Injunctive Relief
Subscribe to Injunctive Relief's Posts

Back in the USA: Seventh Circuit Lifts Sanctions, Anti-Suit Injunction Contempt

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stayed a district court’s contempt sanctions relating to an anti-suit injunction violation, finding that the adjudicated infringer had done all it could to withdraw from the other proceeding in China. Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Hytera Communications Ltd., Case No. 24-1531 (7th Cir. Apr. 16, 2024) (Hamilton, Brennan, St. Eve., JJ.) (per curiam).

Motorola Solutions previously obtained a $500 million judgment against Hytera for trade secret misappropriation and infringement of copyrighted code used in Motorola’s two-way radio systems. Motorola subsequently brought contempt proceedings after Hytera launched a new line of two-way radio systems, asserting that the new radio systems also used the copyrighted code. As part of the contempt proceeding, the district court imposed an anti-suit injunction ordering Hytera to “refrain from further pursuing or enforcing in any way” a lawsuit that Hytera had filed in the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court in China seeking a declaratory judgment that the new line of radios did not infringe Motorola’s intellectual property.

After evidence emerged that Hytera continued to participate in the Chinese proceeding, the district court issued an order directing Hytera to withdraw from the Chinese proceeding. Just a few days later the district court issued an order finding that Hytera had violated the anti-suit injunction by continuing to participate in the Chinese proceeding and imposed contempt sanctions, including a worldwide suspension of Hytera’s sales of two-way radio products; a fine of $1 million per day; and worldwide notice of the sanctions and prohibitions to customers, distributors and others. A few days after the order issued, Hytera filed an appeal.

At the same time, Hytera filed a petition with the Chinese court seeking to withdraw the declaratory judgment action and seeking the return of all evidence from that court. Less than a week later, Motorola appeared before the Chinese court. Because of the anti-suit injunction, Hytera did not appear at the hearing. At the hearing, the Chinese court denied Hytera’s motion to withdraw. Later that same afternoon, the Chinese court summoned Hytera and thereafter issued a short order granting the motion to withdraw.

Despite the Chinese court’s decision to grant Hytera’s motion to withdraw, the district court did not lift the sanctions. The district court expressed concern about a scenario in which a written order “technically withdraws the action” but comes with “a whole series of other consequences that generates duplicative litigation . . . and thereby undermines the whole purpose of the anti-suit injunction and the subsequent contempt proceedings.” The district court also noted that Hytera had not yet produced a promised log of ex parte communications between it and the Chinese court, and thus the district court could not be sure that Hytera was not using the Chinese court’s ex parte procedure to push for a favorable written order behind closed doors. Under the pressure of the continued contempt sanctions, Hytera repeatedly asked the Chinese court to clarify the status and effect of the order granting its withdrawal.

On appeal before the [...]

Continue Reading




read more

Quack, Waddle and Duck: Order That Grants Injunctive Relief Is an Injunction

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded a district court ruling, finding that the district court failed to properly apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) in granting injunctive relief. Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. v. Wong et al., Case Nos. 22-1495; -1662 (4th Cir. June 5, 2023) (Gregory, King, JJ.) (Rushing, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the district court simply entered a permissible order enforcing a settlement agreement between the parties.

The FRCP outlines the necessary criteria and steps for courts to grant injunctive relief. FRCP 52(a)(2) requires courts to state the findings and conclusions that support their actions. FRCP 65(d) requires courts to state the reasons why the injunction was issued, state the injunction’s terms specifically or describe the restrained/required act(s) in detail. Per the Supreme Court’s Ebay test, a party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate the following:

  • It has suffered an irreparable injury.
  • Remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury.
  • Considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted.
  • The public interest would not be disserved by an injunction.

Wudi Industrial competes with Wai L. Wong and his business entity GT Omega Racing (collectively, GTOR) in marketing video gaming chairs and other products. GTOR challenged Wudi’s GTRACING trademark registration in a cancellation proceeding at the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board, alleging that the mark encroached on GTOR’s earlier use of GT OMEGA RACING. The Board ruled in favor of GTOR, and Wudi initiated a first appeal at the district court. The parties subsequently entered into a concurrent-use agreement that assigned to Wudi the right to use the GTRACING word mark in all global markets except within a European carve-out of 53 named countries in exchange for a $4.5 million payment to GTOR. Under the agreement, Wudi was barred from purchasing ad words from search engines and shopping sites or using any social media platforms to promote GTRACING in the European carve-out countries.

In May 2022, GTOR filed a motion for enforcement in the district court, alleging breach because some of Wudi’s marketing and promotional content in the European carve-out contained the GTRACING mark. The district court granted GTOR’s motion and issued a first order. Under threat of contempt for noncompliance, Wudi was ordered to cease impermissible conduct and take down all posts accessible in the European carve-out containing GTRACING within seven days. In June 2022, the district court issued a second order stating that the first order was a grant of specific performance, not a preliminary injunction. Wudi appealed both orders.

The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s first and second orders because of procedural errors amounting to abuses of discretion, despite the dissent’s argument that the orders merely enforced the parties’ agreement. The Court concluded that the first order constituted a preliminary injunction, later made permanent by the second order, because “if it walks like a duck, quacks like a [...]

Continue Reading




read more

Play It Again and Again (Sam): Meanwhile No Injunction, No Fees

In its third opportunity to review the district court’s decision in this trade secret case involving flooring, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit again reversed, this time vacating a permanent injunction and an award of attorneys’ fees. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court failed to make the findings required to support an injunction and abused its discretion in awarding full fees notwithstanding prior reversal of relief awarded. AcryliCon USA, LLC v. Silikal GmbH, Case No. 21-12853 (11th Cir. Aug. 29, 2022) (Newsom, Marcus, JJ.; Middlebrooks, Distr. J.)

In an earlier appeal in this case, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a ruling on trade secret misappropriation rendered by the district court in favor of AcryliCon USA (AC-USA) and vacated the damages award. An aspect of the Court’s ruling was that the “permanent” injunction entered by the district court was only preliminary in nature (not permanent) and was, as a matter of law, dissolved because the district court did not include it in the original final judgment. On remand, the district court was ordered to determine the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees the prevailing party should receive. However, the district court just entered the same amount of attorneys’ fees it had originally awarded and again entered a “permanent” injunction barring the use of the trade secret at issue, concluding that it was obliged to do so by the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in the first appeal.

In the second appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that AC-USA failed, as a matter of law, to prove its misappropriation claim and reversed the judgment entered in favor of AC-USA on that count. The Court also reversed the district court’s judgment that its $1.5 million damages award could be sustained on the basis of the contract claim once the misappropriation claim was reversed. The Court ruled that, as a matter of law, since AC-USA had failed to prove actual damages on its consequential damages theory, it could only recover nominal damages based on its breach of contract claim. Finally, the Court concluded that AC-USA was entitled to attorneys’ fees only on its breach of contract claim because, under Georgia law, even a nominal damages award would still materially alter the legal relationship between the parties.

In the second remand, the district court awarded essentially the same amount of attorneys’ fees ($1.3 million) to AC-USA but acknowledged that, since Silikal prevailed in vacating the award of compensatory and punitive damages, Silikal “was the prevailing party on the appeal under the terms of the [agreement]” and was entitled to almost $500,000 in attorneys’ fees for its successful appeal. The district court also awarded $100 in nominal damages to AC-USA for its successful appeal on the breach of contract claim. The district court then entered a permanent injunction enjoining Silikal “from disclosing or using in any way, directly or indirectly, the [ . . . resin . . . ] to anyone other than Plaintiff.”

Both parties appealed. AC-USA appealed the award of [...]

Continue Reading




read more

Lanham Act Reaches Foreign Defendants’ Extraterritorial Conduct, but Worldwide Injunction Too Broad

The US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a district court’s injunction barring multiple foreign companies from directly or indirectly using a US remote control manufacturer’s trade dress based on the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act. However, the Court narrowed the scope of the worldwide injunction to countries where the US company currently markets or sells its products. Hetronic Int’l, Inc. v. Hetronic Germany GmbH, Case Nos. 20-6057, -6100 (10th Cir. Aug. 24, 2021) (Phillips, J.)

Hetronic International is a US company that manufactures radio remote controls for heavy-duty construction equipment. Hetronic Germany GmbH, Hydronic Steuersysteme GmbH, ABI Holding GmbH, Abitron Germany GmbH and Abitron Austria GmbH (collectively, the Distributers) are foreign companies that have distributed Hetronic’s products—mostly in Europe—for almost a decade. Based on an old research and development agreement between the parties, the Distributors concluded that they, not Hetronic, owned the rights to Hetronic’s trademarks and other intellectual property. The Distributors accordingly reverse-engineered Hetronic’s products and began manufacturing and selling their own copycat products, mostly in Europe. The copycat products were identical to Hetronic’s and were sold under the Hetronic brand and the same product names. Hetronic terminated the parties’ distribution agreements, but the Distributers continued to sell their copycat products. The Distributors attempted to break into the US market, selling several hundred thousand dollars’ worth of products before backing off after Hetronic sued. They then focused their efforts on Europe.

Hetronic sued the Distributors, along with their manager and owner Albert Fuchs, under the Lanham Act. The Distributors moved for summary judgment, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the Lanham Act claims because the conduct at issue occurred overseas. The Distributors asserted that Hetronic’s claims had to be dismissed because the Lanham Act applied extraterritorially only if a defendant’s conduct had a substantial effect on US commerce, and the Distributors’ conduct did not. The district court rejected that argument and denied summary judgment.

In a separate proceeding initiated by the Distributors in the European Union, the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) concluded that Hetronic owned all of the disputed intellectual property. Based on the EUIPO proceeding, the district court applied the doctrine of issue preclusion and granted Hetronic summary judgment on the Distributors’ ownership defense. After an 11-day trial, a jury found that the Distributors had willfully infringed Hetronic’s trademarks and awarded Hetronic more than $100 million in damages, mostly for trademark infringement. The district court also entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the Distributors’ infringing activities worldwide. The Distributors appealed.

On appeal, the Distributors accepted that the Lanham Act can sometimes apply extraterritorially but argued that the Lanham Act did not reach their activity as foreign defendants making sales to foreign consumers. Specifically, the Distributors argued that:

  • The district court erroneously concluded that the Lanham Act applied extraterritorially.
  • The injunction lacked the specificity required by Fed. R. of Civ. Pro. 65.
  • The injunction’s worldwide reach was too broad.

The Distributors challenged the district court’s exercise of personal [...]

Continue Reading




read more

Injunctive Relief Available Even Where Laches Bars Trademark Infringement, Unfair Competition Damage Claims

The US Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed a district court’s conclusion that laches barred an advertising and marketing company’s claims for monetary damages for trademark infringement and unfair competition, but remanded the case for assessment of injunctive relief to protect the public’s interest in avoiding confusion between two similarly named companies operating in the advertising sector. Pinnacle Advertising and Marketing Group, Inc. v. Pinnacle Advertising and Marketing Group, LLC, Case No. 19-15167 (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 2021) (Branch, J.)

Pinnacle Advertising and Marketing Group (Pinnacle Illinois) is an Illinois-based company and owner of two registered trademarks including the name “Pinnacle.” Pinnacle Illinois learned of a Florida-based company operating under almost the same name that was also in the advertising and marketing space—Pinnacle Advertising and Marketing Group (Pinnacle Florida) —through potential clients and a magazine’s accidental conflation of the two unrelated companies. Several years later, Pinnacle Illinois sued Pinnacle Florida for trademark infringement, unfair competition and cybersquatting. Pinnacle Florida filed a counterclaim seeking to cancel Pinnacle Illinois’s trademark registrations and also alleged that Pinnacle Illinois’s claims were barred by the doctrine of laches.

Following a jury trial, the district court granted Pinnacle Florida’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Pinnacle Illinois’s cybersquatting claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Pinnacle Illinois on its claims for trademark infringement and unfair competition, awarding Pinnacle Illinois $550,000 in damages. The district court then granted Pinnacle Florida’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on its laches defense, concluding that Pinnacle Illinois’s trademark infringement and unfair competition claims were barred by laches because it waited more than four years to bring suit after it should have known that it had a potential infringement claim against Pinnacle Florida. The district court also cancelled Pinnacle Illinois’s registrations because it concluded that Pinnacle Illinois’s marks were merely descriptive and lacked secondary meaning. Pinnacle Illinois appealed.

Pinnacle Illinois argued that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Pinnacle Illinois’s claims were barred by laches, and that even if laches did bar Pinnacle Illinois’s claims for money damages, the district court should have considered whether injunctive relief was proper to protect the public’s interest in avoiding confusion between the two companies. Pinnacle Illinois also argued that the district court erred when it cancelled its registrations without regard to the jury’s findings of distinctiveness and protectability or the presumption of distinctiveness afforded to its registered marks.

The 11th Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that laches barred Pinnacle Illinois from bringing its trademark infringement and unfair competition claims for monetary damages. Pinnacle Illinois sued after the Florida four-year statute of limitations had passed, and the Court found that the company was not excused for its delay because it did not communicate with Pinnacle Florida about the infringement until it filed suit. Pinnacle Florida also suffered economic prejudice because it invested significant time and money, including around $2 million, in developing its business under [...]

Continue Reading




read more

A Shoe-In? Fleet Feet Gives Injunction Appeal the Moot Boot

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed a preliminary injunction as moot where the enjoined party had discontinued the use complained of and had no future plan to restart it. Fleet Feet, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., Case No. 19-2390 (4th Cir. Jan. 26, 2021) (Diaz, J.) The Court denied the enjoined party’s request that it vacate the district court’s order granting the preliminary injunction despite mootness due to an ongoing litigation.

Fleet Feet is a retailer selling products related to running, including Nike merchandise. It is also a Nike competitor since Nike sells its own products. Fleet Feet obtained two trademark registrations, having already used both for years: “Running Changes Everything” in 2020, and “Change Everything” in 2015. In July 2019, Nike launched an advertising campaign with the tagline “Sport Changes Everything” scheduled to end at the February 2020 Super Bowl. Fleet Feet sued Nike for trademark infringement. The district court granted a preliminary injunction against Nike and set a $1 million injunction bond. The preliminary injunction order prohibited Nike from any use of the phrase “Sport Changes Everything” or any other designation confusingly similar to the Fleet Feet’s marks when advertising or selling goods and services. Nike discontinued its campaign two months before the scheduled end and appealed the preliminary injunction order.

Nike argued that the district court erred in its preliminary injunction factor analyses. But on appeal, the Fourth Circuit decided as a threshold matter that the end of Nike’s “Sport Changes Everything” campaign and its representation that there were no plans to use the term after the campaign rendered Nike’s appeal of the preliminary injunction “designed to interrupt that very campaign” moot. A case becomes “moot” when the “issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” The Court found that Nike’s appeal of the preliminary injunction was nonjusticiable since there had been an event during the pendency of the appeal that made it impossible to grant effective relief to a prevailing party. Because of the conclusion of the 2020 Super Bowl and Nike’s representations that it did not plan to use the term afterwards, there was no possible relief to Nike based on the preliminary injunction’s interference with the campaign.

The Fourth Circuit disagreed with Nike that two issues remained live. First, Nike argued that the continued restraint on Nike’s speech due to the order’s prohibition of any confusingly similar designation to Fleet Feet continued to be a live issue. The Court explained that this was only a potential controversy, not a live controversy. Because Nike had not engaged in the speech barred by the order, had represented that it did not intend to do so in the future, and had not introduced any new slogans confusingly similar to Fleet Feet’s marks, no actual speech was threatened by the preliminary injunction.

Second, Nike argued that the potential recovery on the injunction bond was a live issue. Referring to the Supreme Court case Univ. of Tex. [...]

Continue Reading




read more

No More Bites at the Apple: Intervening Junior User Can Force You to Get Your Head Out of the Cloud(s)

Addressing how a mark’s intervening junior user’s success can affect a senior user, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a grant of summary judgment in favor of the junior user and the issuance of a permanent injunction for any commercial use of the disputed terms by the senior user. RXD Media, LLC v. IP Application Dev. LLC, Case No. 19-1461 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 2021) (Keenan, J.) (joined by Gregory, J., and Floyd, C.J.)

RXD and Apple (here embodied also in IP Application Development, a company formed and wholly owned by Apple for the purpose of registering the “ipad” mark) have shared a long history of trademark litigation, initiated by RXD, over the use of the “ipad” mark. Prior to this appeal, the district court ruled in favor of Apple on summary judgment and permanently enjoined RXD from commercially using the terms “ipad” or “ipod.”

RXD claimed that the district court failed to account for RXD being the “first user” of the “ipad” mark; that Apple did not establish a distinctive, secondary meaning of “ipad” before RXD’s use; that Apple failed to show a likelihood of consumer confusion based on both parties’ use of “ipad”; and that the district court erred in rejecting RXD’s claim that “two of Apple’s trademark applications were void because Apple lacked a bona fide intent to use the ‘ipad’ mark for the services listed in those applications.” The Fourth Circuit, however, was not convinced.

The Fourth Circuit found that even if RXD was technically the senior user of the mark at issue, its expanded, “wholly altered” use of the mark, which now focused on “cloud storage” services and for which it now claimed protection, was not entitled to such protection, because the use occurred “on the heels of Apple’s [i.e., the intervening junior user’s] commercial success in releasing” the iPad. By that point, Apple had already “experienced undeniable commercial success, ha[d] promoted its products through regular advertising using the mark, and ha[d] obtained extensive media coverage regarding its ‘iPad’ device.” As such, the Court concluded that Apple’s “ipad” mark was strong and distinctive, noting that consumers were likely to and had already experienced confusion regarding the “ipad” mark. The Court further concluded that, because RXD was a “proven infringer” of the mark, injunctive relief ordered by the district court in favor of Apple was justified. Finally, the Court rejected RXD’s intent argument, stating that Apple was not required to prove a bona fide intent to use the mark for services it did not identify in its relevant trademark applications—Apple’s development of “cloud storage” services, while not explicitly named in Apple’s trademark applications, was encompassed by “the context of the strength of Apple’s brand” and was within the “breadth of [its] products and services.”

Practice Note: Practitioners should take careful note of how their clients use their mark, even if such use can be technically classified as “senior,” and how the mark evolved over time and whether it happened to change coinciding [...]

Continue Reading




read more

BLOG EDITORS

STAY CONNECTED

TOPICS

ARCHIVES