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Off the mark: NPE licensees must comply with patent marking for pre-suit damages

Affirming dismissal of a patent infringement complaint and an award of attorneys’ fees, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reiterated that a nonpracticing entity (NPE) seeking pre-suit damages cannot disregard its licensees’ obligations under the patent marking statute, and that a pattern of abusive litigation conduct supports an exceptional case finding under 35 U.S.C. § 285. VDPP, LLC v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Case No. 24-2226 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2026) (Moore, Lourie, Cunningham, JJ.)

VDPP, an NPE, sued an auto manufacturer for infringement of a patent directed to electrically controlled spectacles. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied leave to amend as futile. Because VDPP sought pre-suit damages, it was required to plead compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 287(a), including compliance by its licensees.

VDPP had entered into 11 settlement agreements that included patent licenses, but its proposed amended complaint did not allege that any licensee had marked its products. Instead, VDPP relied on its status as an NPE and asserted that it had no products of its own to mark. VDPP appealed the district court’s dismissal and fee award.

The Federal Circuit affirmed. Although a patentee that does not make or sell patented products may not have products of its own to mark, its licensees remain subject to § 287’s marking requirements. The Court rejected VDPP’s attempt to distinguish licenses granted through settlement agreements, explaining that a settlement license is no different for marking purposes from any other patent license. The Court noted that all 11 settlement agreements were structured as licenses and that one expressly stated that the licensee had no obligation to mark. Because VDPP could not plausibly allege that it made reasonable efforts to ensure compliance by its licensees, the Court affirmed the denial of leave to amend as futile.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s exceptional case determination and fee award under § 285. The district court relied on several aspects of VDPP’s litigation conduct, including seeking future damages and injunctive relief on an expired patent, failing to disclose relevant settlement agreements despite being reminded of them, and advancing positions the district court characterized as frivolous.

The Federal Circuit rejected VDPP’s argument that conduct must independently satisfy Rule 11 before it may support an exceptional case finding. It also concluded that the district court properly considered VDPP’s broader pattern of filing patent infringement suits followed by low-value settlement demands, noting that such a pattern is relevant to an exceptional case determination where adequate evidence of an abusive litigation strategy is presented.

The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal as to sanctions imposed on VDPP’s counsel for lack of jurisdiction. VDPP’s counsel’s notice of appeal listed only VDPP as the appellant, and the counsel’s name appeared only incidentally within a description of the orders being appealed. Corrected notices filed more than 90 days after entry of the orders came too late. The Court also rejected VDPP’s argument that it had standing to contest its own counsel’s [...]

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Resolution impossible: Lower resolution prior art is analogous art to higher resolution claims

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s decision finding that prior art disclosing a low-resolution system was analogous prior art to claims directed to a high-resolution system for purposes of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The Nielsen Company (US), LLC v. TVision Insights, Inc., Case No. 2025-1371 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 14, 2026) (Dyk, Reyna, Bissoon, JJ.)

Nielsen owns a patent related to audience measurement systems that use cameras to capture images of viewers watching media content. The specification describes a “people counter” that may use low-resolution images to detect audience members and a “person identifier” that uses high-resolution images for facial recognition.

TVision petitioned for inter partes review (IPR), asserting two grounds of obviousness, both of which relied on a scientific publication by Tian as part of the asserted prior-art combinations. The Tian publication, titled “Evaluation of Face Resolution for Expression Analysis,” disclosed experimental results evaluating facial-expression analysis using lower-resolution images “down-sampled from the originals.” The Board held that all challenged claims were obvious on both grounds. Nielsen appealed.

A central issue was whether the Board erred in concluding that Tian qualified as analogous art. Two tests define the scope of analogous art: whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, and if not, whether the reference is still reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. In its petition, TVision asserted that Tian was in the same field of endeavor as Nielsen’s patent. Nielsen responded that Tian was neither in the same field of endeavor nor reasonably pertinent. The Board ultimately concluded that Tian was reasonably pertinent analogous art without reaching the field of endeavor prong. Nielsen argued that the Board violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by applying the reasonably pertinent test when TVision’s petition only argued that Tian was in the same field of endeavor, depriving Nielsen of adequate notice and an opportunity to respond.

The Federal Circuit rejected Nielsen’s APA argument on three independent grounds:

  • The Court explained that although the two analogous-art tests are separate, the evidence and analysis relevant to them may overlap. The Court also explained that an analogous-art theory need not be expressly stated and may instead be implicit in the petition. Here, TVision’s discussion of Tian’s analysis of images for head detection and pose estimation placed Nielsen on notice that reasonable pertinence was at issue.
  • Nielsen had an opportunity to address reasonable pertinence and in fact addressed both analogous-art prongs in its Patent Owner Response.
  • Nielsen conceded that it could not identify any evidence or argument that it had been prevented from presenting. Accordingly, even if there had been a notice error, it was harmless.

On the merits, the Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that Tian was reasonably pertinent analogous art. The Court rejected Nielsen’s attempt to limit the analysis to prior art that an ordinarily skilled artisan would reasonably search to address the problems specifically identified in [...]

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Ministerial requirements aren’t enough: Post-AIA prior art priority requires § 112 written description support

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a Patent Trial & Appeal Board final written decision finding challenged claims obvious, concluding that the Board applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether an asserted prior art reference could obtain the filing date of an earlier provisional application based only on satisfaction of “ministerial requirements.” Dental Monitoring SAS v. Align Technology, Inc., Case No. 25-1752 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10, 2026) (Lourie, Stall, Taranto, JJ.)

Dental Monitoring owns a patent directed to a method for acquiring and analyzing an image of a patient’s dental arch. Align Technology petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of the patent based on three references: Salah, Carrier, and Maninis.

Carrier’s status as prior art was central to the dispute. Carrier claimed priority to a provisional application filed before the effective filing date of Dental Monitoring’s patent, but Carrier’s nonprovisional application was filed afterward. Thus, Carrier qualified as prior art only if it could obtain the benefit of its provisional application’s filing date under America Invents Act (AIA) § 102(d)(2).

Dental Monitoring argued that under the Federal Circuit’s 2015 decision in Dynamic Drinkware v. National Graphics, Carrier could rely on the provisional filing date only if the provisional provided written description support for at least one claim of Carrier. The Board disagreed, concluding that Dynamic Drinkware addressed only pre-AIA law. Instead, relying on its precedential decision in Penumbra v. RapidPulse, the Board determined that a reference patent receives the filing date of an earlier application for AIA prior art purposes if it satisfies the “ministerial requirements” of §§ 119 and 120 and the earlier application describes the subject matter relied upon in the reference. Because Carrier’s provisional described the relied-upon subject matter, the Board treated Carrier as prior art as of the provisional filing date.

On the merits, the Board found the claims unpatentable as obvious over a combination of three references. Dental Monitoring appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the statutory question de novo, concluding that §§ 102(d)(2), 119(e)(1), and 112(a) foreclosed the Board’s ministerial requirements approach.

Section 102(d)(2) provides that a patent or patent application may be effectively filed for prior art purposes as of an earlier application’s filing date if it is “entitled to claim a right of priority” under § 119 or the benefit of an earlier filing date under § 120. Section 119(e)(1), in turn, permits a nonprovisional application to claim priority to a provisional only when the invention disclosed in the later application is disclosed in the provisional “in the manner provided by” § 112(a). The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that § 102(d)(2) incorporates § 112(a)’s substantive written description requirement. The Court also found further support in the phrase “entitled to claim a right of priority,” because an applicant would only be “entitled to claim priority” by fulfilling the statutory requirements, including § 112’s written description requirement.

Align argued that Dynamic Drinkware did not apply because its analysis was limited to the pre-AIA version of § [...]

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Unplugged: Claim construction errors, presumption of harm short-circuit preliminary injunction

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction, finding that the district court improperly imported a spatial limitation into the claim term “backplate” and erroneously treated the structural term “pin” as a means-plus-function limitation. The Court also reiterated that in preliminary injunction proceedings, a strong showing of validity and infringement does not give rise to a presumption of irreparable harm. Socket Solutions, LLC v. Import Global, LLC, Case No. 25-1121 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 4, 2026) (Moore, C.J.; Prost, J.; Seeborg, Distr.J. (sitting by designation)).

Socket Solutions owns a patent directed to an indoor electrical outlet cover designed to conceal an outlet’s contact openings while permitting continued use of the outlet. Socket Solutions sued Import Global, alleging that Import Global’s Neat Socket product infringed. Socket Solutions also moved for a preliminary injunction. Adopting a magistrate judge’s reports and recommendations, the district court granted the injunction, barring Import Global from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the accused product. Import Global appealed.

The Federal Circuit first addressed the district court’s construction of “backplate.” The district court construed the term as the component of the cover opposite the frontplate that included at least one set of electrical prongs. Import Global argued that the backplate instead referred to the portion of the cover closest to the wall outlet.

The Federal Circuit rejected both constructions because each imposed a spatial relationship not required by the specification. Looking to the written description, the Court explained that the backplate was used to define the thickness of the outlet cover. The Court therefore construed “backplate” as the component that, together with the frontplate, formed the cover such that the cover’s maximum thickness was measured between the frontplate and that component at the cover’s central portion. The Court also declined to require the backplate itself to include electrical prongs. Because the asserted claim separately recited that limitation, incorporating it into the construction of “backplate” would improperly render other claim language superfluous.

The Federal Circuit next concluded that the district court erred by construing “pin” as a means for making an electrical connection between a wire and a corresponding prong, effectively treating the term as a means-plus-function limitation under Section 112(f). Because the claim did not use the word “means,” the presumption against application of Section 112(f) applied. The Court found that the presumption was not overcome because the specification described a “pin” structurally, and the parties agreed that a skilled artisan would understand a pin to identify structure.

The Federal Circuit rejected Socket Solutions’ proposed purely functional construction as too broad because not every structure capable of connecting a wire to a prong is necessarily a pin. It likewise rejected Import Global’s proposed “mechanical system” construction as unsupported by the specification. Finding neither lexicography nor disavowal, the Court concluded that “pin” should receive its plain and ordinary meaning.

Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the district court’s irreparable harm analysis. Although the Court did not decide whether Socket Solutions had established irreparable harm, [...]

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Not even a thread left: Single reference anticipation, missing claim limitation entitle defendant to JMOL

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a judgment of infringement, concluding that the asserted patent claims were anticipated by a single prior art reference and that the accused products did not satisfy a limitation under the district court’s claim construction. As a result, the Court concluded that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of both invalidity and noninfringement. Board of Regents of the University of Texas v. Boston Scientific Corp., Case Nos. 24-2062; -2063 (Fed. Cir. July 27, 2026) (Taranto, Bryson, Cunningham, JJ.)

The Board of Regents of the University of Texas (UT) owns a patent directed to a composition containing at least one biodegradable polymer fiber that includes one or more dispersed therapeutic agents. The claimed invention may be used with commercially available stents to deliver drugs at the site where the stent is placed.

In 2017, UT sued Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC), alleging that BSC’s drug-eluting coronary stent systems infringed UT’s patent. Following claim construction, the case proceeded to trial. The jury found that BSC willfully infringed the asserted claims and rejected BSC’s argument in its motion for JMOL that the claims were anticipated by a prior art reference known as Song. The jury awarded damages to UT. The district court subsequently set aside the willfulness finding as legally unsupported but otherwise upheld the verdict. BSC appealed the infringement and validity rulings, and UT cross-appealed the district court’s decision overturning the willfulness verdict.

The Federal Circuit reversed the judgment for UT, finding that BSC was entitled to JMOL that the asserted claims were invalid as anticipated and, independently, that BSC did not infringe.

Addressing anticipation, the Federal Circuit concluded that Song disclosed each limitation of the asserted independent claim. Song taught the claimed biodegradable polymer fiber and disclosed the claimed “second phase” limitation. The Court explained that Song’s noncontiguous drug phases satisfied the requirement for discrete drug-containing regions.

The asserted dependent claims added limitations expressed in Markush-group form. Because Song disclosed at least one member of each claimed Markush group, the Federal Circuit concluded that those claims were also anticipated. The Court further found that Song disclosed the claimed release of a drug at varying rates.

The Federal Circuit separately concluded that BSC was entitled to JMOL of noninfringement. Under the district court’s claim construction, the asserted claims required a “thread-like” structure. The Court determined that UT’s evidence did not establish the presence of such a structure in BSC’s accused stent coatings.

UT’s infringement theory relied on sections of the coating that had been artificially separated for purposes of analysis. The Federal Circuit concluded that no reasonable jury could characterize those artificially isolated portions as the claimed thread-like structure. BSC therefore was entitled to JMOL of noninfringement.




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Book of wisdom has limits: Can’t impute knowledge of later-arising facts to hypothetical negotiation

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated in part a US Court of Federal Claims damages award, finding that the court erred in applying the book of wisdom in its damages analysis and assessing noncompensatory damages against the government. 4DD Holdings, LLC, et al. v. United States, Case No. 2024-1996 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2026) (Hughes, Prost, Stark, JJ.)

4DD licensed TETRA software to the US Department of Defense and the US Department of Veterans Affairs to improve interoperability among existing military healthcare databases. Under the license, the government was permitted to make only a single backup copy of TETRA. 4DD later discovered that the government had made thousands of unauthorized copies of the software and sued for copyright infringement. During discovery, 4DD learned that the government had deleted TETRA copies from its development and test center and had destroyed evidence related to those copies. 4DD moved for sanctions.

The Court of Federal Claims imposed about $1.1 million in sanctions, found that the government had exceeded the scope of the licenses by hundreds of thousands of Federator cores and Studio seats, and awarded about $12.7 million in damages based on a hypothetical negotiation rather than the parties’ license agreement. In assessing the parties’ bargaining positions, the claims court relied in part on the fact that TETRA was never implemented, had no established profitability, and faced competition from a less expensive software product. 4DD appealed.

4DD argued that the claims court should have calculated damages using the royalty rates established in the parties’ license agreement, which it contended would have resulted in an award amount between $3 billion and $5 billion. The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b), which provides for “reasonable and entire compensation,” does not require a particular methodology for calculating copyright damages. Although a reasonable royalty may be based on an established royalty rate, it may also be determined through a hypothetical negotiation. The Court explained that the relevance of prior license agreements depends on the extent to which they are economically comparable to the infringing use. Because the government’s licensed use differed materially from the scope of its infringing use, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claims court did not abuse its discretion in determining damages through a hypothetical negotiation rather than by simply applying the parties’ license rates.

4DD also argued that the claims court misapplied the book of wisdom doctrine by imputing to the government (at the time of the hypothetical negotiation) knowledge of its later decision to abandon the TETRA project. The Federal Circuit agreed. The Court explained that although later-occurring facts may be considered to reduce uncertainty and illuminate the value that existed at the time of the hypothetical negotiation, they may not be used to impute knowledge of unforeseeable future events that affect the value of the license. Here, the court’s claims improperly relied on the government’s subsequent change in leadership and resulting decision to discontinue the project before TETRA was implemented to diminish 4DD’s bargaining [...]

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In vitro data, broad dosage ranges fail to enable patient-treatment claims

Clarifying the enablement standard for pharmaceutical method-of-treatment claims, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a post-verdict grant of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), finding patents directed to daily administration of a “unit dosage” to cancer patients invalid for lack of enablement. The Court concluded that the specification’s in vitro data and broad dosage ranges – some exceeding the maximum tolerated dose in humans – did not provide sufficient guidance for translating the disclosed results into a workable patient-dosing regimen. Wyeth LLC v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, Case No. 24-2325 (Fed. Cir. July 9, 2026) (Lourie, Linn, Hughes, JJ.)

Pharmaceutical and healthcare company Wyeth owns patents directed to methods of treating gefitinib- and/or erlotinib-resistant non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) by administering a daily “unit dosage” of an irreversible epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR) inhibitor. A jury found that competitor AstraZeneca, which markets the irreversible EGFR inhibitor Tagrisso® (osimertinib), induced infringement and awarded Wyeth $107.5 million in damages. After trial, however, the district court granted AstraZeneca’s renewed JMOL motion, finding the asserted claims invalid for lack of enablement.

Wyeth appealed, arguing that the district court improperly changed its construction of “unit dosage” after trial, applied that revised construction in its enablement analysis, and improperly granted JMOL on enablement grounds.

The dispute centered on the construction of “unit dosage,” which the district court defined as “physically discrete units suitable as unitary dosage for the subject, each unit containing a predetermined quantity of active material calculated to produce the desired therapeutic effect.” Wyeth argued that the claims required only the identification of compounds capable of inhibiting EGFR activity. AstraZeneca countered that, because the claims expressly required daily administration to a patient, they necessarily required a dosage regimen suitable for human treatment.

The Federal Circuit agreed with AstraZeneca, finding that the claims “plainly require the daily administration of a unit dosage to a patient to achieve a therapeutic effect in treating g/e-resistant NSCLC, not merely the identification of compounds capable of inhibiting EGFR activity in vitro.”

The Federal Circuit rejected Wyeth’s contention that the district court had effectively imported US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval requirements into the enablement inquiry. The Court emphasized that enablement did not require proof of regulatory-grade safety or efficacy. Because the claims required daily administration to patients, however, the specification had to teach a skilled artisan how to arrive at a workable human-dosing regimen without undue experimentation.

The Federal Circuit determined that the specification failed to do so, as it disclosed only three exemplary compounds (EKB-569, HKI-357, and HKI-272), described their in vitro activity, and provided only broad projected dosage ranges (1-1,000 mg and 2-500 mg) without explaining how to translate those ranges into effective human dosing.

The trial record reinforced the lack of enablement. AstraZeneca presented unrebutted testimony, including from Wyeth’s own experts and co-inventors, that at least two disclosed compounds could not be administered within the claimed dosage ranges without exceeding the maximum tolerated dose in humans. One co-inventor testified that the [...]

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Preliminary injunction? Not when substantial questions remain

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction in a patent infringement action, finding that the district court’s claim construction raised, at a minimum, substantial questions regarding infringement and that the patentee failed to establish irreparable harm. Ridge Corp. et al. v. Kirk NationaLease Co. et al., Case No. 25-1254 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2026) (Dyk, Mayer, Taranto, JJ.)

Ridge Corporation, the exclusive licensee of manufacturer Cold Chain’s patent directed to an insulated overhead door, sued truck leasing and maintenance company Kirk NationaLease Co. (KNL) for patent infringement, tortious interference with business relationships, and false patent marking. After the Federal Circuit vacated an initial preliminary injunction because Ridge lacked standing to sue without the patent owner, Cold Chain joined the present action as a plaintiff. The district court again granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. KNL appealed.

KNL argued that the district court improperly construed several disputed claim limitations and, therefore, erred in concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits. The Federal Circuit agreed, explaining that a preliminary injunction should not issue where an accused infringer raises one or more substantial questions concerning infringement – questions that the patentee cannot show lack substantial merit.

The Federal Circuit identified three claim limitations that raised substantial questions of noninfringement:

  • The district court improperly construed the limitation requiring a panel that is “flexible along the entire length of the panel,” explaining that both the claim language and prosecution history supported a narrower construction.
  • The accused product raised a substantial question regarding the limitation requiring that “foam insulating material” form the second outermost surface of the door because the prosecution history distinguished prior art sandwich constructions on that basis.
  • The district court construed the term “insulated overhead door” too broadly, explaining that the specification and industry evidence supported construing the term as referring to a door suitable for cold-storage applications.

The Federal Circuit also determined that the district court erred in finding irreparable harm. Ridge asserted that it had reduced prices because of the defendants’ allegedly infringing products, but the Court found no evidence establishing the required causal nexus between the accused sales and Ridge’s pricing decisions. The Court likewise rejected Ridge’s reliance on its false-marking and tortious-interference claims because there was no credible evidence that the challenged conduct was likely to recur, making prospective injunctive relief inappropriate.

Practice note: This decision illustrates that a patentee seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish more than a plausible infringement theory. Where the accused infringer raises substantial questions regarding claim construction or infringement, a preliminary injunction is inappropriate.




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Federal Circuit: Mandate rule applies only to issues actually decided on appeal

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board obviousness determination, finding that the Board did not exceed the scope of the Court’s prior mandate by addressing a claim limitation that the Board had not reached in its original final written decision. Intellectual Pixels Ltd. v. Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC, Case No. 24-2174 (Fed. Cir. July 10, 2026) (Dyk, Stoll, Stark, JJ.)

Sony Interactive Entertainment petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of an Intellectual Pixels Limited (IPL) patent directed to methods and systems for generating digital images using an external visual server. IPL is a UK-based intellectual property licensing company known for holding a US patent that covers methods for generating and displaying digital images using a remote visual server. A key feature of the claimed invention was that the external server assumed responsibility for generating the images, relieving the client device of that processing burden.

The primary prior art reference disclosed a system in which a game was hosted “exclusively on a server/host computer” while users played the game through separate client or terminal computers. The Board instituted review but, in its first final written decision, concluded that Sony had not shown the challenged claims to be unpatentable.

Sony appealed. The Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s decision, finding that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s determination regarding the claim limitation requiring “generating” a new image.

On remand, the Board addressed a separate “compressing” limitation, concluded that the prior art satisfied that limitation, and issued a second final written decision finding the challenged claims unpatentable as obvious.

IPL appealed, arguing that the Board violated the Federal Circuit’s mandate by revisiting findings that had not been expressly disturbed in the first appeal. Under the mandate rule, issues decided on appeal generally may not be reconsidered by a lower tribunal on remand.

The Federal Circuit rejected IPL’s argument. One of the two findings IPL identified had, in fact, been vacated by the Court’s prior decision as unsupported by substantial evidence. The other concerned the Board’s observation that the primary reference was “completely silent as to the content or origin of that ‘compressed video MPEG stream.’” The Court concluded that this second finding fell outside the scope of the prior mandate because it related to the “compressing” limitation, which the Board had not reached in its first final written decision. Because the Board’s original decision rested only on the “generating” limitation, the “compressing” issue was not before the Court in the first appeal and, therefore, was not resolved – expressly or implicitly – by the Court’s mandate.

The Federal Circuit also noted that its prior discussion of the “generating” limitation had implicitly undermined IPL’s reliance on the Board’s earlier observation. Both the “generating” and “compressing” limitations referred to “at least one updated image,” making the prior finding difficult to reconcile with the Court’s earlier analysis.

IPL relied on a 2025 Federal Circuit decision, Bitmanagement Software GmBH v. United States, suggesting that factual findings made during [...]

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Back on track: Contextual inquiry required before applying § 112(f) to software claim element

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a district court’s indefiniteness ruling based on an insufficient means-plus-function analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) while affirming the denial of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and a new trial following a jury verdict finding a related patent invalid as anticipated. TrackTime, LLC v. Amazon.com Services LLC, Audible, Inc., Case No. 24-1102 (Fed. Cir. July 2, 2026) (Prost, Taranto, JJ; Kovner, J., sitting by designation.)

TrackTime sued Amazon and Audible for patent infringement, asserting two related patents directed to time-synchronized transcript technology for audio and video files. One patent relates to methods for annotating and sharing time-synchronized transcripts on mobile devices. The other relates to “tap-to-jump” technology, which allows a user to tap a word in a transcript and jump to the corresponding point in the associated audio or video file.

The district court issued a claim construction order finding the annotation-and-sharing patent invalid for indefiniteness. The court concluded that the claim terms “executable program code configured to facilitate annotation” and “executable program code configured to synchronously play multimedia” were means-plus-function terms that recited functions without sufficient corresponding structure. Because the specification did not adequately disclose structure for performing those functions, the district court held the terms indefinite.

The tap-to-jump patent proceeded separately to a jury trial. The jury found the asserted claim invalid on multiple grounds, including anticipation by a prior art program called LiveNote, and found no infringement. The district court later denied TrackTime’s post-trial motions for JMOL and a new trial. TrackTime appealed both the indefiniteness ruling on the annotation-and-sharing patent and the denial of JMOL and a new trial on the tap-to-jump patent.

The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the indefiniteness ruling on the annotation-and-sharing patent, finding the district court’s § 112(f) analysis insufficient considering the Federal Circuit’s intervening decision in Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp. (2022). In Dyfan, the Court explained that determining whether a limitation should be construed under § 112(f) requires a full contextual analysis, including whether the claim language recites sufficient structure when viewed in light of the specification, the surrounding claim language, and how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term.

The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not conduct the full inquiry required by Dyfan because it failed to consider extrinsic evidence regarding usage in the field and how a skilled artisan would understand the disputed “executable program code” limitations. The Court declined to decide the § 112(f) issue in the first instance, leaving it to the district court on remand to determine whether the disputed limitations, read in context, recited sufficient structure for performing the claimed annotation and synchronous-play functions on a mobile device.

The Federal Circuit reached a different result on the tap-to-jump patent. TrackTime argued that LiveNote failed to disclose three limitations, namely “performing a data lookup,” a “mobile computing device,” and a “touch-sensitive input interface.” The Court rejected each argument. It found that TrackTime [...]

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