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In Determining Subject Matter Eligibility, the Name of the Game Is the Claim

by Tim Dunker | Jun 18, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit overturned a district court grant of summary judgment of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in connection with a patent directed to remote check deposit technology, explaining that details in the specification but not recited in the claims could not be relied on to meet the test for abstraction. United Services Automobile Association v. PNC Bank N.A., Case No. 23-1639 (Fed. Cir. May 6, 2025) (Dyk, Clevenger, Hughes, JJ.)

The patent in issue was directed to a system for allowing a customer to deposit a check using the customer’s handheld mobile device and claimed a “system configured to authenticate the customer using data representing a customer fingerprint.”

After the United Services Automobile Association (USAA) sued PNC for infringement of the patent, both parties filed motions for summary judgment seeking an adjudication as to whether the claims were patent eligible under § 101. The district court granted USAA’s motion, finding that the claims were not directed to an abstract idea and therefore were patent eligible. After a five-day trial, the jury found no invalidity of the asserted claims and found that PNC had infringed. PNC appealed.

The Federal Circuit found that the asserted claim was directed to the abstract idea of depositing a check using a handheld mobile device. At Alice step one, the Court found that the invention claimed steps for carrying out the process of a mobile check deposit by “instructing the customer to take a photo of [a] check,” “using [a] wireless network” to transmit a copy of the photo, and having the configured system “check for errors.” The Court determined that this amounted to a routine process implemented by a general-purpose device. The Court further found that the claim recited routine data collection and analysis steps that have been traditionally performed by banks and people depositing checks – namely reviewing checks, recognizing relevant data, checking for errors, and storing the resultant data.

USAA argued that “accomplishing check deposit on a consumer device required the development of extremely non-obvious algorithms.” The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, noting that the Court focuses on the claims, not the specification, to determine eligibility, because “the level of detail in the specification does not transform a claim reciting only an abstract concept into a patent-eligible system or method.” Since the claims did not recite the algorithms and neither the specification nor the claims contained a “clear description of how the claimed system is configured,” but only “a concept of improving the check deposit process,” the Court found that the claimed subject matter was directed only to an abstract idea.

At Alice step two (not addressed by the district court, which concluded that the claims passed muster at Alice step one), the Federal Circuit considered whether the claim elements contained an inventive concept sufficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. The Court found no inventive concept present, as computer-mediated implementation of routine or conventional activity is not enough to provide [...]

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Speculation of Harm Isn’t Standing: Not Every Adverse Board Decision Is Ticket to Appeal

by Keval Amin | Jun 12, 2025 | America Invents Act, Patents

After assessing whether a patent owner had standing to appeal the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s final written decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found no injury in fact to support Article III jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. Dolby Labs. Licensing Corp. v. Unified Patents, LLC, Case No. 23-2110 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 2025) (Moore, Clevenger, Chen, JJ.)

Dolby owns a patent covering a prediction method involving an in-loop filter. Unified Patents, claiming to be the sole real party in interest (RPI), filed an inter partes review (IPR) challenging several patent claims as anticipated and obvious. Dolby contested the challenge, identifying nine additional entities it argued should have been named as RPIs (alleged RPIs). The Board declined to rule on Dolby’s inclusion, however, and proceeded with Unified as the sole RPI.

In its final written decision, the Board found that Unified failed to establish the unpatentability of any challenged claims. Consistent with the US Patent & Trademark Office’s practice, it also declined to address the RPI dispute, finding it immaterial – there was no evidence the alleged RPIs were estopped from filing their own IPRs later or that Unified had advantageously or strategically omitted them. Dolby appealed.

The Federal Circuit explained that when it reviews final Board decisions, its jurisdiction is constrained by Article III’s “Cases” and “Controversies” requirement. To establish standing, an appellant must demonstrate:

A concrete and particularized injury in fact that is actual or imminent, not speculative.
A causal link between the injury and the appellee’s challenged conduct.
A likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable ruling.

Dolby asserted standing to appeal the Board’s refusal to address the RPI dispute based on three grounds:

Its statutory right to appeal as a “dissatisfied” party under 35 U.S.C. § 319.

The denial of its right to information under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2).
An injury in fact arising from potential breaches of license agreements by the alleged RPIs and possible conflicts of interest involving the Board’s administrative patent judges.

The Federal Circuit rejected Dolby’s argument that it had a right to appeal based solely on dissatisfaction with the Board’s decision. The Court explained that the right to appeal a Board decision under the America Invents Act (AIA) requires Article III standing. The Court also dismissed Dolby’s argument for a statutory right to RPI information, finding that the AIA does not create an informational right. The Court explained that unlike statutes such as the Federal Advisory Committee Act or the Federal Election Campaign Act, which expressly grant public access to information, the AIA lacks a public access provision and explicitly limits judicial review of IPR-related determinations, including RPI disclosures.

As to Dolby’s right to appeal the Board decision, the Federal Circuit found Dolby’s argument too speculative to establish standing, citing four key deficiencies:

Dolby failed to assert that any alleged RPIs were party to license agreements, undermining its claim of potential breach.

Dolby provided no evidence of conflicts of [...]

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Running on Empty: ‘Stang’ With No Anthropomorphic Characteristics Isn’t Copyrightable Character

by Taylor MacDonald | Jun 5, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of copyright protection for a car that had a name but no anthropomorphic or protectable characteristics. Carroll Shelby Licensing, Inc. v. Denice Shakarian Halicki et al., Case No. 23-3731 (9th Cir. May 27, 2025) (Nguyen, Mendoza, JJ.; Kernodle Dist. J., sitting by designation).

In 2009, Denice Shakarian Halicki and Carroll Shelby Licensing entered into a settlement agreement resolving a lawsuit concerning Shelby’s alleged infringement of Halicki’s asserted copyright interest in a Ford Mustang known as “Eleanor,” which appeared in a series of films dating back to the 1970s. Under the agreement, Shelby, a custom car shop, was prohibited from producing GT-500E Ford Mustangs incorporating Eleanor’s distinctive hood or headlight design. Shortly thereafter, Shelby licensed Classic Recreations to manufacture “GT-500CR” Mustangs, a move Halicki viewed as a breach of the settlement agreement. Halicki contacted Classic Recreations and demanded it cease and desist in the production of the GT-500CRs.

Shelby filed a lawsuit alleging breach of the settlement agreement and seeking declaratory relief. Halicki counterclaimed for copyright infringement and breach of the agreement. Following a bench trial, the district court ruled in Shelby’s favor on both the breach and infringement claims but declined to grant declaratory relief. Shelby appealed.

The Ninth Circuit began by addressing whether “Eleanor” qualified for copyright protection as a character under the Copyright Act. Although the act does not explicitly list characters among the types of works it protects, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that certain characters may be entitled to such protection. The applicable standard, articulated in 2015 by the Ninth Circuit in DC Comics v. Towle, sets forth a three-pronged test, under which the character must:

Have “physical as well as conceptual qualities”
Be “sufficiently delineated to be recognizable as the same character whenever it appears” with “consistent, identifiable character traits and attributes”
Be “especially distinctive” and have “some unique elements of expression.”

The Ninth Circuit concluded that Eleanor failed to satisfy any of the three prongs of the Towle test. As to the first prong, the Court found that Eleanor functioned merely as a prop and lacked the anthropomorphized qualities or independent agency associated with protectable characters. Regarding the second prong, the Court noted that Eleanor’s appearance varied significantly across the films in terms of model, colors, and condition. Under the third prong, the Court found that Eleanor lacked the distinctiveness necessary to elevate it beyond the level of a generic sports car commonly featured in similar films. Thus, the Court concluded that Eleanor did not qualify as a character, let alone a copyrightable one.

The Ninth Circuit next turned to the parties’ settlement agreement. While California law permits the use of extrinsic evidence to aid in contract interpretation, the Court found the language sufficiently unambiguous to render such evidence unnecessary. Notably, the parties did not include “Eleanor” as a defined term in the agreement, and the term was used in varying contexts throughout the document, conveying different meanings [...]

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No Fair Use Defense Results in Default Judgment

by Hannah Hurley | Jun 5, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of a copyright infringement claim alleging copying of a photograph, finding that the defendant’s use of the photograph did not constitute fair use and that the district court erred in its substantive fair use analysis. Jana Romanova v. Amilus Inc., Case No. 23-828 (2d Cir. May 23, 2025) (Jacobs, Leval, Sullivan, JJ.) (Sullivan, J., concurring).

Jana Romanova, a professional photographer, sued Amilus for willful copyright infringement, alleging that the company unlawfully published her photograph, originally licensed to National Geographic, without authorization on its subscription-based website. Amilus failed to appear or respond in the district court proceedings, and Romanova sought entry of default judgment.

Instead of granting the motion, the district court sua sponte raised the affirmative defense of fair use. After considering Romanova’s show cause order response, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the fair use defense was “clearly established on the face of the complaint.” Romanova appealed on substantive and procedural grounds.

Romanova argued that the district court erred in finding a basis for the fair use defense within the four corners of the complaint and erred by sua sponte raising a substantive, non-jurisdictional affirmative defense on behalf of a defendant that failed to appear or respond.

Citing the Supreme Court decisions in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music (1994) and Warhol v. Goldsmith (2023), the Second Circuit reversed. The Court explained that “the district court’s analysis depended on a misunderstanding of the fair use doctrine and of how the facts of the case relate to the doctrine. We see no basis in the facts alleged in the complaint for a finding of fair use.”

The Second Circuit explained that the district court misapplied the first fair use factor (“the purpose and character of the use”). The Court noted that a transformative use must do more than merely assert a different message; it must communicate a new meaning or purpose through the act of copying itself. Here, Amilus’ use of Romanova’s photograph did not alter or comment on the original work but merely republished it in a commercial context.

The Second Circuit also found no basis for the district court’s finding of justification for the copying, a factor that typically depends on the nature of the message communicated through the copying, such as parody or satire, and was mandated by the Supreme Court in Warhol. The Court rejected the notion that Amilus’ editorial framing – claiming to highlight a trend in pet photography – could justify the unauthorized use.

On the procedural issue, the majority noted that an “overly rigid refusal to consider an affirmative defense sua sponte can make a lawsuit an instrument of abuse. A defendant’s default does not necessarily mean that the defendant has insouciantly snubbed the legal process.” In this case, the Second Circuit explained that it “cannot fault the district court for considering a defense which it believed (albeit mistakenly) was valid and important. While district courts should [...]

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X-Ray Vision: Court Sees Through Implicit Claim Construction

by Connor M. Larson | Jun 5, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s final determination that challenged patent claims were not unpatentable, finding that the Board’s decision relied on an erroneous implicit claim construction. Sigray, Inc. v. Carl Zeiss X-Ray Microscopy, Inc., Case No. 23-2211 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2025) (Dyk, Prost, JJ.; Goldberg, Chief Distr. J., sitting by designation).

Zeiss owns a patent related to X-ray imaging systems that incorporate projection magnification. Sigray filed a petition requesting inter partes review (IPR) of all claims in the patent. After institution, the Board issued its final written decision, which declined to hold any of the challenged claims unpatentable. Sigray appealed.

On appeal, Sigray argued that the claims were unpatentable based on a single prior art reference, Jorgensen. The Jorgensen reference “describes a system that uses an X-ray source to generate an X-ray beam, which then passes through a sample before being received by a detector.” Sigray argued that Jorgensen anticipated or rendered the challenged claims obvious. The parties agreed that Jorgensen explicitly disclosed all the limitations of the independent claim except for one reading “a magnification of the projection X ray stage . . . between 1 and 10 times.”

The parties’ arguments centered on whether the magnification limitation was inherently disclosed in Jorgensen. The Board concluded that “viewing the record as a whole, . . . [Sigray] has not shown persuasively that Jorgensen inherently discloses projection magnification within the claimed range. Sigray argued, and the Federal Circuit agreed, that the Board’s findings incorrectly relied on a flawed understanding of the claimed range. In Sigray’s view, “the Board implicitly and incorrectly construed the limitation ‘between 1 and 10’ to exclude unspecified, small divergence resulting in projection magnifications only slightly greater than 1.” This was illustrated by the Board’s determination that Sigray “failed to show that the . . . X-ray beam in Jorgensen diverges enough to result in projection magnification between 1 and 10 times.”

The Federal Circuit found that the Board’s use of the term “enough” indicated that the evidence it relied on supported a finding of some divergence in the X-ray beams. Because the beams were not completely parallel, the Court reasoned that some magnification necessarily resulted, and that even a miniscule amount (as disclosed in the prior art) fell within the claimed magnification range of 1 to 10. Since the Board made only one evidence-supported finding relevant to anticipation, the Court reversed on the independent claim and two dependent claims without remand. However, the Court remanded the case to the Board to determine whether the three remaining challenged claims, which recited further material limitations, would have been obvious.

No Fairytale Ending for Consumer Opposition: RAPUNZEL Reinforces Lexmark Standing Limits

by Hannah Hurley | May 29, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s dismissal of a trademark opposition brought by a consumer, holding that mere consumer interest is insufficient to establish standing under Section 13 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1063). The ruling reinforced the application of the Supreme Court’s Lexmark (2014) framework to administrative trademark proceedings and clarified that only parties with commercial interest fall within the “zone of interests” protected by the statute when challenging a mark. Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., Case No. 23-2140 (Fed. Cir. May 22, 2025) (Taranto, Hughes, JJ.; Barnett, Distr. J., sitting by designation.)

United Trademark Holdings (UTH) applied to register the mark RAPUNZEL for dolls and toy figures. Rebecca Curtin, a law professor, doll collector, and mother, opposed the registration, arguing that “Rapunzel” is a generic or descriptive term and its registration would harm consumers by reducing competition and increasing prices for fairytale-themed dolls.

The Board dismissed Curtin’s opposition, concluding she lacked standing to oppose under § 1063. The Board applied the Lexmark framework, which requires a showing that the opposer’s interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute and that the alleged injury is proximately caused by the registration. The Board found that Curtin, as a consumer, failed both prongs. Curtin appealed.

Curtin argued she had statutory entitlement under the 1999 Federal Circuit decision in Ritchie v. Simpson, “a case that addressed a section of the Trademark Act barring registration of ‘immoral’ or ‘scandalous’ matter.”

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board, holding that the Lexmark framework applied rather than Ritchie. The Court explained that while the Lanham Act may indirectly benefit consumers, the statutory cause of action is reserved for those with commercial interest. Since Curtin’s opposition was based on claims that the mark was generic, descriptive, or failed to function as a mark, her interest as a consumer did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute.

The Federal Circuit also found that Curtin’s alleged injuries, namely reduced marketplace competition, increased prices, and diminished access to diverse interpretations of the Rapunzel character, were too speculative and derivative of harm that might be suffered by commercial competitors. The Court reiterated that injuries must be direct and not merely downstream effects of harm to others. Curtin’s submission of a petition with more than 400 signatures from like-minded consumers did not alter the Court’s conclusion that her alleged harm was too remote to satisfy the proximate cause requirement.

Practice Note: The Federal Circuit’s decision reinforces that only parties with direct commercial stakes, such as competitors or potential market entrants, have standing to oppose trademark registrations on grounds such as genericness, descriptiveness, or fraudulence.

Stylish but Generic: ‘VETEMENTS’ Can’t Dress Up as Trademark

by Sarah Bro | May 29, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s refusal to register the mark VETEMENTS for clothing and related retail services, finding that the mark was generic under the doctrine of foreign equivalents. In re Vetements Group AG, Case Nos. 2023-2050; -2051 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2025) (Prost, Wallach, Chen, JJ.)

Vetements Group AG applied to register the mark VETEMENTS for various clothing items and online retail store services for clothing items. The US Patent & Trademark Office refused registration, finding the mark generic or, in the alternative, merely descriptive without acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act. The Board affirmed, applying the doctrine of foreign equivalents to translate “vetements” (French for “clothing”) and concluding that the term was generic for the applied-for goods and services pertaining to clothing. Vetements Group appealed.

The doctrine of foreign equivalents is used to evaluate whether a non-English trademark is generic or descriptive for the applied-for goods or services by translating the foreign-language mark into English, then applying the relevant legal tests. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the doctrine applies when the “ordinary American purchaser” would likely “stop and translate” the foreign word into English. The “ordinary American purchaser” includes all US consumers, including those familiar with the foreign language.

The Federal Circuit emphasized that words from modern languages are generally translated unless there is a compelling reason not to do so. It rejected Vetements’ argument that the doctrine should only apply if a majority of US consumers understand the foreign word. Instead, the Court held that it is sufficient if an “appreciable number” of US consumers would recognize and translate the term.

In this case, the Federal Circuit found that French is widely spoken and taught in the United States (the Board found that as of 2010, French was the fifth most spoken non-English language at home and the second most widely taught non-English language in US schools). The Court thus concluded that “vetements” is a common French word meaning “clothing,” and that given the mark’s use on apparel and in connection with clothing-related retail services, translation of the term into English was likely.

Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, foreign terms used as trademarks are translated into English, then evaluated under the applicable standards, including genericness, descriptiveness, and likelihood of confusion. In assessing whether a term is generic, courts apply a two-part test: identifying the genus of goods or services at issue, and determining whether the relevant public understands the term primarily to refer to that genus.

Here, the genus was clothing and online retail services for clothing. The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that “vetements,” once translated to “clothing,” directly named the genus of the goods and services. Therefore, the term was generic and ineligible for trademark protection.

Because the mark was found to be generic, the Federal Circuit explained that it did not have to reach the Board’s alternative holding that the VETEMENTS mark was merely descriptive without acquired distinctiveness [...]

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Plausibly Alleging Access Requires More Than Social Media Visibility

by Amit Kumar Saha, PhD | May 29, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a copyright action, finding that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege either that the defendant had “access” to the work in question merely because it was posted on social media, or that the accused photos were substantially similar to any protectable elements of plaintiff’s photographs. Rodney Woodland v. Montero Lamar Hill, aka Lil Nas X, et al., Case No. 23-55418 (9th Cir. May 16, 2025) (Lee, Gould, Bennett, JJ.)

The dispute arose between Rodney Woodland, a freelance model and artist, and Montero Lamar Hill, also known as Lil Nas X, a well-known musical artist. Woodland alleged that Hill infringed on his copyright by posting photographs to his Instagram account that bore a striking resemblance to images Woodland had previously posted. Woodland claimed that the arrangement, styling, and overall visual composition of Hill’s photos closely mirrored his own, asserting that these similarities constituted unlawful copying of his original work.

Woodland’s original images had been publicly shared on his Instagram account, where he maintained a modest following. He did not allege any direct contact or interaction with Hill or his representatives, nor did he claim that Hill had acknowledged or referenced his work. Instead, Woodland’s claim rested on the contention that the similarities between the two sets of photographs were so substantial that copying could be inferred. In his complaint, Woodland asserted that Hill had access to his publicly posted images and that the degree of similarity supported a finding of unlawful copying. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Woodland failed to plausibly allege either access or substantial similarity. Woodland appealed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the district court that Woodland failed to satisfy the pleading standard necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit explained that to state a viable claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must alleged both the fact of copying and the unlawful appropriation of protected expression. The Court found that Woodland failed to establish either element.

The Ninth Circuit considered two principal legal issues:

Whether Woodland sufficiently alleged that Hill had access to Woodland’s copyrighted works
Whether the photographs posted by Hill were substantially similar to Woodland’s photographs in their protectable elements under copyright law

On the issue of access, the Ninth Circuit found that the merely alleging availability of Woodland’s photos on Instagram did not, by itself, plausibly demonstrate that Hill had seen them. The Court noted that in the era of online platforms, “the concept of ‘access’ is increasingly diluted.” And while that might make it easier for plaintiffs to show “access,” there must be a showing that the defendants had a reasonable chance of seeing that work under the platform’s policies. The mere fact that Hill used Instagram and Woodland’s photos were available on the same platform raised only a “bare possibility” that Hill viewed the photos. Woodland had not plausibly alleged that Hill “followed, liked, or otherwise interacted” with Woodland’s posts [...]

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Take That Conception Out of the Oven – It’s CRISPR Even If the Cook Doesn’t Know

by Connor M. Larson | May 22, 2025 | America Invents Act, Patents

Addressing the distinction between conception and reduction to practice and the requirement for written description in the unpredictable arts, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained that proof of conception of an invention does not require that the inventor appreciated the invention at the time of conception. Knowledge that an invention is successful is only part of the case for reduction to practice. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. et al. v. Broad Inst. et al., Case No. 22-1594 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 2025) (Reyna, Hughes, Cunningham, JJ.)

The Regents of the University of California, the University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier (collectively, Regents) and the Broad Institute, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the President and Fellows of Harvard College (collectively, Broad) were each separately involved in research concerning CRISPR systems that “are immune defense systems in prokaryotic cells that naturally edit DNA.” At issue was the invention of the use of CRISPR systems to modify the DNA in eukaryotic cells. Regents and Broad filed competing patent applications resulting in an interference proceeding under pre-AIA law at the US Patent & Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences to determine which applicant had priority to the invention.

The main issue before the Board was a priority dispute over who first conceived of the invention and sufficiently reduced it to practice under pre-AIA patent law. Regents submitted three provisional patent applications dated May 2012, October 2012, and January 2013 and moved to be accorded the benefit of the earliest filing date, May 2012, for the purpose of determining priority. Alternatively, Reagents sought to be accorded either October 2012 or January 2013 as its priority date. The Board found that Regents’ first and second provisional applications (filed in May and October 2012, respectively) were not a constructive reduction to practice because neither satisfied the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. The third provisional application, filed in January 2013, was the first to amount to a constructive reduction to practice of the counts in interference. The Board then ruled that Broad was the senior party for the purposes of priority in the interference proceeding because Broad reduced the invention to practice by October 5, 2012, when a scientist submitted a manuscript to a journal publisher. The Board ruled that Regents failed to prove conception of the invention prior to Broad’s actual reduction to practice. Regents appealed.

Regents argued that in assessing conception, the Board “legally erred by requiring Regents’ scientist to know that their invention would work.” The Federal Circuit agreed and vacated the Board’s decision. As the Court explained, there are three stages to the inventive process: conception, reasonable diligence, and reduction to practice. At the conception stage, “an inventor need not know that his invention will work for conception to be complete.” Rather, knowledge that the invention will work, “necessarily, can rest only on an actual reduction to practice.” The Board therefore legally erred by requiring Regents to know its invention would work to prove [...]

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Up in Smoke: Statutory Trademark Damages Can Exceed Actual Damages

by Taylor MacDonald | May 15, 2025 | Trademarks

Addressing a jury’s statutory damages award that surpassed the plaintiffs’ actual damages, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), finding that the award was consistent with trademark damages law given the jury’s finding of no willfulness and was not violative of constitutional due process. Top Tobacco, L.P. v. Star Importers & Wholesalers, Inc., Case No. 24-10765 (11th Cir. Apr. 30, 2025) (Pryor, Grant, Kid, JJ.)

Top Tobacco, Republic Technologies, and Republic Tobacco (collectively, Republic) sued Star Importers & Wholesalers for trademark violations and the sale of counterfeit cigarette rolling papers. Prior to trial, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Republic. Thus, the only issues tried to the jury were damages related, including whether Star’s conduct had been willful, whether the company’s president should be personally liable, and the appropriate damages award.

Republic sought damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) of the Lanham Act, permitting the jury to look beyond actual damages and award up to $200,000 per non-willfully infringed mark or $2 million per willfully infringed mark. The jury instructions explained to the jury that it could consider multiple factors, including lost revenue, the conduct’s willfulness, and whether the counterfeit goods were a public safety risk. The instructions also clarified that the statute permitted both compensatory and punitive rationales for the award, as long as it was not a windfall for Republic. Ultimately, the jury found that Star’s conduct had not been willful and granted the plaintiffs $123,000 per infringed mark. Star moved for JMOL, arguing the total $1.107 million award was inconsistent with the finding of no willfulness. The district court denied the motion. Star appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the JMOL motion, concluding that:

The jury was permitted to provide an award greater than actual damages.
The jury was permitted to consider punitive and deterrence rationales despite finding the actions were not willful.
The award did not violate constitutional due process.

Applying the principles of statutory construction, the Eleventh Circuit explained that because § 1117(a) permits an award for actual damages, § 1117(c)’s purpose was explicitly to allow awards greater than the actual loss suffered. Further, the jury’s role of factfinder under the Seventh Amendment precluded the district court from overriding a verdict that fell within the statute. Finally, the Court noted that the jury instructions were a safeguard against punishing defendants without any regard for actual damages because the instructions protected against a windfall for the plaintiff. In this case, the jury had facts regarding the marks’ strength, potential dangers of the counterfeit papers’ chemicals, and the prevalence of counterfeiting in the industry. Thus, the Court found that the jury had substantial evidence for the award – which was below the statutory maximum – and that it was not a windfall for Republic.

Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that since the jury awarded damages below the statutory maximum [...]

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