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This Mashup Is Not a Place You’ll Go – Seuss Copyright Will ‘Live Long and Prosper’

by | Jan 7, 2021 | ,

Presented with a publishing company defendant’s mashup of Dr. Seuss’ copyrighted works with Star Trek in a work titled Oh, the Places You’ll Boldly Go!, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit tackled claims of both copyright and trademark infringement, including the defense of fair use and the use of trademarks in expressive works. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants on the copyright infringement claim and affirmed the district court’s dismissal and grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on the trademark claim. Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. ComicMix LLC, et al., Case No. 19-55348 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 2020) (McKeown, J.)

Seuss Enterprises owns the intellectual property in the works of late author Theodor S. Geisel, better known as Dr. Seuss. Seuss Enterprises carefully yet prolifically licenses the Dr. Seuss works and brand across a variety of entertainment, media, art and consumer goods, including derivative works of Dr. Seuss’ final book, and graduation favorite, Oh, the Places You’ll Go! When Seuss Enterprises encountered a Kickstarter campaign to raise funds for the Oh, the Places You’ll Boldly Go! mashup work created by ComicMix (a company whose employees include an author of Star Trek episodes), it filed suit for copyright and trademark infringement. The district court granted ComicMix’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the Boldly work was a fair use of Dr. Seuss’s Oh, the Places You’ll Go! and that Seuss Enterprises did not have a cognizable trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act. Seuss Enterprises appealed.

On appeal, ComicMix asserted its defense of fair use by arguing that its copying of the Dr. Seuss works (described at one point in the record as painstaking attempts to create “identical” illustrations) resulted in a parody of the works. The Ninth Circuit examined the facts under the four non-exclusive factors of fair use reflected in § 107 of the Copyright Act:

  • The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes
  • The nature of the copyrighted work
  • The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole
  • The effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.

Remarking that the outcome of the purpose and character of the use factor influences the assessment of the third and fourth factors, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Boldly work was not transformative as a parody or otherwise, and that the “indisputably commercial” nature of the work weighed against fair use. The Court explained that a parody exists only if the resulting work critiques or comments on the underlying copyrighted work. The Ninth Circuit cited its decision in another Seuss case (Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books), which involved the retelling of the O.J. Simpson murder trial through the lens of The Cat in the Hat. Here, the Court similarly found that Boldly only “evokes” Oh, the Places [...]

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BREXIT: How Will It Impact Your European Trademark Rights?

by and | Dec 17, 2020 | ,

The United Kingdom (UK) has officially withdrawn from the European Union (EU) on February 1, 2020, but will only become a third party after a transition period ending on December 31, 2020. With that date fast approaching, you are probably wondering what will change for your trademark rights on January 1, 2021?

EU TRADEMARKS REGISTERED BEFORE JANUARY 1, 2021

  • Owners of EU trademarks (and EU parts of International Registrations) registered on or before December 31, 2020 will automatically receive a registered and enforceable UK trademark on January 1, 2021, without any re-examination or additional costs. The UK trademark will be for the same sign, the same goods, and the same filing, priority or seniority date as its corresponding EU trademark.
  • Trademark owners will have the right to opt-out from this automatic cloning as of January 1, 2021 if they have no interest in the UK territory.
  • As of January 1, 2021, EU registered trademarks and corresponding UK clones must be renewed separately.
  • Renewals made before January 1, 2021 for EU trademark registrations expiring after this date will not apply to UK clones. Also, UK clones expiring within the six (6) months following January 1, 2021 will benefit from an additional six (6)-month renewal period, with no late renewal fee to be paid.
  • If a EU trademark is declared invalid or cancelled in the EU as result of a procedure that was ongoing on December 31, 2020, its UK clone will also be deemed invalid or cancelled on the same date if the grounds are applicable in the UK.

EU TRADEMARK APPLICATIONS FILED BEFORE JANUARY 1, 2021

  • EU trademark applications (and EU parts of International Registrations) filed, but not yet registered, before January 1, 2021 will not be automatically cloned into UK trademark applications.
  • The holders of such applications have until September 30, 2021 to reapply for an identical trademark in the UK that will benefit from the earlier filing date of its corresponding EU trademark. These new UK filings will be subject to an examination process as well as UK national filing fees.

EU TRADEMARK APPLICATIONS FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2021

  • As of January 1, 2021, new EU trademark applications will cover the 27 remaining EU Member States, but will not be protected in the UK.
  • To acquire trademark protection in the UK, one will have to apply for a separate UK trademark which may still claim priority of an earlier national or EU trademark filed within the preceding six (6) months.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

  • As of January 1, 2021, pending or new oppositions or invalidity actions based solely on UK rights will be dismissed.
  • Licenses recorded for EU trademarks will not automatically be recorded for UK clones or new UK filings.
  • Existing EU Customs applications for action will not continue to have effect in the UK unless granted by UK customs authorities.
  • Agreements will have to be checked to amend provisions if appropriate.

If you are conducting or planning to conduct business [...]

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Fifth Circuit Says No Preliminary Injunction in Boozy Beverage Trademark Fight

by | Dec 17, 2020 |

The maker of BRIZZY-brand hard seltzer claimed that consumers would confuse a product branded VIZZY hard seltzer with its own. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed, however, and affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction with an explanation as to how the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits with respect to its trademark infringement claim. Future Proof Brands, L.L.C., v. Molson Coors Beverage Company, et. al., Case No. 20-50323 (5th Cir. December 3, 2020) (Smith, J.).

With a booming market for hard seltzers and ready-to-drink cocktails, it is no surprise that disputes over brand names of the bubbly alcoholic beverages have followed. After the district court denied Proof Brands’ request for a preliminary injunction against Molson Coors’ entry into that market, Proof Brands appealed. The Fifth Circuit issued a reminder that a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy which should not be granted unless the party seeking it has clearly carried [its] burden of persuasion,” and reviewed the district court’s denial of Future Proof’s request for an abuse of discretion. The Court further noted that under Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Hidalgo Cnty. v. Suehs, Future Proof must demonstrate four factors to obtain a preliminary injunction, namely: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the substantial injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party sought to be enjoined and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction would not disserve the public interest. Concluding that Future Proof was unable to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its trademark infringement claim, the court did not address the remaining three preliminary injunction factors.

Future Proof argued that in the course of determining whether there was a likelihood of confusion between the BRIZZY and VIZZY trademarks, the district court erred in analyzing the various factors, or “digits,” of consumer confusion used by the Fifth Circuit. The Court tackled each of the “digits” assessing the likelihood of consumer confusion, noting that even with “some errors,” the district court correctly concluded that Future Proof failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on its trademark infringement claim.

Starting with the type or strength of the trademark allegedly infringed factor, the Fifth Circuit disagreed somewhat with the district court and found the BRIZZY mark to be suggestive, rather than merely descriptive of “fizzy” beverages. Nevertheless, the Court noted that suggestive marks—like descriptive marks— are “comparatively weak” for purposes of a confusion analysis, and cited a number of third-party carbonated beverage brands sharing the common “-IZZY-” root to affirm its agreement with the district court that BRIZZY is a weak trademark. With a “weak” mark at issue, the Court found the similarity factor to weigh only marginally in favor of the injunction, especially given key differences between the product packaging and labels for the respective BRIZZY and VIZZY beverages.

Moving on to the defendant’s intent factor, [...]

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“You’ve Changed!”—New Trademark and TTAB Fees Incoming

by | Dec 10, 2020 |

Effective January 2, 2021, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) is increasing and adding certain trademark and Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) fees. The changes come after a nearly three-year fee status quo.

The following TTAB fees will increase anywhere from $25 to $200:

  • Petition to cancel filed through the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (“ESTTA”) (now $600 per class);
  • Notice of opposition filed through ESTTA (now $600 per class);
  • Initial 90-day extension request for filing a notice of opposition, filed through ESTTA (now $200 per application);
  • Second 60-day extension request for filing a notice of opposition, filed through ESTTA (now $200 per application);
  • Final 60-day extension request for filing a notice of opposition, filed through ESTTA (now $400 per application); and
  • Ex parte appeal filed through ESTTA (now $225 per class).

New TTAB fees are also taking effect. A $100 fee per application will apply for a second request for an extension of time to file an appeal brief in an ex parte appeal filed through ESTTA (and for any subsequent extension requests). A $200 per class fee will apply for appeal briefs in an ex parte appeal filed through ESTTA. A $500 per proceeding fee will apply to requests for oral hearings.

As before, there will be no fee for a first 30-day extension request for filing a notice of opposition filed through ESTTA. The USPTO will also begin issuing partial refunds for petitions to cancel in default judgments. These refunds, however, will be available only if the cancellation involves solely an abandonment or nonuse claim, if the defendant did not appear, and if there were no filings in the proceeding other than the petition to cancel.

Additionally, USPTO trademark and TTAB filings which can be and are submitted on paper will cost more than filing their electronic counterparts.

Other key USPTO trademark fee changes include the following: TEAS standard application, now $350 per class; TEAS Plus application, now $250 per class; the processing fee for failing to meet TEAS Plus requirements, now $100 per class; Section 8 or 71 declaration filed through TEAS, now $225 per class; petition to the Director filed through TEAS, now $250; and a petition to revive an abandoned application filed through TEAS, now $150. No fee will apply for an electronically filed Section 7 request to amend a registration before submitting a Section 8 or 71 declaration, as long as the filing serves only to delete goods, services, and/or classes in the request. There will, however, now be a fee assessed for deleting goods, services, and/or classes from a registration after submitting a Section 71 or 8 declaration, but before that declaration is accepted ($250 per class if filed through TEAS). Lastly, a letter of protest will now cost $50 per application.

While the changes outlined above are key, practitioners should be mindful of potential changes to all fees applicable to their specific situation and consult the USPTO’s Final Rule, available here, to ensure [...]

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“Icy” Guidance on Polaroid Factors

by | Dec 3, 2020 |

In a “somewhat unusual” trademark case involving directly competing products and marks using the same words, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the grant of summary judgment for the accused infringer on trademark infringement and dilution claims. The Court found that the similarity of the marks and bad faith on part of the accused infringer weighed in favor of finding infringement. Car Freshner Corp. v. American Covers, LLC, Case No. 19-2750 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 2020) (Newman, J.)

Car Freshner and American Covers both sell car air freshener products. Car Freshner filed a lawsuit against American Covers alleging that Car Freshner’s trademark “Black Ice” was infringed and diluted by American Covers’ sale of air freshener products using the words “Midnight Black Ice Storm.” The district court rejected Car Freshner’s trademark infringement claim, concluding that “Midnight Black Ice Storm” was not similar enough to “Black Ice” to create a likelihood of confusion about the source of the products. The district court also rejected Car Freshner’s trademark dilution claim, concluding that the marks in question were not sufficiently famous. Car Freshner appealed.

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s entry of judgment for American Covers on the trademark infringement claim. Reviewing the trademark infringement claim using the eight Polaroid factors, the Court noted the lack of guidance regarding how much weight to accord each of the factors. Despite this lack of guidance, the Court was particularly persuaded by two of the Polaroid factors: the similarity of the marks, and bad faith on the part of the accused infringer. As to the similarity of the marks factor, the Court noted that “[i]t is extremely unusual for the mark of a junior user to include two identical words of a senior user’s mark in sequence[,]” particularly when both users are competitors in the same market. Despite the differences in packaging between the two products, the Court found that the similarity of the marks weighed heavily in favor of a finding of trademark infringement. As to the bad faith factor, the Court found that emails produced by American Covers, which revealed that its employees specifically chose product names meant to encourage customers to form a connection between American Covers’ products and Car Freshner’s products, were “explicit evidence of bad faith” on the part of American Covers.

As to the dilution claim, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment finding, concluding that there was no evidence that either of the marks in question was famous.

Practice Note: Although courts have not provided guidance on how to weigh the Polaroid factors in trademark cases, this case demonstrates that two of the factors (similarity of the marks and bad faith on the part of the accused infringer) can be especially persuasive, particularly when the evidence for these factors is strong.



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PTO Exam Guide: Post Booking.com, Generic.com Terms Still Face Uphill Battle for Registration

by | Nov 12, 2020 |

Addressing the Supreme Court of the United States’ ruling in USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) recently issued guidance on the examining procedures for “generic.com terms.” (Examination Guide No. 3-20, Generic.com Terms after USPTO v. Booking.com, October 2020.)

Booking.com had been engaged in a prolonged battle to secure registration for its BOOKING.COM trademark in connection with hotel reservation services. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Booking.com, rejecting the PTO’s proposed per se rule that a generic term combined with a generic top-level domain (a “generic.com term”) is necessarily generic and therefore ineligible for trademark protection. As the Supreme Court concluded, “[W]hether any given ‘generic.com’ term is generic . . . depends on whether consumers in fact perceive that term as the name of a class or, instead, as a term capable of distinguishing among members of the class.”

In light of this holding, the PTO issued Exam Guide 3-20, which outlines new guidance for examining generic.com terms. The PTO emphasized that the registrability of generic.com terms should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, but that these terms would often face an uphill battle for registration: “[G]iven the nature of these terms, the available evidence will likely support a conclusion that they are, at least, highly descriptive, and thus consumers would be less likely to believe that they indicate source in any party. Thus, for generic.com terms, applicants will generally have a greater evidentiary burden to establish that the proposed mark has acquired distinctiveness.”

The procedure for refusing registration of a generic.com term remains largely unchanged. Typically, an examining attorney cannot issue an initial refusal for genericness; the office action should instead refuse registration for mere descriptiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1). Depending on the examining attorney’s assessment of whether the relevant generic.com term is even capable of serving as a source identifier, the office action may include language suggesting (or advising against) a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) or amendment to the supplemental register.

Applicants seeking registration for a generic.com term on the principal register under Section 2(f) should be prepared to present substantial evidence that consumers recognize the mark as a source identifier, including, for example:

  • Consumer surveys
  • Consumer declarations
  • Evidence as to the duration, extent and nature of the mark’s use
  • Advertising expenditures.

The PTO warned that evidence of five years’ use or reliance on a prior registration alone is likely insufficient. Additionally, surveys should be accompanied by a report outlining “the procedural aspects of the survey and statistical accuracy of the results, . . . [i]nformation regarding how the survey was conducted, the questionnaire itself, the universe of consumers surveyed, the number of participants surveyed, and the geographic scope of the survey.” If the examining attorney believes the generic.com term is capable of functioning as a trademark but the proffered evidence is insufficient to establish acquired distinctiveness, the examining attorney may allow the applicant to amend the registration to the supplemental register.

A [...]

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Sticky Situation? Circumstantial Evidence Can Support Intent to Confuse in Trade Dress Claims

by | Nov 4, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant on trade dress infringement and trade dress dilution claims, finding that evidence relating to the likelihood of confusion was not viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. However, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff’s false advertising claims because the allegedly deceptive advertising was not material to consumer purchasing decisions. J-B Weld Co., LLC v. Gorilla Glue Co., Case No. 18-14975 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2020) (Tjoflat, J.) (Carnes, J., concurring).

J-B Weld and Gorilla Glue are competitors specializing in heavy-duty adhesive products. Gorilla Glue introduced an adhesive under the brand name GorillaWeld that mimicked the packaging of a J-B Weld product. Gorilla Glue advertised GorillaWeld as a steel bond epoxy based on the strength of the bond and its similarity to an epoxy-group polymer, even though the product was not a chemical epoxy and did not contain any steel. J-B Weld sued, alleging trade dress infringement based on the Lanham Act and Georgia law, trade dress dilution based on Georgia law, and false advertising under the Lanham Act. The district court granted Gorilla Glue summary judgment on all claims, finding no trade dress infringement or dilution based on insufficient evidence of likelihood of confusion, and no false advertising because the evidence did not demonstrate that Gorilla Glue’s steel bond epoxy claim was material to consumer purchasing decisions. J-B Weld appealed, arguing that the district court did not properly view the evidence in the light most favorable to J-B Weld.

The 11th Circuit reversed on the trade dress infringement and dilution claims and affirmed on the false advertising claim. On the trade dress infringement claims, the 11th Circuit found that the district court did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to J-B Weld in analyzing the likelihood of confusion between the respective trade dress of J-B Weld and GorillaWeld, as required in the context of summary judgment. The 11th Circuit found that the district court did not properly credit evidence relevant to the similarity of the designs, Gorilla Glue’s intent and instances of actual confusion. For example, despite multiple similarities between the J-B Weld and GorillaWeld packages (including a V-shape tube arrangement and the use, emphasis and location of certain text), the district court found that the presence of the Gorilla Glue logo, brand name and color scheme negated a finding of similarity. The 11th Circuit deemed this finding error in the context of summary judgment. The Court also determined that communications from Gorilla Glue’s packaging design team that repeatedly referenced J-B Weld’s packaging and expressed a desire to use similar elements (including a communication in which a Gorilla Glue employee referred to the GorillaWeld design as a “knock off”) were improperly ascribed to innocuous motives based on self-serving testimony from a Gorilla Glue employee. As the Court explained, summary judgment required drawing all inferences in the light [...]

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Trademark Cancellation Is Appropriate Sanction for Misconduct

by | Nov 4, 2020 |

In upholding a grocery store chain’s standing to petition for cancellation of a US trademark registration, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (TTAB’s) express authority to impose cancellation of a trademark by default judgment as a sanction in a TTAB proceeding. Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, Case No. 19-1526 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 27, 2020) (Reyna, J.).

SFM owns US federal trademark registrations for the mark SPROUTS for use in connection with its retail grocery store services. SFM filed a petition to cancel Corcamore’s US trademark registration for the mark SPROUT for use in connection with vending machine services, alleging a likelihood of consumer confusion with SFM’s prior trademark rights. The TTAB denied Corcamore’s motion to dismiss the cancellation petition for lack of standing. Relying on Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. General Cigar Co., the TTAB confirmed SFM’s standing based on its “real interest” in the cancellation petition and a “reasonable belief of damage” caused by the continued registration of Corcamore’s SPROUT trademark.

Following the TTAB’s denial of its motion to dismiss, Corcamore undertook a series willful, bad-faith procedural maneuvers that resulted in two separate sanctions. When Corcamore’s further procedural misconduct violated both sanctions orders, the TTAB entered default judgment cancelling Corcamore’s SPROUT trademark registration. Corcamore appealed.

On appeal, Corcamore alleged that the TTAB (1) erred in applying Empresa Cubana rather than the Supreme Court of the United States’ Lexmark v. Static Control framework in affirming SFM’s standing, and (2) abused its discretion in granting default judgment as a sanction. On the issue of standing, the Federal Circuit rejected the TTAB’s “unduly narrow” conclusion that the Supreme Court’s Lexmark framework was inapplicable, since Lexmark related to a claim of false advertising under § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, while Empresa Cubana addressed the right to bring a cancellation proceeding under § 1064. The Federal Circuit concluded that Lexmark applied to § 1064 and § 1125(a) because both are statutory causes of action. Nevertheless, the Court found no meaningful substantive difference between the analytical frameworks for standing expressed in Lexmark and Empresa Cubana, and found that the Lexmark “zone-of-interests” proximate cause analysis and the “real interest” and “reasonable belief of damage” requirements under Empresa Cubana similarly provided a right to bring a cause of action. As such, the Court ultimately agreed with the TTAB’s conclusion that SFM’s pleaded allegations of a likelihood of consumer confusion based on a similarity of the parties’ SPROUTS and SPROUT trademarks, and their respective goods and services, were sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable belief of damage under Empresa Cubana and thus supported the right to challenge Corcamore’s registered trademark via cancellation.

With regard to the TTAB’s grant of default judgment, Corcamore did not challenge the TTAB’s express authority to grant default judgment as a sanction under 37 CFR § 2.120(h) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). Instead, Corcamore argued that the TTAB had no factual or legal basis to enter default judgment in the first [...]

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Cookie Trade Dress Infringement Case Crumbles in Face of Functionality Challenge

by | Oct 29, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that trade dress protection did not extend to the design of a chocolate-dipped, stick-shaped cookie, because the product configuration was useful. Ezaki Glico Kabushiki Kaisha v. Lotte Int’l America Corp., Case No. 19-3010 (3d Cir. Oct. 8, 2020) (Bibas, J.).

Ezaki Glico is a Japanese confectionary company that makes and sells the snack food Pocky, which is a thin, stick-shaped cookie with one side dipped in chocolate (or a flavored cream) and the other uncoated. Pocky cookies have been sold in the United States for more than 40 years, during which time Ezaki Glico obtained two trade dress registrations for the Pocky design and a patent for a “Stick Shaped Snack and Method for Producing the Same.”

In 2015, Ezaki Glico sued its competitor, Lotte, alleging that Lotte’s similarly designed cookie, Pepero, infringed the Pocky trade dress. The district court granted Lotte’s motion for summary judgment, finding the Pocky product configuration functional and therefore not protected by trade dress. Ezaki Glico appealed.

Ezaki Glico argued that the Pocky trade dress is not functional because it is not essential to its design. The Third Circuit disagreed, stating “that test is too narrow.” The Court explained that functionality applies to features that are useful, even if they are not necessarily essential. The Court enumerated four indicators of functionality:

  • Evidence that the feature or design makes the relevant product work better
  • Examples of marketing materials touting the usefulness of the feature or design
  • Existence of a utility patent
  • Availability of other designs.

The Third Circuit found that most of these factors supported the finding of functionality. First, the design makes the product work better because “[e]very feature of Pocky’s registration relates to the practical functions of holding, eating, sharing, or packing the snack.” Ezaki Glico’s advertisements also promoted the functional features of Pocky’s design: they featured phrases such as “convenient design,” “the no mess handle of the Pocky Stick,” and “easier for multi-tasking without getting chocolate on your hand.” Likewise, the Court was unpersuaded by Ezaki Glico’s evidence of alternative designs, finding that “[e]very aspect of Pocky is useful. The nine other designs do not make it less so.”

The existence of the utility patent, however, was not a supporting factor in the functionality analysis. The Third Circuit explained that “the patent’s innovation is a better method for making the snack’s stick shape. The method is useful for making the shape whether or not the shape itself is useful for anything.” Although the district court improperly considered this factor in its analysis, the Third Circuit noted that the misstep was “immaterial” given that the district court ultimately reached the correct conclusion.

Practice Note: It is not necessary for a design feature to be essential for it to be considered functional. Trade dress may be considered functional—and therefore not protectable via trademark law—if it is merely useful to the design.



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Eye Don’t: No Counterfeiting Without Likelihood of Confusion

by | Oct 15, 2020 |

Referring to the act of counterfeiting as “hard core” or “first degree” trademark infringement, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for the first time confirmed that the Lanham Act requires a likelihood of confusion in order for the trademark holder to prevail on a counterfeiting claim. Arcona, Inc. v. Farmacy Beauty, LLC, et al., Case No. 19-55586 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 2020) (Lee, J.) In doing so, the Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Farmacy Beauty in a counterfeiting action brought by skin care brand Arcona.

Arcona’s counterfeiting claims (which remained in the district court action after Arcona requested dismissal of its trademark infringement and unfair competition claims) stemmed from Farmacy Beauty’s use of the term EYE DEW on its skincare products, which Arcona asserted to be counterfeit versions of its eye cream sold in the United States under the registered EYE DEW trademark. The district court, however, found that dissimilar packaging and branding made it “implausible” that consumers would be tricked into believing that Farmacy’s EYE DEW product was actually one of Arcona’s skin care products, and granted partial summary judgment for Farmacy on the counterfeiting claim. Arcona appealed.

Arcona argued that it was not required to show a likelihood of consumer confusion with respect to the parties’ EYE DEW eye creams in order to pursue its trademark counterfeiting claim. The Ninth Circuit starkly disagreed, finding that the plain language of the Lanham Act, 15 USC § 1114, expressly states that likelihood of confusion is a requirement for a counterfeiting claim.

The Ninth Circuit also rejected Arcona’s alternative argument, that there should be a presumption of likelihood of confusion based on the parties’ use of the identical mark EYE DEW. The Court explained that in a claim of counterfeiting—even with identical trademarks—there is no presumption of consumer confusion if the products themselves are not identical. Here, evidence demonstrated that the parties sold their respective EYE DEW products in very different packages, with Arcona’s eye cream being in a “tall, cylindrical, silver bottle encased in a slim, cardboard outer box,” and Farmacy’s eye cream sold in a “short, wide, white jar, along with a squarish outer box.” In reviewing the parties’ respective products as a whole, including prominent displays of the respective house marks FARMACY and ARCONA, as well as differences in packaging, size, color, shape and “all other attributes,” the Court determined that the parties’ products were not identical and that there was no presumption of consumer confusion.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that summary judgment of no counterfeiting was proper because there was no genuine dispute of material fact about the likelihood of consumer confusion factor. The Court acknowledged that the parties’ eye cream products do compete in the same space and in the same geographic markets, but explained that a claim of counterfeiting nevertheless requires that the parties’ marks be “considered in their entirety and as they appear in the marketplace.” Noting that the available evidence demonstrated significant differences between [...]

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