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US Court of Appeals

Who decides trademark strength: Judge or jury?

by Kelsey Wun | Jul 16, 2026 | Cert Alert, Trademarks

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the strength of a trademark in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 is a question of law for the court or a question of fact for the jury. RiseandShine Corp. v. PepsiCo, Inc., Case No. 24-1016 (Supr. Ct. June 29, 2026).

RiseandShine sued PepsiCo in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that PepsiCo’s Mtn Dew Rise Energy drink infringed RiseandShine’s RISE marks for cold-brew coffee products. The district court granted RiseandShine a preliminary injunction, but the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded.

The Second Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its analysis of the strength of the RISE marks and the similarity of the parties’ marks. Treating trademark strength as a question of law, the Second Circuit found that the RISE marks were weak because of the “strong logical associations between ‘Rise’ and coffee.” After reviewing images of the parties’ cans, the Second Circuit also concluded that the district court erred in finding PepsiCo’s mark confusingly similar to the RISE marks.

On remand, the district court entered summary judgment for PepsiCo, relying on the Second Circuit’s determination that the RISE marks were “inherently weak as a matter of law” and that the similarity factor “weigh[ed] strongly against” RiseandShine. The Second Circuit affirmed, reiterating that trademark strength is a question of law.

RiseandShine petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. The question presented is: Whether trademark strength is a question of fact in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis under 15 U.S.C. § 1114.

Back on track: Contextual inquiry required before applying § 112(f) to software claim element

by Richard (Rick) Evans | Jul 16, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a district court’s indefiniteness ruling based on an insufficient means-plus-function analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) while affirming the denial of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and a new trial following a jury verdict finding a related patent invalid as anticipated. TrackTime, LLC v. Amazon.com Services LLC, Audible, Inc., Case No. 24-1102 (Fed. Cir. July 2, 2026) (Prost, Taranto, JJ; Kovner, J., sitting by designation.)

TrackTime sued Amazon and Audible for patent infringement, asserting two related patents directed to time-synchronized transcript technology for audio and video files. One patent relates to methods for annotating and sharing time-synchronized transcripts on mobile devices. The other relates to “tap-to-jump” technology, which allows a user to tap a word in a transcript and jump to the corresponding point in the associated audio or video file.

The district court issued a claim construction order finding the annotation-and-sharing patent invalid for indefiniteness. The court concluded that the claim terms “executable program code configured to facilitate annotation” and “executable program code configured to synchronously play multimedia” were means-plus-function terms that recited functions without sufficient corresponding structure. Because the specification did not adequately disclose structure for performing those functions, the district court held the terms indefinite.

The tap-to-jump patent proceeded separately to a jury trial. The jury found the asserted claim invalid on multiple grounds, including anticipation by a prior art program called LiveNote, and found no infringement. The district court later denied TrackTime’s post-trial motions for JMOL and a new trial. TrackTime appealed both the indefiniteness ruling on the annotation-and-sharing patent and the denial of JMOL and a new trial on the tap-to-jump patent.

The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the indefiniteness ruling on the annotation-and-sharing patent, finding the district court’s § 112(f) analysis insufficient considering the Federal Circuit’s intervening decision in Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp. (2022). In Dyfan, the Court explained that determining whether a limitation should be construed under § 112(f) requires a full contextual analysis, including whether the claim language recites sufficient structure when viewed in light of the specification, the surrounding claim language, and how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term.

The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not conduct the full inquiry required by Dyfan because it failed to consider extrinsic evidence regarding usage in the field and how a skilled artisan would understand the disputed “executable program code” limitations. The Court declined to decide the § 112(f) issue in the first instance, leaving it to the district court on remand to determine whether the disputed limitations, read in context, recited sufficient structure for performing the claimed annotation and synchronous-play functions on a mobile device.

The Federal Circuit reached a different result on the tap-to-jump patent. TrackTime argued that LiveNote failed to disclose three limitations, namely “performing a data lookup,” a “mobile computing device,” and a “touch-sensitive input interface.” The Court rejected each argument. It found that TrackTime [...]

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Construing claims to fit the brand

by Ian J. Howard | Jul 9, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s claim construction and grant of a preliminary injunction, concluding that an accused infringer’s proposed construction would have produced the “highly improbable” result of excluding the patentee’s Orange Book-listed drug from the scope of the asserted claims. Otsuka America Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Hetero Labs Limited, Case No. 25-2016 (Fed. Cir. July 1, 2026) (Bryson, Stoll, JJ.) (Dyk, J., dissenting in part)

Otsuka sued Hetero Labs, alleging that Hetero Labs’ generic drug product would infringe Otsuka’s patent rights. Otsuka moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Hetero Labs from entering the market. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Otsuka was likely to succeed on its infringement claim. Hetero Labs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in construing the asserted claims.

The central dispute concerned how to calculate the patent’s claimed weight ratio. The representative claim requires administering dextromethorphan in combination with quinidine, with the proviso that the “weight to weight ratio of dextromethorphan to quinidine is 1:0.5 or less.” The district court construed “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” to include their pharmaceutically acceptable salts. Under that construction, the claimed ratio is calculated using the full weight of the compounds as administered – for example, the full weight of dextromethorphan hydrobromide rather than only the dextromethorphan active moiety. Hetero Labs, by contrast, argued that when the compounds are administered as salts, the ratio must be calculated using only the weight of the active moieties.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction, concluding that the intrinsic evidence supported construing “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” to include both the free base compounds and their pharmaceutically acceptable salts. The Court found that the patent claims, specification, and prosecution history consistently used those terms to encompass the compounds in the form in which they are administered. The Court also found that extrinsic evidence supported its construction. Relying in part on its 2007 decision in Osram GmbH v. ITC, the Court explained that Hetero Labs’ proposed construction would produce the “highly improbable” result of excluding Otsuka’s Orange Book-listed Nuedexta product – the very product the patent was intended to protect – from the scope of the claims. The Court also rejected Hetero Labs’ indefiniteness argument, concluding that the claims were not rendered indefinite simply because they encompassed formulations using either free bases or pharmaceutically acceptable salts.

Judge Dyk, dissenting in part, concluded that the district court’s construction was inconsistent with both the intrinsic evidence and the purpose of the claimed invention. According to Judge Dyk, the invention depended on maintaining a specific ratio of dextromethorphan to quinidine to ensure that:

Dextromethorphan achieved a therapeutic effect
Quinidine slowed the metabolism of dextromethorphan
Patients were not exposed to excessive amounts of quinidine

In his view, calculating the claimed ratio using the full weight of pharmaceutically acceptable salts rather than only the active moieties distorted that relationship by incorporating the weight of carrier ions that have no therapeutic significance. Judge Dyk also disagreed with the majority’s reliance [...]

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La vida loca: First Circuit vacates summary judgment entered before meaningful discovery

by Richard (Rick) Evans | Jul 1, 2026 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of singer Ricky Martin in a copyright infringement action, concluding that the district court improperly resolved key factual issues without allowing the plaintiff to obtain discovery. The Court also vacated the district court’s order invalidating the plaintiff’s copyright registration because that ruling depended on the same prematurely decided issues. Luis Adrián Cortés-Ramos v. Enrique Martin-Morales, a/k/a Ricky Martin, Case No. 24-1805 (1st Cir. June 12, 2026) (Thompson, Aframe, JJ.) (Barron, J., dissenting in part).

The dispute stems from Cortés-Ramos’s submission of a song and music video to a contest sponsored by a recording studio and Ricky Martin for inclusion on the 2014 FIFA World Cup official album. After Martin released the song “Vida,” Cortés-Ramos alleged that it infringed his copyrighted work. Martin defended on the ground that Cortés-Ramos had assigned his copyright to the recording studio by agreeing to the contest rules. Cortés-Ramos contended that he never received those rules despite signing documents acknowledging compliance with them.

The district court rejected Cortés-Ramos’s argument that the dispute belonged in arbitration because Martin was not a party to the arbitration agreement between Cortés-Ramos and the recording studio. The court then adopted an expedited summary judgment schedule that foreclosed discovery, concluding that Cortés-Ramos had assigned his rights to the recording studio and, as a result, that his copyright registration was invalid. Cortés-Ramos appealed.

The First Circuit agreed that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction because Martin could not be compelled to arbitrate under an agreement to which he was not a party. The Court cautioned, however, that factual findings in the litigation could have preclusive effect in the parallel arbitration between Cortés-Ramos and the recording studio.

The First Circuit nevertheless vacated the summary judgment ruling, explaining that Cortés-Ramos had repeatedly sought discovery regarding evidence uniquely within the possession of the recording studio and Martin. Although Cortés-Ramos had not formally moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), the Court treated his repeated requests for discovery as functionally seeking Rule 56(d) relief. The Court found it fundamentally unfair to resolve dispositive issues while denying Cortés-Ramos access to evidence necessary to challenge Martin’s assertion that the contest documents assigned ownership of the work.

Because the district court entered summary judgment without permitting discovery on issues central to ownership of the copyright, the First Circuit vacated both the summary judgment order and the ruling invalidating Cortés-Ramos’ copyright registration and remanded for further proceedings.

Compound errors: Written description, not typographical error analysis, controls priority claim

by Taylor MacDonald | Jul 1, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment that the asserted patent was invalid as anticipated because the provisional application to which it claimed priority did not provide adequate written description support for the claimed compound. The Court explained that the proper inquiry was whether the provisional demonstrated possession of the later-claimed subject matter, not whether a discrepancy in the provisional could be characterized as an obvious typographical error. Enanta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., Case No. 25-1427 (Fed. Cir. June 23, 2026) (Lourie, Bryson, Chen, JJ.)

Enanta owns a patent direct to coronavirus inhibitors. The patent claimed priority to a July 20, 2020, provisional application. In April 2021, before Enanta filed a nonprovisional application correcting what it later characterized as a typographical error, Pfizer publicly disclosed the compound that ultimately became part of its COVID-19 treatment, Paxlovid®.

The dispute centered on a structural limitation defining an alkyl substituent. The provisional disclosed NHC(O)-C2-C12-alkyl while the asserted patent claimed NHC(O)-C1-C12-alkyl. According to Enanta, the “C2” designation in the provisional was an obvious drafting error that a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize and mentally correct.

The district court granted summary judgment that the patent was anticipated because the asserted claims were not entitled to the provisional application’s filing date. Enanta appealed.
While the Federal Circuit affirmed, it clarified that the district court framed the issue incorrectly. Rather than asking whether a court could correct an alleged error in the provisional, the proper question was whether the provisional itself provided sufficient written description support for the later-claimed invention.

In clarifying the appropriate inquiry, the Federal Circuit rejected Enanta’s reliance on cases addressing correction of errors in issued patents and decisions concerning genus-species written description issues, explaining that those authorities did not govern the priority analysis presented here. Nor could the Court simply construe the provisional to correct the alleged mistake because the disclosure was subject to reasonable debate.

Applying the written description standard, the Federal Circuit concluded that “C2 is simply different from C1.” Because the provisional disclosed only the C2 structure, it did not demonstrate that the inventors possessed the later-claimed C1 embodiment as of the provisional filing date. The Court also found Enanta’s expert testimony insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, explaining that generalized opinions regarding carbon chain nomenclature and drafting errors elsewhere in the specification did not establish written description support for the specific claimed limitation.

Because the asserted claims were not entitled to the provisional application’s priority date, Pfizer’s intervening public disclosure constituted anticipatory prior art, rendering the patent invalid.

Up in smoke: Eighth Circuit sends Lanham Act dispute to state court

by Lauren Hong | Jun 25, 2026 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a trademark dispute on forum non conveniens grounds, finding that the Lanham Act claims concerning ownership and scope of trademark rights arose out of a stock purchase agreement and therefore belonged in the state court designated by the parties’ forum selection clause. Vaughn Boyd v. Deadwood Tobacco Company, Case No. 25-1659 (8th Cir. June 8, 2026) (Smith, Kelly, Grasz, JJ.)

The dispute stemmed from the 2018 sale of Deadwood Tobacco, a South Dakota cigar business associated with the DEADWOOD family of marks. Prior to the sale, Deadwood Tobacco and Drew Estate had collaborated on a successful cigar line sold under names including Sweet Jane, Fat Bottom Betty, and Crazy Alice. The stock purchase agreement reserved trademark registrations associated with those three brands from the transaction. After acquiring the company, the new owners launched additional cigar products under other Deadwood Tobacco branding. Vaughn Boyd and Drew Estate (the sellers under the agreement) subsequently alleged that the new products infringed trademark rights they had retained under the agreement.

After the parties failed to reach a resolution, Boyd and Drew Estate filed suit under the Lanham Act in federal district court in Florida. The district court concluded that the asserted trademark claims arose out of the stock purchase agreement and therefore fell within the scope of the agreement’s South Dakota forum selection clause.

Following that dismissal, Deadwood filed a related contract suit in South Dakota state court and Boyd and Drew Estate countered with a Lanham Act claim in federal district court in South Dakota. The South Dakota district court likewise determined that the dispute arose from the agreement and that the forum selection clause was valid and mandatory. Boyd and Drew Estate appealed the district court decision.

On appeal, Boyd and Drew Estate argued that their claims arose exclusively under federal trademark law rather than contract law and therefore did not “arise out of” the agreement. They further contended that the forum selection clause was permissive rather than mandatory and could not divest federal courts of jurisdiction. Finally, they asserted that public policy favored adjudication of Lanham Act claims in federal court.

The Eighth Circuit rejected each argument. Beginning with trademark ownership, the Court emphasized that trademark rights are inseparable from the goodwill they represent. Because determining the scope of Boyd and Drew Estate’s retained trademark rights required analyzing what goodwill, if any, accompanied the reserved marks, resolution of the dispute necessarily depended on interpreting the stock purchase agreement. The Court therefore concluded that the trademark claims arose out of the agreement, notwithstanding that they were pleaded solely under the Lanham Act.

The Eighth Circuit also found that the forum selection clause was mandatory. The agreement provided that disputes arising out of the agreement “shall” be venued in Lawrence County, South Dakota, and that the Lawrence County circuit court “shall have jurisdiction.” Applying South Dakota law, the Eighth Circuit found the language unambiguously mandatory and concluded that the reference to [...]

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A costly discovery misstep: Untimely damages evidence excluded

by Nicholas J. DiRoberto | Jun 18, 2026 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court’s exclusion of damages evidence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) and the resulting grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff on all claims. Deque Sys. Inc. v. BrowserStack, Inc., Case No. 25-1534 (4th Cir. June 5, 2026) (Agee, Traxler, Floyd, JJ.)

Deque Systems develops software that helps businesses make websites accessible to users who have visual and hearing impairments. Deque sued competitor BrowserStack for copyright infringement, false advertising, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, alleging that BrowserStack reverse-engineered Deque’s software to develop a competing product and falsely advertised it as “5x faster” than Deque’s flagship offering.

Under the district court’s scheduling order, initial disclosures were due on June 7, 2024; expert disclosures were due on August 9, 2024; and fact discovery closed on October 11, 2024. Although Deque timely served its Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures, it failed to provide a computation of damages as required by Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). When BrowserStack later served an interrogatory seeking the categories and calculations of Deque’s claimed damages, Deque again declined to provide a damages computation, stating only that it intended to seek all available damages and that its calculations remained incomplete.

Deque also failed to serve a damages expert report by the August 2024 expert disclosure deadline. After retaining new counsel, Deque disclosed a $30 million damages calculation on October 8, 2024, just three days before the close of discovery. BrowserStack moved to exclude the damages evidence and sought summary judgment.

The district court excluded Deque’s damages evidence under Rule 37(c)(1), finding that Deque failed to comply with Rule 26’s disclosure requirements. Because Deque could no longer prove damages and failed to establish entitlement to injunctive relief, the district court granted summary judgment in BrowserStack’s favor on all claims. Deque appealed.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Court explained that Rule 37(c)(1) “gives teeth” to Rule 26’s disclosure requirements by prohibiting a party from using information that was not properly disclosed during discovery. The Court found that Deque had “indisputably failed to comply” with Rule 26(a)’s damages disclosure requirements by failing to provide a damages computation in its initial disclosures, expert disclosures, or interrogatory responses. The Court rejected Deque’s argument that its disclosure of damages in a rebuttal expert report three days before the close of discovery constituted a timely disclosure.

Turning to the propriety of the sanction, the Fourth Circuit applied the five-factor test set forth in its 2003 Southern States Rack & Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co. decision:

Surprise to the opposing party
Ability to cure the surprise
Disruption of trial
Importance of the evidence
Explanation for the nondisclosure

The Fourth Circuit concluded that all five factors favored exclusion. BrowserStack was plainly surprised by Deque’s $30 million damages claim, which was disclosed only days before discovery closed. Curing that surprise would have required reopening discovery and significantly delaying the proceedings. Although the damages evidence was important, Deque failed to offer any meaningful justification for its repeated failure [...]

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Tick tock: Related trade secrets have single accrual date under DTSA statute of limitations

by Tori Lazerson | Jun 11, 2026 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a judgment awarding damages and a permanent injunction, finding that the plaintiff’s trade secret misappropriation claims were barred by the statute of limitations under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). Insulet Corp. v. EOFlow, Co. Ltd., Case No. 25-1807 (Fed. Cir. May 28, 2026) (Dyk, Reyna, JJ.) (Prost, J., dissenting).

Insulet manufactures the Omnipod, an adhesive wearable insulin patch pump currently sold in 25 countries. EOFlow developed a competing product, the EOPatch 2, marketed in Europe and South Korea. On August 3, 2023, Insulet filed suit against EOFlow alleging trade secret misappropriation under the DTSA and patent infringement.

The misappropriation allegedly occurred when EOFlow hired several former Insulet employees to develop the EOPatch 2. The employees included Steve DiIanni, former director of mechanical engineering at Insulet, who possessed “detailed technical information” about the Omnipod. Between March and May 2018, DiIanni provided EOFlow with computer-aided design (CAD) files and information regarding the Omnipod’s soft cannula and occlusion-detection algorithm.

The district court bifurcated the DTSA and patent claims. At trial on the DTSA claims, the jury found misappropriation of four trade secrets, including the Omnipod CAD files, and concluded that none of Insulet’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The jury initially awarded $170 million in compensatory damages and more than $280 million in exemplary damages. These amounts were reduced to $26 million and $34 million, respectively, with the district court’s grant of a permanent injunction. Insulet’s patent claims were dismissed without prejudice.

On appeal, Insulet moved to transfer to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The Federal Circuit denied the motion, concluding that it retained jurisdiction because the dismissal of the patent claims functioned, at least in part, as a dismissal with prejudice, since the statute of limitations expired with respect to certain alleged acts of patent infringement. The Court then addressed two issues under the DTSA statute of limitations: when the statute of limitations begins to run and whether related trade secrets are subject to a single accrual date.

On the first issue, the parties disputed the applicable standard. EOFlow argued that the statute of limitations began to run under an inquiry-notice standard while Insulet contended that the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds required application of a discovery standard under which the limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the facts underlying its claim. The Federal Circuit declined to decide which standard governed, concluding that Insulet’s claims were time-barred even under the more demanding Merck standard. Applying an access-plus-similarity framework, the Court found that, before the critical date, Insulet knew or should have known that EOFlow had access to its trade secrets through a former Insulet employee, and possessed sufficient information regarding similarities between the EOPatch 2 and Insulet’s trade secret technology to plead a misappropriation claim.

On the second issue, for which there was no controlling First Circuit authority, the Federal Circuit determined that the [...]

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E-I-E-I-No patents for data harvesting

by Ashley K. Justice | Jun 11, 2026 | Patents

Addressing patent eligibility and attorneys’ fees, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that five farming data patents were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, but vacated and remanded the district court’s unexplained determination that the case was not exceptional. AGI SureTrack LLC v. Farmers Edge Inc., Case Nos. 24-1730; -1830 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 2, 2026) (Moore, Mayer, Lourie, JJ.)

AGI SureTrack owns five patents directed to capturing farming operation data in real time using passive data collection devices attached to farming equipment while the equipment performs farming operations. The claimed systems process and share the collected data through an online farming data exchange system or server. AGI sued Farmers Edge and Farmers Edge (US) for patent infringement.

At summary judgment, the district court found the asserted patents invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101, concluding that the claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. The district court also ruled that the case was not exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285 for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees. AGI appealed the invalidity ruling, and Farmers Edge cross-appealed the no-exceptionality ruling.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the § 101 ruling under the two-step Alice framework. At Alice step one, the Federal Circuit found that AGI’s claims were directed to the abstract idea of collecting, analyzing, and transmitting farming data. The Court explained that claims using conventional computer components to collect, analyze, and present data (activities that can be characterized as mental processes) are directed to an abstract idea. The Court rejected AGI’s argument that the patents claimed an unconventional hardware and software system that solved interoperability problems among distinct brands of farming equipment. The claim language did not recite such a technological solution, and the specification described the invention as a way to track, store, and profit from farming operation data.

The Federal Circuit also rejected AGI’s reliance on claims involving detection of communication protocols and the use of stored “implement profiles” to decode farming equipment information. In the Court’s view, those limitations merely combined abstract concepts and did not change the character of the claims as being directed to data collection, processing, and transmission.

At Alice step two, the Federal Circuit found no inventive concept sufficient to transform the abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. The claims relied on generic computer components performing conventional functions. The Court explained that although the claimed automation may have increased the speed and efficiency of collecting and analyzing farming data, improved speed from automation alone does not supply an inventive concept. Considering the claim elements individually and as an ordered combination, the Court concluded that the patents did not claim a patent-eligible application for tracking and collecting farming data.

The Federal Circuit reached a different result on attorneys’ fees. The district court had ruled that the case was not exceptional under § 285 but provided no explanation for that determination. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, explaining that while district courts need not always provide extensive reasoning, they must provide enough [...]

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Funked out: Sixth Circuit finds copyright ownership claim accrues upon plain and express repudiation

by Tyler Jackson | Jun 11, 2026 | Copyrights

Addressing when a copyright ownership claim accrues under the Copyright Act, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed a summary judgment grant, finding that genuine disputes of material fact remained as to whether a musician’s estate timely asserted joint ownership rights in certain sound recordings. The Court explained that an ownership claim accrues only when one party plainly and expressly repudiates another party’s ownership. Est. of Worrell v. Thang, Inc., Case No. 25-1863 (6th Cir. May 27, 2026) (Boggs, Batchelder, Moore, JJ.)

George Bernard (Bernie) Worrell, Jr. and George Clinton were members of Parliament-Funkadelic (P-Funk), the influential funk collective that began in the 1950s. Worrell collaborated with Clinton and P-Funk for approximately a decade before leaving the group in the 1980s. During that period, Worrell and Clinton allegedly operated under several informal and disputed agreements, including a purported 1976 agreement under which Worrell allegedly assigned ownership of certain sound recordings to Thang, Inc. (a company owned by Clinton) in exchange for royalty payments. The parties disputed whether the agreement was ever validly executed, and Worrell allegedly was not consistently paid under it.

After Worrell died in 2016, his estate sued Thang in New York state court in 2019 for breach of contract. Thang prevailed, arguing that Worrell did not possess a countersigned copy of the 1976 agreement. In that litigation, Clinton submitted sworn testimony stating that Thang never signed the agreement and that Clinton himself did not sign either the original or a copy.

Two years later, the estate sued Thang in federal district court, seeking a declaration that Worrell jointly owned the sound recordings he created with P-Funk and requesting an accounting of royalties. The district court granted summary judgment to Clinton and Thang, finding that the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations barred the estate’s claims. The estate appealed.

The Sixth Circuit explained that a copyright ownership claim accrues only once and must be brought within three years of accrual. Following its own precedent and the approach of other circuits, the Court reiterated that an ownership claim accrues when there has been a “plain and express repudiation” of ownership by one party against another. The Court emphasized that the repudiation inquiry is fact-intensive and subject to equitable considerations.

Applying that standard, the Sixth Circuit found genuine disputes of material fact as to when, if ever, Clinton and Thang plainly and expressly repudiated Worrell’s alleged co-ownership. The Court reasoned that because the New York court had determined that Thang never executed the 1976 agreement, which was the agreement that purportedly exchanged Worrell’s ownership rights for royalty payments, a fact finder could conclude that Worrell never gave up his joint ownership rights in the recordings. The Sixth Circuit also found that the parties’ decades-long conduct in relation to the agreement complicated the limitations analysis and precluded summary judgment.

The Sixth Circuit also considered whether the estate had presented sufficient evidence of joint authorship. Under the Copyright Act, a joint work is one prepared by two or more authors [...]

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