The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed dismissal of a patent and copyright infringement action, finding that an exclusive license remained in force, transferred all substantial rights in the asserted patents, and permitted the licensee to sue without joining the patent owner. TexasLDPC Inc. v. Broadcom Inc., Case No. 25-1074 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2026) (Moore, Chen, Bissoon).
TexasLDPC exclusively licensed a portfolio of low-density parity check (LDPC) technology patents and related copyrights from Texas A&M University. The agreement granted TexasLDPC broad rights to make, use, sell, sublicense, and enforce the licensed technology, as well as to recover damages for infringement. Texas A&M retained limited rights, including rights for research and educational purposes, certain rights associated with a preexisting Marvell license, and approval rights over assignment.
After TexasLDPC was unable to secure customers or sublicensees, it shifted its business toward patent and copyright enforcement and sued Broadcom, Avago, and LSI for infringement.
The district court dismissed the action on two grounds. First, it concluded that the exclusive license automatically terminated when TexasLDPC abandoned commercial development and became an enforcement-focused entity, reasoning that TexasLDPC had “cease[d] its business operations.” Second, the district court held that, even if the exclusive license remained in effect, TexasLDPC had not received all substantial rights in the asserted patents and therefore could not sue without joining Texas A&M, which had asserted sovereign immunity and refused to join the lawsuit. TexasLDPC appealed.
The Federal Circuit rejected both of the district court’s conclusions and reversed.
As to termination, the Federal Circuit found that patent enforcement qualified as a contemplated “business operation” under the agreement. Several provisions expressly treated enforcement as part of TexasLDPC’s “commercially reasonable efforts,” and the agreement separately granted TexasLDPC the right to bring infringement actions and retain infringement recoveries. The Court therefore concluded that TexasLDPC did not cease its business operations merely because it stopped pursuing commercialization and focused instead on enforcement.
The Federal Circuit next found that the agreement transferred all substantial rights in the asserted patents. Considering the agreement as a whole, the Court emphasized TexasLDPC’s exclusive rights to make, use, and sell licensed products; sublicense the technology; bring infringement actions; and collect damages without Texas A&M’s approval. Although Texas A&M retained certain rights, including limited practice rights and the ability to enforce against Marvell, the Court found those reservations insufficient to defeat TexasLDPC’s status as the holder of all substantial rights. TexasLDPC therefore had standing to sue in its own name without joining Texas A&M.
Finally, the Federal Circuit found that Texas A&M was not otherwise a required party under Rule 19. The district court had reasoned that Texas A&M’s absence could impair access to potentially relevant discovery. The Federal Circuit rejected that rationale, explaining that “Rule 19 is not a discovery tool.” The fact that an absent party may possess relevant evidence does not, standing alone, make that party necessary where the court can otherwise accord meaningful relief.
