writ of mandamus
Subscribe to writ of mandamus's Posts

Dude, Where’s My Venue? Texas Car Dealerships Aren’t Distributor Agents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a district court’s denial of motions made by two car distributors to transfer cases out of the Western District of Texas for improper venue, finding that the patent owner failed to establish that franchised car dealerships in the judicial district were agents of the manufacturers for venue purposes under § 1400(b). In re Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., Case Nos. 22-108; -109 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 2022) (Dyk, Reyna, Chen, JJ.) (per curiam).

StratosAudio filed complaints in the Western District of Texas against Volkswagen and Hyundai, asserting infringement of infotainment-related patents. Volkswagen and Hyundai are car distributors incorporated in New Jersey and California, respectively. Both distributors moved to dismiss or transfer their cases for improper venue under § 1406(a). The district court denied the motions, concluding that venue was proper because independently owned Volkswagen and Hyundai car dealerships operated in the district. The district court found that franchise agreements gave the car distributors sufficient control over their respective dealerships such that they constituted regular and established places of business in the district. The district court reached this finding despite the fact that Texas law prohibited direct or indirect operation or control of a franchise by a car manufacturer or distributor. Volkswagen and Hyundai petitioned the Federal Circuit for writ of mandamus to vacate the district court’s order or transfer for improper venue.

The Federal Circuit first considered whether mandamus review was appropriate. The Court explained that it may only issue a writ if the petitioner has no other means adequate to attain the desired relief. In contrast to a motion to transfer to a more convenient venue under § 1404(a), denial of a motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue under § 1406(a) can be remedied on appeal from final judgment. The Court explained that mandamus relief is therefore only available for a ruling on a § 1406(a) motion where the issue presented doing so is important to “proper judicial administration.” Citing to its ruling in In re. Google LLC, the Court explained that this condition may be met when there are a significant number of district court decisions that adopt conflicting views on a basic legal issue. The Court described the disagreement among district courts over whether independent car dealerships establish venue over vehicle manufacturer and distributors and determined that the situation warranted immediate review.

The Federal Circuit turned to the merits to analyze the factors for determining whether a defendant has a “regular and established place of business” for the purposes of establishing proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). There was no dispute that the car dealerships were physically located in the Western District of Texas, and that the defendants did not have any employees at these locations. The Court thus identified the three operative statutory requirements that StratosAudio had the burden of establishing:

  • Whether the dealerships were the agents of the defendants
  • Whether the dealerships conducted the defendants’ [...]

    Continue Reading



California, I’m Coming Home: Transfer to Venue Where Products Were Designed Is Appropriate

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a patent owner’s petition for writ of mandamus, finding that the district court properly transferred a case from the Eastern District of Virginia to the Northern District of California because the center of the alleged infringing activities occurred in California. In re: SunStone Information Defense, Inc., Case No. 2022-121 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 11, 2022) (Moore, Dyk, Stoll, JJ). (non-precedential).

SunStone filed a patent infringement suit against F5 Networks and one of its customers in the Eastern District of Virginia. F5 Networks moved to transfer the case to the Northern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), arguing that at the time of filing, SunStone was headquartered in Northern California, and the F5 Networks subsidiary that designed and developed the accused products was also located in the area. F5 Networks also noted that essentially all of the relevant documents and knowledgeable employees were in Northern California.

The district court granted F5 Networks’ motion, explaining that F5 Networks satisfied its burden of proving that transfer was warranted based on convenience of the parties and witnesses and because California was the “center of the alleged infringing activities.” The district court also noted that neither party disputed that the action “might have been brought” in the Northern District of California. SunStone petitioned for writ of mandamus.

The Federal Circuit applied the law of the regional circuit (the Fourth Circuit), which requires finding a clear abuse of discretion in order to overturn a district court’s transfer decision. The Court found that SunStone failed to meet this “stringent standard.” The Court also found that SunStone’s choice of forum was not entitled to significant weight because it was not SunStone’s home forum and had no specific connection to the infringement claims. The Court therefore denied SunStone’s petition.

Practice Note: This is another decision in a long line of recent Federal Circuit rulings relating to venue, which are summarized in an article related to a string of transfer denials in the Western District of Texas and our 2022 IP Outlook Report: The Developments Shaping Patent Law.




Federal Circuit to WD Tex.: Denial of Transfer Motion was Clear Error, Abuse of Discretion

For the third time in as many months, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found clear error in the US District Court for the Western District of Texas’s denial of a defendant’s motion to transfer venue. In re Juniper Networks, Inc., Case No. 21-160 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 24, 2021) (per curiam).

WSOU Investments d/b/a Brazos Licensing filed seven complaints against Juniper Networks in the Western District of Texas for infringement of seven different patents. Juniper, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Sunnyvale, California, moved the district court to transfer the case to the Northern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Juniper pointed out that Brazos is a self-described patent assertion entity that does not conduct any business other than asserting patents and argued that “whatever ties Brazos has to this District appear to have been created for the purpose of its patent litigation activities in this District.” Additionally, two of Brazos’s officers, its CEO and its president, reside in California. Juniper argued that the Northern District of California was a clearly more convenient forum, noting that potential key witnesses were located in the Northern District of California. Juniper also asserted that the accused products were designed, developed, marketed and sold primarily from its Sunnyvale headquarters. While acknowledging that six of the actions could have been brought in the Northern District of California, the district court denied Juniper’s motion to transfer based on its analysis of the four private interest and four public interest factors. Juniper petitioned the Federal Circuit for writ of mandamus directing the district court to transfer the six cases.

Applying Fifth Circuit law, the Federal Circuit noted that a motion to transfer under § 1404(a) should be granted if “the movant demonstrates that the transferee venue is clearly more convenient.” The Court noted that district courts enjoy broad discretion in transfer determinations, but that it has routinely issued mandamus when a district court’s denial of a motion to transfer amounts to clear abuse of discretion.

The Federal Circuit explained that the “single most important factor” in transfer analysis is the relative convenience and cost of attendance for witnesses. Juniper identified 11 potential witnesses, all of whom were located in the Northern District of California, while Brazos only identified one Texas-based employee as a potential witness. The district court found that this only weighed slightly in favor of transfer, assigning “little weight” to both party and prior art witnesses and concluding that many of the witnesses were “unlikely to testify.” The Court disagreed, holding that the district court clearly erred in not giving sufficient weight to this factor in light of the “striking imbalance” in the parties’ 11-to-one listing of potential witnesses. The Court noted that it previously rejected both of the arguments used by the district court to discount the weight applied to Juniper’s witnesses. In August 2021, the Court held in In re Hulu, LLC that the district court’s discounting of party and prior art witnesses was “untethered [...]

Continue Reading




Overcoming Heavy Burden Required to Succeed on Venue-Related Writ of Mandamus

Addressing a venue challenge, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a petition for a writ of mandamus because the challenger did not demonstrate it had no adequate alternative means to obtain desired relief since meaningful review could occur after final judgment was entered. In re. Google, Case No. 20-144 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 18, 2020) (Reyna, J.).

Personalized Media Communications (PMC) sued Google in the Eastern District of Texas for infringement of six patents related to adaptive video streaming. PMC initially asserted venue was proper based on the presence of several Google Global Cache (GGC) servers at facilities owned by internet service providers (ISPs) located within the district. Google moved to dismiss for improper venue. While Google’s motion was pending, the Federal Circuit issued its decision in In re. Google, rejecting a venue argument asserted by a different plaintiff against Google that was also premised on the presence of GGC servers, and finding that a regular and established place of business requires the regular physical presence of an employee or other agent of the defendant conducting the defendant’s business at the alleged place of business.

After the Federal Circuit’s decision, PMC asserted a different venue theory based on Google’s agreements with Communications Test Design (CTDI) to warehouse, refurbish, repair and ship hardware products, such as Google’s cellphones and speakers, from a CTDI facility located in the Eastern District of Texas. The district court agreed with PMC and denied Google’s motion, finding that CTDI was acting as Google’s agent and was conducting Google’s business from its facility. Google filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the district court’s order.

The Federal Circuit denied Google’s petition. The Court explained that a party seeking a writ bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that it has no adequate alternative means to obtain the desired relief and that the right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. Without providing an explanation, the Court found that although Google raised viable arguments based on the law of agency and the Court’s precedent, it was not satisfied that Google’s right to a writ was clear and indisputable. The Court concluded that Google can obtain meaningful review of the district court’s venue ruling after final judgment in the case.

Practice Note: The Federal Circuit was also concerned that the district court did not move more quickly to resolve Google’s venue challenge. Significant work in the case had already been done, and the trial date is currently set for November 2020. If the venue is later found to be improper, the case will be transferred and a new trial will occur.




Mandamus Denied: Need to Show Abuse of Discretion in Addition to Prejudice from Delay

Addressing an emergency request for a writ of mandamus to compel discovery of electronically stored information, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declined to set aside a district court’s denial of a request to create forensic images of all the defendant’s business and personal computers and cell phones. In re FCA US LLC, Case No. 19-1923 (6th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

FCA filed trade-secret misappropriation and other claims against Patrea Bullock, a lawyer who formerly served as outside counsel to FCA. According to FCA, while serving as defense counsel, Bullock had access to extensive confidential and proprietary information belonging to FCA, including its “defense playbook.” After she resigned from her law firm, but before returning her computer, Bullock downloaded her files from the laptop onto several USB drives. Thereafter, she opened her own law firm representing plaintiffs against automobile manufacturers, including FCA. During discovery, Bullock produced 1,345 documents in response to FCA’s requests for the documents she had taken FCA, however, moved to compel a forensic image of all of Bullock’s business and personal laptops and cell phones so an expert could investigate what documents Bullock took.

(more…)




BLOG EDITORS

STAY CONNECTED

TOPICS

ARCHIVES