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“Lightly Sketched” Characters Not Copyrightable

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that “lightly sketched anthropomorphized characters representing human emotions” were not copyrightable. Daniels v. Walt Disney Co., Case No. 18-55635 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2020) (McKeown, J.).

Denise Daniels created The Moodsters Company. The Moodsters were five named characters, each color-coded to an emotion. The Moodsters Company developed a pitchbook in 2005, a pilot episode for television in 2007, and toys and books of a second generation of The Moodsters by 2013. Daniels and The Moodsters Company also pitched The Moodsters to Disney. In 2010, Disney began developing a movie about five anthropomorphized emotions called Inside Out.

Daniels brought a claim of copyright infringement against Disney. After the district court granted Disney’s motion to dismiss, Daniels appealed.

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Lightbulb Moment: It’s Possible to Grant an Implied Copyright Sublicense

Addressing for the first time the issue of implied copyright sublicenses, the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that where a copyright license provides an unrestricted right to grant sublicenses, a copyright licensee may do so impliedly and without express language. Photographic Illustrators Corp. v. Orgill, Case No. 19-1452 (1st Cir. Mar. 13, 2020) (Kayatta, J.).

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Ninth Circuit Shows Led Zeppelin a Whole Lotta Love in ‘Stairway’ Copyright Win

Ruling en banc, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinstated a 2016 jury verdict, finding that the rock band Led Zeppelin and the opening notes of its hit song “Stairway to Heaven” did not infringe the 1967 song “Taurus” by the band Spirit. Michael Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin et al., Case No. 16-56057 (9th Cir., March 9, 2020) (en banc) (McKeown, J.) (Bea and Ikuta, JJ., dissenting).

The en banc decision addressed a “litany of copyright issues”—the most critical being the interplay between the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts and the Court’s reversal of its own precedent in rejecting a doctrine occasionally referred to as the “inverse ratio rule”—when it concluded that, regardless of a copyrighted work’s fame, all plaintiffs must satisfy the same standard of proof in showing that an allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work.

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2019 IP Law Year in Review: Copyrights

Executive Summary

In many ways, copyright jurisprudence in 2019 was a study in contrasts. While certain cases represented a “back to basics” approach, answering fundamental questions such as “When can a copyright owner sue for copyright infringement?” and “What costs can a prevailing copyright owner recover?,” others addressed thorny issues involving fair use and the first sale doctrine.

In the wake of several pivotal copyright decisions involving the music industry in 2018, such as the watershed “Blurred Lines” verdict, disputes involving music continued to provide fuel for the courts to weigh in on copyright this year. As we look to 2020, all eyes will be on the Supreme Court and its decision in the epic battle between Google and Oracle and the protectability of software. This report provides a summary of 2019’s important copyright decisions with the hopes of assisting those navigating copyright infringement and enforcement issues in the coming year.

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Failure to Mitigate Not a Complete Defense to Statutory Damages Under Copyright or DMCA

On an issue of first impression in a copyright infringement dispute out of the Southern District of Texas, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit confirmed that failure to mitigate is not a complete defense to copyright or Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) claims for statutory damages. Energy Intelligence Grp., Inc. et. al., v. Kayne Anderson Capital Advisors, LP, et. al., Case No. 18-20350 (5th Cir., January 15, 2020) (Higginson, J.).

In 2014, energy industry publisher Energy Intelligence Group, Inc. and its affiliated entity in the United Kingdom (together, EIG) filed suit against energy securities investment firm Kayne Anderson Capital Advisers (KA), alleging copyright infringement and abuses of the DMCA based on a KA partner’s violation of US copyright law and violation of his subscription agreement for EIG’s Oil Daily newsletter, which provides news and analysis about the North America petroleum industry. The jury in the district court proceeding found that EIG could have reasonably avoided almost all of the alleged copyright and DMCA violations through real-time investigations and enforcement efforts, and thus awarded EIG just over $500,000 in statutory damages for the infringement of 39 works of authorship. The district court, however, still applied the Copyright Act’s fee shifting provisions and awarded EIG over $2.6 million in attorney’s fees and costs. The parties’ consolidated appeals to the Fifth Circuit thus presented an issue of first impression: namely, whether the failure to mitigate copyright infringement is a complete defense to liability for statutory damages under the Copyright Act and the DMCA.

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A Mixed Bag on New Rules – Juggling Copyright Preclusion and Patent Infringement

Addressing issues of copyright and patent infringement, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act did not preempt copyright protection and that patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) does not require that the claimed process be performed by a single entity. Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC v. Willowood, LLC, Case Nos.18-1614, -2044 (Fed. Cir., Dec. 18, 2019) (Reyna, J.).

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Ain’t worried about local rules: Scope of sound recording protection is narrow

Addressing for the first time what evidence is required to prove infringement of a sound recording copyright, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the defendant, finding that the plaintiff’s copyright registration of his work as a sound recording required proof of actual sampling to establish infringement. Richardson v. Kharbouch, Case No. 24-1119 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 2025) (Brennan, Jackson-Akiwumi, Pryor, JJ.)

In 2012, then-16-year-old Eddie Richardson created a hip-hop beat titled “*Hood* Pushin Weight” (HPW). Months later, while listening to the hit song “Ain’t Worried About Nothin” (AWAN) by Karim Kharbouch, who is better known by his stage name French Montana, Richardson believed that he recognized his own HPW beat. The next day, Richardson registered a sound recording copyright with the US Copyright Office. Richardson did not obtain a copyright registration for his musical composition. After Richardson’s attempts to negotiate with French Montana and his representatives failed, Richardson filed a copyright infringement lawsuit.

The district court conducted two rounds of summary judgment briefing. In both rounds, neither party complied with a local rule that required each side to respond to the opposing party’s statement of material facts. The court, in its discretion, declined to deem the unopposed facts admitted. After French Montana’s reply brief in the first round included a “passing comment” on the nature of Richardson’s copyright, raising a potentially dispositive issue, the district court ordered supplemental briefing.

In the second round of briefing, the district court determined that because Richardson had registered his copyright as a sound recording rather than a musical composition, he was required to show duplication or sampling, not mere imitation. Finding no such evidence, the court granted summary judgment in favor of French Montana. The district court then awarded costs to French Montana but denied attorneys’ fees. Richardson appealed the grant of summary judgment and the court’s decision not to enforce the local rules against French Montana while French Montana cross-appealed the denial of attorneys’ fees.

Richardson argued that the district court abused its discretion by failing to deem his unopposed factual statements admitted under the local rules. The Seventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court, reasoning that because neither party complied with the local rules, the district court acted appropriately in declining to enforce them against only one side.

The Seventh Circuit also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of French Montana, explaining that “sound recording copyrights only protect those sounds that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording from infringement.” Mere imitation, even if indistinguishable to the listener, is not infringement, and Richardson failed to present evidence of actual duplication of the sound recording.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees to French Montana. Although there is a “strong presumption in favor of awarding fees in copyright infringement cases,” the Seventh Circuit held that the district court properly applied the four-factor Fogerty [...]

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DMCA safe harbor: Prelude to a Supreme Court encore?

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted in part and denied in part Capitol Records’ petition for reconsideration of the Court’s January 13, 2025, decision in Capitol Records v. Vimeo. In that ruling, the Court determined that Capitol Records had waived the argument that Vimeo’s encouragement of users to make infringing lip-dub videos may constitute a form of right and ability to control infringement – an apparent forfeiture of the safe harbor provided by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In its reconsideration decision, the Court removed a footnote regarding whether the “right and ability to control” argument was preserved for Supreme Court review. Capitol Records, LLC, et al. v. Vimeo, Inc., et al., Case Nos. 21-2949; -2974 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 2025) (Leval, Parker, Merriam JJ.)

Capitol Records filed a petition for reconsideration of the Second Circuit’s decision, which found that Capitol had waived its argument under Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster. A central issue was application of the Grokster precedent, which addressed inducement of copyright infringement. Capitol Records argued that Vimeo’s encouragement of users to create infringing lip-dub videos constituted a “right and ability to control” infringement, potentially forfeiting the DMCA safe harbor protection.

In its earlier ruling, the Second Circuit found that Capitol Records had waived this argument by not adequately presenting it in the appellate brief, despite having discussed it in the fact section. The Court emphasized that the argument was not developed in the argument section of the brief and, in a footnote, noted that Capitol Records had acknowledged that the argument was foreclosed by a prior ruling. Capitol Records argued that its waiver was not of the Grokster-based theory of forfeiture of the safe harbor, but rather of a claim under Grokster for induced infringement. The Court was not persuaded, noting that Capitol Records’ opening brief made no distinction between a Grokster-based inducement claim and a Grokster-based theory for forfeiting DMCA safe harbor protection. As a result, the Court rejected Capitol Records’ argument that the Grokster-based theory had not been waived.

In its most recent ruling, the Second Circuit granted Capitol’s petition to remove language from a footnote in the Court’s prior ruling that suggested Capitol’s Grokster inducement theory, based on the “right and ability to control,” was barred from Supreme Court review.

Practice note: The Second Circuit’s decision to partially grant and deny the petition for reconsideration clarifies the procedural requirements for preserving arguments on appeal and reinforces the complexities of applying traditional copyright principles to digital platforms. As the case progresses, stakeholders in the music and technology industries should monitor developments and implications for the DMCA and copyright enforcement.




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Oh brother: Draft settlement agreements carefully

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court judgment, finding that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently prove damages for its copyright claim, the jury instructions accurately applied the sophisticated consumer exception to initial-interest confusion, and the district court properly submitted ambiguous contract language to the jury for interpretation. Hoffmann Brothers Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Hoffmann Air Conditioning & Heating LLC, Case No. 24-1289 (8th Cir. Sept. 8, 2025) (Graza, Stras, Kobes, JJ.)

Brothers Tom and Robert Hoffmann were partners in Hoffmann Brothers. After Robert bought out Tom, they entered into a settlement agreement that included a four-year restriction barring Tom from using the name “Hoffmann” in connection with an HVAC business. After four years, Tom began using “Hoffmann Air Conditioning & Heating, LLC” (Hoffmann AC). Hoffmann AC’s advertising agency later mistakenly used pictures of Hoffmann Brothers. Hoffmann Brothers sued for trademark and copyright infringement. Hoffmann AC prevailed on some issues at summary judgment, and the jury reached a mixed verdict on the remaining claims. Both parties were denied attorneys’ fees, and Hoffmann Brothers appealed.

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed that Hoffmann Brothers did not sufficiently prove damages for its copyright claim based on Hoffmann AC’s use of its photographs. Because the photographs were unregistered works, Hoffmann Brothers was required to prove actual damages and/or additional profits of the infringer attributable to the infringement. Hoffmann Brothers’ only evidence of actual damages was Hoffmann AC’s monthly fee paid to its marketing agency. The Court found that using the monthly fee was too speculative because it did not reflect the benefit to Hoffmann AC or the harm to Hoffmann Brothers. For evidence of additional profits, Hoffmann Brothers’ expert report failed to link the use of the photographs to Hoffmann AC’s gross revenue. The Court explained that the Hoffmann Brothers could have linked additional profits attributable to the use of the photographs by, for example, demonstrating that:

  • Hoffmann AC gained customers because of the ads.
  • The photographs actually influenced purchasing decisions.
  • There was spike in monthly revenue that coincided with use of the photographs.

Regarding Hoffmann Brothers’ trademark claim, the jury found that the names were not so similar as to cause confusion. Hoffmann Brothers appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its jury instructions. The Eighth Circuit rejected the argument, finding the instructions fair and legally adequate. The instruction was directed to the issue of initial-interest confusion (a concept not adopted by Missouri courts), which occurs when consumer confusion arises at the outset, even if no sale ultimately results. The Court explained that under Eighth Circuit precedent, a sophisticated consumer exception applies to this theory, meaning that consumers who exercise a high degree of care are less likely to be initially confused. Here, the district court instructed the jury to consider initial-interest confusion only if it found that Hoffmann Brothers’ customers were not sophisticated. While the Eighth Circuit acknowledged some hesitation about the assumption that sophisticated consumers are never susceptible to initial-interest [...]

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Penny for your characters? Victorian tropes not so striking or protectable

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a copyright infringement claim finding that the plaintiff had not plausibly alleged copying of protected characters. Anna Biani v. Showtime Networks, Inc. et al., Case No. 24-3949 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2025) (Nguyen, Mendoza, Kernodle, JJ.)

Biani sued Showtime alleging that the series “Penny Dreadful” infringed on three original characters she created for an online role-playing forum. Biani claimed that Showtime incorporated various aspects of her characters into two of the show’s characters and alleged that the defendants had access to her work because of the similarities between the characters. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Biani failed to plausibly allege that Showtime had a reasonable opportunity to copy her work. The district court applied the extrinsic test for protectable material under copyright, filtering out characteristics considered to be stock aspects of the Victorian-era England genre, and found that any remaining similarities were not striking enough to preclude the possibility of independent creation. Biani was granted leave to amend but chose not to, leading to the dismissal of the case with prejudice. Biani appealed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Biani’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court explained that to state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must plausibly allege both ownership of a valid copyright and that the defendant copied protected aspects of the work, which includes factual copying and unlawful appropriation. Biani did not challenge the district court’s determination that she failed to plausibly allege evidence of access. Instead she argued that the similarities between the works were so striking as to preclude independent creation. While the panel concluded that the district court improperly filtered out unprotectable elements of the works, it found this error was harmless because Biani’s allegations were insufficient to plausibly infer copying. The Court found that any resemblance between the characters was not extensive enough to preclude the possibility of coincidence, independent creation, or prior common source.

The Ninth Circuit also held that Biani’s claim failed under the “unlawful appropriation” analysis, agreeing with the district court that Biani failed to allege substantial similarity in protectable expression. The Court applied the extrinsic test to assesses the objective similarities of the two works, focusing only on the protectable elements of the plaintiff’s expression. The Court found that many of the characteristics that Biani alleged were unique to her characters (such as their age, strength, beauty, and engagement in witchcraft) were actually unprotectable elements, common in the public domain, and a standard aspect of Victorian-era-based fiction. The Court thus concluded that Biani failed to allege substantial similarity in protectable expression and thus affirmed the district court’s dismissal.




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