch, Justice) (Alito, Justice, concurring) (Sotomayor, Justice, concurring).

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Internet Sales Lead to Personal Jurisdiction Despite No Physical Presence

by Paul Devinsky | Mar 12, 2020 | Trademarks

Addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction in a trademark infringement case, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and concluded that the plaintiff had made a prima facie showing that defendants, who had no physical presence in the forum state, were subject to personal jurisdiction based on sales to consumers through an interactive website. Charles Curry d/b/a/ Get Diesel Nutrition v. Revolution Labs. LLC, Case No. 17-2900 (7th Cir. Feb. 10, 2020) (Ripple, J).

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