Addressing issues of copyright and patent infringement, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act did not preempt copyright protection and that patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) does not require that the claimed process be performed by a single entity. Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC v. Willowood, LLC, Case Nos.18-1614, -2044 (Fed. Cir., Dec. 18, 2019) (Reyna, J.).
Raising the hurdle for proving secondary considerations, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the “coextensiveness” requirement for purposes of nexus requires that the practicing product be “essentially the claimed invention.” FOX Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, Case No. 18-2024, -2025 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 18, 2019) (Prost, J.).
Bicycle chainrings are the toothed disks to which bicycle chains engage. SRAM owns a patent directed to an improved chainring structure that better maintains the chain, obviating the need for extraneous structures. The independent claims of the patent recite a chainring with alternating narrow and wide tooth tips and teeth offset from the center of the chainring. Some of the claims recite tooth tips offset toward the body of the bicycle (inboard offsets) and other claims recite teeth offset away from the body of the bicycle (outboard offsets). The specification discloses additional chainring features that are not recited in the claims. Each of the disclosed but unclaimed features contribute to improving chain retention. For example, the specification discloses forwardly protruding tip portions that function to engage a chain link earlier than a chain lacking the tip portion, a hook feature formed on the rear flank of each tooth to provide better guiding of the chain, and also that the narrow and wide teeth preferably fill at least 80% of the axial distance of the corresponding space in the chain link (>80% gap filling). SRAM sells 13 different versions of its “X-Sync” chainrings, 12 of which embody the inboard offset claims and one of which embodies the outboard offset claims. The X-Sync chains also embody the unclaimed features disclosed in the specification.
Addressing an issue of software subject matter eligibility, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings under 35 USC § 101, finding claims related to error checking patent eligible. Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GMBH et al., Case Nos. 18-1862, -1864, -1865 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 2019) (Chen, J).
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The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a judgment of infringement, concluding that the asserted patent claims were anticipated by a single prior art reference and that the accused products did not satisfy a limitation under the district court’s claim construction. As a result, the Court concluded that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of both invalidity and noninfringement. Board of Regents of the University of Texas v. Boston Scientific Corp., Case Nos. 24-2062; -2063 (Fed. Cir. July 27, 2026) (Taranto, Bryson, Cunningham, JJ.)
The Board of Regents of the University of Texas (UT) owns a patent directed to a composition containing at least one biodegradable polymer fiber that includes one or more dispersed therapeutic agents. The claimed invention may be used with commercially available stents to deliver drugs at the site where the stent is placed.
In 2017, UT sued Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC), alleging that BSC’s drug-eluting coronary stent systems infringed UT’s patent. Following claim construction, the case proceeded to trial. The jury found that BSC willfully infringed the asserted claims and rejected BSC’s argument in its motion for JMOL that the claims were anticipated by a prior art reference known as Song. The jury awarded damages to UT. The district court subsequently set aside the willfulness finding as legally unsupported but otherwise upheld the verdict. BSC appealed the infringement and validity rulings, and UT cross-appealed the district court’s decision overturning the willfulness verdict.
The Federal Circuit reversed the judgment for UT, finding that BSC was entitled to JMOL that the asserted claims were invalid as anticipated and, independently, that BSC did not infringe.
Addressing anticipation, the Federal Circuit concluded that Song disclosed each limitation of the asserted independent claim. Song taught the claimed biodegradable polymer fiber and disclosed the claimed “second phase” limitation. The Court explained that Song’s noncontiguous drug phases satisfied the requirement for discrete drug-containing regions.
The asserted dependent claims added limitations expressed in Markush-group form. Because Song disclosed at least one member of each claimed Markush group, the Federal Circuit concluded that those claims were also anticipated. The Court further found that Song disclosed the claimed release of a drug at varying rates.
The Federal Circuit separately concluded that BSC was entitled to JMOL of noninfringement. Under the district court’s claim construction, the asserted claims required a “thread-like” structure. The Court determined that UT’s evidence did not establish the presence of such a structure in BSC’s accused stent coatings.
UT’s infringement theory relied on sections of the coating that had been artificially separated for purposes of analysis. The Federal Circuit concluded that no reasonable jury could characterize those artificially isolated portions as the claimed thread-like structure. BSC therefore was entitled to JMOL of noninfringement.
Clarifying the enablement standard for pharmaceutical method-of-treatment claims, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a post-verdict grant of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), finding patents directed to daily administration of a “unit dosage” to cancer patients invalid for lack of enablement. The Court concluded that the specification’s in vitro data and broad dosage ranges – some exceeding the maximum tolerated dose in humans – did not provide sufficient guidance for translating the disclosed results into a workable patient-dosing regimen. Wyeth LLC v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, Case No. 24-2325 (Fed. Cir. July 9, 2026) (Lourie, Linn, Hughes, JJ.)
Pharmaceutical and healthcare company Wyeth owns patents directed to methods of treating gefitinib- and/or erlotinib-resistant non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) by administering a daily “unit dosage” of an irreversible epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR) inhibitor. A jury found that competitor AstraZeneca, which markets the irreversible EGFR inhibitor Tagrisso® (osimertinib), induced infringement and awarded Wyeth $107.5 million in damages. After trial, however, the district court granted AstraZeneca’s renewed JMOL motion, finding the asserted claims invalid for lack of enablement.
Wyeth appealed, arguing that the district court improperly changed its construction of “unit dosage” after trial, applied that revised construction in its enablement analysis, and improperly granted JMOL on enablement grounds.
The dispute centered on the construction of “unit dosage,” which the district court defined as “physically discrete units suitable as unitary dosage for the subject, each unit containing a predetermined quantity of active material calculated to produce the desired therapeutic effect.” Wyeth argued that the claims required only the identification of compounds capable of inhibiting EGFR activity. AstraZeneca countered that, because the claims expressly required daily administration to a patient, they necessarily required a dosage regimen suitable for human treatment.
The Federal Circuit agreed with AstraZeneca, finding that the claims “plainly require the daily administration of a unit dosage to a patient to achieve a therapeutic effect in treating g/e-resistant NSCLC, not merely the identification of compounds capable of inhibiting EGFR activity in vitro.”
The Federal Circuit rejected Wyeth’s contention that the district court had effectively imported US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval requirements into the enablement inquiry. The Court emphasized that enablement did not require proof of regulatory-grade safety or efficacy. Because the claims required daily administration to patients, however, the specification had to teach a skilled artisan how to arrive at a workable human-dosing regimen without undue experimentation.
The Federal Circuit determined that the specification failed to do so, as it disclosed only three exemplary compounds (EKB-569, HKI-357, and HKI-272), described their in vitro activity, and provided only broad projected dosage ranges (1-1,000 mg and 2-500 mg) without explaining how to translate those ranges into effective human dosing.
The trial record reinforced the lack of enablement. AstraZeneca presented unrebutted testimony, including from Wyeth’s own experts and co-inventors, that at least two disclosed compounds could not be administered within the claimed dosage ranges without exceeding the maximum tolerated dose in humans. One co-inventor testified that the [...]
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The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction in a patent infringement action, finding that the district court’s claim construction raised, at a minimum, substantial questions regarding infringement and that the patentee failed to establish irreparable harm. Ridge Corp. et al. v. Kirk NationaLease Co. et al., Case No. 25-1254 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2026) (Dyk, Mayer, Taranto, JJ.)
Ridge Corporation, the exclusive licensee of manufacturer Cold Chain’s patent directed to an insulated overhead door, sued truck leasing and maintenance company Kirk NationaLease Co. (KNL) for patent infringement, tortious interference with business relationships, and false patent marking. After the Federal Circuit vacated an initial preliminary injunction because Ridge lacked standing to sue without the patent owner, Cold Chain joined the present action as a plaintiff. The district court again granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. KNL appealed.
KNL argued that the district court improperly construed several disputed claim limitations and, therefore, erred in concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits. The Federal Circuit agreed, explaining that a preliminary injunction should not issue where an accused infringer raises one or more substantial questions concerning infringement – questions that the patentee cannot show lack substantial merit.
The Federal Circuit identified three claim limitations that raised substantial questions of noninfringement:
The Federal Circuit also determined that the district court erred in finding irreparable harm. Ridge asserted that it had reduced prices because of the defendants’ allegedly infringing products, but the Court found no evidence establishing the required causal nexus between the accused sales and Ridge’s pricing decisions. The Court likewise rejected Ridge’s reliance on its false-marking and tortious-interference claims because there was no credible evidence that the challenged conduct was likely to recur, making prospective injunctive relief inappropriate.
Practice note: This decision illustrates that a patentee seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish more than a plausible infringement theory. Where the accused infringer raises substantial questions regarding claim construction or infringement, a preliminary injunction is inappropriate.
The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the manufacturer of an iconic lamp design, finding that the designer’s heirs could not pursue trademark infringement and related tort claims based on the contractual transference of ownership and use of the intellectual property associated with the lamp. The Court concluded that the governing agreements authorized the manufacturer’s conduct and that the designer’s family later ratified the manufacturer’s ownership by accepting royalties with knowledge of its ownership claim. Nelson v. MillerKnoll, Inc., Case No. 25-1940 (6th Cir. July 7, 2026) (Boggs, Clay, Gilman, JJ.)
George Nelson, a prominent mid-century furniture designer, created the cloth-covered hanging fixtures known as the Bubble Lamp while serving as design director of Herman Miller, now MillerKnoll. George and Herman Miller did not enter into a formal written agreement addressing ownership of the Bubble Lamp’s intellectual property during the designer’s employment.
After George’s death, his widow, Jacqueline Nelson, entered into a 2006 agreement under which Herman Miller agreed to pay royalties on certain products designed by George. In 2015, while a related foundation was litigating against another company that had registered and sold Bubble Lamp trademarks, George’s son, Mico Nelson, executed an addendum on Jacqueline’s behalf. The addendum expanded the royalty arrangement to include “Nelson branded Lamp Products” and granted Herman Miller exclusive worldwide rights to manufacture, use, sell, and license those products.
Herman Miller later acquired the Bubble Lamp business and related trademark registrations, including two product-configuration marks and the BUBBLE LAMP word mark.
The Nelson family sued MillerKnoll, alleging that it had improperly obtained the Bubble Lamp’s intellectual property as part of a broader scheme to deprive the family of George’s rights. The complaint asserted federal and state trademark infringement, fraud, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and cancellation of the trademark registrations. The district court granted summary judgment to MillerKnoll on all claims. The Nelson family appealed.
The principal issue on appeal was whether the 2006 agreement and 2015 addendum merely licensed MillerKnoll to use the Bubble Lamp’s intellectual property or also authorized MillerKnoll ownership of that intellectual property.
Applying Michigan contract law, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the agreements unambiguously granted MillerKnoll both ownership and use rights. Although the agreements referred to “Licensed Products,” that term was contractually defined to include products whose rights MillerKnoll owned. Other provisions granted MillerKnoll “exclusive right, title, and interest” in the covered designs and the sole right to enforce the associated proprietary rights.
That contractual authorization defeated the Nelson family’s Lanham Act claim. The Sixth Circuit explained that authorized use of a mark cannot support an infringement claim under § 43(a) because authorized conduct does not create the type of source confusion the statute is intended to prevent.
The same reasoning foreclosed the state-law trademark and tort claims. Because the agreements authorized MillerKnoll’s ownership and use of the Bubble Lamp’s intellectual property, the Nelson family could not recover for conduct to which it had consented.
The Sixth Circuit also concluded that Mico independently ratified MillerKnoll’s ownership. [...]
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The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board obviousness determination, finding that the Board did not exceed the scope of the Court’s prior mandate by addressing a claim limitation that the Board had not reached in its original final written decision. Intellectual Pixels Ltd. v. Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC, Case No. 24-2174 (Fed. Cir. July 10, 2026) (Dyk, Stoll, Stark, JJ.)
Sony Interactive Entertainment petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of an Intellectual Pixels Limited (IPL) patent directed to methods and systems for generating digital images using an external visual server. IPL is a UK-based intellectual property licensing company known for holding a US patent that covers methods for generating and displaying digital images using a remote visual server. A key feature of the claimed invention was that the external server assumed responsibility for generating the images, relieving the client device of that processing burden.
The primary prior art reference disclosed a system in which a game was hosted “exclusively on a server/host computer” while users played the game through separate client or terminal computers. The Board instituted review but, in its first final written decision, concluded that Sony had not shown the challenged claims to be unpatentable.
Sony appealed. The Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s decision, finding that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s determination regarding the claim limitation requiring “generating” a new image.
On remand, the Board addressed a separate “compressing” limitation, concluded that the prior art satisfied that limitation, and issued a second final written decision finding the challenged claims unpatentable as obvious.
IPL appealed, arguing that the Board violated the Federal Circuit’s mandate by revisiting findings that had not been expressly disturbed in the first appeal. Under the mandate rule, issues decided on appeal generally may not be reconsidered by a lower tribunal on remand.
The Federal Circuit rejected IPL’s argument. One of the two findings IPL identified had, in fact, been vacated by the Court’s prior decision as unsupported by substantial evidence. The other concerned the Board’s observation that the primary reference was “completely silent as to the content or origin of that ‘compressed video MPEG stream.’” The Court concluded that this second finding fell outside the scope of the prior mandate because it related to the “compressing” limitation, which the Board had not reached in its first final written decision. Because the Board’s original decision rested only on the “generating” limitation, the “compressing” issue was not before the Court in the first appeal and, therefore, was not resolved – expressly or implicitly – by the Court’s mandate.
The Federal Circuit also noted that its prior discussion of the “generating” limitation had implicitly undermined IPL’s reliance on the Board’s earlier observation. Both the “generating” and “compressing” limitations referred to “at least one updated image,” making the prior finding difficult to reconcile with the Court’s earlier analysis.
IPL relied on a 2025 Federal Circuit decision, Bitmanagement Software GmBH v. United States, suggesting that factual findings made during [...]
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The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) updated its director review process by extending the deadline for requesting director review of decisions made in Patent Trial & Appeal Board proceedings from 14 to 30 days.
Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.75(c)(1), a request for director review must be filed within the time period set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), unless the director grants an extension for good cause. Section 42 generally requires that a request for director review be filed within 14 days of a decision instituting trial or 30 days of a final decision or a decision denying institution.
In a precedential order in Light & Wonder, Inc. v. Evolution Malta Ltd., IPR2025-01072, Paper 30 (Director June 22, 2026), however, the director waived the 14-day deadline and extended it to 30 days. The USPTO has now incorporated that change into its published director review process.
The updated process explains that the deadline may be extended in exceptional circumstances, provided that “the trial has not progressed meaningfully.” Examples of exceptional circumstances include:
Parties seeking an extension based on exceptional circumstances must email Director_PTABDecision_Review@uspto.gov, copy counsel for all parties, and explain in three sentences or fewer why an extension is warranted. The remaining parties will then be given an opportunity to respond.
The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a district court’s indefiniteness ruling based on an insufficient means-plus-function analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) while affirming the denial of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and a new trial following a jury verdict finding a related patent invalid as anticipated. TrackTime, LLC v. Amazon.com Services LLC, Audible, Inc., Case No. 24-1102 (Fed. Cir. July 2, 2026) (Prost, Taranto, JJ; Kovner, J., sitting by designation.)
TrackTime sued Amazon and Audible for patent infringement, asserting two related patents directed to time-synchronized transcript technology for audio and video files. One patent relates to methods for annotating and sharing time-synchronized transcripts on mobile devices. The other relates to “tap-to-jump” technology, which allows a user to tap a word in a transcript and jump to the corresponding point in the associated audio or video file.
The district court issued a claim construction order finding the annotation-and-sharing patent invalid for indefiniteness. The court concluded that the claim terms “executable program code configured to facilitate annotation” and “executable program code configured to synchronously play multimedia” were means-plus-function terms that recited functions without sufficient corresponding structure. Because the specification did not adequately disclose structure for performing those functions, the district court held the terms indefinite.
The tap-to-jump patent proceeded separately to a jury trial. The jury found the asserted claim invalid on multiple grounds, including anticipation by a prior art program called LiveNote, and found no infringement. The district court later denied TrackTime’s post-trial motions for JMOL and a new trial. TrackTime appealed both the indefiniteness ruling on the annotation-and-sharing patent and the denial of JMOL and a new trial on the tap-to-jump patent.
The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the indefiniteness ruling on the annotation-and-sharing patent, finding the district court’s § 112(f) analysis insufficient considering the Federal Circuit’s intervening decision in Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp. (2022). In Dyfan, the Court explained that determining whether a limitation should be construed under § 112(f) requires a full contextual analysis, including whether the claim language recites sufficient structure when viewed in light of the specification, the surrounding claim language, and how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term.
The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not conduct the full inquiry required by Dyfan because it failed to consider extrinsic evidence regarding usage in the field and how a skilled artisan would understand the disputed “executable program code” limitations. The Court declined to decide the § 112(f) issue in the first instance, leaving it to the district court on remand to determine whether the disputed limitations, read in context, recited sufficient structure for performing the claimed annotation and synchronous-play functions on a mobile device.
The Federal Circuit reached a different result on the tap-to-jump patent. TrackTime argued that LiveNote failed to disclose three limitations, namely “performing a data lookup,” a “mobile computing device,” and a “touch-sensitive input interface.” The Court rejected each argument. It found that TrackTime [...]
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