Addressing the limits of federal jurisdiction, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the fair use exception in federal copyright law required disclosure of a student survey under Kentucky’s open records statute. The Court determined that neither the hypothetical presence of a federal fair use defense nor the possibility of future copyright litigation was sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction. Stovall v. Jefferson County Board of Education, Case No. 25-5357 (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 2026) (Sutton, Boggs, Bloomekatz, JJ.)
Miranda Stovall, a Kentucky resident, learned that Jefferson County Public Schools planned to administer a mental health survey to students. She requested a copy of the survey under the Kentucky Open Records Act. The school district denied the request, citing an exemption for records prohibited from disclosure by federal law and asserting that the survey was copyrighted intellectual property of its publisher, NCS Pearson.
Stovall sued in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that that disclosure of the survey would be permitted under the Copyright Act’s fair use doctrine. NCS Pearson moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the district court granted that motion. Stovall appealed.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying the established “arising under” framework used to assess federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 and 1338. Under that framework, a claim may arise under federal copyright law only if:
- It is created by the Copyright Act.
- It is a state law claim that necessarily raises a disputed and substantial copyright issue.
- It asserts rights equivalent to those protected by copyright and is therefore preempted.
The Court concluded that none of these categories applied.
First, the Copyright Act did not create Stovall’s cause of action; her asserted entitlement to inspect or copy the survey arose solely under the Kentucky Open Records Act.
Second, although copyright law was implicated, it entered the case only as a potential defense to the school district’s disclosure obligation. The Sixth Circuit emphasized that federal jurisdiction cannot be manufactured by anticipating a federal defense, even where the defense involves copyright fair use. Because federal copyright law was not an essential element of Stovall’s state law claim, the case did not “arise under” federal law.
Third, the Sixth Circuit rejected Stovall’s argument that her claim was effectively a copyright dispute because it might provoke an infringement action by NCS Pearson. The Kentucky Open Records Act claim did not resemble an infringement action and did not seek to vindicate rights equivalent to those protected by the Copyright Act. Accordingly, it was not preempted and did not fall within exclusive federal jurisdiction.
The Sixth Circuit concluded that Stovall also lacked Article III standing under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Court explained that a speculative fear of future litigation does not create the “substantial controversy” required to establish a justiciable case or controversy. Stovall had not alleged any prior infringement claim, threat of suit, or concrete indication that NCS Pearson intended to sue her. At most, she alleged a hypothetical possibility of future enforcement, which was insufficient to establish standing.
