Copyrights Archives

Copyrights

On repeat: Separate accrual rule doesn’t apply to continuing harm from infringing act

by Amol Parikh | Aug 28, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a copyright lawsuit as time barred, finding that the separate accrual rule does not apply to continuing harm from a single infringing act. Foss v. Eastern States Exposition, Case No. 24-1360 (1st Cir. Aug. 21, 2025) (Montecalvo, Kayatta, Aframe, JJ.)

In 2016, Spencer Brewery commissioned graphic designer Cynthia Foss to create a room-sized artwork for its exhibition space at an annual fair hosted by Eastern States Exposition. Foss retained copyright ownership and specified that the installation be displayed exclusively in person to paying patrons of the fair. During the fair, Eastern produced a marketing video featuring Foss’s work without attribution. Foss applied for copyright registration on April 19, 2017, and it was subsequently granted.

In early 2018, Foss filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against Eastern, which the district court dismissed without prejudice. Rather than amending her initial complaint, Foss filed a second suit in July 2018, which was also dismissed without prejudice. In December 2020, she submitted an amended complaint, which was again dismissed. Foss appealed, and the First Circuit reversed and remanded the case, instructing the district court to determine whether the dismissal should have claim preclusive effect because of the prejudice caused to Eastern by Foss’s failure to meet the precondition to sue.

On remand, Eastern moved to dismiss, arguing that permitting Foss to proceed would be prejudicial and that the statute of limitations barred the suit. The district court agreed on both grounds. Foss appealed.

Foss contended that the district court misinterpreted when Eastern’s alleged violations ceased for purposes of the statute of limitations and misunderstood when she was legally permitted to seek relief.

The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the statute of limitations barred the claim.

Foss argued that the district court failed to apply the separate accrual rule, asserting that the infringing video constituted a continuing display until it was removed. Because Eastern had not established when the video was taken down, Foss claimed that the limitations period had not begun. The First Circuit rejected this argument and clarified that continuing harm from a single infringement does not equate to separately accruing acts. The Court explained that Foss’ contention (that Eastern’s posts remained infringing displays until they were removed) reflected a theory of continuing harm stemming from a single act of infringement, rather than a series of discrete violations that would trigger the separate accrual rule.

Foss further argued that her claims accrued only after she obtained copyright registration and could legally file suit. The First Circuit dismissed this argument, citing Supreme Court precedent that infringement claims accrue when the infringing act occurs, not upon registration or the ability to sue.

Accordingly, the First Circuit concluded that Foss’s December 2020 complaint was untimely and affirmed the district court’s dismissal.

Wrestling with prevailing defendant’s post-trial fee request in copyright dispute

by Christian Tatum | Aug 21, 2025 | Copyrights, Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees to the defendant after it prevailed at trial in a copyright infringement suit, concluding that the district court adequately addressed the Supreme Court’s Fogarty factors and did not abuse its discretion. Booker T. Huffman v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., et al., Case No. 22-40072 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025) (Richman, Elrod, Oldham, JJ.) (Oldham, J., dissenting) (nonprecedential).

Booker Huffman, a retired professional wrestler, alleged that Activision’s “Prophet” character in Call of Duty: Black Ops IV infringed his G.I. Bro comic book poster. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Activision. Activision then sought attorneys’ fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505, arguing that Huffman’s claims were frivolous, objectively unreasonable, and brought in bad faith, citing a lack of supporting evidence and substantial proof of independent creation. The district court found that the claims involved unsettled areas of law and were neither frivolous nor objectively unreasonable. Applying the factors the Supreme Court outlined in Fogarty v. Fantasy (1994), the district court concluded that an award of attorneys’ fees was not warranted. Activision appealed.

Activision argued that the district court failed to follow Fifth Circuit precedent, which holds that fee awards are “the rule rather than the exception” for prevailing parties in copyright actions. Activision contended that Huffman’s claims were meritless due to a lack of evidence establishing access, striking similarity, or causation. The Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments, emphasizing that there is no automatic entitlement to fees and that the district court’s six-page Fogerty analysis was more thorough than in other cases in which the Fifth Circuit has sustained lower court fee decisions. The Fifth Circuit highlighted that the district court carefully analyzed whether Huffman’s claims were objectively unreasonable, noting that the case implicated areas of unsettled law. The panel emphasized the district court’s denial of Activision’s pretrial motions, the evidence supporting Huffman’s access and similarity, and the district court’s evaluation of the evidentiary record.

The Fifth Circuit also rejected Activision’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by failing to analyze each of the Fogerty factors separately, finding that the judge recited the parties’ arguments for the relevant factors and that it could be inferred that the district court did not find Activision’s arguments persuasive. Throughout its analysis, the Court emphasized that a district court’s attorneys’ fees decision is reviewed only for abuse of discretion and not to relitigate the merits.

Judge Oldham dissented, concluding that Huffman’s claims were “speculation piled on fantasy piled on a pipe dream” and that overwhelming evidence of independent creation made the suit clearly unreasonable. Judge Oldman would have awarded fees to compensate Activision for defending against what he characterized as a baseless $32 million claim and to deter similarly unmeritorious lawsuits in the future.

To kill a derivative: Licensee has no post-termination copyright control

by Rick Evans | Aug 7, 2025 | Copyrights

Addressing a dispute concerning two derivative stage adaptations of Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of declaratory relief, finding that the plaintiff did not infringe any copyright interest in derivative works following the termination of the defendant’s exclusive licensing grant. Atticus Limited Liability Company v. The Dramatic Publishing Company, Case No. 23-1226 (2d Cir. July 29, 2025) (Wesley, Chin, Perez, JJ.)

In 1969, Harper Lee granted Dramatic an exclusive license to create and license a derivative work stage adaptation of To Kill a Mockingbird for non-first-class productions (e.g., amateur and community theater). Lee terminated that grant in 2011 under the Copyright Act’s termination provisions, effective in 2016. In 2015, Lee granted exclusive rights to develop and perform a second derivative stage adaptation to Atticus.

In 2019, Dramatic initiated arbitration against Lee’s estate asserting continued exclusive rights to non-first-class productions despite the termination. The arbitrator ruled in favor of Dramatic. Subsequently, Atticus, which was not a party to the arbitration, sought declaratory judgment that performances of its play did not infringe any rights held by Dramatic. The district court ruled in favor of Atticus and awarded Atticus more than $200,000 in attorneys’ fees. Dramatic appealed the judgment and the parties cross-appealed the award of fees.

Dramatic argued that its exclusive right to stage non-first-class productions of To Kill a Mockingbird survived Lee’s termination of the 1969 grant under the Copyright Act’s derivative works exception. The Second Circuit rejected this argument, finding that Dramatic improperly equated its rights in the derivative work with ownership rights in the original copyrighted work. While Dramatic could continue using its play under the original grant, it could not prevent the creation or authorization of new adaptations. Those exclusive rights belonged to Lee and reverted to her upon termination of the grant.

Dramatic also argued that:

Lee’s grant to Atticus was invalid because it preceded the effective termination date of Dramatic’s grant.
Atticus’ claim was untimely.
Atticus’ claims were barred by res judicata based on the earlier arbitration.

The Second Circuit disposed of each of these arguments, explaining that:

The grant date was irrelevant because Dramatic no longer held exclusive rights.
The statute of limitations did not toll because Atticus’ claim was for noninfringement, not ownership.
The claims were not barred by res judicata because Atticus was not a party to the arbitration.

Regarding the award of attorneys’ fees, the Second Circuit agreed that Dramatic’s statute of limitations and res judicata defenses were objectively unreasonable, justifying a fee award, but found no basis for fees based on an alleged forfeiture of Dramatic’s statute of limitations defense since it was properly raised in the answer, even if not included in its opposition to Atticus’ pre-answer motion for summary judgment. The Court further found that Atticus was not entitled to attorneys’ fees for Dramatic’s limited discovery efforts to determine Atticus’ involvement in the arbitration or for the current appeal. Accordingly, the [...]

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Que sera, sera: No declaratory relief after songwriter’s heir terminated copyright assignments

by Taylor MacDonald | Jul 17, 2025 | Copyrights

Addressing the intersection of a trust beneficiary’s rights to royalties and an heir’s copyright termination rights under 17 U.S.C. § 203, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the beneficiary’s request for declaratory relief for failure to state a claim. Tammy Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc. and Travilyn Livingston, Case No. 24-5263 (6th Cir. Jul. 7, 2025) (Readler, Siler, Clay, JJ.)

Jay Livingston was a prominent 20th century songwriter. In 1985, he established a family trust that granted the beneficiaries royalties from nearly 250 songs and transferred his reversionary copyright interests in the songs to the trust. The copyright interest was reversionary because in 1984, Livingston executed a contract that began assigning copyright interests in the songs to a company whose legal successor would become Jay Livingston Music. That contract laid the groundwork for successive agreements that would each transfer a specific song to the company. By 2000, Livingston had assigned his interests in each song to Jay Livingston Music.

In 2000, Livingston signed a second overarching contract, extending the company’s rights to the full duration of each song’s copyright protection. The songs’ copyrights expire around 2050. In 2003, after Livingston passed away, a California probate court ordered that the trust no longer held any rights in his copyright interests beyond the royalties.

In 2015, Travilyn Livingston (Livingston’s only child) terminated the assignment to Jay Livingston Music of 32 songs under § 203(a)(2)(B) of the Copyright Law, reverting all rights to Travilyn. Tammy Livingston, Travilyn’s daughter, sued Travilyn in 2022, requesting declaratory relief stating either that the termination notices Travilyn used were invalid or that Tammy remained entitled to royalties from the 32 songs under state law. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. Tammy appealed.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court. The Sixth Circuit considered whether Livingston executed the 2000 contract as an individual or a trustee and to what extent that affected the validity of the assignment extensions. The Court determined that the probate court’s 2003 order had preclusive effect and that Livingston had signed the 2000 contract in his individual capacity. Therefore, the company – not the trust – held the valid assignments in 2015 when Tammy terminated them.

Tammy argued that Travilyn could only terminate the assignments if they had been transferred to a third party in 1984. Tammy claimed that Travilyn did not own the company when the 1984 contract was executed and that Livingston thus granted the rights to himself as the owner of the company. The Sixth Circuit was unpersuaded by this argument because the 1984 agreement stated that Travilyn owned the company on the date of execution. Tammy next argued that the district court committed reversable error when it stated that Travilyn owned the company “sometime before” the 1984 contract’s execution rather than on the day, as the contract itself stated. The Court found that this misstatement did not rise to reversible error.

Finally, to support her [...]

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Fair use or foul play? The AI fair use copyright line

by Jodi Benassi | Jul 2, 2025 | Copyrights

The US District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of an artificial intelligence (AI) company, finding that its use of lawfully acquired copyrighted materials for training and its digitization of acquired print works fell within the bounds of fair use. However, the district court explicitly rejected the AI company’s attempt to invoke fair use as a defense to rely on pirated copies of copyrighted works as lawful training data. Andrea Bartz, et al. v. Anthropic PBC, Case No. 24-CV-05417-WHA (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2025) (Alsup, J.)

Anthropic, an AI company, acquired more than seven million copyrighted books without authorization by downloading them from pirate websites. It also lawfully purchased print books, removed their bindings, scanned each page, and stored them in digitized, searchable files. The goal was twofold:

To create a central digital library intended, in Anthropic’s words, to contain “all the books in the world” and to be preserved indefinitely.
To use this library to train the large language models (LLMs) that power Anthropic’s AI assistant, Claude.

Each work selected for training the LLM was copied through four main stages:

Each selected book was copied from the library to create a working copy for training.
Each book was “cleaned” by removing low-value or repetitive content (e.g., footers).
Cleaned books were converted into “tokenized” versions by being simplified and split into short character sequences, then translated into numerical tokens using Anthropic’s custom dictionary. These tokens were repeatedly used in training, allowing the model to discover statistical relationships across massive text data.
Each fully trained LLM itself retained “compressed” copies of the books.

Once the LLM was trained, it did not output any of the books through Claude to the public. The company placed particular value on books with well-curated facts, structured analyses, and compelling narratives (i.e., works that reflected well-written creative expressions) because Claude’s users expected clear, accurate, and well-written responses to their questions.

Andrea Bartz, along with two other authors whose books were copied from pirated and purchased sources and used to train Claude, sued Anthropic for copyright infringement. In response, Anthropic filed an early motion for summary judgment on fair use only under Section 107 of the Copyright Act.

To assess the applicability of the fair use defense, the court separated and analyzed Anthropic’s actions across three distinct categories of use.

Transformative training (fair use)

The authors challenged only the inputs used to train the LLMs, not their outputs. The district court found that Anthropic’s use of copyrighted books to train its LLMs was a transformative use, comparable to how humans read and learn from texts and produce new, original writing. While the authors claimed that the LLMs memorized their creative expression, there was no evidence that Claude released infringing material to the public. The court concluded that using the works as training inputs – not for direct replication, but to enable the generation of new content – favored a finding of fair use.

Format-shifting copies (fair use)

[...]

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Running on Empty: ‘Stang’ With No Anthropomorphic Characteristics Isn’t Copyrightable Character

by Taylor MacDonald | Jun 5, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of copyright protection for a car that had a name but no anthropomorphic or protectable characteristics. Carroll Shelby Licensing, Inc. v. Denice Shakarian Halicki et al., Case No. 23-3731 (9th Cir. May 27, 2025) (Nguyen, Mendoza, JJ.; Kernodle Dist. J., sitting by designation).

In 2009, Denice Shakarian Halicki and Carroll Shelby Licensing entered into a settlement agreement resolving a lawsuit concerning Shelby’s alleged infringement of Halicki’s asserted copyright interest in a Ford Mustang known as “Eleanor,” which appeared in a series of films dating back to the 1970s. Under the agreement, Shelby, a custom car shop, was prohibited from producing GT-500E Ford Mustangs incorporating Eleanor’s distinctive hood or headlight design. Shortly thereafter, Shelby licensed Classic Recreations to manufacture “GT-500CR” Mustangs, a move Halicki viewed as a breach of the settlement agreement. Halicki contacted Classic Recreations and demanded it cease and desist in the production of the GT-500CRs.

Shelby filed a lawsuit alleging breach of the settlement agreement and seeking declaratory relief. Halicki counterclaimed for copyright infringement and breach of the agreement. Following a bench trial, the district court ruled in Shelby’s favor on both the breach and infringement claims but declined to grant declaratory relief. Shelby appealed.

The Ninth Circuit began by addressing whether “Eleanor” qualified for copyright protection as a character under the Copyright Act. Although the act does not explicitly list characters among the types of works it protects, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that certain characters may be entitled to such protection. The applicable standard, articulated in 2015 by the Ninth Circuit in DC Comics v. Towle, sets forth a three-pronged test, under which the character must:

Have “physical as well as conceptual qualities”
Be “sufficiently delineated to be recognizable as the same character whenever it appears” with “consistent, identifiable character traits and attributes”
Be “especially distinctive” and have “some unique elements of expression.”

The Ninth Circuit concluded that Eleanor failed to satisfy any of the three prongs of the Towle test. As to the first prong, the Court found that Eleanor functioned merely as a prop and lacked the anthropomorphized qualities or independent agency associated with protectable characters. Regarding the second prong, the Court noted that Eleanor’s appearance varied significantly across the films in terms of model, colors, and condition. Under the third prong, the Court found that Eleanor lacked the distinctiveness necessary to elevate it beyond the level of a generic sports car commonly featured in similar films. Thus, the Court concluded that Eleanor did not qualify as a character, let alone a copyrightable one.

The Ninth Circuit next turned to the parties’ settlement agreement. While California law permits the use of extrinsic evidence to aid in contract interpretation, the Court found the language sufficiently unambiguous to render such evidence unnecessary. Notably, the parties did not include “Eleanor” as a defined term in the agreement, and the term was used in varying contexts throughout the document, conveying different meanings [...]

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No Fair Use Defense Results in Default Judgment

by Hannah Hurley | Jun 5, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of a copyright infringement claim alleging copying of a photograph, finding that the defendant’s use of the photograph did not constitute fair use and that the district court erred in its substantive fair use analysis. Jana Romanova v. Amilus Inc., Case No. 23-828 (2d Cir. May 23, 2025) (Jacobs, Leval, Sullivan, JJ.) (Sullivan, J., concurring).

Jana Romanova, a professional photographer, sued Amilus for willful copyright infringement, alleging that the company unlawfully published her photograph, originally licensed to National Geographic, without authorization on its subscription-based website. Amilus failed to appear or respond in the district court proceedings, and Romanova sought entry of default judgment.

Instead of granting the motion, the district court sua sponte raised the affirmative defense of fair use. After considering Romanova’s show cause order response, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the fair use defense was “clearly established on the face of the complaint.” Romanova appealed on substantive and procedural grounds.

Romanova argued that the district court erred in finding a basis for the fair use defense within the four corners of the complaint and erred by sua sponte raising a substantive, non-jurisdictional affirmative defense on behalf of a defendant that failed to appear or respond.

Citing the Supreme Court decisions in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music (1994) and Warhol v. Goldsmith (2023), the Second Circuit reversed. The Court explained that “the district court’s analysis depended on a misunderstanding of the fair use doctrine and of how the facts of the case relate to the doctrine. We see no basis in the facts alleged in the complaint for a finding of fair use.”

The Second Circuit explained that the district court misapplied the first fair use factor (“the purpose and character of the use”). The Court noted that a transformative use must do more than merely assert a different message; it must communicate a new meaning or purpose through the act of copying itself. Here, Amilus’ use of Romanova’s photograph did not alter or comment on the original work but merely republished it in a commercial context.

The Second Circuit also found no basis for the district court’s finding of justification for the copying, a factor that typically depends on the nature of the message communicated through the copying, such as parody or satire, and was mandated by the Supreme Court in Warhol. The Court rejected the notion that Amilus’ editorial framing – claiming to highlight a trend in pet photography – could justify the unauthorized use.

On the procedural issue, the majority noted that an “overly rigid refusal to consider an affirmative defense sua sponte can make a lawsuit an instrument of abuse. A defendant’s default does not necessarily mean that the defendant has insouciantly snubbed the legal process.” In this case, the Second Circuit explained that it “cannot fault the district court for considering a defense which it believed (albeit mistakenly) was valid and important. While district courts should [...]

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Plausibly Alleging Access Requires More Than Social Media Visibility

by Amit Kumar Saha, PhD | May 29, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a copyright action, finding that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege either that the defendant had “access” to the work in question merely because it was posted on social media, or that the accused photos were substantially similar to any protectable elements of plaintiff’s photographs. Rodney Woodland v. Montero Lamar Hill, aka Lil Nas X, et al., Case No. 23-55418 (9th Cir. May 16, 2025) (Lee, Gould, Bennett, JJ.)

The dispute arose between Rodney Woodland, a freelance model and artist, and Montero Lamar Hill, also known as Lil Nas X, a well-known musical artist. Woodland alleged that Hill infringed on his copyright by posting photographs to his Instagram account that bore a striking resemblance to images Woodland had previously posted. Woodland claimed that the arrangement, styling, and overall visual composition of Hill’s photos closely mirrored his own, asserting that these similarities constituted unlawful copying of his original work.

Woodland’s original images had been publicly shared on his Instagram account, where he maintained a modest following. He did not allege any direct contact or interaction with Hill or his representatives, nor did he claim that Hill had acknowledged or referenced his work. Instead, Woodland’s claim rested on the contention that the similarities between the two sets of photographs were so substantial that copying could be inferred. In his complaint, Woodland asserted that Hill had access to his publicly posted images and that the degree of similarity supported a finding of unlawful copying. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Woodland failed to plausibly allege either access or substantial similarity. Woodland appealed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the district court that Woodland failed to satisfy the pleading standard necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit explained that to state a viable claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must alleged both the fact of copying and the unlawful appropriation of protected expression. The Court found that Woodland failed to establish either element.

The Ninth Circuit considered two principal legal issues:

Whether Woodland sufficiently alleged that Hill had access to Woodland’s copyrighted works
Whether the photographs posted by Hill were substantially similar to Woodland’s photographs in their protectable elements under copyright law

On the issue of access, the Ninth Circuit found that the merely alleging availability of Woodland’s photos on Instagram did not, by itself, plausibly demonstrate that Hill had seen them. The Court noted that in the era of online platforms, “the concept of ‘access’ is increasingly diluted.” And while that might make it easier for plaintiffs to show “access,” there must be a showing that the defendants had a reasonable chance of seeing that work under the platform’s policies. The mere fact that Hill used Instagram and Woodland’s photos were available on the same platform raised only a “bare possibility” that Hill viewed the photos. Woodland had not plausibly alleged that Hill “followed, liked, or otherwise interacted” with Woodland’s posts [...]

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Copyright, AI, and Politics

by Paul Devinsky | May 22, 2025 | Copyrights

In early 2023, the US Copyright Office (CO) initiated an examination of copyright law and policy issues raised by artificial intelligence (AI), including the scope of copyright in AI-generated works and the use of copyrighted materials in AI training. Since then, the CO has issued the first two installments of a three-part report: part one on digital replicas, and part two on copyrightability.

On May 9, 2025, the CO released a pre-publication version of the third and final part of its report on Generative AI (GenAI) training. The report addresses stakeholder concerns and offers the CO’s interpretation of copyright’s fair use doctrine in the context of GenAI.

GenAI training involves using algorithms to train models on large datasets to generate new content. This process allows models to learn patterns and structures from existing data and then create new text, images, audio, or other forms of content. The use of copyrighted materials to train GenAI models raises complex copyright issues, particularly issues arising under the “fair use” doctrine. The key question is whether using copyrighted works to train AI without explicit permission from the rights holders is fair use and therefore not an infringement or whether such use violates copyright.

The 107-page report provides a thorough technical and legal overview and takes a carefully calculated approach responding to the legal issues underlying fair use in GenAI. The report suggests that each case is context specific and requires a thorough evaluation of the four factors outlined in Section 107 of the Copyright Act:

The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes
The nature of the copyrighted work
The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole
The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

With regard to the first factor, the report concludes that GenAI training run on large diverse datasets “will often be transformative.” However, the use of copyright-protected materials for AI model training alone is insufficient to justify fair use. The report states that “transformativeness is a matter of degree of the model and how it is deployed.”

The report notes that training a model is most transformative where “the purpose is to deploy it for research, or in a closed system that constrains it to a non-substitutive task,” as opposed to instances where the AI output closely tracks the creative intent of the input (e.g., generating art, music, or writing in a similar style or substance to the original source materials).

As to the second factor (commercial nature of the use), the report notes that a GenAI model is often the product of efforts undertaken by distinct and multiple actors, some of which are commercial entities and some of which are not, and that it is typically difficult to discern attribution and definitively determine that a model is the product of a commercial or a noncommercial [...]

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No Protectable Code: No Literal or Nonliteral Copying

by Keval Amin | May 15, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that a plaintiff failed to establish copyright protection for its software platforms, drawing a distinction between “literal” copying (direct duplication of source code) and “nonliteral” copying (reproduction of structure, sequence, or user interface). InfoDeli, LLC v. Western Robidoux, Inc., et al., Case No. 20-2146 (8th Cir. May 5, 2025) (Gruender, Kelly, Grasz, JJ.)

InfoDeli partnered with Western Robidoux, Inc. (WRI), a commercial printing and fulfillment firm co-owned by family members, in 2009 to form a joint venture. The agreement leveraged InfoDeli’s expertise in developing custom webstore platforms and WRI’s capacity for printing and fulfillment. Their collaboration served major clients such as Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica Inc. (BIVI) and CEVA Animal Health, LLC, both providers of animal health products. InfoDeli built webstores enabling the companies’ sales teams to order promotional materials, which WRI then fulfilled. InfoDeli developed the Vectra Rebate platform for CEVA, allowing marketing staff to issue customer coupons that were also fulfilled by WRI.

By early 2014, tensions emerged. Without informing InfoDeli, WRI hired a competitor, Engage Mobile Solutions, to replace InfoDeli’s platforms for CEVA and BIVI. Engage used open-source software, in contrast to InfoDeli’s proprietary systems. WRI also shared InfoDeli-developed content with Engage to aid the transition. Shortly thereafter, WRI abruptly terminated its joint venture with InfoDeli.

InfoDeli sued WRI, CEVA, BIVI, and Engage for copyright infringement, tortious interference, and violations of the Missouri Computer Tampering Act related to certain webstores. The defendants counterclaimed conversion and tortious interference. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants on the copyright claims and denied InfoDeli’s motion on the counterclaims. After a jury sided with the defendants, InfoDeli filed motions for judgment and a new trial, both of which were denied. InfoDeli appealed.

The Eighth Circuit found that InfoDeli failed to prove its platforms were protected by copyright. The Court distinguished between “literal” and “nonliteral” copying, explaining that literal copying referred to direct duplication of original source code while nonliteral copying involved reproducing the overall structure or user interface. The district court had already determined that the nonliteral elements of InfoDeli’s platforms were not copyrightable. On appeal, InfoDeli did not challenge this determination regarding the individual elements. Instead, InfoDeli argued that the platforms should be protected “as a whole,” claiming that the interrelationship of elements made them protectable. However, the Eighth Circuit found that InfoDeli did not explain how the elements’ arrangement exhibited the required creativity for copyright protection.

InfoDeli further argued that the district court erred in not considering the verbatim copying of its source code. However, since InfoDeli’s complaint only alleged infringement of nonliteral elements, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court properly focused on those claims.

InfoDeli also argued that the district court erred by relying on InfoDeli’s expert’s list of protectable elements for the BIVI platform. However, the Court rejected this claim, pointing to precedent holding that when a plaintiff identifies specific elements as protectable, it effectively concedes that the remaining elements [...]

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