SubscribeAddressing the scope of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (“Board”) discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny institution, the Board designated three opinions as precedential or informative.
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Results for "Patent design"
Administrative Patent Judges – You’re Fired (At Will and Without Cause)
The en banc US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit declined to review its October 2019 panel decision holding the appointment of administrative patent judges (APJs) at the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) unconstitutional because APJs are appointed as if they are “inferior officers” but vested with authority that is reserved for Senate-confirmed “principal officers” under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., Case No. 18-2140 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 2020) (per curiam) (Moore, J., joined by O’Malley, Reyna and Chen, JJ., concurring) (Dyk, J., joined by Newman, Wallach and Hughes, JJ., dissenting).
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2019 IP Law Year in Review: Patents
Executive Summary
2019 was another important year in intellectual property law that resulted in hundreds of decisions by the courts and Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) that may affect your company’s litigation, patent prosecution or business strategy. This special report on patents discusses some of the most important cases from 2019 from the US Supreme Court, the US Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit and the PTAB.
On January 22, 2019, the Supreme Court addressed in Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. the question of whether, under the America Invents Act (AIA), an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court concluded that such a sale qualifies as prior art.
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Boss move: Disclaimer that doesn’t work can still work as a disclaimer
The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s judgment of noninfringement and no invalidity for indefiniteness, concluding that the court correctly construed the claims and properly determined that the patents’ specifications and prosecution histories would enable a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) to ascertain the scope of the claims with reasonable certainty. Barrette Outdoor Living, Inc. v. Fortress Iron, LP, Fortress Fence Products LLC, Case Nos. 24-1231; -1359 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 17, 2025) (Moore, Linn, Cunningham, JJ.)
Barrette sued Fortress for infringing its patents directed to a fencing assembly featuring pivoting, sliding connectors that connect pickets to rails. During claim construction, the district court determined that the terms “boss,” “projection,” and “nub” should be given the same meaning and that these “boss” terms described fastener-less and integral structures, distinguishing them from prior art. The district court also held that the terms “sliding” and “causes” were not indefinite because a POSA would understand their scope.
Following the Markman hearing, Barrette stipulated that it could not prove infringement under the court’s construction of the “boss” terms because the accused products used non-integral fasteners. Fortress stipulated, under the same construction, that it could not establish invalidity for indefiniteness. Barrette appealed, and Fortress cross-appealed.
Barrette first argued that the district court erred in finding that the specification disclaimed bosses with fasteners by disparaging prior art assemblies that used them. According to Barrette, the specification did not criticize the use of fasteners but merely distinguished the prior art designs. Fortress, however, argued that the specification repeatedly criticized assemblies employing fasteners, describing prior art systems that used fasteners to join the rails as time consuming to install. In contrast, the patented invention attributes its quick installation advantage to the use of fastener-less, integral bosses.
The Federal Circuit agreed with Barrette that the specification did not clearly and unmistakably disclaim bosses that use fasteners. The Court explained that while a patent may describe multiple advantages over the prior art, not every embodiment must incorporate each of those advantages. Accordingly, claims should not be construed to require every advancement disclosed in the specification. The Court further rejected Fortress’ argument that the claimed “boss” must always achieve the benefit of quick installation. Although the asserted patents describe ease of installation as an advantage of using bosses, that benefit does not limit the term’s structural scope. A “boss,” the Court held, is not restricted to fastener-less configurations. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court erred in limiting the claims to fastener-less bosses.
Barrette next argued that the district court erred by concluding that the prosecution history disclaimed non-integral bosses. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and agreed with the district court that Barrette had clearly disclaimed non-integral boss structures during prosecution. The Federal Circuit stated that Barrette clearly distinguished prior art from the “claimed integral boss” in prosecution and expressly clarified the scope of its claims.
Barrette argued that its subsequent communications with the patent office rendered any purported disclaimer [...]
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The smoke has cleared – and so has your invalidity defense
The US District Court for the Northern District of Iowa issued an instructive decision clarifying the scope of statutory estoppel under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) following post-grant review (PGR) proceedings before the Patent Trial & Appeal Board. Intirion Corp. v. College Products, Inc., Case No. 23-cv-4023-CJW-KEM (N.D. Iowa Sept. 16, 2025) (Williams, J.)
Intirion brought a patent infringement suit against College Products, which responded by petitioning the Board for PGR, challenging the patents based on obviousness and indefiniteness. While the PGR was pending, the district court proceeded with claim construction and initially found the terms “level of smoke,” “amount of smoke,” and “dangerous condition” indefinite. Intirion moved for reconsideration, and College Products filed a motion for partial summary judgment asserting invalidity. Intirion also sought a stay of the litigation pending the PGR outcome, which the court granted.
The Board instituted review of all claims. Initially, it found that neither party had requested express construction of any terms and adopted Intirion’s interpretation that “level of smoke” and “amount of smoke” meant “merely detecting smoke,” based on Intirion’s representations in the district court. In its final written decision (FWD), the Board acknowledged the district court’s indefiniteness findings but ultimately adopted the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms, concluding that a person of ordinary skill in the art could determine appropriate thresholds using known methods. Expert testimony persuaded the Board that defining the terms by their function was sufficiently definite under patent law.
After the Board upheld the claims, the district court found that College Products was estopped under 35 U.S.C. §325(e)(2) from asserting any invalidity grounds (including indefiniteness and obviousness) that were or reasonably could have been raised during the PGR. The district court explained that the AIA established a streamlined system allowing third parties to challenge the patentability of issued claims before the Board as a quicker and more cost-effective alternative to litigation. This structure is specifically designed to prevent challengers from getting multiple bites at the apple by raising the same or similar arguments in subsequent court proceedings.
College Products argued that estoppel should not apply because it filed its motion for partial summary judgment before the Board issued its FWD. The district court rejected this argument, explaining that the statutory language provides no exception based on timing and imposes a clear bar once the Board has issued a FWD. The district court also found that College Products’ position was inconsistent with applicable case law and noted that it failed to cite any contrary authority.
The district court further explained that it had intentionally deferred ruling on College Products’ motion for partial summary judgment of invalidity pending the outcome of the PGR proceedings. Once the PTAB issued its FWDs, College Products was estopped from further challenging the validity of the patents, including through its pending summary judgment motion, because it could have raised any such indefiniteness arguments during the PGR process.
Practice note: Unlike inter partes review (IPR), during PGR a petitioner can challenge patentability on grounds [...]
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Derivation proceedings highlight race to file under AIA
In one of the first decisions regarding derivation proceedings under the America Invents Act (AIA), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s finding that an application earlier filer had not derived his claimed invention from a later-filing petitioner. Global Health Solutions, LLC v. Marc Selner, Case No. 2023-2009 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 2025) (Stoll, Stark, JJ.) (Goldberg, J., sitting by designation).
Global Health Solutions (GHS) and Marc Selner filed patent applications governed by the AIA and covering similar subject matter. Selner filed his application first. GHS filed a petition to institute derivation under 35 U.S.C. § 135, alleging that Selner’s patent claims were derived from Burnam, the single inventor on the GHS application.
During Board proceedings, the parties submitted evidence regarding the timing of their respective conceptions of the claimed inventions, including several email communications. Based on Selner’s evidence, the Board determined that he could not have derived the claimed invention from Burnam. The Board also rejected GHS’s argument that actual reduction to practice was necessary to complete conception of the claimed invention. GHS appealed.
The Federal Circuit explained that while pre-AIA patent interference proceedings required a party alleging derivation to establish prior conception and communication of the invention to the opposing party, the AIA does not expressly define the evidentiary requirements for derivation petitions. Nevertheless, the Court, borrowing from its interference jurisprudence, reasoned that an AIA derivation proceeding similarly requires a showing of both conception and communication of the claimed invention. The Court emphasized, however, that standards articulated in case law from pre-AIA interference proceedings must be applied with caution and considered in light of the AIA’s distinct statutory framework.
The Federal Circuit determined that although the Board focused on which party had proof of the earliest conception (typically the dispositive issue in interference proceedings), it was harmless error. Under the AIA first-to-file framework, determination of the first to invent is not dispositive. The Court noted that because Selner was first to file, he only needed to show that his conception was independent of Burnam’s. Here, Selner’s proof of earlier conception was also proof of conception independent of Burnam, the Court noted.
The Federal Circuit also determined that the Board did not err in rejecting GHS’s argument that Selner failed to demonstrate invention in the absence of evidence of actual reduction to practice. The Court found that the Board appropriately addressed whether such a requirement (often applied in interference proceedings to complicated, unpredictable technology) applied to the invention at issue. The Court explained that Selner’s conception was complete either when he could define the invention by its method of preparation or when he had formed a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention. Selner’s earlier email communication to Burnam supported the finding that Selner had reached the requisite understanding to establish complete conception without the need for actual reduction to practice. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Board’s decision in favor of Selner, finding no derivation.
Practice note: [...]
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Dim damages methods can doom bright ideas
In a mixed ruling on evidentiary exclusions and damages methodology, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded a district court’s decision that excluded patent validity evidence and granted judgment as a matter of law (JMOL). The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in blocking the defendant’s invalidity case and directed it to reassess the reliability of the damages expert’s testimony under Rule 702. Jiaxing Super Lighting Co., Ltd. v. CH Lighting Technology Co., Ltd., Case No. 23-1715 (Fed. Cir. July 28, 2025) (Dyk, Chen, Hughes, JJ.)
Jiaxing Super Lighting and its affiliate Obert (collectively, Super Lighting) sued CH Lighting over three patents related to LED tube lamps – two covering structural designs and one addressing electrical safety. CH Lighting admitted infringement but argued that the structural patents were invalid under the America Invents Act’s (AIA) on-sale bar. The district court excluded key evidence, found the remaining expert testimony insufficient, and granted JMOL in Super Lighting’s favor. A jury later found CH Lighting liable and awarded damages, which the district court doubled. CH Lighting’s motions for a new trial and renewed JMOL were denied. CH appealed.
CH Lighting contended that certain 2014 LED tubes met all claim limitations and triggered the on-sale bar. The Federal Circuit disagreed, affirming the district court’s finding that CH Lighting’s expert lacked a proper foundation, having offered no concrete evidence or personal knowledge of the alleged sales. However, the Court found error in the exclusion of two key evidentiary items: testimony authenticating sales documents and an internal presentation showing competitor products predating the patents. The district court excluded the documents for lack of authentication and barred the presentation because of its connection to a dropped inequitable conduct claim, later reasoning that the products shown differed in wattage. The Federal Circuit rejected both rationales, explaining that the relevant inquiry focused on whether the products disclosed patented features, not their wattage. The Federal Circuit deemed these exclusions an abuse of discretion, warranting a retrial on validity.
The Federal Circuit separately upheld the jury’s findings on a different patent where the jury found the patent not invalid for anticipation and infringed. CH Lighting had argued that a prior art reference anticipated the asserted claims and that the accused chips could not infringe if the reference did not. The Court found, based on the conflicting testimony of the parties’ expert witnesses, that the jury was free to credit one expert over the other and therefore had substantial evidence supporting the jury’s no invalidity verdict. Similarly, the parties’ experts presented conflicting evidence on infringement and that Jiaxing’s expert’s theory was not necessarily inconsistent with the validity ruling. The Court thus affirmed the findings of validity and infringement.
Turning to damages, the Federal Circuit emphasized that expert testimony must be based on reliable methodology and sufficient factual grounding, reinforcing standards articulated in the recent EcoFactor, Inc. v. Google en banc decision. Because the jury [...]
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It’s not monkey business: NFTs can be trademarked
The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that a non-fungible token (NFT) is a “good” under the Lanham Act but reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for trademark infringement because the owner did not prove as a matter of law that the defendants’ use was likely to cause confusion. The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the defendants’ counterclaim for declaratory relief regarding copyright ownership. Yuga Labs, Inc. v. Ryder Ripps and Jeremy Cahen, Case No. 24-879 (9th Cir. July 23, 2025) (Bade, Forrest, Curiel, JJ.)
Yuga Labs is the creator of the Bored Ape Yacht Club (BAYC) NFT collection. Yuga created this collection through a smart contract recorded on the blockchain Ethereum. Each BAYC NFT has a cartoon of a bored ape and a sequential unique identifier called an ape ID. Per its terms and conditions, BAYC NFT consumers receive commercial and personal rights free of royalty fees.
Ryder Ripps and Jermey Cahen created the Ryder Ripps Bored Ape Yacht Club (RR/BAYC) using the same ape images and ape IDs. The collection was also hosted on an Ethereum blockchain smart contract. They criticized Yuga for “using neo-Nazi symbolism, alt-right dog whistles, and racist imagery” and alleged that they created RR/BAYC as satire and criticism. Ripps made the RR/BAYC smart contracts’ names “Bored Ape Yacht Club” and made the smart contract symbol “BAYC.” Ripps’ website includes an artist statement that the artwork is a “new mint of BAYC imagery.” NFT marketplace websites for RR/BAYC displayed a large header “Bored Ape Yacht Club” and in a smaller text “@ryder_ripps.”
Yuga sued Ripps and Cahen for several claims, including trademark infringement based on a false designation of origin theory, false advertising, and cybersquatting. In response, the defendants asserted that Yuga did not have enforceable trademark rights, and even if it did, the defendants’ use was protected by fair use and the First Amendment. The defendants asserted several counterclaims, including knowing misrepresentation of infringing activity under the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), and sought declaratory judgment of no copyright ownership.
The district court granted Yuga’s motion for summary judgment on its false designation of origin and cybersquatting claims. Yuga withdrew its remaining claims, so the trial proceeded only for equitable remedies on the false designation of origin and cybersquatting. At trial, the district court found that Yuga’s BAYC marks were unregistered trademarks. The district court awarded Yuga disgorgement of the defendants’ profits, maximum statutory damages, and attorneys’ fees after finding that the case was exceptional due to the defendants’ willful infringement, bad faith intent to profit, and litigation conduct. The defendants were also permanently enjoined. The defendants appealed the grant of summary judgment and sought vacatur of the remedies.
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the defendants’ argument that NFTs are not goods protected by the Lanham Act. The Court concluded that NFTs are goods under the Lanham Act based on a US Patent & Trademark Office report that determined them as such. The Court also [...]
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Victory lap: Extraterritorial injunction permitted for breach of settlement agreement
The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a permanent injunction, concluding that the district court properly determined that a party’s violation of a settlement agreement would lead to irreparable harm. Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. v. Wong, Case No. 24-1186 (4th Cir. July 11, 2025) (King, Gregory, Rushing, JJ.)
The dispute originated in 2017 when Wudi registered the trademark GTRACING with the US Patent & Trademark Office. Wai L. Wong, asserting prior use of the similar mark GT OMEGA RACING, initiated cancellation proceedings before the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board. In 2020, the Board ruled in Wong’s favor. Wudi sought review in the Eastern District of Virginia under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b), and Wong counterclaimed for trademark infringement.
In May 2021, the parties entered into a confidential global concurrent-use settlement agreement resolving their litigation. Under the agreement, Wudi was permitted to use GTRACING globally, except in designated regions including multiple European countries. Critically, paragraph 6(b) of the agreement prohibited Wudi from using the phrases “GTRACING” or “GT RACING” in online advertising or social media within the European carve-out. The district court subsequently granted a stay of the dispute pending compliance by the parties.
Following the compliance period, Wong alleged that Wudi violated the agreement by using prohibited terms in online marketing within the restricted regions. The district court granted Wong’s motion to enforce the agreement, ordering Wudi to remove specific content and cease future violations. The district court warned that continued noncompliance could result in contempt proceedings.
Wudi appealed, and the Fourth Circuit initially remanded the case, instructing the district court to apply the four-factor eBay test for injunctive relief. The district court found that Wudi had breached the agreement and that Wong had suffered irreparable harm to the goodwill of its marks. The court concluded that monetary damages were inadequate, the balance of hardships favored Wong, and enforcing the agreement served the public interest. The district court issued a permanent injunction. Wudi appealed again.
Wudi challenged the injunction on multiple grounds, including claims of extraterritorial overreach, improper application of the eBay factors, erroneous breach findings, exclusion of parol evidence, failure to apply the unclean hands doctrine, and improper award of attorneys’ fees.
The Fourth Circuit rejected Wudi’s arguments and affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Court held that the injunction merely enforced contractual obligations voluntarily undertaken by Wudi and that the district court properly applied the eBay test. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exclusion of parol evidence and its rejection of the unclean hands defense, finding that the district court properly concluded that reputational harm can demonstrate that irreparable injury will flow from the breach of a trademark-related settlement agreement.
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Motivation, expectation of success negate obviousness presumption in overlapping range case
The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed (on its second review) a district court’s ruling upholding the validity of patent claims related to a long-acting injectable dosing regimen, finding that the presumption of obviousness does not apply automatically and must be grounded in specific factual findings, particularly regarding a skilled artisan’s motivation and expectations. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Case No. 25-1228 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 2025) (Prost, Reyna, Taranto, JJ.)
Janssen sued Teva under the Hatch-Waxman Act in 2018 after Teva filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) seeking approval for a generic version of Janssen’s drug. Teva stipulated infringement but challenged the patent’s validity, arguing that all claims were obvious in light of prior art. The patent at issue covered a dosing regimen involving two “loading doses” spaced about a week apart, followed by monthly maintenance injections, designed to improve patient compliance compared to traditional oral dosing.
In 2021, the district court rejected Teva’s obviousness arguments, citing key differences between the claims and prior art, including the specific dosage amounts, the sequence of administration, and the requirement for deltoid injections. In 2024, the Federal Circuit initially vacated that decision and remanded for further analysis. On remand, the district court again found the claims nonobvious, and Teva appealed again.
A prima facie case of obviousness typically exists when the ranges of a claimed composition overlap the ranges disclosed in the prior art. Teva argued that a presumption of obviousness should apply because the prior art disclosed equal loading doses (150 or 100 mg-eq) within the claimed range. The Federal Circuit disagreed, emphasizing that the presumption depends on factual premises (such as a skilled artisan’s motivation to optimize and expectations from routine experimentation), which were not met here. The Court noted that Janssen’s specific choice of a higher first dose followed by a lower second dose did not clearly fall within the presumption’s scope.
Turning to the obviousness analysis, the Federal Circuit found that the three primary prior art references did not disclose a loading-dose regimen. Teva’s additional references, which it claimed taught dose reduction strategies, were also deemed insufficient. The Court found that one expert cited a reference recommending a high first dose for acutely ill patients while another noted that long-acting injectables were not typically used for such patients. The Court found that the prior art taken as a whole undermined Teva’s position.
Teva further contended that the district court improperly considered safety and efficacy (factors not recited in the claims) and erred in finding that the multidose regimen added complexity that would discourage a skilled artisan. The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments, affirming that the district court appropriately considered the motivation to develop a safe and effective regimen and correctly found that the prior art lacked relevant safety or efficacy data for multidose approaches.
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