Results for "Patent design"
Subscribe to Results for "Patent design"'s Posts

PTAB Designates Three Opinions as Precedential

In RPX Corp. v. Applications in Internet Time, LLC, Case Nos. IPR2015-01750, -01751, -01752 (Oct. 2, 2020) (Boalick, CAPJ) (designated precedential on Dec. 4, 2020), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) terminated institution of RPX’s petitions for inter partes review (IPR) because Salesforce—served with a complaint more than one year before—should have been named as a real party-in-interest (RPI) to the proceedings. As a result, RPX’s petition was time-barred under § 315(b).

The Board’s determination came after remand from the Federal Circuit, which vacated the Board’s prior finding that Salesforce was not an RPI. (IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 8). The Federal Circuit instructed the Board to use the common law understanding of “real party-in-interest” and a “flexible approach that takes into account both equitable and practical considerations, with an eye toward determining whether the non-party is a clear beneficiary that has a pre-existing, established relationship with the petitioner.” On remand, the Board took additional discovery to examine the relationship between RPX and Salesforce, including RPX’s business model, Salesforce’s relationship with RPX, whether RPX represents Salesforce’s interests in invalidating the patents, and the significance of the fact that Salesforce and RPX had overlapping Board members. After considering the relationship, the Board found the evidence pointed clearly toward a common interest—between RPX and its members—in invalidating the patents in IPR proceedings. It found RPX could not avoid the time bar under § 315(b), or estoppel under § 315(e) for its members, by creating the appearance that RPX acts independently of its members’ interests when filing IPR petitions.

In SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., Case No. IPR2020-00734 (Oct. 6, 2020) (Melvin, APJ) (designated precedential on Dec. 4, 2020), the Board declined to address—for purposes of institution—the patent owner’s claim that the IPR petition failed to name an alleged RPI under § 312(a)(2)’s requirement that a petition “identif[y] all real parties-in-interest.” iRobot alleged that JS Global was an unnamed RPI because it was intertwined with SharkNinja’s business and was in a position to fund and exercise control over the IPR petition. The Board declined to reach a determination on the issue because it would have no impact on the proceeding, absent evidence that (1) JS Global was a time-barred or an otherwise estopped entity whose addition to the petition would result in its dismissal under § 315 or (2) SharkNinja’s omission of JS Global was done in bad faith. Even if SharkNinja was mistaken in its decision not to name JS Global as an RPI, the Board’s precedent would allow SharkNinja to correct the mistake during the proceeding.

In Apple Inc. v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, Case No. IPR2020-00854 (Oct. 28, 2020) (Quinn, APJ) (designated precedential on Dec. 4, 2020), the Board exercised its discretion to deny Apple’s motion for joinder because it would have resulted in a “serial attack” on Uniloc’s patent. Apple had previously filed an IPR petition on the same patent, alleging various grounds of invalidity. The Board denied institution because it failed to show a reasonable likelihood [...]

Continue Reading




Standard Essential Patent Licensing Practices Do Not Violate Antitrust Laws

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a district court decision that found Qualcomm’s patent licensing practices violate antitrust laws and reversed a permanent, worldwide injunction against several of Qualcomm’s business practices. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., Case No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2020) (C.J. Callahan).

Qualcomm sells modem chips that are incorporated into cellular handsets (i.e., smartphones) made by companies such as Samsung, Huawai, Apple and others. Qualcomm also holds a number of standard essential patents (SEPs) implemented by modem chips that are essential to cellular communication standards. A core part of Qualcomm’s business model is that it only licenses its SEPs to smartphone makers, i.e., its original equipment manufacturer (OEM) customers, not to rival modem chip suppliers—even though its rivals’ chips practice Qualcomm’s SEPs. Doing this allows Qualcomm to maximize its profits by charging royalty rates based on the value of the end-product smartphones rather than just the modem chip. In addition, Qualcomm will not supply modem chips to OEM customers unless they first pay to license Qualcomm’s SEPs (“no license, no chips”). OEMs must pay this licensing fee to Qualcomm even if they source chips from another supplier.

In January 2017, the FTC filed suit against Qualcomm in the Northern District of California, alleging that Qualcomm’s licensing practices violate the antitrust laws and unfairly protect its monopoly power as a modem chip supplier. Following a two-week bench trial, the district court issued a lengthy opinion ruling in favor of the FTC and ordering extensive injunctive relief requiring Qualcomm to change its business practices. The court made a number of findings, including: (1) Qualcomm’s refusal to license its SEPs to rival chipmakers violates both its FRAND commitments to standard-setting organizations (SSOs) and an antitrust duty to deal; (2) Qualcomm’s royalty rates for its SEPs are unreasonably high because they are based on the value of end products and (3) Qualcomm’s royalties, in conjunction with its “no license, no chips” policy, imposes an anticompetitive “surcharge” on the price of its rivals’ chips. Qualcomm appealed.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision in its entirety and vacated the injunctive relief which had been ordered, finding that Qualcomm’s licensing practices amount to “hypercompetitive,” not anticompetitive, behavior. The Court recognized that Qualcomm’s licensing practices are designed to maximize its profits, but concluded that they do not unfairly distort competition within the modem chip markets. According to the Court, the district court improperly extended the reach of the antitrust laws in issuing its injunction.

The Ninth Circuit addressed and rejected each of the district court’s findings. First, the Court concluded that Qualcomm does not have an antitrust “duty to deal” with its rival chipmakers. The Court emphasized that the Supreme Court has recognized only a narrow exception to the general rule that a business need not deal with its competitors, and concluded that the exception was not met here. The Court also concluded that whether Qualcomm breached a FRAND commitment to license its SEPs to rivals was [...]

Continue Reading




Eighth Circuit Cools Off Antitrust Claims Based on Alleged Patent Fraud

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment dismissing antitrust and tortious interference claims based on fraudulent procurement of patents where the plaintiff failed to show a knowing and willful intent to deceive the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Inline Packaging, LLC v. Graphic Packaging International, LLC, Case No. 18-3167 (8th Cir. June 18, 2020) (Smith, J.).

Inline Packaging and Graphic Packaging are manufacturers of susceptor packaging, a specialized food packaging used for microwaving frozen foods. Graphic developed the susceptor design in partnership with Nestlé in 2005. The packaging was redesigned from a prior patent obtained several years earlier. Although Graphic’s computer-aided design drafter was listed as the sole inventor of the redesigned packaging claimed in the asserted patent, Nestlé’s engineer provided feedback that was implemented into the design, including the addition and deletion of certain features of the packaging.

In 2014, Nestlé held an auction to select the next manufacturer of its susceptor packaging. Nestlé originally selected Inline as the supplier of its susceptor packaging, but later awarded 90% of the susceptor packaging business to Graphic after Graphic notified Nestlé that Inline would likely infringe on Graphic’s patents. In June 2015, Graphic initiated patent litigation against Inline. In July 2015, Inline brought an antitrust suit against Graphic alleging that Graphic monopolized the susceptor packaging market using anticompetitive practices in violation of federal and state antitrust laws. To support its antitrust claims, Inline alleged that Graphic fraudulently procured the asserted patents, made baseless litigation threats and engaged in predatory discount bundling through the use of multi-year supply agreements. At the time the lawsuit was initiated, Graphic was the dominant supplier of susceptor packaging, with an almost 95% share of the US market. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Graphic, dismissing Inline’s claims. Inline appealed.

The Eighth Circuit reviews grants of summary judgment de novo to determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists and whether judgment is entitled as a matter of law. Here, all inferences were viewed in the light most favorable to Inline. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolizing, or attempting to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce among the several states. To prove a violation of Section 2, a claimant must show that an entity possessed monopoly power in the relevant market and willfully acquired or maintained such monopoly power through anticompetitive conduct rather than as the result of fair competition (e.g., by means of a superior product or business acumen).

The Eighth Circuit first considered whether Graphic fraudulently procured the asserted patents. Patent fraud, also known as Walker Process fraud, can support a monopolization claim where the defendant procured the patent at issue by knowing and willful fraud on the PTO, or maintained and enforced the patent with knowledge of the fraudulent manner in which it was obtained. Knowing and willful fraud requires an intent to deceive or inequitable conduct. The Court reasoned that this standard requires clear and convincing [...]

Continue Reading




Administrative Patent Judges – You’re Fired (At Will and Without Cause)

The en banc US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit declined to review its October 2019 panel decision holding the appointment of administrative patent judges (APJs) at the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) unconstitutional because APJs are appointed as if they are “inferior officers” but vested with authority that is reserved for Senate-confirmed “principal officers” under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., Case No. 18-2140 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 2020) (per curiam) (Moore, J., joined by O’Malley, Reyna and Chen, JJ., concurring) (Dyk, J., joined by Newman, Wallach and Hughes, JJ., dissenting).

(more…)




2019 IP Law Year in Review: Patents

Executive Summary

2019 was another important year in intellectual property law that resulted in hundreds of decisions by the courts and Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) that may affect your company’s litigation, patent prosecution or business strategy. This special report on patents discusses some of the most important cases from 2019 from the US Supreme Court, the US Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit and the PTAB.

On January 22, 2019, the Supreme Court addressed in Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. the question of whether, under the America Invents Act (AIA), an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court concluded that such a sale qualifies as prior art.

(more…)




Golden State of Mind: Witness Convenience Isn’t Based Solely on Travel Distance

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ordered a district court to transfer a patent infringement case from Texas to California because the district court had wrongly assessed facts relating to the convenience of witnesses when it originally denied a motion to transfer venue. In re: Apple Inc., Case No. 22-128 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 22, 2022) (Dyk, Reyna, Chen, JJ.) (non-precedential).

CPC Patent Technologies PTY Ltd. filed a lawsuit against Apple in the Western District of Texas, alleging that Apple’s mobile phones, tablets and computing products equipped with Touch ID, Face ID or Apple Card features infringed three of CPC’s patents relating to biometric security. Apple moved to transfer to the Northern District of California, arguing that its employees responsible for the design, development and engineering of the accused functionality resided either in California or outside of the United States, and that the employees most knowledgeable about the marketing, licensing and financial issues relating to the accused products resided in California. Apple explained that no employees with relevant information worked in Western Texas.

The district court denied Apple’s motion. After acknowledging that the action might have been brought in Northern California, the district court analyzed the private and public interest factors governing transfer determinations. The court determined that the factor concerning the convenience of willing witnesses slightly favored transfer. However, the court determined that the factor accounting for the availability of compulsory process weighed strongly against transfer. The district court also determined that court congestion and practical problems factors weighed against transfer based on its ability to quickly reach trial and the fact that CPC had another pending infringement suit in Western Texas. The district court recognized that Apple had identified seven relevant witnesses in California who would have to travel to Texas but found that inconvenience was counterbalanced by the presence of two Apple employees in Austin who CPC insisted had relevant information, and an Apple witness in Florida who would “find it about twice as inconvenient to travel to [Northern California] than to [Western Texas] because Texas sits halfway from Florida to California.” The district court also relied on its ability to compel the third-party Mac Pro manufacturer in Western Texas to attend trial. Finally, the Court noted that there was local interest in the dispute because Apple employs thousands of workers in Western Texas. Balancing these facts, the district court determined that Apple had failed to meet the burden of proving that Northern California was clearly more convenient that Western Texas, and thus denied the motion. Apple petitioned for mandamus review.

The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that Apple had shown clear entitlement to transfer to the Northern District of California. The Court found that the district court erroneously relied on two Apple employees in Austin whom CPC identified as potential witnesses and concluded that it was far from clear that either employee had relevant or material information. One employee had testified that he worked on authentication technology that was different from that accused by CPC, [...]

Continue Reading




Multiple Purchasing Options Overpower Use of “Quotation” in Finding Offer for Sale

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s summary judgment of no invalidity under the on-sale bar, finding that the completeness of relevant commercial sale terms, including multiple purchase options, was not an invitation to further negotiate but rather was multiple offers for sale. Junker v. Medical Components, Inc., Case No. 21-1649 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2022) (Dyk, Reyna, Stoll, JJ.)

Larry Junker designed a sheath that makes it easier for doctors to grasp the sheath during catheter insertion. After designing the sheath, Junker inquired about manufacturing and eventually began a business relationship with James Eddings and his company, Galt Medical, to manufacture the product. Eddings also started a new company, Xentek Medical, to help with the development, manufacture and sale of the product. In January 1999, Eddings, through Xentek, communicated with Boston Scientific Corporation about the sheath products and sent a letter detailing bulk pricing information for the products. The letter concluded by noting Eddings’ appreciation for “the opportunity to provide this quotation.” In February 2000, Junker filed a design patent directed to an “ornamental design for a handle for introducer sheath.”

Junker sued MedComp in 2013 for infringement of the claimed design. In response, MedComp asserted invalidity, unenforceability and noninfringement defenses, as well as counterclaims. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment for several issues, including invalidity under the on-sale bar. The primary dispute regarding the on-sale bar was whether the January 1999 letter to Boston Scientific was considered an offer for sale of a product embodying the claimed design. The district court found that it was not an offer for sale because it was a preliminary negotiation and not a definite offer. The district court reasoned that although the letter included many specific commercial terms, the repeated use of the word “quotation” and the invitation to discuss specifics rendered the letter a preliminary negotiation. The district court proceeded with a bench trial, ultimately finding in favor of Junker and awarding damages. MedComp appealed.

A patent claim is invalid under § 102(b) if the invention was on sale more than a year before the application date and the claimed invention was the subject of a commercial offer for sale and was ready for patenting. There was no dispute that the January 1999 letter was sent more than one year before the patent’s filing and that the claimed design was also ready for patenting. As a result, the only issue on appeal was whether the letter was a commercial offer for sale of the claimed design.

The Federal Circuit determined that the letter was a commercial offer for sale. The Court found that the statement that Xentek was responding to a “request for quotation” signaled that the letter was more than just an unsolicited price quote and was instead a specific offer to take further action. The Court found that the letter contained many necessary terms typical in a commercial contract, including prices for bulk shipments, specific delivery conditions and payment terms. The Court [...]

Continue Reading




The PTO Isn’t Playing Around: More Sanctions for Improper Trademark Filings

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) continues to uphold its promise to combat fraud and “protect the integrity of the U.S. trademark register” with initiatives to investigate and sanction actions before the PTO that appear to violate the Trademark Rules of Practice or the PTO website terms of use. The latest effort comes in the form of a January 25, 2022, sanctions order signed by the commissioner for trademarks against Abtach, 360 Digital Marketing and Retrocube based on evidence that each of the respondents engaged in an “egregious scheme to deceive and defraud both the PTO and individual applicants in more than 5,500 trademark applications, including engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and intentionally providing false, fictitious, or fraudulent information to the PTO in violation of the PTO’s rules of practice in trademark matters.” According to the sanctions order, the respondents were each given an opportunity to respond to a show cause order issued in November 2021, but the PTO received no responses from the noticed parties.

In the sanctions order, the PTO outlined the activities of the three respondents, which appear to operate as separate entities but are ultimately controlled by Abtach, a Pakistan-based company that is also under investigation by Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency for criminal fraud. The PTO’s use of the word “egregious” to describe the respondents’ actions might be an understatement. The sanctions order describes how the respondents set up dozens of websites to hold themselves out as providers of logo designs and low-cost trademark application filing services while forging documents that appear to be issued by the PTO, artificially modifying official PTO documents, threatening customers with legal action if they did not file for registration of their logos through the respondents, intentionally filing applications with errors to delay and increase the cost of the prosecution process, submitting invalid verifications and declarations and demanding payments for unnecessary services or fraudulently inflated fees. The respondents took these actions while failing to employ any US-licensed lawyers to do this work before the PTO.

In determining appropriate sanctions, the PTO considers several factors, including whether the conduct was willful or negligent, whether it was part of a pattern of activity or an isolated event, whether it infected the entire record or was limited to a single submission, whether it was intended to injure a party, what effect it has on the PTO and what is needed to deter similar conduct by others. In this case, the PTO found that the respondents had orchestrated a “widespread, intentional and coordinated effort to defraud both applicants and the USPTO.” Finding the respondents’ activities to be both willful and fraudulent, and to have harmed thousands of applicants while also delaying proceedings in the PTO and “eroding trust in the U.S. trademark registration process,” the PTO ordered termination of all trademark applications and proceedings submitted by the respondents. The PTO will also flag any issued registrations as being subject to a sanctions order. To the extent any victims of the respondents have [...]

Continue Reading




This .SUCKS: Trademark Applications for Identical Characters Is a No-Go

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board) decision affirming the US Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO) refusal to register two trademark applications for “.SUCKS.” In Re: Vox Populi Registry Ltd., Case No. 21-1496 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2022) (Lourie, Dyk, Stoll, JJ.)

Vox is a domain registry operator that maintains the master database of all domain names registered in each top-level domain. Vox filed two trademark applications for identical characters, one as a standard character and the other as a stylized form of .SUCKS, as shown below.

The PTO refused Vox’s applications on the grounds that, when used in connection with the domain services, each failed to function as a trademark. Vox appealed to the Board. The Board concluded that .SUCKS, whether as a standard mark or in the stylized form, would not be perceived as a source identifier. Vox appealed the Board’s decision only with respect to the stylized form of .SUCKS.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that although Vox did not appeal the rejection of the standard character application, it spent much of its opening brief arguing that the standard character functions as a mark. As such, the Court reviewed the Board’s decision with respect to the standard character mark .SUCKS under the substantial evidence standard. Substantial evidence “means only such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” The Court found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that consumers will view .SUCKS as only a non-source identifying part of a domain name, rather than as a trademark. The Court cited evidence reviewed by the Board, including Vox’s website, online articles and advertisements showing that .SUCKS refers to a product rather than as an identifiable provider or service. Ultimately, the Court found that the Board reasonably weighed the evidence.

The Federal Circuit next addressed the question of whether the stylized design of .SUCKS is registerable. The Court found no error in the Board’s analysis of whether the stylized form creates a separate commercial impression, where “all of the characters in the mark are the same height and width and are merely displayed in a font style that was once mandated by the technological limitations of computer screens.” Because the stylized design was not inherently distinctive, the Court rejected Vox’s application, thus affirming the Board’s decision in full.




BLOG EDITORS

STAY CONNECTED

TOPICS

ARCHIVES