IP UPDATE
Exploring the latest in intellectual property law
IP UPDATE
Exploring the latest in intellectual property law
Results for "Patent"
Subscribe to Results for "Patent"'s Posts

PTO Proposes New Guidelines for Director Review in Board Proceedings

by | Apr 25, 2024 | ,

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) proposed new rules governing the process for Director review of Patent Trial & Appeal Board decisions in America Invents Act (AIA) proceedings. Rules Governing Director Review of Patent Trial and Appeal Board Decisions, 89 Fed. Reg. 26,807 (proposed Apr. 16, 2024) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) proposes adding 37 C.F.R. § 42.75, which includes rules addressing the following issues:

Limited Availability of Director Review. The NPRM proposes that Director review in AIA proceedings would only be available to a party from institution decisions, final written decisions or panel decisions granting rehearing of a decision on institution or a final written decision. However, the Director would have authority to review any interlocutory decisions rendered in reaching such decisions. The NPRM also proposes that the Director may sua sponte review institution decisions, final written decisions or decisions granting rehearing.

Timing, Format and Content of Requests for Director Review. The NPRM proposes that requests for Director review would have to be sought within the time period set forth by 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), comply with the formatting and length requirements of 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(a) and 42.24(a)(1)(v), and would not be allowed to introduce new evidence. Any sua sponte Director review would have to be initiated within 21 days after the deadline to seek rehearing.

Effect of Director Review. The NPRM proposes that a decision on institution, a final written decision or a decision granting rehearing would become final agency action unless Director review was timely sought or timely initiated sua sponte or a request for Director review was denied.

Director Review Process. The NPRM proposes that Director review would not stay the underlying proceeding, but if the Director grants review, the review would conclude with the issuance of a decision or order that provides the reasons for the Director’s disposition of the case. A party would be permitted to appeal a Director review decision of either a final written decision or a decision granting rehearing of a final written decision (not institution decisions or decisions granting rehearing of institution decisions) to the Federal Circuit in accordance with the procedures set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(c) and 319. A request for Director review would be treated as a request for rehearing and would reset the time for appeal until Director review was resolved.

Delegation. The NPRM proposes that delegation of Director review would be permitted, subject to conditions set forth by the Director.

Communications With the PTO. The NPRM proposes that communications from a party concerning a specific Director review request or proceeding would have to copy counsel for all parties. Other than authorized amicus briefings, communications from third parties would not be allowed.

Comments are due by June 17, 2024, and can be submitted through the federal eRulemaking portal here.



read more

New Guidance Addresses Use of AI Systems, Tools in Practice Before the PTO

by | Apr 18, 2024 |

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued new guidance on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) tools in practice before the PTO. The new guidance is designed to promote responsible use of AI tools and provide suggestions for protecting practitioners and clients from misuse or harm resulting from their use. This guidance comes on the heels of a recent memorandum to both the trademark and patent trial and appeal boards concerning the applicability of existing regulations addressing potential misuse of AI  and recent guidance addressing the use of AI in the context of inventorship.

Patent practitioners are increasingly using AI-based systems and tools to research prior art, automate the patent application review process, assist with claim charting, document reviews and gain insight into examiner behavior. The PTO’s support for AI use is reflected in patent examiners’ utilization of several different AI-enabled tools for conducting prior art searches. However, because AI tools are not perfect, patent practitioners are potentially vulnerable to misuse or misconduct. Therefore, the PTO’s new guidance discusses the legal and ethical implications of AI use in the patent system and provides guidelines for mitigating the risks presented by AI tools.

The guidance discusses the PTO’s existing rules and policies for consideration when applying AI tools, including duty of candor, signature requirement and corresponding certifications, confidentiality of information, foreign filing licenses and export regulations, electronic systems’ policies and duties owed to clients. The guidance also discusses the applicability of these rules and policies with respect to the use of AI tools in the context of document drafting, submissions, and correspondence with the PTO; filing documents with the PTO; accessing PTO IT systems; confidentiality and national security; and fraud and intentional misconduct.

AI tools have been developed for the intellectual property industry to facilitate drafting technical specifications, generating responses to PTO office actions, writing and responding to briefs, and drafting patent claims. While the use of these tools is not prohibited, nor is there any obligation to disclose their use unless specifically requested, the guidance emphasizes the need for patent practitioners to carefully review any AI outputs generated before signing off on any documents or statements made to the PTO. For example, when using AI tools, practitioners should make a reasonable inquiry to confirm that all facts presented have evidentiary support, that all citations to case law and other references are accurately presented, and that all arguments are legally warranted. Any errors or omissions generated by AI in the document must be corrected. Likewise, trademark and Board submissions generated or assisted by AI must be reviewed to ensure that all facts and statements are accurate and have evidentiary support.

While AI tools can be used to assist or automate the preparation and filing of documents with the PTO, care must be taken to ensure that no PTO rules or policies are violated and that documents are reviewed and signed by a person, not an AI tool or non-natural person. AI [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Drawing Can Teach Claim Limitations If “Clear on Its Face”

by | Apr 18, 2024 |

Addressing when a drawing in a prior art reference includes a teaching that is “clear on its face,” the Director of the US Patent & Trademark Office vacated and remanded a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision denying institution of an inter partes review (IPR) petition. MAHLE Behr Charleston Inc. v. Catalano, IPR2023-00861 (PTAB Decision Review, Apr. 5, 2024) (Vidal, PTO Dir.)

MAHLE Behr filed a petition requesting institution of an IPR, challenging claims of a patent owned by Catalano. The patent is directed to a device known as a sacrificial anode that prevents corrosion in motor vehicle radiators caused by electrolysis. One of the claim terms at issue requires the anode to be “within 10 inches” of another element. MAHLE argued that a figure in a prior art reference anticipated or rendered obvious several challenged claims.

The Board denied the institution after determining that MAHLE did not establish a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. The Board cited the Federal Circuit’s 2000 decision in Hockerson-Halberstadt v. Avia Group International to explain that “[p]atent drawings do not define the precise proportions of the elements and may not be relied on to show particular sizes if the specification is completely silent on the issue.” The Board concluded that the figure relied on by MAHLE did not provide exact dimensions and thus could not be sufficient to render the claims invalid.

MAHLE filed a request for Director Review, which was granted. In its request, MAHLE argued that the Board erred in its application of Federal Circuit case law on the use of patent drawings as prior art teachings. The Director agreed, explaining that “the Board did not adequately address [MAHLE’s] arguments regarding what [the figure in the prior art] clearly shows or would have reasonably suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Federal Circuit case law established that a claim may be anticipated or rendered obvious by a figure in the prior art if the drawing clearly discloses the claim limitation. If “a person of skill in the art could derive the claimed dimensions from the patent’s disclosure, there is no additional requirement that the specification must explicitly disclose the precise proportions or particular sizes.”

The Director further explained that “the Board did not adequately address MAHLE’s arguments regarding what [the prior art figure] clearly shows or would have reasonably suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” While the prior art figure did not disclose the precise proportions or measured quantity specified in the challenged claims, the figure showed the elements being located as claimed (necessarily within the 10 inches recited). The Director explained that the Board should have considered whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the figure to disclose the claimed elements being within 10 inches of each other.

The Director vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the petition with instructions to consider both what the prior art figure [...]

Continue Reading



read more

ITU Applicants Beware: Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Pending Trademark Applications

by | Apr 11, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part a district court’s ruling in a trademark dispute, upholding its decision to invalidate trademark applications. The Ninth Circuit held that district courts have jurisdiction to alter or cancel trademark applications in an action properly brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1119, and that in the context of challenges to intent-to-use (ITU) applications, proof of a lack of bona fide intent can invalidate. BBK Tobacco & Foods LLP v. Central Coast Agriculture, Inc., Case Nos. 22-16190; -16281 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2024) (Hurwitz, Desai, JJ.) (Bumatay, J., dissenting).

BBK sells and distributes smoking-related products with BBK’s “RAW” branding. Central Coast Agriculture (CCA) sells cannabis products using “Raw Garden” branding. BBK filed a complaint against CCA including claims of trademark infringement and a petition to void several ITU trademark applications owned by CCA for lack of a bona fide intent to use the relevant trademarks in commerce. Instead of disputing the merits of BBK’s claims, CCA argued that the district court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate this issue. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BBK on its claims to invalidate the trademark applications. CCA appealed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of BBK on its claims to invalidate CCA’s trademark applications. The Court explained that “when an action involves a claim of infringement on a registered trademark, a district court also has jurisdiction to consider challenges to the trademark application of a party to the action.” The Lanham Act, at 15 U.S.C. § 1119, provides that “[i]n any action involving a registered mark the court may determine the right to registration, order the cancelation of registrations, . . . restore canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify the register with respect to the registrations of any party to the action.” The Lanham Act, at § 1051, defines an application for use of trademark as a “request for registration of a trademark on the principal register.” Because a challenge to an application affects the applicant’s right to the registration, the Court reasoned that § 1119 authorizes a district court to resolve disputes over trademark applications.

The Ninth Circuit held that a “lack of bona fide intent to use a mark in commerce is a valid basis to challenge a trademark application,” aligning with decisions in sister circuits and the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board. An applicant can seek to register a mark if the mark is already being used in commerce or if the applicant has a bona fide intention, under circumstances showing the good faith of such person, to use a trademark in commerce. While applicants filing under the ITU provisions may begin the registration process based on a bona fide intent to later use the mark in commerce, the Lanham Act requires such applicants to either subsequently file a verified statement of actual use of the mark or convert their application into a use application. As a result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Reasonable Royalty Available for Foreign Activities (But Not This Time)

by | Apr 11, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to preclude a patent owner from seeking damages based on method claims infringed outside of the United States but confirmed that reasonable royalties are available based on foreign activities. Harris Brumfield v. IBG LLC, Case No. 22-1630 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 27, 2024) (Prost, Taranto, Hughes, JJ.)

Trading Technologies International (TT), whose successor is Harris Brumfield, filed a lawsuit against IBG in 2010 alleging infringement of four patents directed to graphical user interfaces for commodity trading and methods for placing trade orders using those interfaces. During the underlying proceeding, the district court issued several orders. The district court granted IBG’s motion for summary judgment that the claims of two of the patents were invalid. The district court also excluded one of TT’s damages theories concerning foreign activities. Prior to trial, the district court found that two of the patents were invalid as patent ineligible and that the other two patents contained patent eligible subject matter. The district court also excluded one of TT’s damages theories concerning foreign activities.

The case proceeded to trial on the two remaining patents, and the jury found the asserted claims of those two patents infringed. IBG proposed $6.6 million in damages, which corresponds to the total demanded by IBG using IBG’s proposed royalty rate measured against domestic usage, rather than global users. By contrast, TT proposed damages of $962 million, which included all worldwide users of the accused product, regardless of whether they performed the claimed method. The jury agreed with IGB and awarded TT $6.6 million. the district court denied TT’s post-verdict motion for a new trial on damages, a motion in which TT alleged that IBG had misrepresented how it calculated the damages figures it presented to the jury. TT appealed.

Under the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in WesternGeco v. Ion Geophysical, a patent owner can recover damages in the form of foreign lost profits when infringement is found under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) of the Patent Act. TT argued that under WesternGeco, it can seek damages in the form of a reasonable royalty based on IBG “making” the accused product in the US, even though the products were used overseas. The Federal Circuit engaged in a detailed description of WesternGeco, concluding that the Court must examine the particular acts alleged to constitute infringement under particular statutory provisions to determine if the allegations focus on domestic conduct. The Court explained that under § 271(a), the making, using, offering to sell and selling provisions are limited to domestic acts. The Court acknowledged that the WesternGeco framework applies to reasonably royalty awards (not just lost profits) and that a reasonable royalty would be the amount a hypothetical infringer would pay to engage in the domestic acts constituting the infringement.

Despite finding that reasonable royalties are permitted under WesternGeco, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s exclusion of TT’s damages theory because TT’s infringement theory about making the accused product [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Faulty Jury Instruction Tampered With Tamper-Proof Trial

by | Apr 4, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded a district court decision after concluding that a jury instruction on the objective indicia of nonobviousness that failed to specify all indicia on which evidence had been received constituted prejudicial legal error. Inline Plastics Corp. v. Lacerta Group, LLC, Case Nos. 22-1954; -2295 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 27, 2024) (Taranto, Chen, Hughes, JJ.)

Inline Plastics owns a patent family pertaining to containers with specific tamper-proof features and methods of producing these containers using thermoformed plastic. The invention is intended to deter unauthorized tampering with products in the containers. These tamper-proof features serve to prevent theft and product loss and maintain consumer confidence in product integrity.

Inline sued Lacerta Group for patent infringement over its tamper-proof technology. The district court made several significant pretrial rulings, including a claim construction order, and granted Inline’s motion for partial summary judgment of infringement on some of the asserted claims. During trial, Inline voluntarily withdrew certain claims, and the jury returned a verdict declaring all remaining claims (even those on which summary judgment had been granted) invalid and not infringed. After trial, Inline sought partial final judgment, which was granted, but also motioned for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial on invalidity. The district court denied Inline’s motions. Both Inline and Lacerta appealed.

Inline argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law of no invalidity and that an error in the jury instructions requires a new trial on invalidity. Lacerta cross-appealed, challenging the denial of attorneys’ fees and the “without prejudice” dismissal of certain patent claims that Inline voluntarily dropped from its asserted-claims list near the end of trial.

The Federal Circuit rejected Inline’s argument for judgment as a matter of law of no invalidity but agreed with Inline that the jury instruction on the objective indicia of nonobviousness constituted prejudicial legal error. The Court determined that the jury could have reasonably found obviousness and rejected Inline’s three arguments against it. First, Inline argued deficiencies in Lacerta’s prior art references and expert testimony, but the Court found these arguments unpersuasive. Second, Inline challenged Lacerta’s evidence of motivation to combine references, but the Court found enough support to prove a motivation to combine. Third, Inline argued that Lacerta’s challenge failed because there was no rebuttal or opinion on objective-indicia evidence. The Court dismissed this argument, explaining that the absence of such testimony did not necessarily discredit the patentee’s evidence on nonobviousness. According to the Court, Inline failed to explain why the jury could not reasonably assign little weight to its objective-indicia evidence, which led the Court to reject Inline’s categorical argument based on the absence of expert testimony from Lacerta’s side.

However, the Federal Circuit agreed with Inline’s argument for a new trial on invalidity. The Court explained that jury instructions must be legally correct and sufficiently comprehensive to address disputed evidence. The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court’s objective-indicia instruction [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Who Solved the Problem? Joint Inventors, That’s Who

by | Apr 4, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to correct inventorship in a post-issuance inventorship dispute, finding that the alleged joint inventors’ contributions were significant even though they were mostly unclaimed. Tube-Mac Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, Case No. 22-2170 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2024) (Lourie, Hughes, Stark, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

Steve Campbell was the original sole inventor named on a utility patent application directed to a container for transporting gaseous fluids. Before Campbell filed the patent application, Campbell’s prototypes had a “major problem” with the container’s liner. Campbell enlisted the help of Tube-Mac Industries’ Gary Mackay and Dan Hewson to solve the problem. Campbell, Mackay and Hewson exchanged plans regarding the problem over the course of several months. Campbell’s patent issued, naming himself as the sole inventor. Mackay, Hewson and Tube-Mac filed suit seeking to be named as co-inventors. The district court agreed and ordered correction of the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 256. Campbell appealed.

A court may order a correction of inventorship when it determines that an inventor has been erroneously omitted from a patent. In any inventorship challenge, the inventors listed in an issued patent are presumed to be the correct inventor(s). Thus, a party challenging inventorship must prove incorrect inventorship by clear and convincing evidence. A joint inventor must contribute significantly to the invention’s conception or reduction to practice when that contribution is measured against the scope of the full invention.

The Federal Circuit found that prior to the involvement of Mackay and Hewson, Campbell did not have a viable invention that could be reduced to practice without extensive experimentation. The Court also found that Mackay’s and Hewson’s contributions solved the problem that precluded the prototype from being successful, even though their contributions were “mostly unclaimed.” The Court noted, however, that their contributions were included in the application’s figures, specifications and dependent claims. Accordingly, the Court found that Mackay and Hewson contributed significantly to the conception of the invention and should be included as co-inventors.

The Federal Circuit also dismissed Campbell’s arguments that the district court did not properly construe the claims to determine their scope and erred by misidentifying the subject matter of the claims.



read more

PTO Proposes Trademark Application Filing Changes, Fee Adjustments

by | Apr 4, 2024 |

On March 26, 2024, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register concerning changes to trademark application filings and fee adjustments in trademark cases for 2025. The PTO solicits written comments from the public on the proposed rule changes on or before May 28, 2024. The proposed rules seek to generate sufficient multiyear revenue for trademark operations in future years based on projections described in the notice.

The changes are recommended to support the PTO’s strategic goals and objectives, including optimizing trademark application pendency through the promotion of efficient operations and filing behaviors, issuing accurate and reliable trademark registrations, and encouraging access to the trademark system for stakeholders.

The proposal seeks to incentivize more complete and timely filings, improve prosecution, adjust 31 trademark fees and impose 12 new fees while discontinuing six existing fees. The proposal also seeks to consolidate the present Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) filing options (i.e., TEAS Plus and TEAS standard) into a single electronic filing option. The single option would include most of the same requirements as TEAS Plus, while eliminating those under TEAS Standard. The new filing framework would discontinue the previous filing fees and fees for failing to meet the requirements of a TEAS Plus application. Similar to TEAS Plus, however, applicants complying with the proposed requirements in their initial filing would pay the lowest fees.

The proposed fee adjustments would:

  • Set the fee for a base application at $350 using the ID Master List (which is $100 more than the current fee for a TEAS Plus application)
  • Discontinue current fees for filing an application under the Madrid Protocol
  • Require surcharge fees between $100 and $200 for applications that are noncompliant with the base filing requirements
  • Require an additional $200 fee per class for the identification of goods and services entered in the free-form text field to incentivize use of the Trademark ID Manual for such identifications instead
  • Require an additional $200 fee for each additional group of 1,000 characters in the free-form text field; identifications directly from the ID Manual would not incur these fees
  • Increase fees by $50 for filing amendments to allege use (AAU) and statements of use (SOU), with fees being discounted $100 for electronic filings
  • Increase post-registration maintenance fees from $50 to $75
  • Increase the letter of protest fee from $50 to $150.

Regarding the proposed fee adjustments, the notice describes changes to 37 CFR 2.6 and 7.6. The notice further describes changes to 37 CFR 2.22 and 2.71 with respect to base application fees and amendments to correct informalities, respectively.

For further details, see the Federal Register notice.



read more

What Use Does § 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor “Solely” Protect?

by | Apr 4, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) safe harbor protecting certain infringing acts undertaken for regulatory approval applied to an alleged infringer’s importation of transcatheter heart systems while attending a trade conference, finding the importation reasonably related to submitting information to the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) for medical device approval. Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. Meril Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd., Case No. 22-1877 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 25, 2024) (Stoll, Cunningham, JJ.) (Lourie, J., dissenting).

The fact pattern in this case is unusual. Meril, a manufacturer of a transcatheter heart system approved for sale in Europe but not in the United States, brought two demonstration samples to San Francisco with lawyer-generated instructions that the samples could not be used, sold or offered for sale in the US. Meril presented at a trade booth during a cardiovascular medical device conference. It was undisputed that the samples never left a bag that was first kept at a hotel and later brought to the conference and placed in a storage room.

Edwards Lifesciences nevertheless sued for infringement based on importation. The district court found that Meril’s importation was reasonably related to its attempts to secure regulatory approval because they were for the purposes of recruiting investigators for a clinical trial Meril had made initial efforts to commence (as required to market this type of device in the US). Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement on grounds that the safe harbor under § 271(e)(1) applied. Edwards appealed.

Edwards argued that the district court erred by not finding a genuine material dispute of fact relating to Meril’s subjective intent (i.e., whether, notwithstanding some evidence, Meril actually intended the importation to relate to FDA approval). Edwards also challenged whether the importation was solely related to FDA approval and argued that the non-use of the devices to recruit investigators rendered the safe harbor inapplicable.

The Federal Circuit rejected all three challenges. Canvassing the Federal Circuit’s decades of prior case law, the Court concluded that a putative infringer’s intent is irrelevant when determining whether the safe harbor applies. Thus, even if Edwards were correct in challenging Meril’s intent, there would still be no material factual dispute. On the issue of whether the importation activity was solely related to FDA approval, the Court, discussing the use of “solely” in terms of the safe harbor provision, reiterated prior cases’ determination that the uses need not be solely related to FDA approval, but rather, that the only uses that would be protected were those within the safe harbor. Finally, the Court again deemed the non-use of the devices irrelevant, as nothing in the statute required actual use.

Judge Lourie dissented, not because he necessarily viewed the district court’s or the majority’s application as squarely incorrect under existing precedent, but because he believed that existing precedent did not expressly give proper weight to the statute’s use of the word “solely.” Applying a plain text analysis, Judge Lourie argued that the safe harbor [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Mandamus Denied but Jurisdictional Door Left Open a Crack

by | Apr 4, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a patent owner’s writ of mandamus seeking to prevent a defendant from amending its answer to add an affirmative licensing defense, but also noted that the defense was added only after the district court found that there were no remaining claims. In re VLSI Technology LLC, Case No. 24-116 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 18, 2024) (Moore, Taranto, Chen, JJ.)

VLSI asserted four patents against Intel in the Northern District of California. In December 2023, the district court granted summary judgment that two of the patents were not infringed and denied summary judgment of noninfringement on the remaining two patents. The parties additionally submitted cross motions for summary judgment on a licensing defense that turned on a forum selection clause, but the court denied both motions. To deprive the court of jurisdiction, VLSI granted Intel a covenant not to sue for infringement of the remaining two patents in the case. Two days later, Intel moved to amend its answer to add a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that Intel was licensed to VLSI’s entire patent portfolio. The district court granted Intel’s motion, and VLSI filed a mandamus petition to block Intel’s amendment.

The Federal Circuit denied VLSI’s petition for two primary reasons. First, the Court determined that VLSI had not shown that it had no other available means of obtaining relief. The district court expressly invited the parties to brief issues pertaining to Intel’s licensing defense in subsequent briefing, and VLSI had since filed a motion to dismiss pertaining to this very issue. The Court also noted that VLSI could raise this issue on appeal after a final judgment. Second, the Court determined that VLSI failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Intel to amend its answer, finding that Intel acted diligently in seeking to amend its answer and that VLSI had long since known about the potential defense.

With respect to the substantive issue of whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit declined to offer an opinion at this stage. Nevertheless, in an apparent message to the court below, the final sentence of the Court’s opinion reads, “[w]e only note that Intel’s motion to amend its answer was filed after the court determined there were no remaining claims, such that no case or controversy remained before the court.”



read more

BLOG EDITORS

Paul Devinsky

Amol Parikh

Jodi Benassi

STAY CONNECTED

Subscribe

TOPICS

ARCHIVES