IP UPDATE
Exploring the latest in intellectual property law
IP UPDATE
Exploring the latest in intellectual property law
Results for "Patent design"
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Standard Essential Patent Licensing Practices Do Not Violate Antitrust Laws

by and | Aug 26, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a district court decision that found Qualcomm’s patent licensing practices violate antitrust laws and reversed a permanent, worldwide injunction against several of Qualcomm’s business practices. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., Case No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2020) (C.J. Callahan).

Qualcomm sells modem chips that are incorporated into cellular handsets (i.e., smartphones) made by companies such as Samsung, Huawai, Apple and others. Qualcomm also holds a number of standard essential patents (SEPs) implemented by modem chips that are essential to cellular communication standards. A core part of Qualcomm’s business model is that it only licenses its SEPs to smartphone makers, i.e., its original equipment manufacturer (OEM) customers, not to rival modem chip suppliers—even though its rivals’ chips practice Qualcomm’s SEPs. Doing this allows Qualcomm to maximize its profits by charging royalty rates based on the value of the end-product smartphones rather than just the modem chip. In addition, Qualcomm will not supply modem chips to OEM customers unless they first pay to license Qualcomm’s SEPs (“no license, no chips”). OEMs must pay this licensing fee to Qualcomm even if they source chips from another supplier.

In January 2017, the FTC filed suit against Qualcomm in the Northern District of California, alleging that Qualcomm’s licensing practices violate the antitrust laws and unfairly protect its monopoly power as a modem chip supplier. Following a two-week bench trial, the district court issued a lengthy opinion ruling in favor of the FTC and ordering extensive injunctive relief requiring Qualcomm to change its business practices. The court made a number of findings, including: (1) Qualcomm’s refusal to license its SEPs to rival chipmakers violates both its FRAND commitments to standard-setting organizations (SSOs) and an antitrust duty to deal; (2) Qualcomm’s royalty rates for its SEPs are unreasonably high because they are based on the value of end products and (3) Qualcomm’s royalties, in conjunction with its “no license, no chips” policy, imposes an anticompetitive “surcharge” on the price of its rivals’ chips. Qualcomm appealed.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision in its entirety and vacated the injunctive relief which had been ordered, finding that Qualcomm’s licensing practices amount to “hypercompetitive,” not anticompetitive, behavior. The Court recognized that Qualcomm’s licensing practices are designed to maximize its profits, but concluded that they do not unfairly distort competition within the modem chip markets. According to the Court, the district court improperly extended the reach of the antitrust laws in issuing its injunction.

The Ninth Circuit addressed and rejected each of the district court’s findings. First, the Court concluded that Qualcomm does not have an antitrust “duty to deal” with its rival chipmakers. The Court emphasized that the Supreme Court has recognized only a narrow exception to the general rule that a business need not deal with its competitors, and concluded that the exception was not met here. The Court also concluded that whether Qualcomm breached a FRAND commitment to license its SEPs to rivals was [...]

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Eighth Circuit Cools Off Antitrust Claims Based on Alleged Patent Fraud

by | Aug 5, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment dismissing antitrust and tortious interference claims based on fraudulent procurement of patents where the plaintiff failed to show a knowing and willful intent to deceive the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Inline Packaging, LLC v. Graphic Packaging International, LLC, Case No. 18-3167 (8th Cir. June 18, 2020) (Smith, J.).

Inline Packaging and Graphic Packaging are manufacturers of susceptor packaging, a specialized food packaging used for microwaving frozen foods. Graphic developed the susceptor design in partnership with Nestlé in 2005. The packaging was redesigned from a prior patent obtained several years earlier. Although Graphic’s computer-aided design drafter was listed as the sole inventor of the redesigned packaging claimed in the asserted patent, Nestlé’s engineer provided feedback that was implemented into the design, including the addition and deletion of certain features of the packaging.

In 2014, Nestlé held an auction to select the next manufacturer of its susceptor packaging. Nestlé originally selected Inline as the supplier of its susceptor packaging, but later awarded 90% of the susceptor packaging business to Graphic after Graphic notified Nestlé that Inline would likely infringe on Graphic’s patents. In June 2015, Graphic initiated patent litigation against Inline. In July 2015, Inline brought an antitrust suit against Graphic alleging that Graphic monopolized the susceptor packaging market using anticompetitive practices in violation of federal and state antitrust laws. To support its antitrust claims, Inline alleged that Graphic fraudulently procured the asserted patents, made baseless litigation threats and engaged in predatory discount bundling through the use of multi-year supply agreements. At the time the lawsuit was initiated, Graphic was the dominant supplier of susceptor packaging, with an almost 95% share of the US market. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Graphic, dismissing Inline’s claims. Inline appealed.

The Eighth Circuit reviews grants of summary judgment de novo to determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists and whether judgment is entitled as a matter of law. Here, all inferences were viewed in the light most favorable to Inline. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolizing, or attempting to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce among the several states. To prove a violation of Section 2, a claimant must show that an entity possessed monopoly power in the relevant market and willfully acquired or maintained such monopoly power through anticompetitive conduct rather than as the result of fair competition (e.g., by means of a superior product or business acumen).

The Eighth Circuit first considered whether Graphic fraudulently procured the asserted patents. Patent fraud, also known as Walker Process fraud, can support a monopolization claim where the defendant procured the patent at issue by knowing and willful fraud on the PTO, or maintained and enforced the patent with knowledge of the fraudulent manner in which it was obtained. Knowing and willful fraud requires an intent to deceive or inequitable conduct. The Court reasoned that this standard requires clear and convincing [...]

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Administrative Patent Judges – You’re Fired (At Will and Without Cause)

by | Apr 2, 2020 |

The en banc US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit declined to review its October 2019 panel decision holding the appointment of administrative patent judges (APJs) at the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) unconstitutional because APJs are appointed as if they are “inferior officers” but vested with authority that is reserved for Senate-confirmed “principal officers” under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., Case No. 18-2140 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 2020) (per curiam) (Moore, J., joined by O’Malley, Reyna and Chen, JJ., concurring) (Dyk, J., joined by Newman, Wallach and Hughes, JJ., dissenting).

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2019 IP Law Year in Review: Patents

by | Feb 20, 2020 |

Executive Summary

2019 was another important year in intellectual property law that resulted in hundreds of decisions by the courts and Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) that may affect your company’s litigation, patent prosecution or business strategy. This special report on patents discusses some of the most important cases from 2019 from the US Supreme Court, the US Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit and the PTAB.

On January 22, 2019, the Supreme Court addressed in Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. the question of whether, under the America Invents Act (AIA), an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court concluded that such a sale qualifies as prior art.

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Expert had firm grip on Rule 702

by | Jan 29, 2026 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed an exclusion of expert testimony and grant of judgment as a matter of law, finding that the district court improperly conflated admissibility with credibility and weight of the evidence. Barry v. DePuy Synthes Companies, et al., Case Nos. 023-2226; -2234 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2026) (Prost, Taranto, Stark, JJ.) (Prost, J., dissenting).

Mark Barry owns patents covering surgical techniques and tools for treating spinal deformities. Barry sued DePuy alleging that DePuy induced surgeons to infringe the patents. The patents describe tools and methods, including levers, for applying force to vertebrae to realign the spinal column. Two of the patents required the presence of a “handle means,” which the district court construed as “a part that is designed especially to be grasped by the hand.”

At trial, Barry relied on two experts. His infringement expert, Dr. Walid Yassir, testified that DePuy’s accused tools could be assembled and used in infringing configurations and that certain components (or linked assemblies) constituted the claimed “handle means” under the court’s construction. Barry also offered expert testimony from Dr. David Neal, who conducted a surgeon survey to estimate how often DePuy’s tools were used in infringing configurations, which in turn supported Barry’s damages case.

Although the district court had denied DePuy’s pretrial Daubert motions regarding Barry’s experts, it reversed course mid-trial. The court excluded Yassir’s testimony on the ground that he contradicted the court’s claim construction by equating “handle means” with parts that must be grasped during assembly. The court also excluded Neal’s survey testimony, concluding that methodological flaws, such as nonprobability sampling and alleged defects in question design, rendered the survey unreliable. Having excluded both experts, the court granted DePuy judgment as a matter of law. Barry appealed.

The Federal Circuit agreed that expert opinion that contradicts a court’s claim construction would not be helpful to a jury and should be excluded under Rule 702. The Court found, however, that Yassir did not contradict the court’s construction but instead applied it in a manner a reasonable factfinder could accept or reject – a disputed application that DePuy challenged on cross-examination. However, DePuy did not object to Yassir’s direct testimony despite having secured a pretrial ruling barring evidence inconsistent with the claim construction.

The Federal Circuit concluded that Yassir’s testimony did not contradict the court’s claim construction but rather exposed areas of tension and potential weakness in how Yassir applied that construction to the accused devices. The Court explained that DePuy’s questioning elicited testimony about what could constitute a “handle means” that went to the credibility and persuasiveness of Yassir’s opinions, not their admissibility. The Court rejected the district court’s reliance on isolated testimonial snippets divorced from their surrounding explanations, noting that ordinary ambiguities and concessions revealed through adversarial questioning are for the jury to evaluate and do not convert an expert’s application of a claim construction into an impermissible contradiction warranting exclusion under Rule 702.

The Federal Circuit likewise held that the district court abused [...]

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USPTO elevates precedential and informative decisions on discretionary institution in IPR/PGR

by | Jan 22, 2026 |

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) designated four decisions as precedential and nine decisions as informative, all highlighting the factors the USPTO will consider in determining whether to deny a petition for inter partes review (IPR) or post-grant review (PGR) based on discretionary considerations.

Although the individual outcomes differ among the four precedential decisions (two granting institution and two denying), the decisions provide insight on how the USPTO will exercise its discretion to institute and deny America Invents Act (AIA) trials based on timing, copycat petitions and joinder, sequential petitions, and policy preference for PGR availability. The USPTO designated the following decisions precedential:

The USPTO designated the following decisions as informative, illustrating the types of factual scenarios that may support either discretionary denial of a petition or, conversely, a decision to consider the petition on the merits.

Together, these informative decisions provide concrete, real‑world examples of how the Director is likely to applies discretion under 35 USC §§ 314(a) and 324(a), ranging from circumstances where institution is disfavored (e.g., parallel litigation dynamics, petition quality, procedural posture) to situations where the USPTO [...]

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Vague definitions deflate tire trade secret claims

by | Dec 18, 2025 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) that the plaintiff failed to prove misappropriation of five alleged trade secrets related to self-inflating tire (SIT) technology and separately rejected the plaintiff’s claim for correction of inventorship of defendant’s patent related to the alleged trade secrets. Coda Dev. S.R.O., et al. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., et al., Case No. 23-1880 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 2025) (Lourie, Dyk, Cunningham, JJ.)

Coda sued Goodyear in the Northern District of Ohio, alleging that Goodyear misappropriated trade secrets disclosed during SIT-technology collaboration discussions and that Coda’s founder should be added as an inventor on Goodyear’s patent related to the same technology. A jury initially found for Coda on five trade secrets (TS 7, 11, 20, 23, and 24) and awarded more than $64 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The district court, however, granted Goodyear JMOL, holding that the asserted trade secrets were insufficiently definite, not secret, and/or never used or disclosed by Goodyear. It later denied Coda’s inventorship claim of a Goodyear patent related to the alleged trade secrets after a bench proceeding. Coda appealed.

Trade secret claims

TS 24 concerned the “optimal” pump location in a tire sidewall above the rim. The Federal Circuit found that Coda had already disclosed this placement in a 2007 PCT application and a 2008 Tire Technology article, both of which discussed pump placement in the sidewall. At trial, Coda confirmed that these publications described the same location. The Federal Circuit determined that because the information was public, it could not be a trade secret.

Coda’s attempt to narrow TS 24 post hoc by adding qualifiers such as “conventional tire sidewall” failed because those limitations did not appear in Coda’s interrogatory responses in compliance with the district court’s order to provide “a complete list of the trade secrets (with particularity).” The Federal Circuit rejected Coda’s attempt to belatedly introduce additional specificity into the trade secret based on trial testimony and attorney arguments.

The Federal Circuit similarly affirmed that TS 7, 11, and 20 (which described broad categories of SIT system components and functions) failed the definiteness requirement. Each trade secret identified a list of desired features but did not specify the underlying “design and development” knowledge Coda claimed to own. Without a concrete articulation of the claimed technical know-how, the Court found that the descriptions were too vague to distinguish trade secret information from general design concepts already known in the field.

TS 23 comprised a set of pump-pressure test results. At trial, Coda offered only a single 2009 email that mentioned one of the pressure values listed in TS 23. The Federal Circuit found that this partial overlap could not sustain a verdict of “use,” particularly when no evidence showed Goodyear had received or relied on the totality of the testing data. The Court also found that Coda’s arguments about Goodyear proceeding with its SIT project after the email failed to establish a [...]

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IPR estoppel doesn’t extend to ongoing ex parte reexamination

by | Dec 11, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by the Patent Trial & Appeal Board, concluding that inter partes review (IPR) estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) does not apply to ongoing ex parte reexamination proceedings and that the Board may retain jurisdiction over a patent even after its expiration. In re Gesture Tech. Partners, LLC, Case No. 25-1075 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 1, 2025) (Lourie, Bryson, Chen, JJ.)

Gesture Technology owns a patent covering methods and apparatus for rapid TV camera and computer-based sensing of objects and human input for applications such as handheld devices, automotive systems, and video games. Samsung requested ex parte reexamination, which the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) granted.

While the ex parte reexamination was pending, Unified Patents, an organization that includes Samsung as a member, filed two IPR petitions. After the Board issued a final written decisions on the IPRs, Gesture Technology petitioned to terminate the ex parte reexamination, asserting that Samsung was estopped under 35 U.S.C. §315(e)(1) from “maintain[ing] a proceeding” at the USPTO challenging the patent on grounds it could have raised in the IPRs. The USPTO denied the petition, concluding that the estoppel provision does not apply to continuing ex parte reexamination proceedings.

Gesture Technology appealed both IPR final written decisions where the Board invalidated all but two claims. In the ex parte reexamination, the examiner rejected the two remaining claims as anticipated by Liebermann, a patent directed to an electronic communication system designed for deaf individuals that enables real-time interaction using sign language and speech translation. The Board affirmed. Gesture Technology appealed.

Gesture Technology argued that:

  • Estoppel under 35 U.S.C. §315(e)(1) should bar the reexamination because Samsung had previously participated in an IPR.
  • The Board had no jurisdiction because the patent expired.
  • The Board erred in finding anticipation based on Liebermann.

The Federal Circuit rejected Gesture Technology’s estoppel argument, explaining that § 315(e)(1) applies to an IPR “petitioner” maintaining a proceeding before the USPTO. In contrast, under 35 U.S.C. § 305, the USPTO – not the requester – maintains an ex parte reexamination. Thus, estoppel does not bar ongoing ex parte reexamination proceedings.

Gesture Technology argued that Liebermann did not correlate information with a function of the apparatus because its sending function was always selected. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding substantial evidence that Liebermann disclosed a transmitter/receiver device with a camera performing initial image processing and transmitting processed data. Liebermann’s description of reducing images to pertinent data and sending that data to a processing center supported the conclusion that its device correlated image information with a transmission function, satisfying the claim limitations.

Finally, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Board retains jurisdiction over ex parte reexaminations even after patent expiration. Patent owners maintain rights such as the ability to sue for past damages, creating a live case or controversy that an ex parte reexamination can resolve.

Practice note: Ex parte reexamination remains a viable tool for challengers even after an IPR concludes because estoppel [...]

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Boss move: Disclaimer that doesn’t work can still work as a disclaimer

by | Oct 30, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s judgment of noninfringement and no invalidity for indefiniteness, concluding that the court correctly construed the claims and properly determined that the patents’ specifications and prosecution histories would enable a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) to ascertain the scope of the claims with reasonable certainty. Barrette Outdoor Living, Inc. v. Fortress Iron, LP, Fortress Fence Products LLC, Case Nos. 24-1231; -1359 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 17, 2025) (Moore, Linn, Cunningham, JJ.)

Barrette sued Fortress for infringing its patents directed to a fencing assembly featuring pivoting, sliding connectors that connect pickets to rails. During claim construction, the district court determined that the terms “boss,” “projection,” and “nub” should be given the same meaning and that these “boss” terms described fastener-less and integral structures, distinguishing them from prior art. The district court also held that the terms “sliding” and “causes” were not indefinite because a POSA would understand their scope.

Following the Markman hearing, Barrette stipulated that it could not prove infringement under the court’s construction of the “boss” terms because the accused products used non-integral fasteners. Fortress stipulated, under the same construction, that it could not establish invalidity for indefiniteness. Barrette appealed, and Fortress cross-appealed.

Barrette first argued that the district court erred in finding that the specification disclaimed bosses with fasteners by disparaging prior art assemblies that used them. According to Barrette, the specification did not criticize the use of fasteners but merely distinguished the prior art designs. Fortress, however, argued that the specification repeatedly criticized assemblies employing fasteners, describing prior art systems that used fasteners to join the rails as time consuming to install. In contrast, the patented invention attributes its quick installation advantage to the use of fastener-less, integral bosses.

The Federal Circuit agreed with Barrette that the specification did not clearly and unmistakably disclaim bosses that use fasteners. The Court explained that while a patent may describe multiple advantages over the prior art, not every embodiment must incorporate each of those advantages. Accordingly, claims should not be construed to require every advancement disclosed in the specification. The Court further rejected Fortress’ argument that the claimed “boss” must always achieve the benefit of quick installation. Although the asserted patents describe ease of installation as an advantage of using bosses, that benefit does not limit the term’s structural scope. A “boss,” the Court held, is not restricted to fastener-less configurations. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court erred in limiting the claims to fastener-less bosses.

Barrette next argued that the district court erred by concluding that the prosecution history disclaimed non-integral bosses. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and agreed with the district court that Barrette had clearly disclaimed non-integral boss structures during prosecution. The Federal Circuit stated that Barrette clearly distinguished prior art from the “claimed integral boss” in prosecution and expressly clarified the scope of its claims.

Barrette argued that its subsequent communications with the patent office rendered any purported disclaimer [...]

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