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How Not to Build a Case of Trade Secret Misappropriation

by | Jan 14, 2021 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a dismissal of trade secret claims, finding that although misappropriation of a trade secret prior to the enactment of the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) does not preclude a claim arising from post-enactment or continued use of the same trade secret, the publication of a trade secret in a patent application extinguishes trade secret status. Eli Attia; Eli Attia Architect PC v. Google LLC, et al., Case No. 19-15771 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2020) (Wallace, J.)

Eli Attia is an architect who developed a system and method for automated design, fabrication and construction, called Engineered Architecture (EA). In 2010, Attia entered into a partnership with Google. Attia disclosed his trade secrets related to the technology to Google so that they could work together to develop a program that would implement EA. Attia executed patent assignments with Google, and a year later Google filed patent applications related to the EA trade secrets. The patents were published in 2012. Google then allegedly excluded Attia from the project and used EA to create Flux, a platform used by architects, engineers and construction workers, focused on making buildings more efficient and using artificial intelligence to streamline the design process.

In 2014, Attia sued Google under state law for trade secret misappropriation and breach of contract. In 2016, Congress enacted the DTSA. Since its inception, DTSA has been an enumerated predicate for the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which means that plaintiffs can bring lawsuits claiming a conspiracy when theft of trade secrets is an underlying claim. Attia amended his complaint to add RICO claims based on Google’s alleged trade secret misappropriation. Google removed the action to federal court and moved to dismiss. Attia filed another amended complaint, this time asserting a new DTSA claim and two RICO claims.

The district court dismissed Attia’s federal claims with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The district court found that the alleged trade secrets were already disclosed in Google’s 2012 published patent applications, and those publications extinguished the relevant trade secrets. The court held that Attia lacked standing to assert DTSA or RICO claims, and neither estoppel nor continued use could convert the 2012 publications into a DTSA violation. Attia appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the issue was one of first impression before the Court, and set out to determine whether, as a matter of law, the pre-enactment disclosure of a trade secret forecloses the possibility of a DTSA claim arising from the continued use of the trade secret after enactment. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), the established model statute for trade secret misappropriation that has been adopted by the majority of the states, contains an anti-continued use provision, the Court noted. The UTSA states that “ a continuing misappropriation that began prior to the effective date,”… “does not apply to the continuing misappropriation that occurs after the effective date.” The DTSA does not [...]

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Defend Trade Secrets Act Supports Sealing Information on Appeal

by | Jan 7, 2021 | ,

Addressing whether purported trade secret information ought to remain under seal on appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled in a one-judge order that the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) provided a statutory basis that overcame the presumption of public access. Magnesium Machine, LLC v. Terves, LLC, Case No. 20-3779 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2020) (McKeague, J.)

This case presented the issue of what part of a record may be sealed on appeal—normally a routine question—in litigation that was anything but routine. According to the verified complaint, Magnesium Machine discovered a particular salt-based treatment for use on oil and gas tools. According to Magnesium, in the course of litigating a patent infringement suit against one of Magnesium’s suppliers, Terves and its counsel, McDonald Hopkins, obtained information reflective of Magnesium’s alleged trade secret from a third party pursuant to subpoena. Specifically, Magnesium claimed that particular language in a settlement agreement disclosed Magnesium’s trade secrets. The settlement agreement had been produced by the third party without any confidentiality designation. The complaint alleged violations of the federal DTSA and Oklahoma and Ohio state trade secrets acts.

Invoking the seizure provisions of the DTSA, Magnesium sought and obtained an ex parte order directing the US Marshals to seize Terves’s electronic equipment, including devices at Terves’ president’s home. That order did not last long. Following an evidentiary hearing (in which Terves participated) the day after the order was issued, the district court vacated the seizure order because Magnesium had not demonstrated misappropriation of a trade secret.

To appeal, Magnesium requested express findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court explained that Terves and its lawyers subpoenaed materials in good faith, that the settlement agreement was produced without restriction (such as a confidentiality marking), that Terves’s lawyers did not impermissibly share the settlement agreement with Terves employees and that upon objection by Magnesium, Terves deleted its copies of the settlement agreement. Thereafter, on motions to dismiss, the district court concluded that Magnesium failed to allege misappropriation and that the litigation privilege protected Terves’ counsel.

Terves sought and obtained attorneys’ fees against Magnesium and its counsel for proceeding in bad faith. The district court found that Magnesium had every reason to know that its claims were baseless, because it was “well aware at the time the suit was filed that Defendants had received the allegedly secret information through legitimate discovery means and that it was provided to them without description.” Moreover, claiming that a three-word phrase in the settlement agreement purportedly disclosed trade secret information was “an intentional exaggeration/misrepresentation.” Indeed, other public statements had provided far more detail than the purportedly secret phrase, according to the district court.

On appeal, although Terves contended that the purported trade secret did not qualify as a secret, in the exercise of caution and on Magnesium’s request, Terves nonetheless sought to file a brief under seal. Judge David McKeague, acting on behalf of the Sixth Circuit, agreed that it was appropriate to seal the information, [...]

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Trade Secret Misappropriators Fail to Launch in Rocket Facility

by | May 14, 2020 |

Addressing a variety of challenges to a judgment against defendants in a trade secret misappropriation action, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the plaintiff had standing on the basis of lawful possession (as opposed to ownership) of the trade secret materials and that the damages awarded, including punitives, was supported by sufficient evidence. Advanced Fluid Systems, Inc. v. Huber, Case Nos. 19-1722; -1752 (3d Cir. Apr. 30, 2020) (Jordan, J.).

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Settled means settled: Broad settlement release equates to res judicata

by | Apr 16, 2026 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment decision, concluding that an intellectual property owner’s claims were barred by the scope of a settlement agreement resolving earlier state court litigation between the parties. Clear Touch Interactive, Inc. v. The Ockers Co. et al., Nos. 25-1304, 25-1374 (4th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026) (Wynn, Harris, JJ.) (Rushing, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Clear Touch, a designer and manufacturer of interactive technology products, entered into exclusive reseller agreements with information and communications technology reseller Ockers in 2014. After Clear Touch revoked Ockers’ exclusivity in 2017, Ockers began developing a competing product called TouchView. Clear Touch terminated Ockers as a reseller in 2019. The following year, Ockers filed suit in South Carolina state court alleging breach of contract and asserting various tort, trade secret, defamation, and civil conspiracy claims.

In June 2021, the parties resolved the state court action through a settlement agreement that dismissed the case with prejudice and included a broad mutual release of all claims and counterclaims – known or unknown – that were brought or could have been brought and that arose out of or related to the subject matter of the lawsuit.

Despite that settlement, Clear Touch filed a federal action one month later against Ockers, two of its officers (John J. Houser and Jason Houser), and TouchView Interactive, asserting claims for trademark infringement, trade secret misappropriation, and unfair competition based on the TouchView product. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the settlement agreement and the state court’s dismissal with prejudice barred Clear Touch’s claims.

The district court initially allowed some claims to proceed, including certain Lanham Act claims and claims against TouchView Interactive, but dismissed the remainder. After discovery, however, the court revisited the preclusion issue and granted summary judgment to Ockers and its officers, concluding that all of Clear Touch’s remaining claims were barred by res judicata. The district court also granted summary judgment to TouchView Interactive, finding it to be a shell entity with no commercial activity. Following a jury verdict in favor of Ockers, Clear Touch appealed.

Clear Touch challenged the district court’s res judicata determination, arguing both substantive error and procedural error under Rule 54(b). The Fourth Circuit rejected both arguments. Substantively, the Fourth Circuit held that Clear Touch failed to create a genuine dispute regarding the settlement agreement’s plain language or the parties’ mutual intent to release all claims, including those that could have been brought, arising from the same operative facts. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Clear Touch, the federal claims were precluded because they could have been asserted as counterclaims in the prior state court action, which had been dismissed with prejudice.

Procedurally, the Fourth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to revisit its earlier rulings. Rule 54(b) permits revision of nonfinal orders when new evidence emerges or a legal error becomes apparent. Here, supplemental evidence showed that Clear Touch [...]

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When patent law meets free speech: Anti-SLAPP appellate jurisdiction

by | Oct 30, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that it had jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a district court’s denial of a California anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion in a trade secret and inventorship case, finding such a denial was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. On the merits, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s decision. IQE, plc v. Newport Fab, LLC, DBA Jazz Semiconductor, et al., Case No. 24-1124 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2025) (Hughes, Stark, Wang, JJ.)

IQE sued Jazz Semiconductor, Tower Semiconductor, and other entities and individuals (collectively, Tower) for violation of the Defend Trade Secrets Act, correction of inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256, and five claims arising under California state law, including trade secret misappropriation and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. Tower moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and simultaneously filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the claims for misappropriation and intentional interference arising under state law. The district court denied Tower’s motion to strike. Tower appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit determined that under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) the Federal Circuit would have had jurisdiction at the time the appeal was filed. The Ninth Circuit explained that the Federal Circuit had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because the complaint asserted a claim for correction of inventorship, a cause of action arising under federal patent law. The Ninth Circuit further concluded that the Federal Circuit had appellate jurisdiction under Ninth Circuit law since the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is an immediately appealable order under the collateral order doctrine. The Ninth Circuit therefore transferred the appeal to the Federal Circuit.

The Federal Circuit noted that the appeal raised a jurisdictional question of first impression: whether the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court’s denial of an anti-SLAPP motion before entry of final judgment. The Federal Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit that it has subject matter jurisdiction over claims created by federal patent law. The Federal Circuit noted that appellate jurisdiction typically is limited to a final decision by the district court, but the collateral order doctrine provides a narrow exception that allows an interlocutory appeal when a trial court’s order affects rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal. The Court analyzed the three collateral order factors and determined that an anti-SLAPP motion to strike under California law fits squarely within the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule.

IQE argued that jurisdiction was improper for two reasons:

  • IQE filed an amended complaint after Tower’s appeal, suggesting the district court must revisit the motion.
  • Some circuits have held that state anti-SLAPP statutes conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Federal Circuit rejected both arguments, finding the amended complaint improper under Ninth Circuit precedent and deferring to the Ninth Circuit’s view that California’s anti-SLAPP law applies in federal court. [...]

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State court action doesn’t create reasonable apprehension of related federal claims

by | Jul 17, 2025 |

Addressing whether a federal district court had jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief that certain trade secrets and trademarks were invalid and not infringed, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that state law claims for breach of contract, trade secret misappropriation, and trademark infringement did not create a reasonable apprehension of federal litigation sufficient to give rise to federal jurisdiction. Thunderhead of Ankeny, Inc. v. Chicken Bones of Kearney, Inc., Case No. 24-2741 (8th Cir. July 8, 2025) (Colloton, Arnold, Gruender, JJ.)

Nearly 20 years ago, David Anders sold his equity in Chicken Bones of Kearney, Inc., which ran a bar and grill called the Chicken Coop. Anders subsequently opened a new Chicken Coop restaurant. Chicken Bones sued Anders for misappropriating Chicken Bones’ trade secrets, trademarks, and trade dress. The parties settled, and Anders received a limited license to the Chicken Coop intellectual property. Anders then opened several other Chicken Coop locations under that license.

Believing that Anders had not complied with the license in opening the new restaurants, Chicken Bones sued Anders in state court for breach of the settlement agreement, misappropriation of trade secret recipes, and infringement of the Chicken Coop trademarks and trade dress. In response, Anders sued Chicken Bones in federal court, seeking declarations of noninfringement and invalidity. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. Anders appealed.

The parties and the Eighth Circuit assumed that the district court would have jurisdiction only if the suit presented a federal question. The Eighth Circuit explained that to assess federal question jurisdiction in the case of a declaratory action, the Court must imagine a traditional action that presents the same controversy and determine whether a federal claim would appear on the face of the resulting complaint. “If, but for the availability of the declaratory judgment procedure, the federal claim would arise only as a defense to a state created action, jurisdiction is lacking.”

Applying this principle, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court did not have jurisdiction over Anders’ declaratory action because he primarily sought vindication of his defenses to Chicken Bones’ pending state law claims. While the Court recognized that Anders also sought declaratory relief in anticipation of potential federal trade secret, trademark, and trade dress claims, the Court reasoned that any federal law controversy between the parties was too speculative to support jurisdiction. While a threat of litigation can give rise to a justiciable controversy, there was no evidence that Chicken Bones would assert overlapping and duplicative federal law claims against Anders. The Eighth Circuit further found that Chicken Bones’ petition to cancel Anders’ federal trademark registration of a Chicken Coop logo did not change its analysis, because the petition merely confirmed the existence of a trademark infringement dispute between the parties, which Chicken Coop elected to adjudicate in state court.

The Eighth Circuit distinguished cases involving state law trade secret claims concerning a patented invention. Because there is no state patent system, such trade secret claims can [...]

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Paint It White: No Sovereign Immunity in Economic Espionage Case

by | May 8, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of foreign sovereign immunity to a Chinese company accused of stealing trade secrets related to the production of proprietary metallurgy technology. United States v. Pangang Grp. Co., Ltd., Case No. 22-10058 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2025) (Wardlaw, Collins, Bress, JJ.)

Pangang is a manufacturer of steel, vanadium, and titanium. E.I. du Pont de Nemours (DuPont) had a proprietary chloride-route technology used for producing TiO₂, a valuable white pigment used in paints, plastics, and paper. Pangang allegedly conspired with others to obtain DuPont’s trade secrets related to TiO₂ production through economic espionage in order to use the stolen information to start a titanium production plant in China. The US government filed a criminal lawsuit.

In defense, Pangang invoked the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and federal common law, arguing that it was entitled to foreign sovereign immunity from criminal prosecution in the United States because it was ultimately owned and controlled by the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In a prior appeal, the Ninth Circuit had found that Pangang failed to make a prima facie showing that it fell within the FSIA’s domain of covered entities. On remand, the district court again rejected Pangang’s remaining claims of foreign sovereign immunity, including its claims based on federal common law.

While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Turkiye Halk Bankasi v. United States clarified that common law, not the FSIA, governs whether foreign states and their instrumentalities are entitled to foreign sovereign immunity from criminal prosecution in US courts. This led to a rebriefing of the present appeal to focus on the now-controlling issues concerning the extent to which Pangang enjoys foreign sovereign immunity under federal common law. Under federal common law, an entity must satisfy two conditions to enjoy foreign sovereign immunity from suit:

  • It must be the kind of entity eligible for immunity.
  • Its conduct must fall within the scope of the immunity conferred.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that Pangang did not make a prima facie showing that it exercised functions comparable to those of an agency of the PRC and therefore was not eligible for foreign sovereign immunity from criminal prosecution. The Court also found that “[t]he mere fact that a foreign state owns and controls a corporation is not sufficient to bring the corporation within the ambit of [sovereign immunity].” Since Pangang’s commercial activities were not governmental functions, there was no evidence that sovereign immunity should be applied. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity.



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One Bite at the Apple Where State and Federal Jurisdiction Is Concurrent

by | Aug 15, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a federal district court’s dismissal of a case on res judicata grounds after a state court issued a decision on different claims but had concurrent jurisdiction over the claims alleged in the federal case. Beijing Neu Cloud Oriental Sys. Tech. Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., Case No. 22-3132 (2d Cir. July 25, 2024) (Livingston, Menashi, Kahn, JJ.)

Beijing Neu Cloud Oriental System Technology filed suit in federal district court against several International Business Machines companies (collectively, IBM defendants) asserting a single claim for trade secret misappropriation under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). Shortly thereafter, Neu Cloud also sued the IBM defendants in New York state court, alleging state law causes of action for unfair competition, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and tortious interference.

The state court dismissed the claims. After the state court issued its decision, the IBM defendants moved to dismiss the federal action, arguing that:

  • Neu Cloud’s claim was time-barred.
  • Neu Cloud failed to state a plausible DTSA claim.
  • The judgment of the New York Supreme Court precluded the instant DTSA claim under res judicata.

The district court granted the motion to dismiss, agreeing with the IBM defendants on the DTSA claims but not on the effect of res judicata. Neu Cloud appealed the dismissal of its complaint. The Second Circuit only considered the arguments related to the IBM defendants’ res judicata defense.

Applying New York law to determine the preclusive effect of the state court’s judgment, the Second Circuit explained that under New York preclusion law “a party may not litigate a claim where a judgment on the merits exists from a prior action between the same parties involving the same subject matter.” This rule applies if the subsequent claim was “actually litigated” in the prior action or if it merely “could have been raised in the prior litigation.”

The Second Circuit found that the district court’s decision was on the merits and the trade secret claims could have been raised in the state court action. The Court held that the New York state court would have been competent to adjudicate the DTSA claim since jurisdiction for DTSA actions is not exclusive to federal courts. The Court noted that the plain text of the DTSA is strong evidence that Congress intended for jurisdiction over DTSA claims to be federal and state concurrent. Moreover, the Second Circuit found that the legislative history revealed no evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction over DTSA claims on the federal courts. The Court noted that many other circuit courts had come to the same conclusion.

Since the parties were clearly the same, the state court case involved the same subject matter, and the claims alleged the same injury and arose out of the same or related facts, the Second Circuit stated that the relevant question was whether Neu Cloud should have sought recovery in state court for its claim of trade secret [...]

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“Common Sense” Governs Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federal Contracting Program

by | May 16, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s ruling, holding that waiver of sovereign immunity for claims related to a federal contracting program means the defendant, a sovereign Indian tribe, can be sued and that the district court failed to consider the valid and enforceable nature of the forum. AQuate II, LLC v. Jessica Tedrick Myers and Kituwah Global Gov’t Group, LLC, Case No. 22-12669 (11th Cir. May 1, 2024) (Grant, Abudu, Hull, JJ.)

AQuate II is a business organized under the authority of the Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town. Kituwah Services is organized under the authority of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. Both tribal entities compete for and perform federal contracts under the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Business Development program, which was created to help qualifying small businesses that are owned/controlled by “socially and economically disadvantaged” individuals/groups compete for federal procurement contracts. Jessica Myers, a former AQuate II employee, took a job as the director of administration for Kituwah and allegedly violated her confidentiality commitments by taking copies of contracts, proposals, personnel lists and other secret information. Myers also allegedly contacted her former colleagues at AQuate II to solicit information regarding bids for a federal contract and provided job offers to AQuate II employees contingent upon Kituwah winning the federal contract. AQuate II sued in federal district court, alleging that Myers breached her employment agreements and that she and Kituwah violated both the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 and the Alabama Trade Secrets Act. (18 U.S.C. § 1836; Ala. Code § 8-27-1 et seq.) AQuate II requested a preliminary injunction, and Kituwah and Myers moved to dismiss.

Enrollment in the 8(a) program requires qualifying businesses to agree to “sue and be sued” in US federal courts for “all matters relating to” the Small Business Administration, including its 8(a) program and related participation, loans and contract performance. (13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(1).) Kituwah invoked sovereign immunity and claimed it was not subject to suit in federal district court. AQuate II argued that Kituwah had waived its sovereign immunity with respect to claims relating to Kituwah’s participation in the 8(a) program. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that Kituwah had not waived sovereign immunity for the trade secrets claims because AQuate II’s lawsuit did not “relate to” participation in the 8(a) program. The district court dismissed the same claims against Myers, finding that Kituwah was a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19. Lastly, the district court dismissed the remaining breach of contract claim against Myers under forum non conveniens, concluding that the dispute resolution policy required that the claim be resolved in the Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town court. The district court denied AQuate II’s motion for reconsideration, and AQuate II appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that under 1998 Supreme Court precedent, Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs., “an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit, or the tribe has waived its immunity.” [...]

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Badgerow Enforced: District Court Lacks Independent Jurisdiction to Enforce Arbitration Award

by | Feb 29, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s arbitration award because the district court lacked proper subject matter jurisdiction, independent from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), to enforce the award. SmartSky Networks, LLC v. DAG Wireless, LTD, Case No. 22-1253 (4th Cir. Feb. 13, 2024) (Diaz, Thacker, Rubin, JJ.)

SmartSky Networks filed suit in the district court against Wireless Systems Solutions and related companies and individuals over alleged breach of contract, trade secret misappropriation and deceptive trade practices. The parties entered into a business relationship regarding wireless communications in 2017. The relationship was governed by several agreements in the form of statements of work, purchase orders and a teaming agreement.

After filing suit in the district court, SmartSky submitted an arbitration demand against Wireless Systems. The related companies and individuals voluntarily agreed to submit to arbitration with respect to SmartSky’s claims filed against them. Wireless Systems moved to stay the district court action pending arbitration. The arbitration tribunal found in favor of SmartSky and issued an award, which included monetary damages in favor of SmartSky and a permanent injunction against the other parties. Thereafter, SmartSky filed a motion to enforce the award, and the district court confirmed the award. Wireless Systems and the related entities appealed.

The threshold question on appeal was whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award. Wireless Systems argued that the 2022 Supreme Court decision in Badgerow v. Walters dictated that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award. In Badgerow, the Supreme Court held that a federal district court faced with an application to enforce or vacate an arbitration award under Sections 9 or 10 of the FAA must have a basis for subject matter jurisdiction independent from the FAA and apparent on the face of the application. The Supreme Court further held that “look-through” jurisdiction (when a court looks beyond a petition to compel arbitration to the underlying controversy to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists) only applies to petitions to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA, and that such jurisdiction is not available for Section 9 and 10 applications to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration awards.

Reviewing the district court ruling de novo, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The Court reasoned that at the time the parties filed their respective Section 9 and 10 applications, the dispute focused on the enforceability of the arbitral award and not on the issues and claims already resolved by the tribunal. For the district court to find that it had jurisdiction over the contract dispute between the parties, the district court had to “look through” to the civil lawsuit and determine that a federal claim existed. Ruling consistently with Badgerow, the Court determined that “look-through” jurisdiction is not available for Section 9 and 10 applications. The Court reasoned that once the tribunal ordered that all claims between SmartSky and Wireless Systems be arbitrated and the related companies and [...]

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