IP UPDATE
Exploring the latest in intellectual property law
IP UPDATE
Exploring the latest in intellectual property law
Results for "Patent filing"
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Choosing Advocacy over Candor Renders Patent Unenforceable

by | Mar 19, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that the patents-in-suit were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct because of a failure to disclose information related to an offer for sale of the claimed invention made more than one year prior to the critical date. GS Cleantech Corp v Adkins Energy LLC, Case Nos. 16-2231, 17-1838; GS Cleantech Corp. et al. v. Big River Resources Galva, LLC et al., Case No. 17-1832 (Fed Cir. March 2, 2020) (Wallach, J.)

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2019 IP Law Year in Review: Patents

by | Feb 20, 2020 |

Executive Summary

2019 was another important year in intellectual property law that resulted in hundreds of decisions by the courts and Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) that may affect your company’s litigation, patent prosecution or business strategy. This special report on patents discusses some of the most important cases from 2019 from the US Supreme Court, the US Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit and the PTAB.

On January 22, 2019, the Supreme Court addressed in Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. the question of whether, under the America Invents Act (AIA), an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court concluded that such a sale qualifies as prior art.

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Private Sale Means Public Fail

by | Aug 8, 2024 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision that a private sale of a product embodying the claimed invention did not qualify as a “public disclosure” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(B). Sanho Corp. v. Kaijet Technology Int’l Ltd, Inc., Case No. 23-1336 (Fed. Cir. July 31, 2024) (Dyk, Clevenger, Stoll, JJ.)

Sanho owns a patent directed to a port extension apparatus designed to enhance connectivity of end-user devices (such as laptops) with other devices (such as printers). Kaijet petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) challenging certain claims of Sanho’s patent, arguing that the claims were obvious based on a prior art reference. The Board found that the patent claims were invalid because of the prior art reference’s earlier effective filing date. Sanho argued that a prior sale of its HyperDrive device by the inventor of the patent should disqualify the reference as prior art. However, the Board determined that Sanho failed to demonstrate a public disclosure of the HyperDrive sale before the prior art reference’s effective filing date. Thus, the patent was invalidated. Sanho appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed, explaining that the America Invents Act (AIA) redefined prior art, shifting from a first-to-invent to a first-inventor-to-file system. Under the AIA, prior art includes patents and applications filed before the patent’s effective filing date subject to exceptions for public disclosures by the inventor. Sanho argued that the HyperDrive sale fell into this exception.

The Federal Circuit dismissed Sanho’s argument that the phrase “publicly disclosed” in § 102(b)(2)(B) should encompass all types of disclosures described in § 102(a)(1), including private sales. The crux of the issue was whether placing an invention “on sale” was tantamount to a “public disclosure” under § 102(b)(2)(B). The statute states that a disclosure is not prior art if the subject matter was publicly disclosed by the inventor before the effective filing date of the prior art. Sanho argued that “publicly disclosed” includes any disclosure, even private sales. The Court disagreed, explaining that the statute’s use of “publicly” implies a narrower scope than just “disclosed.” The Court noted that the purpose of this exception is to protect inventors who make their inventions available to the public before another’s patent filing.

The Federal Circuit also relied on legislative history in support of the conclusion that “public disclosure” in § 102(b)(2)(B) means the invention must be made available to the public. Sanho argued that as long as there are no confidentiality requirements, all disclosures, even private sales, should constitute public disclosures. Again, the Court rejected that argument, noting that the statute differentiates between “publicly disclosed” and general “disclosures,” implying different meanings.

The Federal Circuit determined that § 102(b)(2)(B) protects inventors who publicly disclose their inventions from subsequent disclosures by others, ensuring that prior public disclosure by the inventor prevents a third party’s disclosure from becoming prior art. This provision aims to encourage inventors to share their innovations with the public.

Practice Note: For a disclosure to qualify as “public” under the [...]

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Are You Ready for the UPC? Act Now to Prepare for its Opening on June 1

by , and | Mar 1, 2023 | ,

On February 17, 2023, Germany ratified the Agreement on the Unified Patent Court (UPC) and triggered the UPC’s entry into force on June 1, 2023. The UPC will revolutionize patent enforcement across Europe and impact companies around the world that hold European patents or conduct business in Europe.

Owners of existing European patents or pending applications can “opt out” of the UPC’s jurisdiction for an initial transitional period of at least seven years. Companies must act now if they want to opt out before the court officially opens.

Understanding the UPC

The UPC will have exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement and invalidity actions in its member states for patents granted by the European Patent Office (EPO), including existing European patents and new European patents with unitary effect (unitary patents). There are currently 17 EU Member States participating in the UPC (Germany, France, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and Slovenia). Additional EU Member States may join the UPC in the future.

The UPC will have local and regional divisions in its member states, with a central division in Paris and Munich and a Court of Appeal in Luxembourg.

As a streamlined patent enforcement venue, the UPC will provide several new benefits to patent owners, including faster decisions with limited discovery and lower cost, and the possibility of injunctive relief throughout the member states. At the same time, the UPC will allow revocation of a patent in a single action with effect for all member states, alongside the possibility to oppose a European patent before the EPO.

European Freedom to Operate

Because of the UPC’s structure and incentives, patent litigation will likely increase in Europe, which will heighten the intellectual property (IP) infringement risk for companies doing business in Europe. If a company has not already done so, it should promptly review its competitors’ European patent estates to assess the potential risks and develop a defense strategy to avoid a surprise attack from a competitor after June 1, 2023.

European Enforcement Actions

Although the UPC is new and untried, it has the incentive to provide strong relief for those who trust it. If a company needs to bring a patent infringement action against a competitor and would like to do so in a fast, cost-effective manner, with the possibility of significant remedies, the UPC should be considered as a potential venue. The company should review its portfolio and infringement evidence to assess its opportunities.

Deciding Whether to Opt Out

The right to opt out European patent filings from the UPC’s jurisdiction will be available for an initial transitional period of seven years, which may extend to 14 years. It will be possible to reverse an opt-out, but not if the patent has been enforced or attacked in national court.

McDermott’s UPC Resource Center explores the various advantages and disadvantages of both staying in and opting out of the UPC.



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Article III standing: Claims of future injury must be sufficiently tied to the claim limitations at issue

by | Apr 16, 2026 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal of a post-grant review (PGR) for lack of Article III jurisdiction, finding that the appellant failed to meet its burden to prove it would likely suffer an injury in fact. ironSource Ltd. v. Digital Turbine, Inc., Case No. 2024-1831 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 2026) (Moore, Lourie, Reyna J.J.)

Mobile advertising company Digital Turbine has a patent related to streamlined background processes for downloading and installing mobile applications. That patent is a continuation an earlier related patent which was invalidated during a prior PGR proceeding. Mobile advertising and app monetization platform ironSource once had a product on the market called Aura, which included “Click to Install” features. When faced with what it referred to as “veiled threats” of liability for infringement of the earlier patent, ironSource modified its Aura product – eventually removing it from the market – and petitioned the Patent Trial & Appeal Board for a PGR of the continuation patent’s claims 1 – 22.

During the PGR, the Board held that claims 1 – 22 were all unpatentable pursuant to its earlier decision in the earlier PGR but allowed Digital Turbine to amend the claims. In so doing, Digital Turbine included, among other changes, two narrowing limitations to the claims. The Board concluded that ironSource had not carried its burden of proving that the newly amended claims were unpatentable or ineligible for patent protection. ironSource appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that while Article III standing is not required before the Board, it is required to sustain an appeal of the Board’s decisions. The burden is on the appellant to prove it meets the requirements for standing under federal law at the time of filing. Federal law requires an appellant to prove it has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the [appellee], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo. Specific to patent cases, the appellant must show concrete evidence of its intended future actions that pose a substantial risk of infringement or an assertion of infringement.

To meet this obligation, ironSource submitted a declaration by one of its senior directors. The declarant discussed past changes and concessions to the Aura product that ironSource had made in light of Digital Turbine’s patent rights. It also stated that ironSource intended to reintroduce the Aura product to the market. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that ironSource failed to meet its burden of tying that potential product’s features to the patent’s amended claims. Instead, ironSource focused on the claims of the original, alleging that they were “substantially identical” to the continuation patent’s claims, i.e., the claims Digital Turbine had previously “threatened” against the company. The Court emphasized, however, that ironSource failed to account for the narrowing limitations in the amended claims and thus failed to prove a likely injury in fact from infringement of the substituted claims.

Finally, the Federal Circuit distinguished [...]

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Picture this: AI enhancements to trademark search and examination

by | Apr 16, 2026 |

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has announced several new artificial intelligence (AI) enhancements to its trademark search system and to the Trademark Center, continuing its broader effort to modernize trademark examination and improve both searchability and application quality.

One of the most notable updates is a new beta image-search capability within the USPTO’s trademark search system. This feature allows users to upload an image to identify similar marks with related design elements, functioning in a manner comparable to reverse image search tools available on commercial platforms. By enabling users to search for visually similar marks more intuitively, the tool may enhance clearance efforts, particularly for design marks that can be difficult to capture through traditional keyword-based searching.

The USPTO also announced that, beginning April 23, the Trademark Center will include a mark description and color claim generator. This feature is intended to assist applicants in drafting accurate and complete mark descriptions and color claims, which are often a source of inconsistency and procedural deficiency in trademark applications. By reducing guesswork and standardizing how such information is presented, the generator may help minimize office actions and improve overall application quality.

In addition to front-end user tools, the USPTO highlighted its Trademark Classification Agentic Codification Tool (Class ACT), an AI-driven system designed to automate certain back-end classification and coding functions. Class ACT assigns international classes to applications and generates design search codes and pseudo marks that make trademark records more easily searchable. Historically, these classification and coding steps could take months to complete, delaying examination and limiting searchability in the interim. The USPTO reports that Class ACT can perform these functions almost immediately, while still subject to human review to ensure accuracy and consistency.

Taken together, these developments reflect a continued shift toward integrating AI into both applicant facing and internal aspects of trademark prosecution. By accelerating classification, expanding search functionality, and assisting with application drafting, the USPTO seeks to streamline workflows while maintaining examiner oversight.

Practice note: Trademark applicants and practitioners may wish to incorporate the tools discussed above into clearance and filing strategies, particularly for design marks and applications involving complex descriptions or color claims. At the same time, AI generated results may surface a broader range of potentially relevant marks and classifications, underscoring the need for careful professional review. These tools are best viewed as supplements to – not substitutes for – informed legal analysis and strategic judgment.



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Game over: No self-help clock reset for mandatory stay request

by | Apr 9, 2026 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a respondent in a US International Trade Commission proceeding may not seek a mandatory stay of a companion federal district court case under 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a)(2) by refiling a declaratory judgment action involving the same parties when it missed the mandatory 30-day deadline for seeking a stay in the originally filed action. Ascendis Pharma A/S v. BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc., Case No. 26-1026 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 26, 2026) (Lourie, Chen, Stoll, JJ.)

Ascendis Pharma and BioMarin Pharmaceutical are both drug manufacturers. Ascendis filed a New Drug Application (NDA) with the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) for its drug TransCon CNP. The next day, BioMarin filed a complaint at the Commission, alleging that TransCon CNP infringed a BioMarin patent. To avoid the Commission’s importation safe harbor, BioMarin alleged that TransCon CNP was being imported in a quantity that exceeded “any quantity that would be solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information to the FDA.”

Ascendis filed a declaratory judgment action in federal district court, asserting that its “manufacture, use, and importation” was “exempt from patent infringement liability by the statutory safe harbor.” After BioMarin moved to dismiss or stay the declaratory judgment action, Ascendis reversed course and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, stating its intention to refile its declaratory judgment action and seek a mandatory stay under § 1659(a)(2). Ascendis refiled and two weeks later filed a § 1659(a)(2) motion for a mandatory stay. The district court granted BioMarin’s discretionary stay and denied Ascendis’s motion as moot. Ascendis appealed.

First addressing appellate jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit held that Ascendis had standing for its appeal. At the district court, BioMarin had argued that the district court should retain authority to lift any stay and stated that if the FDA approved TransCon CNP and the Ascendis NDA, BioMarin intended to seek preliminary injunctive relief from the district court. The Federal Circuit explained that those circumstances created a sufficiently real and immediate controversy for appellate jurisdiction.

The Federal Circuit then assessed whether it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Under that doctrine, an order must meet three requirements to permit an interlocutory appeal. It must “(1) ‘conclusively determine the disputed question’; (2) ‘resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action’; and (3) ‘be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’” Because denial of Ascendis’s stay motion conclusively determined that issue, and because the intent of § 1659(a)(2) is to prevent overlapping litigation, the Court found that the requirements for collateral order jurisdiction were met.

The Federal Circuit concluded that Ascendis’s arguments failed on the merits, however. After entering a discretionary stay, the district court had denied Ascendis’s motion as moot. The Federal Circuit found that a temporary stay does not necessarily render a stay under § 1659(a)(2) moot, and that a discretionary stay that can be lifted is not the same as (and thus does not moot) a request for [...]

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Hot out of the oven: Trademark limits on pizza-inspired names

by | Jan 29, 2026 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part a preliminary injunction barring the use of PIZZA PUFF, concluding that the trademark owner failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because the term was likely generic and, in any event, was descriptively and fairly used. Illinois Tamale Company, Inc. v. LC Trademarks, Inc., Case Nos. 24-3317; 25-1072; -1076; -1112 (7th Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) (Scudder, St. Eve, Jackson-Akiwumi, JJ.)

Illinois Tamale Company (Iltaco), a Chicago-based food company, has sold its signature “Pizza Puff” since 1976, distributing the product nationwide alongside other “Puff”-branded products. Iltaco owns federal trademark registrations for PIZZA PUFF (registered in 2009) and PUFF (registered in 2022).

In March 2024, Little Caesars introduced “Crazy Puffs,” small baked dough cups filled with pizza ingredients. The product launched as part of Little Caesars’ long-running “Crazy” line and was marketed prominently under the Little Caesars name, logo, and orange trade dress. Little Caesars secured its own federal registration for CRAZY PUFFS, and the United States Patent and Trademark Office identified no conflicting marks during examination.

Following the product launch, Iltaco sent a cease-and-desist letter claiming that CRAZY PUFFS and the phrase “4 Hand-Held Pizza Puffs” infringed its trademarks. When Little Caesars declined to change its marketing, Iltaco sued for trademark infringement and unfair competition and sought a preliminary injunction. The district court issued a split ruling, enjoining Little Caesars from using PIZZA PUFF but permitting continued use of CRAZY PUFFS and PUFF. Both parties appealed.

The Seventh Circuit found that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in assessing the protectability of PIZZA PUFF. The Court explained that rather than asking whether competitors could offer similar products without using the term, trademark protectability turns on the “primary significance” test, which is whether consumers primarily understand the term as a brand name or as the common name of a product. Because generic terms can never function as trademarks, the Court focused on evidence of consumer perception.

Applying that framework, the Seventh Circuit found substantial evidence that PIZZA PUFF was generic:

  • More than 80% of surveyed consumers viewed the term as referring to a product category rather than a brand.
  • Dictionary definitions treated the term generically.
  • Third-party filings and industry usage consistently employed the phrase as a common name.

This evidence rebutted the presumption of validity afforded by Iltaco’s federal registration, and Iltaco failed to demonstrate a likelihood of proving distinctiveness at trial. The Court therefore concluded that Iltaco did not show a likelihood of success on the merits and reversed the preliminary injunction barring Little Caesars’ use of PIZZA PUFF.

The Seventh Circuit further found that even if PIZZA PUFF were distinctive, Iltaco still could not obtain injunctive relief because Little Caesars was likely to prevail on a fair-use defense. The Court emphasized that fair use requires only descriptive, good-faith use, and not a perfect fit between the challenged term and the product. Here, PIZZA PUFF plausibly described Little Caesars’ light, pizza-filled food [...]

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No escape from fees and sanctions for reckless litigation conduct

by | Dec 4, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed attorneys’ fees awards against EscapeX IP, LLC, finding the case “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285, and upheld sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 based on counsel’s reckless litigation conduct. EscapeX IP, LLC v. Google LLC, Case No. 24-1201 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25, 2025) (Taranto, Stoll, Stark, JJ.)

EscapeX brought suit against Google in the Western District of Texas, alleging that Google’s YouTube Music product infringed its patent directed to systems for generating artist-specified dynamic albums. After Google pointed out that the accused features were absent from YouTube Music and later demonstrated that the accused “Auto-Add” feature predated the patent’s priority date, EscapeX amended its complaint to list the correct product and refused to dismiss the case.

Shortly after EscapeX sued Google, its patent was invalidated under § 101 in a separate litigation. EscapeX did not appeal that ruling, and Google requested that EscapeX dismiss the case. In response, EscapeX filed what it characterized as a “joint stipulation of dismissal,” which Google contested because it had not agreed to such a filing. Google moved for attorneys’ fees under § 285, arguing that EscapeX had filed frivolous claims and unreasonably prolonged the litigation. The district court agreed, awarding Google its fees.

EscapeX then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to amend the judgment, attaching declarations from its CEO and an engineer to show pre-suit diligence. The district court denied the motion, finding that the evidence was not “newly discovered” and the motion was frivolous. Google successfully sought additional fees and sanctions under § 1927, resulting in an additional $63,525 jointly and severally against EscapeX and its attorneys. EscapeX appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decisions and found no abuse of discretion. The Court concluded that the record supported the finding that EscapeX had not conducted any pre-suit investigation and that the case was “frivolous from the start.” This conclusion was also supported by Google’s early, detailed warnings against filing the suit and EscapeX’s general nonresponsiveness.

Regarding the Rule 59(e) motion, the Federal Circuit agreed that the declarations were not “newly discovered evidence” because they were always within EscapeX’s control and knowledge. The Court rejected arguments of “manifest injustice,” which were not raised in district court and had no merit.

Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the sanctions under § 1927, finding that EscapeX’s counsel acted recklessly by filing a frivolous motion that multiplied proceedings. The Court noted that zealous advocacy does not excuse filing baseless motions. The Court upheld Google’s fees and sanctions in their entirety, with costs related to the appeal also awarded to Google.



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Spooky silence: USPTO Director summarily denies 13 IPR petitions

by | Nov 6, 2025 |

On October 31, 2025, the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued a notice denying institution of inter partes review (IPR) in 13 separate proceedings. The notice listed only the docket numbers of the affected IPRs and offered no substantive explanation for the denials, stating simply: “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), institution of inter partes review is denied in the [listed] proceedings.” The summary denial follows the Director’s October 17, 2025, memorandum, which stated that the authority to determine whether to institute trial for IPR and post-grant review (PGR) proceedings rests solely with the USPTO Director.

Practice note: The October 17 memorandum signaled a shift in procedural control and reflected a broader policy approach to discretionary denials. While the October 31 notice provides limited insight into the basis for denial, it underscores the importance of understanding the USPTO’s evolving stance on institution discretion. Practitioners and petitioners alike should monitor future developments closely, as they may impact strategic considerations for filing and defending IPRs.



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