infringement Archives

infringement

Identical or not? Jury can’t decide issues of claim construction

by Cecilia Choy, Ph.D. | Aug 21, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of noninfringement, finding that the jury’s infringement findings were unsupported by sufficient evidence and that the district court had improperly delegated claim construction to the jury. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Qiagen Sciences, LLC, Case No. 23-2350 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 13, 2025) (Lourie, Dyk, Cunningham, JJ.)

Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings (LabCorp) holds two patents with substantially overlapping specifications, both generally directed to methods for preparing DNA samples for sequencing and enrichment techniques aimed at enabling whole-genome sequencing. LabCorp initiated litigation alleging that various Qiagen Sciences kits containing materials used in DNA sample preparation for sequencing infringed its patents. During claim construction, the district court construed several patent terms as follows:

In the first patent, “second target-specific primer” means a single-stranded oligonucleotide with a 3’ portion that specifically anneals to a portion of the known target nucleotide sequence in the amplicon from step (b), and a 5’ portion identical to a second sequencing primer.
Also in the first patent, “second adaptor primer” refers to a nucleic acid molecule containing a sequence identical to part of the first sequencing primer and nested relative to the first adaptor primer.
In the second patent, “target-specific primer” is defined as a primer sufficiently complementary to the target to enable selective annealing and amplification, without amplifying non-target sequences in the sample.

The jury found that Qiagen infringed the first patent under the doctrine of equivalents and willfully and literally infringed the second patent. The jury awarded damages accordingly. The district court denied Qiagen’s renewed motion for JMOL to reverse the damages and the jury’s findings of infringement and validity, and its alternative request for a new trial. Qiagen appealed.

Qiagen raised two noninfringement arguments regarding the first patent, and the Federal Circuit agreed with both. First, the Court held that it was error to allow the jury to apply “plain meaning” and equate a sequence being “identical to another” with being “identical to a portion” of another. Specifically, Qiagen’s accused second target-specific primer (Sample Index Primer, or SIP) was 19 nucleotides long while the second sequencing primer (Read2 primer) was 34 nucleotides. The fact that they shared an overlapping sequence did not make them identical.

Although the district court had treated “identical” as a factual issue for the jury, the Federal Circuit, citing its 2008 decision in O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech., found that this was a claim construction matter that should not have been left to the jury. The term “identical” must be given its full meaning under claim construction and cannot be interpreted as “identical to a portion.” The Court emphasized that the specification and claims distinguished between full and partial identity: The second target-specific primer must be “identical to” the second sequencing primer while the adaptor primer need only be “identical to a portion” of the first sequencing primer. This difference [...]

Continue Reading

Don’t walk away: Trademark owner can’t bring infringement suit against co-owner

by Amit Kumar Saha, PhD | Jul 17, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a district court’s summary judgment decision that a co-owner of a trademark cannot bring infringement or dilution claims under the Lanham Act against other co-owners or their licensees. Reed v. Marshall et al., Case No. 24-20198 (5th Cir. July 2, 2025) (Graves, Smith, Duncan, JJ.)

Originally formed by Di Reed, Joi Marshall, and Tonya Harris (aka Tonya Kelly), Jade was a music group that enjoyed commercial success before disbanding in 1995. In 2018, the trio attempted a reunion and jointly applied for the federal service mark JADE, which was registered in June 2019. The reunion ultimately did not materialize. In 2021, Marshall and Harris began performing under the JADE name with a new singer, Myracle Holloway, engaged under a six-month work-for-hire agreement. Reed objected, claiming they used the jointly owned mark without her consent, and filed suit in the US District Court for the Southern District of Texas, asserting claims under the Lanham Act and Texas law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marshall and Harris. Reed appealed.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The central question was whether a co-owner of a federally registered trademark may bring an action under the Lanham Act against another co-owner for alleged unauthorized use of the mark.

The district court concluded that absent a contractual agreement to the contrary, co-owners of a trademark each have equal rights to use the mark. The Fifth Circuit affirmed that the Lanham Act does not authorize one co-owner to sue another for infringement or dilution; such disputes must be resolved through contract law or other private arrangements. Because Holloway’s use of the mark was authorized by two co-owners of the registration, she too was shielded from liability under the Lanham Act.

The Fifth Circuit also rejected Reed’s unfair competition and dilution claims, finding no evidence of misuse that would infringe the rights of an equal co-owner.

Practice note: When multiple parties intend to co-own a trademark, it is usually advisable to enter into an agreement that clearly defines each party’s rights and limitations on use. Without such an agreement, co-owners may find themselves with limited recourse in the event of a dispute.

Plausibly Alleging Access Requires More Than Social Media Visibility

by Amit Kumar Saha, PhD | May 29, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a copyright action, finding that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege either that the defendant had “access” to the work in question merely because it was posted on social media, or that the accused photos were substantially similar to any protectable elements of plaintiff’s photographs. Rodney Woodland v. Montero Lamar Hill, aka Lil Nas X, et al., Case No. 23-55418 (9th Cir. May 16, 2025) (Lee, Gould, Bennett, JJ.)

The dispute arose between Rodney Woodland, a freelance model and artist, and Montero Lamar Hill, also known as Lil Nas X, a well-known musical artist. Woodland alleged that Hill infringed on his copyright by posting photographs to his Instagram account that bore a striking resemblance to images Woodland had previously posted. Woodland claimed that the arrangement, styling, and overall visual composition of Hill’s photos closely mirrored his own, asserting that these similarities constituted unlawful copying of his original work.

Woodland’s original images had been publicly shared on his Instagram account, where he maintained a modest following. He did not allege any direct contact or interaction with Hill or his representatives, nor did he claim that Hill had acknowledged or referenced his work. Instead, Woodland’s claim rested on the contention that the similarities between the two sets of photographs were so substantial that copying could be inferred. In his complaint, Woodland asserted that Hill had access to his publicly posted images and that the degree of similarity supported a finding of unlawful copying. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Woodland failed to plausibly allege either access or substantial similarity. Woodland appealed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the district court that Woodland failed to satisfy the pleading standard necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit explained that to state a viable claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must alleged both the fact of copying and the unlawful appropriation of protected expression. The Court found that Woodland failed to establish either element.

The Ninth Circuit considered two principal legal issues:

Whether Woodland sufficiently alleged that Hill had access to Woodland’s copyrighted works
Whether the photographs posted by Hill were substantially similar to Woodland’s photographs in their protectable elements under copyright law

On the issue of access, the Ninth Circuit found that the merely alleging availability of Woodland’s photos on Instagram did not, by itself, plausibly demonstrate that Hill had seen them. The Court noted that in the era of online platforms, “the concept of ‘access’ is increasingly diluted.” And while that might make it easier for plaintiffs to show “access,” there must be a showing that the defendants had a reasonable chance of seeing that work under the platform’s policies. The mere fact that Hill used Instagram and Woodland’s photos were available on the same platform raised only a “bare possibility” that Hill viewed the photos. Woodland had not plausibly alleged that Hill “followed, liked, or otherwise interacted” with Woodland’s posts [...]

Continue Reading

High Burden Dooms Intra-District Transfer Request

by Hannah Hurley | Apr 17, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a mandamus petition requesting transfer from the Marshall division to the Sherman division within the US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, finding that there was lack of clear error and no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to deny transfer. In re SAP America, Inc., Case No. 25-118 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 10, 2025) (Dyk, Prost, Chen, JJ.) (per curiam).

Valtrus Innovations and Key Patent Innovations (collectively, Valtrus) filed a patent infringement lawsuit against SAP. SAP moved for an intra-district transfer from the Marshall division, where the case was originally filed, to the Sherman division. In support of the motion, SAP cited the presence of SAP offices, relevant witness residences, and two SAP employees, all located in Sherman. Valtrus opposed the transfer, pointing out that co-pending litigation in Marshall involved the same asserted patents.

The district court denied SAP’s motion, even though the co-pending case had been closed. The district court also pointed out that most of SAP’s witnesses were out of state or international, making either Texas division equally inconvenient for those witnesses. SAP appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling under the stringent standards for mandamus relief, which are as follows:

There is no other adequate means to attain the desired relief.
There is a clear and indisputable right to relief.
The writ is appropriate under the circumstances.

Under the Federal Circuit’s 2022 decision in In re Volkswagen, there must be “clear abuses of discretion that produce patently erroneous results.”

Under Volkswagen, a court must consider both private and public factors when deciding whether to transfer venue. The private factors are:

The relative ease of access to sources of proof.
The availability of a compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses.
The cost of attendance for willing witnesses.
All other practical issues that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.

The public interest factors are:

The administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion.
The local interest in having localized issues decided at home.
The forum’s familiarity with the law that will govern the case.
The avoidance of unnecessary conflict of laws issues or in the application of foreign law.

The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in assigning weight to the co-pending litigation in Marshall, which had been closed and had all defendants dismissed by the time the motion to transfer was resolved. The Court added that the district court improperly weighed the court congestion factor against transfer based solely on the case’s smooth progression to trial.

Despite these errors, the Federal Circuit concluded that SAP failed to demonstrate that the denial of transfer was erroneous. The district court had plausibly found the convenience of the two divisions comparable for most potential witnesses who resided outside of Texas, and that SAP had not sufficiently shown that its Sherman-based employees had relevant knowledge or would be trial witnesses. The Court therefore denied [...]

Continue Reading

Prosecution Disclaimer Alive and Well, Especially in Closed Claim

by Hannah Hurley | Apr 17, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s noninfringement determination, finding that the presence of a disclaimed compound in the accused product precluded infringement. Azurity Pharm., Inc. v. Alkem Lab’ys Ltd., Case No. 23-1977 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 8, 2025) (Moore, Chen, Murphy, JJ.)

Azurity owns a patent directed to a nonsterile, stable liquid formulation of vancomycin hydrochloride, specifically designed for oral administration to treat Clostridium difficile infections. Following Alkem’s submission of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), Azurity brought a Hatch-Waxman Act claim against Alkem for infringement of certain claims of the patent. The district court found that Azurity had disclaimed the presence of propylene glycol in the claimed formulation during the prosecution. Since Alkem’s ANDA product contained propylene glycol, the district court held that it did not infringe. Azurity appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed, focusing on the patent’s prosecution history and noting that Azurity used the lack of propylene glycol to distinguish its claimed invention from the prior art. The Court noted that this distinction was made during prosecution multiple times in response to the examiner’s rejections, and that Azurity had added negative claim limitations that specifically omitted propylene glycol from the scope of the claims.

The Federal Circuit also noted that Azurity used a “consisting of” transitional phrase to narrow the claims and relied on the closed transition to overcome the prior art. The Court explained that “consisting of” is a closed transition that limits the claim scope to only the recited components. By using this transition and not including propylene glycol as one of the claim components, Azurity effectively disclaimed propylene glycol from the invention. Therefore, the Court found that omission of propylene glycol during patent prosecution was “clean, unambiguous, and complete.”

Azurity argued that a pretrial stipulation between the parties, which stated that “[s]uitable flavoring agents for use in the asserted claims include flavoring agents with or without propylene glycol,” should preclude the application of the disclaimer. The Federal Circuit did not find this argument persuasive, concluding that the stipulation did not alter the clear and unambiguous disclaimer made during prosecution, nor did it affect the noninfringement finding. Since Alkem’s ANDA product contained propylene glycol and Azurity disclaimed inclusion of propylene glycol, there was no infringement.

Religious Texts, Copyrights, and Estate Law: A Case of Strange Bedfellows

by Ashley K. Justice | Feb 13, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a case involving a deceased religious leader who owned the copyrights to works reflecting his teachings. The Court found that the copyrighted works were not works for hire under copyright law, that the leader therefore had the right to license his copyrights, and that the subsequent owner of the copyrights (not a statutory heir) also had the right to terminate licenses. Aquarian Foundation, Inc. v. Bruce Kimberley Lowndes, Case No. 22-35704 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025) (Hawkins, McKeown, de Alba, JJ.)

Aquarian Foundation is a nonprofit religious organization founded by Keith Milton Rhinehart. During his time as the leader of Aquarian, Rhinehart copyrighted his spiritual teachings. An Aquarian member, Bruce Lowndes, claimed that he obtained a license from Rhinehart in 1985. Upon Rinehart’s death in 1999, he left his estate, including interests in copyrights, to Aquarian. In 2014, Aquarian discovered that Lowndes was uploading Rhinehart’s teachings online and sent Lowndes takedown requests pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In 2021, Aquarian sent Lowndes a letter terminating Lowndes’ license and sued Lowndes for copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and false designation of origin.

After a bench trial, the district court concluded that Rhinehart’s works were not works for hire under either the 1909 or the 1976 Copyright Act, so Rhinehart had the authority to grant Lowndes an unrestricted license. The district court also found that Aquarian did not have the authority to terminate the license as a nonstatutory heir and should have given Lowndes two years notice. The district court denied attorneys’ fees. Both parties appealed the district court’s ruling on ownership and attorneys’ fees, and Aquarian appealed the ruling on its lack of authority to terminate the license.

The Ninth Circuit, finding no clear error, affirmed the district court’s holding that Rhinehart’s works were not works for hire under either the 1909 or the 1976 Copyright Act. Under the 1909 Act’s “instance and expense” test, the Court found that “the creation and maintenance of the works was Rhinehart’s purview, and not the church’s domain.” Under the 1976 Act, which applies agency law, the Court similarly found that Rhinehart’s creation of the works was outside the scope of his employment as Aquarian’s president and secretary. Therefore, under either act, Rhinehart’s works were not works for hire, making Rhinehart the copyright owner. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that as owner, Rhinehart had authority to grant the license to Lowndes. The Court also found that Lowndes’ license to “use copyrighted materials ‘without restriction’” referenced “a coming World Wide Network,” so Lowndes did not breach the license by posting the works online.

The Ninth Circuit also affirmed that the testamentary transfer of copyrights to Aquarian was permitted by both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts: “Both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts allow for the transfer of a copyright by will. 17 U.S.C. § 42 (repealed) (providing that copyrights ‘may be bequeathed by will’); [...]

Continue Reading

Dog Toy Maker in the Doghouse (Again) for Tarnishing Jack Daniel’s Marks

by Eleanor B. Atkins | Feb 6, 2025 | Trademarks

Addressing this case for the third time, the US District Court for the District of Arizona found on remand that Jack Daniel’s was entitled to a permanent injunction after finding that VIP Products’ “Bad Spaniels” dog toy diluted Jack Daniel’s trademark and trade dress, despite VIP not having infringed those marks. VIP Products LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Properties Inc., Case No. CV-14-02057-PHX-SMM (D. Ariz. Jan. 21, 2025).

This case began more than 10 years ago when VIP filed a declaratory judgment action that its “Bad Spaniels” Silly Squeaker dog toy did not infringe or dilute Jack Daniel’s trademark rights. Jack Daniel’s counterclaimed, alleging trademark infringement and dilution. The district court initially entered a permanent injunction against VIP, finding that VIP’s “Bad Spaniels” toy violated and tarnished Jack Daniel’s trademarks and trade dress. VIP appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that VIP’s use of “Bad Spaniels” was protected expressive speech under the First Amendment. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to VIP on infringement and dilution. Jack Daniel’s appealed, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the heightened protection afforded by the First Amendment does not apply where the contested mark is used as a trademark. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded for further consideration. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether VIP’s use of “Bad Spaniels” tarnished and/or infringed Jack Daniel’s trademarks and trade dress, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision.

On remand, VIP attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the Lanham Act’s cause of action for dilution by tarnishment, arguing that “the statute amounts to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by enjoining the use of a mark that ‘harms the reputation’ of a famous mark.” Ultimately, the district court did not consider the merits of the constitutional challenge. The district court stated that although it was not precluded from considering VIP’s constitutional challenge, the issue was not properly before the court because VIP had not amended its pleadings to assert the challenge.

The district court assessed dilution by tarnishment using a three-factor analysis of fame, similarity, and reputational harm. With respect to fame, the parties did not dispute that the JACK DANIEL’S mark was famous. Nonetheless, VIP contended that Jack Daniel’s had not shown tarnishment of a famous mark by a “correlative junior mark.” Specifically, VIP argued that the famous JACK DANIEL’S mark correlated with VIP’s “Bad Spaniels,” and VIP’s use of “Old. No. 2” correlated with Jack Daniel’s mark “Old No. 7.” According to VIP, there could be no tarnishment because only the latter was offensive and Jack Daniel’s had not demonstrated that “Old. No. 7” was a famous mark. The district court disagreed with VIP’s correlative mark argument, stating, “it is VIP’s use of Jack Daniel’s marks – on a poop-themed dog chew toy – that Jack Daniel’s claims tarnish its trademarks, not ‘Bad Spaniels’ itself [...]

Continue Reading

Eye-Catching: Biosimilars Injunction Prevails

by Courtney Seams | Feb 6, 2025 | Patents

Addressing a preliminary injunction in patent litigation related to the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, finding that there was a proper exercise of personal jurisdiction and that no substantial question of invalidity had been raised for the patents at issue that would prevent the injunction from issuing. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Case No. 24-1965 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 2025) (Moore, C.J.; Reyna, Taranto, JJ.)

Regeneron holds a Biologics License Application for Eylea®, a therapeutic product containing aflibercept (a VEGF antagonist used in various treatments for eye diseases). Regeneron owns multiple patents related to its Eylea® product, including a patent directed to intravitreal injections using VEGF formulations. Mylan, Samsung Bioepis (SB), and other companies filed abbreviated Biologics License Applications (aBLAs) with the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) seeking approval to market Eylea® biosimilars. Regeneron brought suit against these parties asserting infringement of its patent and filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.

The district court granted the preliminary injunction against SB, enjoining it from offering for sale or selling the subject of its aBLA without a license from Regeneron. SB appealed, arguing that:

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over it was improper.
There was a substantial question of invalidity of the patent under either obviousness-type double patenting or lack of adequate written description.
There was no causal nexus established.

The Federal Circuit upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction on SB, finding that SB had minimum contacts with the state of West Virginia. SB is headquartered in South Korea and entered into a development and commercialization agreement with Biogen for a biosimilar to Eylea®, SB15, that gives SB continuing rights and responsibilities as the agreement is implemented. The Court found that SB did not have to distribute the product itself under the agreement for it to be subject to personal jurisdiction. Further, the Court found that SB’s aBLA and internal documentation indicated an intent to distribute SB15 US-wide, which was sufficient to establish intent to distribute the product in West Virginia.

The Federal Circuit also upheld the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction. SB invoked another patent in the same family as the asserted patent that was directed to an intravitreal injection containing a VEGF trap as the reference patent for an obviousness-type double patenting theory. The Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s findings that the stability requirement, the “glycosylated” requirement, and the “vial” limitations in the claims of the asserted patent were all patentably distinct from the reference patent. The Court found that the stability requirement recited in the asserted patent was more specific than, and not inherent within, the reference patent. The Court further agreed that the reference patent embraced both non-glycosylated and glycosylated aflibercept, not only the glycosylated aflibercept contained in the asserted patent claims.

The Federal Circuit then addressed SB’s arguments that the specification lacked sufficient written description for the claimed [...]

Continue Reading

The Devil Is in the Details: Bioequivalence, In Vitro Testing Not Enough to Establish Infringement

by Peter Marston | Dec 19, 2024 | Patents

Addressing for the first time the issue of whether bioequivalence data and in vitro testing can show that an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) product with different immediate and delayed release portions infringed on a patent, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s finding of noninfringement. Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Lupin Inc., Case No. 24-1664 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 6, 2024) (Moore, C.J.; Linn, Prost, JJ.)

Galderma owns and markets Oracea® (doxycycline USP) 40 mg capsules, which are used to treat papules and pustules associated with rosacea. Galderma’s patents cover a unique once-daily oral formulation of doxycycline, combining 30 mg of immediate release (IR) and 10 mg of delayed release (DR) pellets. Lupin filed an ANDA to market a bioequivalent 40 mg doxycycline product, featuring 22 mg IR and 18 mg DR pellets, and using the same enteric polymer for the DR portion as Oracea®. Galderma sued Lupin under the Hatch-Waxman Act, alleging patent infringement.

Despite Lupin’s different pellet composition, Galderma contended that Lupin’s product effectively contained 30 mg IR and 10 mg DR because of a “weak enteric coat” on the DR pellets, causing early release of some doxycycline. Lupin presented two key pieces of evidence:

A two-stage in vitro dissolution test at pH 1.1 and 4.5, showing some DR pellet release at pH 4.5.
Bioequivalence data comparing Oracea® and Lupin’s product.

The district court ultimately ruled in favor of Lupin. Galderma appealed. The issue on appeal was whether Galderma’s evidence of bioequivalence and in vitro testing was indeed insufficient to establish literal infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents (DoE).

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court: in vitro testing and bioequivalence were not enough to establish literal infringement. Crucially, Galderma’s two-stage in vitro dissolution test didn’t accurately mimic in vivo conditions. The Court highlighted that the pH 4.5 environment used in the test wasn’t physiologically relevant for a fasted stomach, which typically has a pH between 1 and 2. Moreover, the bioequivalence data failed to address the differing proportions of IR and DR pellets. Consequently, the Court found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings.

Nor did the DoE save Galderma. The Federal Circuit applied two different tests: the function-way-result test and the insubstantial differences test. Under the function-way-result test the court is charged with determining whether the accused product performs the same function, in the same way, to achieve the same result as the claimed invention. Under the insubstantial differences test – as its name suggests – the court is charged with determining whether the differences between the claimed invention and the accused product are insubstantial.

Again, Galderma relied on bioequivalence data and its in vitro testing to argue that either DoE test was satisfied. The Federal Circuit was not persuaded, finding no clear error in the district court’s reasoning. As for the function-way-result test, the in vitro testing did not show that Lupin’s ANDA product used the same function or method as the asserted [...]

Continue Reading

Case Closed: OpenAI Prevails on Secondary Meaning

by Hannah Hurley | Dec 5, 2024 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction (PI) in a trademark action under the Lanham Act, stating that the district court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous based on its finding that the plaintiff had likely acquired secondary meaning in the mark. OpenAI, Inc. v. Open Artificial Intelligence, Inc., Guy Ravine, Case No. 24-1963 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2024) (Thomas, Owens, Collins, JJ.) (per curiam) (Collins, J., dissenting) (nonprecedential).

OpenAI is the founder of ChatGPT and other artificial intelligence tools. OpenAI has used the OPENAI (no space) mark extensively in association with its goods, services, website, social media, and marketing. OpenAI first attempted to register the mark with the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) in 2016, but the PTO rejected the mark as being merely descriptive and potentially confusing with Guy Ravine’s prior-filed application for the mark OPEN AI (with a space). Ravine claimed to have used the mark as early as 2015, which would have predated OpenAI’s use of its mark. However, the PTO also rejected Ravine’s application for registration on the Principal Register under a similar rationale, and the OPEN AI mark was only accepted for registration on the Supplemental Register in 2017. Neither mark is registered on the Principal Register.

OpenAI filed a trademark action under the Lanham Act against Ravine’s company, Open Artificial Intelligence, and sought a PI, which the district court granted after finding that OpenAI had established that it had acquired distinctiveness in the mark. Ravine appealed the denial of Open Artificial Intelligence’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b) to amend or vacate that injunction.

A PI is granted when a plaintiff establishes that:

It is likely to succeed on the merits.
It is likely to suffer irreparable harm.
The balance of equities tips in its favor.
An injunction is in the public interest.

The Ninth Circuit applies a sliding scale approach, where a stronger showing of one factor could offset a weaker showing of another factor. To succeed on a trademark infringement claim, a plaintiff must show that it has a protectible ownership interest in the mark and that the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.

To evaluate the claims, the district court looked at each of the parties’ history and use of the disputed marks. The district court noted that OpenAI had used its mark in connection with its most widely used product, ChatGPT, resulting in the mark becoming a household name. The district court recognized that OpenAI’s trademark was one of the most recognized in artificial intelligence (AI) history. The district court noted that OpenAI’s website was one of the most visited websites, with almost 100 million monthly active users. In contrast, the district court found that Ravine had not established that he had used the mark in commerce prior to OpenAI’s use and even took issue with Ravine’s representations regarding his use of the mark. The district court granted [...]

Continue Reading

Older Posts »

BLOG EDITORS

Paul Devinsky

Amol Parikh

Jodi Benassi

BLOG EDITORS

STAY CONNECTED

TOPICS

ARCHIVES

RECENT POSTS