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Pay up, per party litigation stipulation

by | Apr 23, 2026 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit revived key portions of a long-running patent dispute, rejecting the district court’s extraterritoriality ruling and narrowing its prosecution disclaimer analysis while leaving intact the exclusion of certain damages theories for inadequate disclosure. VLSI Technology LLC v. Intel Corporation, Case No. 24-1772 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 15, 2026) (Moore, Chen, Kleeh, JJ.)

VLSI filed suit in 2017 accusing Intel of infringing several patents related to selecting an appropriate core in a multicore processor to execute a task based on measured performance characteristics. Following claim construction and discovery, the district court struck portions of VLSI’s damages case, concluding that certain theories advanced by VLSI’s damages expert had not been adequately disclosed. The court then granted summary judgment of noninfringement on two independent grounds: extraterritoriality on the theory that the claimed “measuring” activity occurred outside the United States, and failure of VLSI’s doctrine of equivalents arguments. VLSI appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed in substantial part. As to the asserted method claims, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court’s extraterritoriality analysis could not be reconciled with the parties’ stipulation. That stipulation provided that, for accused Intel products and activities meeting the technical requirements of the asserted claims, 70% would be deemed to satisfy the requisite US nexus for infringement purposes. The district court had reasoned that the stipulation could not establish domestic infringement unless the underlying claim limitations themselves were practiced in the United States. The Federal Circuit disagreed, emphasizing the stipulation’s plain language that the technical requirement inquiry was to be conducted “without regard to geographic considerations.”

The Federal Circuit rejected Intel’s contention that the stipulation merely served as a damages accounting shortcut rather than as an agreement bearing on infringement. However, in the Court’s view, stipulating a fact relevant to infringement, such as US nexus, is different from conceding infringement itself. The Court therefore found that Intel was bound by the agreement it struck, even if it later came to view the agreement as “imprudently made.”

On that basis, the Federal Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment of noninfringement on extraterritoriality grounds for the asserted method claims.

The Federal Circuit also reversed summary judgment as to the asserted apparatus claims. It concluded that the district court had focused too narrowly on where the claimed measuring functionality was practiced, rather than on whether the accused products were reasonably capable of performing the claimed functions without significant alteration. The Court concluded that the record contained sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the accused products were reasonably capable of performing the claimed measuring limitations. Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate, and the Court reversed the extraterritoriality ruling as to the apparatus claims.

The Federal Circuit also reinstated VLSI’s doctrine of equivalents theory for some of the apparatus claims that the district court had barred based on a prosecution disclaimer finding. Referencing the prosecution of the asserted patent, the district court imported an “upon identifying” limitation into the claims, notwithstanding [...]

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Public use, even without explicit public disclosure, is patent bar under pre-AIA § 102(b)

by | Apr 23, 2026 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of invalidity under the pre-America Invents Act (AIA) on sale bar, holding that a third party sale to the public of a product embodying a patented method and apparatus can trigger invalidity even where details of the invention were not expressly disclosed. Definitive Holdings v. Powerteq, Case No. 24-1761 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 14, 2026) (Moore, Dyk, Cunningham, JJ.)

Definitive Holdings sued Powerteq alleging infringement of a patent directed to methods and systems for reprogramming engine controllers. With a priority date of March 30, 2001, the patent was subject to pre-AIA law. Powerteq moved for summary judgment of invalidity under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), arguing that a nonparty, Hypertech, had sold a product (the PP3) that embodied all limitations of the asserted claims more than one year before the patent’s priority date.

Rather than disputing the underlying facts, Definitive challenged the admissibility of the evidence on which Powerteq relied. Definitive argued that the deposition testimony of Hypertech’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, the PP3 source code, and expert testimony relying on that source code were inadmissible. The district court rejected those arguments and granted summary judgment of invalidity, concluding that the third party sales triggered the on sale bar. Definitive appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the summary judgment ruling de novo, applying Tenth Circuit law.

Definitive first argued that the district court improperly relied on testimony from Hypertech’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Hypertech CEO and owner Jay Ramsay. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that Ramsay’s testimony was based on his personal knowledge and thus was sufficient to authenticate Hypertech’s sales records and establish that Powerteq’s expert analyzed source code from the PP3 product.

The Court explained that a reasonable juror could conclude that Ramsay had personal knowledge of Hypertech’s recordkeeping practices and sales activities. Because those portions of the testimony were sufficient to support summary judgment, the Court declined to address whether other portions of the 30(b)(6) testimony were properly considered and how the Tenth Circuit generally treats Rule 30(b)(6) testimony at summary judgment.

Definitive next argued that the PP3 source code and related expert testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay. The Federal Circuit disagreed. The Court explained that while comments or annotations in source code could, in some circumstances, qualify as hearsay statements, the operative source code itself functions as a set of commands or instructions. As such, it is not offered for the truth of any assertion. The Court therefore found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering expert testimony describing the functioning of the source code when granting summary judgment.

Finally, Definitive contended that the on sale bar did not apply because Hypertech’s sales of the PP3 did not publicly disclose how to perform the patented method, even if the PP3 embodied all claim limitations and was sold more than one year before the priority date.

The Federal Circuit rejected Definitive’s argument, emphasizing that Hypertech’s sales directly conveyed to the public the ability to practice the [...]

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How ex parte is ex parte reexam?

by | Apr 16, 2026 |

Under a new procedure, announced in an Official Gazette Notice dated April 1, 2026, patent owners may now provide input before the United States Patent and Trademark Office decides whether to initiate an ex parte reexamination proceeding. Previously, while patent owners could participate after reexamination was ordered, they had no opportunity to submit arguments before the Office determined whether a request raised a substantial new question of patentability (SNQ). Under the new policy, patent owners may submit a limited pre-order paper to inform that threshold determination.

Ex parte reexamination is an administrative mechanism that allows third parties to challenge patent validity outside of court. Unlike inter partes review and post-grant review – both adjudicated by Patent Trial and Appeal Board judges – ex parte reexaminations are handled by the Central Reexamination Unit and initiation there turns on whether or not the request raises an SNQ.

The new procedure introduces an optional patent owner pre-order paper that must be filed within 30 days of service of the reexam request, with no extensions available. The submission is limited to 30 pages and must focus on why the cited prior art does not raise an SNQ. Supporting declarations are permitted and do not count toward the page limit, but incorporation by reference is not allowed.

The notice also places important limits on the scope of these submissions. The patent owner’s paper must be directed only to the issues raised in the request and should not address matters outside that scope. For example, the Office indicates that arguments regarding discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) are not part of the SNQ determination and therefore should not be included.

Requesters have limited ability to respond to a patent owner’s pre-order paper. While responses are not ordinarily permitted, a requester may petition to file a reply (limited to 10 pages). Any such reply must be filed within 15 days of service of the patent owner’s paper and requires payment of a fee.

These changes may shift the dynamics of ex parte reexamination practice. Historically, institution decisions were made based solely on the requester’s submission. The new procedure allows patent owners to present arguments earlier in the process, potentially assisting the Office in evaluating whether the request satisfies the SNQ standard before ordering reexamination.

For challengers, this change increases the importance of the initial request. Requests should be drafted with the expectation that the patent owner may respond before institution and that opportunities to reply will be limited.



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Article III standing: Claims of future injury must be sufficiently tied to the claim limitations at issue

by | Apr 16, 2026 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal of a post-grant review (PGR) for lack of Article III jurisdiction, finding that the appellant failed to meet its burden to prove it would likely suffer an injury in fact. ironSource Ltd. v. Digital Turbine, Inc., Case No. 2024-1831 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 2026) (Moore, Lourie, Reyna J.J.)

Mobile advertising company Digital Turbine has a patent related to streamlined background processes for downloading and installing mobile applications. That patent is a continuation an earlier related patent which was invalidated during a prior PGR proceeding. Mobile advertising and app monetization platform ironSource once had a product on the market called Aura, which included “Click to Install” features. When faced with what it referred to as “veiled threats” of liability for infringement of the earlier patent, ironSource modified its Aura product – eventually removing it from the market – and petitioned the Patent Trial & Appeal Board for a PGR of the continuation patent’s claims 1 – 22.

During the PGR, the Board held that claims 1 – 22 were all unpatentable pursuant to its earlier decision in the earlier PGR but allowed Digital Turbine to amend the claims. In so doing, Digital Turbine included, among other changes, two narrowing limitations to the claims. The Board concluded that ironSource had not carried its burden of proving that the newly amended claims were unpatentable or ineligible for patent protection. ironSource appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that while Article III standing is not required before the Board, it is required to sustain an appeal of the Board’s decisions. The burden is on the appellant to prove it meets the requirements for standing under federal law at the time of filing. Federal law requires an appellant to prove it has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the [appellee], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo. Specific to patent cases, the appellant must show concrete evidence of its intended future actions that pose a substantial risk of infringement or an assertion of infringement.

To meet this obligation, ironSource submitted a declaration by one of its senior directors. The declarant discussed past changes and concessions to the Aura product that ironSource had made in light of Digital Turbine’s patent rights. It also stated that ironSource intended to reintroduce the Aura product to the market. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that ironSource failed to meet its burden of tying that potential product’s features to the patent’s amended claims. Instead, ironSource focused on the claims of the original, alleging that they were “substantially identical” to the continuation patent’s claims, i.e., the claims Digital Turbine had previously “threatened” against the company. The Court emphasized, however, that ironSource failed to account for the narrowing limitations in the amended claims and thus failed to prove a likely injury in fact from infringement of the substituted claims.

Finally, the Federal Circuit distinguished [...]

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Where’s Waldo? Inventorship error fatal when omitted coinventor cannot be found

by | Apr 16, 2026 |

Addressing the limits of correcting inventorship, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed an invalidity determination where an omitted coinventor could not be added because statutory notice requirements could not be satisfied. Fortress Iron, LP v. Digger Specialties, Inc., Case No. 24-2313 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 2, 2026) (Lourie, Hughes, Kleeh, JJ.)

Building products manufacturer Fortress Iron sued competitor Digger Specialties for infringement of two patents directed to pre assembled vertical cable railing panels. The inventions resulted from collaboration among Fortress’ owner and an employee, as well as two employees of its quality control liaison, Hua Ping Huang and Alfonso Lin, who proposed design changes to address cable tensioning issues. The issued patents, however, named only Fortress personnel and omitted Lin and Huang as coinventors.

During the litigation, Fortress acknowledged that Lin and Huang were coinventors. Fortress successfully added Lin under 35 U.S.C. § 256(a) but was unable to locate Huang, who had left the liaison company years earlier without providing contact information. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, with Fortress seeking correction of inventorship and Digger seeking invalidity. The district court denied Fortress’ motion and held the patents invalid for incorrect inventorship. Fortress appealed.

Fortress argued that Huang was not a “party concerned” under § 256(b) and therefore was not entitled to notice and a hearing. The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, explaining that an omitted inventor qualifies as a “party concerned” regardless of whether the inventor has a demonstrated economic interest in the patent. The Court explained that inventorship carries legal, financial, and ownership consequences that an inventor has a right to contest, and § 256(b)’s notice and hearing requirements cannot be bypassed. The Court further clarified that standing and “party concerned” status under § 256(b) are distinct legal concepts with different requirements.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Fortress’ characterization of § 256(b) as a broadly permissive “savings provision,” explaining that the statute only operates to save patents once its procedural prerequisites of notice and an opportunity to be heard are satisfied.

Turning to Fortress’ second argument, the Federal Circuit concluded that a patent that incorrectly lists its inventors and cannot be corrected under § 256 has a clear statutory basis for invalidity. Reading § 256(b) together with §§ 101 and 100(f), the Court concluded that when an invention has multiple inventors, all must be named. Allowing a patent to survive with only some inventors listed would render § 256’s corrective framework meaningless.

Practice note: The decision underscores the importance of accurate inventorship determinations and the practical risk that patents may be rendered invalid if an omitted inventor cannot be located and statutory correction requirements cannot be met.



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Game over: No self-help clock reset for mandatory stay request

by | Apr 9, 2026 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a respondent in a US International Trade Commission proceeding may not seek a mandatory stay of a companion federal district court case under 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a)(2) by refiling a declaratory judgment action involving the same parties when it missed the mandatory 30-day deadline for seeking a stay in the originally filed action. Ascendis Pharma A/S v. BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc., Case No. 26-1026 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 26, 2026) (Lourie, Chen, Stoll, JJ.)

Ascendis Pharma and BioMarin Pharmaceutical are both drug manufacturers. Ascendis filed a New Drug Application (NDA) with the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) for its drug TransCon CNP. The next day, BioMarin filed a complaint at the Commission, alleging that TransCon CNP infringed a BioMarin patent. To avoid the Commission’s importation safe harbor, BioMarin alleged that TransCon CNP was being imported in a quantity that exceeded “any quantity that would be solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information to the FDA.”

Ascendis filed a declaratory judgment action in federal district court, asserting that its “manufacture, use, and importation” was “exempt from patent infringement liability by the statutory safe harbor.” After BioMarin moved to dismiss or stay the declaratory judgment action, Ascendis reversed course and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, stating its intention to refile its declaratory judgment action and seek a mandatory stay under § 1659(a)(2). Ascendis refiled and two weeks later filed a § 1659(a)(2) motion for a mandatory stay. The district court granted BioMarin’s discretionary stay and denied Ascendis’s motion as moot. Ascendis appealed.

First addressing appellate jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit held that Ascendis had standing for its appeal. At the district court, BioMarin had argued that the district court should retain authority to lift any stay and stated that if the FDA approved TransCon CNP and the Ascendis NDA, BioMarin intended to seek preliminary injunctive relief from the district court. The Federal Circuit explained that those circumstances created a sufficiently real and immediate controversy for appellate jurisdiction.

The Federal Circuit then assessed whether it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Under that doctrine, an order must meet three requirements to permit an interlocutory appeal. It must “(1) ‘conclusively determine the disputed question’; (2) ‘resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action’; and (3) ‘be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’” Because denial of Ascendis’s stay motion conclusively determined that issue, and because the intent of § 1659(a)(2) is to prevent overlapping litigation, the Court found that the requirements for collateral order jurisdiction were met.

The Federal Circuit concluded that Ascendis’s arguments failed on the merits, however. After entering a discretionary stay, the district court had denied Ascendis’s motion as moot. The Federal Circuit found that a temporary stay does not necessarily render a stay under § 1659(a)(2) moot, and that a discretionary stay that can be lifted is not the same as (and thus does not moot) a request for [...]

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Ticket to ride: USPTO requires counsel for foreign patent applicants

by | Apr 2, 2026 |

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) adopted a final rule requiring foreign-domiciled patent applicants and patent owners to be represented by a registered US patent practitioner, signaling a meaningful procedural shift aimed at harmonization, efficiency, compliance, and fraud prevention. 91 Fed. Reg. 13510 (Mar. 20, 2026).

The USPTO explained that the rule is intended primarily to address recurring compliance and fraud concerns, such as false or improper certifications, including micro entity certifications, and other filings that misrepresent eligibility for fee reductions or expedited treatment. Because registered US practitioners are subject to the USPTO’s Rules of Professional Conduct and disciplinary authority, the agency views mandatory representation as a more reliable accountability mechanism.

The USPTO also cited practical administrative considerations, indicating that foreign pro se filings are more likely to be procedurally deficient and therefore consume disproportionate examination and processing resources, particularly when application papers are not in condition for publication or examination upon receipt.

The final rule clarifies how the requirement will operate in practice. While a foreign domiciled applicant may still obtain a filing date without a practitioner’s signature, any subsequent papers will not be entered unless signed by a registered US patent practitioner. This includes application data sheets, micro entity certifications, petitions, amendments, and other key prosecution documents. In some circumstances, the consequences for noncompliance may be significant. For example, if an unsigned application data sheet is treated merely as a transmittal letter, inventorship, priority, or benefit claims may not be properly established at filing, necessitating corrective petitions and additional cost. Likewise, requests that must be made at filing, such as nonpublication or prioritized examination requests, may be forfeited if not properly signed.

The USPTO emphasized that the rule is procedural rather than substantive. It does not alter the standards of patentability or the requirements for securing a filing date. The rule applies to all filings received on or after its effective date, regardless of the application’s effective filing date. The USPTO also noted that an applicant that believes it has been incorrectly designated as foreign domiciled may respond to that determination even before retaining counsel, although conclusory or unsupported assertions are unlikely to succeed.

Practice note: Foreign applicants and patent owners should now assume that US practitioner involvement is essential to preserve rights and avoid preventable procedural defects.



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Code, copies, and consequences: $185 million verdict uninstalled!

by | Mar 26, 2026 |

Addressing patent eligibility, infringement, willfulness, enhanced damages, and the limits of patent damages tied to foreign software sales, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a $185 million jury award after finding that damages based on foreign sales were improperly included because the accused software copies were made and installed abroad. Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Gen Digital Inc., Case No. 24-1243 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 11, 2026) (Dyk, Prost, Reyna, JJ.)

The Trustees of Columbia University sued Gen Digital, the Norton software brand marketer, for infringement of patents directed to detecting anomalous program execution in antivirus software. A jury found willful infringement and awarded approximately $185 million in damages, including more than $94 million attributable to foreign sales of Norton software products based on findings that the infringing product sold to foreign customers was made in and distributed from the United States. The district court denied Gen Digital’s post-trial motions, enhanced the damages, and awarded attorneys’ fees. Gen Digital appealed.

Patent eligibility: Abstract at Alice step one

The Federal Circuit determined that the asserted claims are directed to an abstract idea at step one of the Alice framework. The Court explained that the claims, at their core, involve comparing data (function calls) to a model – created using multiple computers – to identify anomalous behavior, which is a long-standing abstract concept in the context of virus detection. Although Columbia argued that the claims improved computer functionality through efficiency gains and the use of distributed models, the Court found that those purported improvements were either themselves abstract or not required by the claim language. The Court agreed with Columbia that factual disputes remain as to whether certain claimed features – particularly the “model of function calls” – were well-understood, routine, and conventional, precluding resolution of step two of the Alice framework. The Court remanded for further proceedings to perform an Alice step two analysis.

Willfulness: Affirmed by substantial evidence

The Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported a finding that Gen Digital knew or should have known of the asserted patents, including evidence that its personnel were aware of the underlying technology and related patent applications prior to issuance. The Court rejected Gen Digital’s argument that its litigation defenses precluded willfulness, explaining that post hoc reasonable defenses do not negate willfulness absent evidence that the defendant relied on those defenses at the time of the accused conduct. Because the record supported a finding that Gen Digital failed to adequately investigate potential infringement despite being aware of the patents, the Federal Circuit found no basis to disturb the district court jury’s willfulness determination.

No domestic infringement for foreign-made software copies

The Federal Circuit reiterated the general rule that US patent law does not apply to products made and sold abroad. Although the jury was instructed that damages could include foreign sales if the infringing product was “made in or distributed from the United States,” the Court found this instruction legally incorrect. The Court further explained that 35 U.S.C. § [...]

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Virtually displayed: USPTO updates guidance for computer-generated interfaces and icons

by | Mar 26, 2026 |

To address evolving digital technologies, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued supplemental guidance for examining design patent applications directed to computer-generated interfaces and icons. The guidance expands flexibility for applicants – particularly in projection, hologram, and virtual and augmented reality (PHVAR) contexts – while maintaining the statutory requirement that claimed designs be tied to an article of manufacture.

The USPTO first sought public input in 2020 on how the “article of manufacture” requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 171 should apply to emerging digital designs. Although many commenters urged recognition of PHVAR designs, subsequent guidance issued by the USPTO in 2023 did not fully address those technologies. The latest supplemental guidance responds to continued stakeholder feedback, particularly regarding the limitations imposed by prior drawing requirements.

Traditionally, applicants seeking protection for computer-generated icons or graphical user interfaces (GUIs) were required to depict a physical article of manufacture, such as a display screen, in solid or broken lines in the drawings. This requirement ensured that the claimed design was not merely a “transient or disembodied” image but was instead tied to a statutory article of manufacture.

The updated guidance removes the requirement that drawings depict a display panel or other physical article, provided that the title and claim clearly identify the relevant article of manufacture (e.g., a computer, computer display, or computer system). In such cases, the article need not appear in the drawings, so long as the application, taken as a whole, makes it clear that the claimed design is “for” an article of manufacture and not merely an abstract or disembodied image. For example, phrases such as “interface for a computer system” or “icon for a display panel” are sufficient to establish that the design is tied to a qualifying article.

The USPTO reiterated that the guidance “does not constitute substantive rulemaking and hence does not have the force and effect of law.” Examiners will continue to evaluate applications under all applicable patentability provisions, including §§ 102, 103, and 112.

Overall, the updated guidance provides applicants with greater flexibility in claiming and depicting computer-generated designs while reaffirming that such designs must remain tied to a qualifying article of manufacture.



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Absent a client waiver, attorney-client relationship survives conflict

by | Mar 26, 2026 |

Reversing a district court order requiring the disclosure of attorney-client communications and holding a law firm in civil contempt, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that an attorney’s conflict of interest does not automatically terminate the attorney-client privilege and that an invalid order could not support civil contempt. Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Gen Digital Inc., Case No. 24-1243, (Fed. Cir. Mar. 11, 2026) (Dyk, Prost, Reyna, JJ.)

The Trustees of Columbia University sued Gen Digital, the Norton software brand marketer, for infringement of two patents and to correct the inventorship of one of the patents. Norton owned the patent on which inventorship correction was sought, and a Norton employee, Dr. Dacier, was listed as the sole inventor. Columbia alleged that two Columbia professors invented the subject matter.

On the inventorship issue, Norton and Dr. Dacier were both represented by Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan. Dr. Dacier was deposed and testified about the development of the invention, including activities involving the Columbia professors. Dr. Dacier did not attribute any inventive contributions to the Columbia professors, but Columbia argued – and the district court agreed – that his testimony supported Columbia’s inventorship theory.

Before the district court, Columbia argued that this representation created an improper conflict of interest, particularly because Dr. Dacier had allegedly expressed views critical of Norton’s litigation positions. In Columbia’s view, Quinn Emanuel had improperly prevented Dr. Dacier from testifying at trial in support of Columbia’s inventorship claims. The district court agreed, finding that Quinn Emanuel’s representation of Dr. Dacier raised a conflict, and ruled that Quinn Emanuel’s current representation of Norton automatically terminated its representation of Dr. Dacier. The district court ordered Quinn Emanuel to release its communications with Dr. Dacier. Quinn Emanuel had previously asserted a claim of privilege over these communications. Quinn Emanuel refused the production order, and the district court found Quinn Emanuel in civil contempt. As a sanction, the district court imposed a negative evidentiary inference that Dr. Dacier would have testified to improper conduct by Quinn Emanuel – supporting Columbia’s motion for enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees in a companion case. Quinn Emanuel appealed.

On appeal, Quinn Emanuel argued that the district court’s order requiring the disclosure of communications with Dr. Dacier was invalid because it improperly compelled production of privileged communications and that the contempt finding should be reversed. Columbia argued that the disclosure order was proper because Norton did not raise the privilege issue response to Columbia’s motion for an order to show cause, Quinn Emanuel failed to request in camera review, Quinn Emanuel did not contact Dr. Dacier to determine if he wanted to assert privilege, and Dr. Dacier waived the privilege by emailing both Columbia’s counsel and Quinn Emanuel disclosing that he had been in contact with Columbia’s counsel.

The Federal Circuit rejected all four arguments, holding that there was “no question that Dr. Dacier retained Quinn [Emanuel] to represent him and that he did not terminate the relationship [...]

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