IP UPDATE
Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
IP UPDATE
Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
Sixth Circuit
Subscribe to Sixth Circuit's Posts

Stryking Noncompete Preliminary Injunction

By on Mar 9, 2023
Posted In

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction restricting a former employee from working for conflicting organizations or communicating with a competitor’s counsel. Stryker Emp. Co., LLC v. Abbas, Case No. 22-1563 (6th Cir. Feb. 16, 2023) (Clay, Bush, JJ.; Sutton, C.J.) The Court found that the preliminary injunction was an appropriate measure to protect the plaintiff’s confidential information that was consistent with the employee’s noncompete agreement.

Stryker develops and manufactures spinal implants and related medical products. From 2013 through mid-2022, Stryker employed Abbas in various roles relating to finance and sales. As part of his job duties, Abbas led sales and finance projects, assisted with Stryker’s litigation efforts, and cultivated relationships with customers, distributors and sales representatives. These responsibilities required Abbas to have access to Stryker’s confidential information and trade secrets.

In April 2022, Abbas entered into a confidentiality, noncompetition and nonsolicitation agreement with Stryker. This agreement prohibited Abbas from disclosing Stryker’s confidential information without its consent and barred Abbas from working for “any Conflicting Organization” in which Abbas could use Stryker’s confidential information to boost the marketability of a “Conflicting Product or Service.” The noncompete provision was time limited to one year following Abbas’s departure from Stryker.

In summer 2021, a competing spinal implant manufacturer, Alphatec, began recruiting Abbas for a finance position. After determining that the finance position was too similar to Abbas’s previous work at Stryker, Alphatec created a new “sales role” that was allegedly “crafted to protect Stryker’s confidential information.” Abbas resigned from Stryker in May 2022 to take the newly created role.

Shortly after Abbas resigned, Stryker sued for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets and violation of the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Stryker also requested a no-notice temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary and permanent injunctions. The district court granted Stryker’s motion for preliminary injunction prohibiting Abbas from the following:

  • Working in any capacity for Alphatec or any “Conflicting Organization”
  • Having any ex parte communications with Alphatec’s counsel or otherwise disclosing information concerning Stryker’s litigation strategies.

Abbas appealed, arguing that the noncompetition portion of the preliminary injunction amounted to an industry-wide ban and that the communication portion impermissibly disqualified counsel.

The Noncompetition Provision

The Sixth Circuit first noted that federal law, rather than state law, defines a court’s power to issue a noncompetition restriction in a preliminary injunction. Under federal law, courts have discretion to craft preliminary injunctions based on the equities of a case and can even “proscribe activities that, standing alone, would have been unassailable.” Applying this standard, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the preliminary injunction was not overly broad but instead preserved the status quo. First, the district court found that Abbas often worked beyond the scope of his position. Second, the district court agreed to entertain a motion to vacate the injunction if Alphatec created a new position for Abbas that Stryker found acceptable. Third, the injunction merely sought to enforce the noncompetition agreement, which [...]

Continue Reading



Nothing Lasts for Everly, Not Even Copyright Co-Authorship Rights

By on Feb 23, 2023
Posted In

Addressing a novel issue, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that a statute of limitations can time-bar a defense in narrow circumstances where a defendant uses it to seek affirmative relief. Garza v. Everly, Case No. 21-5530 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2023) (Bush, Guy, JJ.) (Murphy, J., concurring).

After successful careers writing and recording music as the Everly Brothers, Don and Phil Everly disputed copyright ownership of certain songs. Don sued Phil’s estate, seeking declaratory judgment that Don was the sole author of “Cathy’s Clown.” After a bench trial, the district court held that Don repudiated Phil’s co-authorship of “Cathy’s Clown” and Phil failed to reassert his co-authorship rights within the three-year timeframe provided by the Copyright Act. The trial court also ruled that Phil’s estate was “time-barred from asserting he was a co-author as a defense,” since the Copyright Act time-barred him from asserting the same as a claim. Don died in the interim, and Phil’s estate appealed.

There were three issues on appeal:

  • Whether the lower court improperly applied the Copyright Act’s scheme for authorship claims
  • Whether the finding of Don’s repudiation was erroneous
  • Whether the court erred in applying the statute of limitation to Phil’s defense.

Regarding the authorship issue, the Sixth Circuit explained that the Copyright Act allows authors to transfer ownership of works while retaining certain rights, including a termination right that lets authors later reclaim copyright ownership. Phil’s estate argued that because termination rights are inalienable, the trial court erred in finding that Phil was not a co-author since he should have had the opportunity to reclaim his rights. The estate also argued that any statute of limitations regarding Phil reclaiming co-authorship should not have started tolling until all of Phil’s descendants learned of these rights. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, explaining that the lower court properly applied the Copyright Act. Because Phil did not dispute repudiation within the statutory period, the trial court correctly denied his co-ownership. Furthermore, the statute of limitations does not “refresh itself” when an owner dies, because descendants cannot obtain rights a decedent had forfeit.

Addressing the repudiation issue, the Sixth Circuit found ample trial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion. The evidence included 1980s vintage letters, phone calls, and a “Release and Assignment” Phil signed containing language relinquishing his co-authorship rights in “Cathy’s Clown.” There was also credible testimony that Don “plainly and expressly repudiated Phil’s authorship” decades prior.

Finally, addressing the statute of limitations defense, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court. In doing so, it noted that Phil’s estate originally argued that Phil remained a co-author of “Cathy’s Clown” as a counterclaim to Don’s suit. It was only after Don successfully argued that the claim was time-barred that Phil’s estate “reframed the counterclaim into a defense.” The Court explained the general policies underpinning statutes of limitation and noted that they typically do not bear on defenses because plaintiffs could otherwise wait out the statutory periods for defenses before suing. However, this [...]

Continue Reading



A Healthy Dose of Seeds: Unique Combination Trade Secrets Entitled to Protection

By on Nov 29, 2022
Posted In

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a jury verdict finding a dietary supplement company liable for misappropriating another company’s research and development (R&D) related to broccoli-seed extract. Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co., Inc. v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc., Case No. 21-5354 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 2022) (per curiam) (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The decision addressed several issues relating to so-called “combination” trade secrets.

Caudill manufactures and sells various nutritional supplements, including a supplement made using broccoli-seed extract. Caudill sued Jarrow Formulas for trade secret misappropriation after its Director of Research Ken Ashurst left Caudill and joined Jarrow. Ashurst had led Caudill’s R&D efforts for nine years, including extensively researching the development of broccoli-seed derivatives and assembling a large body of research related to broccoli seeds. After he joined Jarrow, Ashurst delivered a curated collection of broccoli product research to Jarrow and helped it bring its own competing broccoli-seed extract supplement to the market in just four months.

The case proceeded to trial. The jury found that Caudill had a protectable trade secret; Jarrow misappropriated said trade secret; and Caudill was entitled to more than $2 million in actual losses, more than $400,000 in unjust enrichment damages, and exemplary damages. Jarrow moved for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. After the district court denied the motions, Jarrow appealed.

Jarrow argued that Caudill improperly asserted a “kitchen-sink theory” of trade secrets by broadly defining all its research activities as a single trade secret. Jarrow also argued that Caudill failed to show that it had acquired the alleged trade secret. Finally, Jarrow challenged the damages awards on legal grounds. The Sixth Circuit rejected each of Jarrow’s arguments on appeal.

The Sixth Circuit first found that Caudill properly defined its alleged trade secret as its “research and development on supplements, broccoli, and chemical compounds.” The Court treated Caudill’s alleged trade secret as a “combination” trade secret (i.e., a collection of elements that individually are generally known but are unique in combination.) The Court concluded that Caudill demonstrated it had assembled a unique collection of processes and information relating to its R&D process, and therefore, Caudill properly defined its entire R&D process as a trade secret. The Court rejected Jarrow’s argument that Caudill’s alleged trade secret mostly consisted of public domain materials on the basis that the materials were unique in combination.

The Sixth Circuit also rejected Jarrow’s argument that Caudill failed to show that Jarrow acquired and used the entire combination trade secret. The Court noted differing authority on whether a plaintiff alleging a combination trade secret must show acquisition and use of the entire combination but concluded that trade secret law does not require proving acquisition of “each atom” of the combination trade secret. The Court reasoned that when a trade secret consists of a “mass of public information” that has been collected, the defendant will always be able to identify some minute detail of the combination that it did [...]

Continue Reading



Don’t Throw in the Towel: Retroactive Copyright Protects Fight Live Stream

By on Oct 6, 2022
Posted In

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed a district court’s summary judgment of noninfringement in a copyright dispute, finding that the transfer of ownership prior to the display of the copyrighted work conferred standing to sue for any alleged infringement. Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Griffith, Case No. 21-6088 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2022) (Clay, Rogers, Stranch, JJ.)

On August 26, 2017, world-famous boxer Floyd Mayweather Jr. and famous mixed martial arts fighter Conor McGregor engaged in what became one of the most legendary fights of all time (Fight). Showtime produced the Fight, charging a $99.99 personal use license and more expensive commercial streaming licenses for public viewing in a commercial setting. Two months prior to the event, on June 20, 2017, Showtime entered into a distribution agreement with Mayweather Promotions granting an exclusive license “to exhibit and distribute, and authorize the exhibition and distribution” of the Fight in a defined territory via the internet. On August 1, 2017, Mayweather in turn entered into a Commercial Licensing Agreement with Joe Hand Promotions (JHP), a smaller distributor. The agreement granted “the sole and exclusive third party license … to distribute … and authorize the public exhibition of the [Fight]” in a designated area. JHP then promoted the event and sold commercial licenses authorizing live broadcast at bars and restaurants.

There was no copyright registration at the time the Fight aired. However, the Copyright Act allows registration of live events within three months, and Showtime applied for a copyright within two months. On November 21, 2017, Showtime signed a Copyright Agreement with JHP, granting JHP “the exclusive right to distribute and publicly perform the [Fight] live on August 26, 2017,” “the exclusive right … to take enforcement actions,” and “the right and standing, as exclusive assignee, to assert independent claims, solely in the name of [JHP], for copyright infringement.” Mayweather Promotions, although a nonparty, also signed.

JHP then sued several restaurants, including Griffith, which livestreamed the Fight in a public setting without paying the commercial license fee. Griffith had paid for a personal use license, but then used an HDMI cable to connect a personal device to a TV and broadcast the live show in the restaurant. Griffith also promoted the Fight on the restaurant’s Facebook page and charged a $6 entry fee for patrons to watch the Fight. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted Griffith’s motion, finding no evidence of copyright ownership on the day of the Fight. The court found that because the Copyright Agreement granted rights retroactively, JHP was granted a mere right to sue, which was insufficient for ownership. JHP appealed.

Griffith argued on appeal that because there was no copyright registration at the time of the event, any exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Agreement were illusory and insufficient to establish ownership. In response, JHP argued that Showtime intended such retroactive grant of rights, as evidenced by the Commercial Licensing Agreement with Mayweather Promotions. The Sixth Circuit agreed with [...]

Continue Reading



Novel Derivative Sovereign Immunity Defense Struck as Forfeited

By on Sep 8, 2022
Posted In

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court decision implementing a preliminary injunction and striking a new defense first asserted in an amended complaint as untimely and frivolous. ACT, Inc. v. Worldwide Interactive Network, Inc., Case Nos. 21-5889; -5907; -6155 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2022) (White, Bush, Reader, JJ.)

ACT publishes WorkKeys, a product designed to assess job performance skills. Three of the product’s assessments (Applied Mathematics, Locating Information and Reading for Information) were at issue in this case, and all included various “Skill Definitions” that describe the skills tested by the assessments. ACT and Worldwide Interactive Network (WIN) worked together from 1997 to 2011. During that time, WIN had the authority to develop and sell WorkKeys. After the business relationship ended, WIN began developing and promoting its own assessment tests.

In 2018, competing bids between ACT and WIN to provide educational material to the state of South Carolina showed that WIN’s “Learning Objectives” that were virtually indistinguishable from ACT’s Skill Definitions. ACT brought suit against WIN asserting claims, including copyright infringement, based on WIN’s alleged copying of ACT’s Learning Objectives. The district court granted partial summary judgment to ACT in March 2020 with the additional claims to go to trial, but trial was seriously delayed by COVID-19. During this time, WIN revised its Learning Objectives and claimed they no longer infringed. The district court ordered ACT to amend its complaint to include new allegations regarding the revisions. ACT complied. WIN then asserted a new derivative sovereign immunity defense in its amended answer, to which ACT objected. The district court agreed and struck the defense as untimely and frivolous. The district court entered a preliminary injunction in August 2021 barring WIN from distributing the original and revised Learning Objectives and assessments. WIN appealed, contesting the preliminary injunction and the striking of the defense.

After explaining its jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit examined whether the district court had abused its discretion in imposing an overly broad preliminary injunction. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit agreed that ACT was likely to succeed on its copyright claim. WIN’s argument on this issue was primarily based on its belief that the Skill Definitions were not creative or original to ACT and therefore were not copyrightable. The Court stated that while ACT’s selection of the skills was likely not copyrightable, the descriptions and arrangement of the skills were likely protectable. The Sixth Circuit also determined that the district court did not erroneously presume irreparable harm because it did not rely on a presumption but independently found irreparable harm. The Sixth Circuit also stated that the district court properly weighed the parties’ competing interests in the preliminary injunction and found minimal legitimate interest for WIN based on WIN’s business model essentially being infringement of ACT’s intellectual property.

The Sixth Circuit then explained why the district court properly struck the derivative sovereign immunity defense. While states generally enjoy sovereign immunity from suit, private contractors can sometimes obtain certain immunity in connection [...]

Continue Reading



Holdover Trademark Licensee Status Can’t Do Heavy Lifting on “Exceptionality”

By on Aug 4, 2022
Posted In

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed issues of enhanced remedies in a dispute regarding the sale of weightlifting equipment beyond the expiration of a licensing agreement between the involved parties. Pointing to the different standard required to prove a violation and damages, the Court ultimately reduced a trademark infringement award to about a quarter of the amount initially awarded. Max Rack, Inc. v. Core Health & Fitness, LLC, et al., Case No. 20-3598 (6th Cir. July 14, 2022) (Cole, Rogers, Murphy, JJ.)

In 2006, Max Rack exclusively licensed its patents and trademarks relating to weightlifting racks to Star Trac Strength. Core Health subsequently acquired Star Trac and its licensing agreements. The final patent covering the Max Rack equipment expired on November 21, 2015, thereby terminating the licensing agreements between Max Rack and Core Health. The agreements permitted Core Health to sell any remaining Max Rack units for six months following expiration of the license.

Following expiration of the licensing agreements, Max Rack learned that Core Health failed to update web pages, marketing materials and owner’s manuals to reflect the termination of Core Health’s affiliation with Max Rack. Core Health’s failure to scrub references to “Max Rack” extended to third-party sellers’ websites advertising Core Health’s competing “Freedom Rack” product using the Max Rack name. Core Health also sold 271 more units manufactured as Max Racks after the license expired, 238 of which were sold during the six-month grace period. Of the remaining 33 units, 24 were sold after the six-month window had closed, and nine were alleged to have had their labels changed from Max Rack to Core Health’s Freedom Rack. Core Health further failed to pay Max Rack royalties for any of the 271 sales made after the license expired.

Max Rack brought two federal claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a) and 1125(a)(1)(A), alleging trademark infringement and unfair competition. Max Rack also brought three claims under Ohio’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, alleging that Core Health passed off the Max Rack as its own machine and caused a likelihood of confusion regarding the source of the machine and regarding Core Health’s affiliation with the Max Rack trademark. The jury awarded Max Rack $1 million in damages and $250,000 in Core Health’s profits. Ruling on post-trial motions, the district court overturned the $1 million damages award for lack of evidence of any consumer confusion but enhanced the $250,000 award to $500,000 and further awarded Max Rack attorneys’ fees. Both parties appealed.

The Sixth Circuit sidestepped the fact-laden analysis to determine whether Core Health’s actions created a likelihood of consumer confusion, reasoning that the dispute related to the “holdover licensee.” Citing its own precedent and precedent from the Third, Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, the Court applied a much more objective standard, finding that unauthorized use of a licensed trademark by a licensee after the license has expired is by itself sufficient to establish a likelihood of confusion in the mind of the consumer.

Although the Sixth Circuit used [...]

Continue Reading



Sixth Circuit Endorses Sealing of Filings to Protect Confidentiality of Alleged Trade Secrets

By on Jan 27, 2022
Posted In

On appeal from a dismissal based on a failure to state a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted the litigants’ motion to seal their briefs and file publicly available redacted versions in order to protect the confidentiality of the appellant’s alleged trade secrets. Magnesium Machine, LLC v. Terves, LLC, Case No. 20-3998 (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 2022) (Donald, J.)

The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the case had been brought under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, which requires courts to take “action as may be necessary and appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets.” The Court also relied on precedent to the effect that trade secrets generally provide a justification (i.e., a “compelling reason”) for sealing. The Court left open the possibility of reconsidering its ruling if it later determines that any of the redacted information should be made available to the public.

Practice Note: Public disclosure—even in a court document—can destroy a trade secret. Litigants should be careful when disclosing information that is even alleged to be a trade secret, even if they are not certain whether the information qualifies as a trade secret since, if and when litigated, the information may later be held to qualify.



Sixth Circuit: It’s a Go on Plaintiff’s Claims Despite Arbitration Clause

By on Sep 16, 2021
Posted In

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part a district court’s grant of a stay pending arbitration, finding that as non-parties to the underlying arbitration agreement, defendants could not stay the plaintiff’s action against them by arguing that they were beneficiaries of the arbitration agreement. AtriCure, Inc. v. Meng, Case No. 19-4067 (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 2021) (Murphy, J.) (Guy, J., dissenting).

AtriCure invested millions into developing medical devices that treat a serious degenerative heart condition known as atrial fibrillation. The company sells these products to hospitals throughout the world. In the mid-2000s, AtriCure sought to enter the Chinese market. In order to do so, it needed a Chinese agent. Dr. Jian Meng approached AtriCure about partnering with one of his companies to serve as AtriCure’s Chinese distributor. AtriCure eventually entered into a relationship with Meng’s company, ZenoMed.

In 2015, AtriCure discovered that another of Meng’s companies, Med-Zenith, was attempting to market a knockoff version of one of AtriCure’s medical devices. AtriCure opted to continue the relationship with ZenoMed, and in 2016, AtriCure and ZenoMed entered into a distribution agreement. However, in 2017, AtriCure learned that Med-Zenith was attempting to develop more counterfeit versions of AtriCure’s devices. As a result, AtriCure allowed the distribution agreement to expire and demanded that ZenoMed return its inventory.

AtriCure then sued Meng and Med-Zenith in the Southern District of Ohio, alleging improper manufacturing and selling of dangerous counterfeit productions, as well as various state law claims. AtriCure also brought an arbitration demand under the distribution agreement against ZenoMed. Meng and Med-Zenith sought to stay the federal lawsuit, arguing that they were beneficiaries of the arbitration clause in the distribution agreement under equitable estoppel and agency theories. After the district court denied the motion, Meng appealed.

The Sixth Circuit explained that after the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2009 ruling in Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, circuit courts are obligated to look to relevant state common law to decide when nonparties may enforce or be bound by an arbitration agreement. As a result, the blanket federal presumption favoring arbitration even against nonparties was no longer applicable. Now, courts must examine state law to determine whether nonparties may enforce or be bound by an arbitration agreement. The Court examined Ohio contract law to determine that a nonparty cannot enforce an arbitration clause unless it is an intended third-party beneficiary. The Court rejected Meng and Med-Zenith’s equitable estoppel arguments, finding that under Ohio law, AtriCure’s state law claims did not seek to enforce the distribution agreement against Meng and Med-Zenith, or rely on any theory that they owed contractual duties to AtriCure notwithstanding their nonparty status. Finally, the Court remanded the question of whether Meng’s agency argument could prevail by determining if he was acting as an agent of ZenoMed when he engaged in the conduct AtriCure complained about in the separate arbitration.

In dissent, Judge Ralph B. Guy Jr. argued that Meng “unambiguously sought a ‘stay under Section 3 of the [...]

Continue Reading



Confused? How Do You Factor That?

By on May 27, 2021
Posted In

Considering the eight-factor likelihood of confusion test, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding on all factors, concluding that two competing marks in the transportation logistics industry are overlapping to the extent that consumers would likely be confused. AWGI, LLC v. Atlas Trucking Co., LLC, Case No. 20-1726 (6th Cir. May 18, 2021) (Cook, J.)

Atlas Movers owns the “Atlas” mark and a federal registration for the mark for “freight forwarding services and transportation of household goods of others.” It first used the mark “Atlas Van Lines” in 1948 for transportation and logistics services. In 2007, it revised its name to Atlas Relocation Services and marketed its services under “Atlas Logistics.”

Atlas Trucking, a part of Eaton Steel, manufactured and distributed steel under its Atlas Trucking mark starting in 1999. Later, in 2003, Eaton expanded its services to ship other goods under the mark Atlas Logistics. Eaton admitted it knew of Atlas Van Lines for logistics before it began using the mark.

Atlas Movers sued Eaton for infringement of its “Atlas” mark and Eaton counterclaimed that it owned the Atlas Logistics mark.

The district court found that Eaton’s use of “Atlas” creates a likelihood of confusion with Atlas Movers. The court went through the eight-factor likelihood of confusion test, considering: (1) strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) relatedness of the goods or services; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines or services “Atlas” marks. The court ultimately found for Atlas Movers on its trademark infringement claim. Eaton appealed.

The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court’s analysis. First, on commercial strength, the district court found Atlas Movers’ mark to be commercially strong because of its significant advertising expenditures, exposing consumers to its trademark with public recognition. Eaton tried to demonstrate weakness of the mark by presenting evidence of third parties’ use of similar marks, but the lower court rejected the argument, noting the other marks did not use “Atlas” for transportation and logistics. The court found this factor favored Atlas Movers.

The Sixth Circuit also agreed with the district court on the second factor, relatedness of goods and services, concluding buyers would be likely to believe the parties’ respective goods and services, which relate to the same industry and are directed to common consumers, come from the same source or are connected with a common company. The court found this factor also favored Atlas Movers.

Third, as to similarity of the marks, the lower court gave weight to pronunciation, appearance and verbal translation of the marks in their entirety, finding the dominant potion of the mark (“Atlas”) was identical. Again, this factor favored Atlas Movers.

Fourth, on the issue of actual confusion, the lower court considered evidence of five people experiencing actual confusion from Eaton’s use of its “Atlas” mark. There were also consumer [...]

Continue Reading



Mandamus Denied: Need to Show Abuse of Discretion in Addition to Prejudice from Delay

By on Jan 15, 2020
Posted In

Addressing an emergency request for a writ of mandamus to compel discovery of electronically stored information, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declined to set aside a district court’s denial of a request to create forensic images of all the defendant’s business and personal computers and cell phones. In re FCA US LLC, Case No. 19-1923 (6th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

FCA filed trade-secret misappropriation and other claims against Patrea Bullock, a lawyer who formerly served as outside counsel to FCA. According to FCA, while serving as defense counsel, Bullock had access to extensive confidential and proprietary information belonging to FCA, including its “defense playbook.” After she resigned from her law firm, but before returning her computer, Bullock downloaded her files from the laptop onto several USB drives. Thereafter, she opened her own law firm representing plaintiffs against automobile manufacturers, including FCA. During discovery, Bullock produced 1,345 documents in response to FCA’s requests for the documents she had taken FCA, however, moved to compel a forensic image of all of Bullock’s business and personal laptops and cell phones so an expert could investigate what documents Bullock took.

(more…)



BLOG EDITORS

Paul Devinsky

Amol Parikh

STAY CONNECTED

Subscribe

TOPICS

ARCHIVES