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First Amendment Punches Out Alleged Lanham Act Violation

by | Nov 29, 2022 |

Addressing the balance between trademark rights under the Lanham Act and the First Amendment right to protected expression, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court judgment finding that the defendant’s use of the term “Punchbowl” was not a Lanham Act violation because it was expressive and not misleading as to its source. Punchbowl, Inc. v. AJ Press, LLC, Case No. 21-55881 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2022) (Ownes, Bress, Fitzwater, JJ.)

Punchbowl is an online communications company that provides “online events and celebration invitations and greeting cards” as part of its subscription-based service. Punchbowl has used the mark Punchbowl® since 2006 and the mark was registered with the US Patent & Trademark Office in 2013. Punchbowl describes itself as “The Gold Standard in Online Invitations & Greeting Cards,” and uses the logo of a punch bowl ladle:

Punchbowl filed suit claiming that AJ Press infringed on Punchbowl’s mark through its subscription-based online news publication Punchbowl News. Punchbowl News covers “insider” political topics and reports on events in Washington, DC, and derives its name from the use of the term “punchbowl” by the Secret Service to refer to the US Capitol building. As such, the Punchbowl News logo comprises of an overturned image of the US Capitol filled with purple punch and the slogan “Power. People. Politics.”

AJ Press argued that its use of the term “Punchbowl” was protected under the First Amendment and did not violate the Lanham Act. The district court granted summary judgment to AJ Press, concluding that its use of the name “Punchbowl” did not give rise to liability because it constituted protected expression and was not explicitly misleading as to its source. Punchbowl appealed.

Traditionally, the likelihood of confusion test is used for claims brought under the Lanham Act. When artistic expression is at issue, however, that test fails to account for the full weight of the public’s interest in free expression. If the product involved is an expressive work, courts generally apply a gateway test, grounded in background First Amendment concerns, to determine whether the Lanham Act applies. One approach was set forth in the Second Circuit’s 1989 decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi to determine whether First Amendment concerns were strong enough to outweigh the need to protect a mark. The Rogers test requires the defendant to first “make a threshold legal showing that its allegedly infringing use is part of an expressive work protected by the First Amendment.” Once this threshold is satisfied, the Lanham Act will not apply unless the plaintiff can establish that “the defendant’s use of the mark (1) is not artistically relevant to the work or (2) explicitly misleads consumers as to the source or the content of the work.”

The Ninth [...]

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Functionality Dooms Alleged Trade Dress Protection

by | Nov 29, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment of noninfringement in a trade dress suit, finding that the trade dress was functional and the attorneys’ fee award—as diminished by the district court—was appropriate. Pocket Plus, LLC v. Pike Brands, LLC, Case No. 21-3414 (8th Cir. Nov. 15, 2022) (Gruender, Melloy, Erickson, JJ.)

Since 2009, Pocket Plus has sold vertically oriented pouches that attach to waistbands or belts to carry water bottles, cell phones and other small objects. Pike Brands, d/b/a Running Buddy, began selling similar pouches in 2012 and introduced a vertical version in 2015. In 2021, Pocket Plus sent cease and desist letters to Running Buddy, then sued for trade dress infringement under Iowa common law and the Lanham Act. Running Buddy moved for summary judgment, arguing that Pocket Plus’s trade dress was unprotectable. Running Buddy also threatened Rule 11 sanctions because of the weakness of the case. After winning summary judgment, Running Buddy moved to recover attorneys’ fees, which the district court partially granted. Both parties appealed, with Pocket Plus challenging the summary judgment grant and both parties challenging the amount of the attorneys’ fee award.

The Eighth Circuit began by noting that the issue of validity was complicated by Pocket Plus’s shifting explanation of what its trade dress was, explaining that its “definition evolved throughout the litigation,” becoming increasingly detailed. Eventually, the Court reasoned that regardless of which definition prevailed, the result was the same.

Addressing the noninfringement finding, the Eighth Circuit recited the relevant legal principles, explaining that to prove infringement, a plaintiff must show that its trade dress is nonfunctional and distinctive and that a lack of protection may confuse customers. The Court explained that it must consider trade dress in its entirety—not as individual elements—and determine whether features are protectable “arbitrary embellishment” or simply essential to product use. In this case, Pocket Plus never registered its trade dress so it did not benefit from a presumption of nonfunctionality. Pocket Plus argued that its vertical orientation and over-the-hip design were nonfunctional elements since competitors made pouches differently and that packaging illustrations likewise made the trade dress nonfunctional. The Court was not persuaded, finding that each feature the plaintiff pointed to was designed to “affect [the pouch’s] suitability for carrying objects,” making each feature essential to purpose and therefore functional. Because the Court found functionality, it affirmed noninfringement without addressing the other requirements.

The Eighth Circuit next considered the attorneys’ fees. Under the Lanham Act, a court may, in its discretion, grant attorneys’ fees to the winning party but only in “exceptional cases” after “considering the totality of the circumstances.” Pocket Plus argued that this case was not “exceptional” while Running Buddy argued that the district court abused its discretion in awarding only a portion of the attorneys’ fees.

The Eighth Circuit addressed both exceptionality and the amount awarded, in turn. To be “exceptional,” a case must be objectively unreasonable, motivated by ill will or frivolous. The Court noted Pocket Plus’s weak [...]

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Press # For Options, but Not for a Trademark Registration

by | Nov 29, 2022 |

In a precedential opinion addressing the most fundamental requirement for trademark protection, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) affirmed the US Patent & Trademark Office’s (PTO) refusal to register a “#” based mark on the ground that it fails to function as a mark. In re Pound Law, LLC, Ser. No. 87724338 (TTAB Nov. 9, 2022) (Adlin, Lynch, Larkin, ATJ)

Pound Law, claiming acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act, sought to register #LAW as a mark for providing legal services and legal referral services to consumers seeking a lawyer where legal representation or referral is initiated by phone. During prosecution, the Examining Attorney refused registration on the ground that #LAW failed to function as a service mark, reasoning that a consumer would only understand that dialing #LAW would put them in contact with some legal service provider, but not specifically Pound Law. Pound Law appealed.

Pound Law argued that the Examining Attorney improperly applied a per se rule against mnemonic or vanity telephone number marks as being incapable of functioning as a mark identifying the source of goods or services. In response, the Examining Attorney asserted that the PTO refused registration only after engaging in a specimen-based determination tailored to the #LAW mark. The Examining Attorney argued that, based on the manner of using the mark with a telephone, a consumer would regard #LAW only as a means of contacting Pound Law and concluded that #LAW does not indicate the source of legal services to be rendered, only a means by which legal services might be obtained.

To assess whether #LAW conveys an informational message or functions as a source identifier, the Board considered whether the nature of #LAW affects consumer perception of the asserted mark. The Board cited examples #LAW or #law being used throughout the legal industry, including as a hashtag in social media content. The Board reasoned that, in the context of social media, a hashtag functions as a searchable keyword, not as a source identifier. Pound Law argued that it ran radio advertisements vocalizing #LAW as “pound law” to explain to consumers that the asserted mark is not a hashtag.

The Board did not find Pound Law’s evidence persuasive, explaining that Pound Law’s radio advertising was insufficient to instill Pound Law as the source of the legal services in a consumer’s mind since “there is no correct pronunciation of a trademark, and consumers may pronounce a mark differently than intended by the brand owner.” The Board also pointed to evidence of Pound Law’s “extensive visual-only advertising,” which does not distinguish the use of an octothorpe as specifically a pound sign on a telephone keypad as opposed to a hashtag used on social media platforms. The Board concluded that many consumers would understand and pronounce #LAW as a hashtag (i.e., vocalized as “hashtag law”) “given the prevalence of social media and hashtags.” On this point, the Board highlighted “quite persuasive” evidence of numerous examples from the record showing third parties—e.g., law firms, legal [...]

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Supreme Court to Consider Whether Lanham Act Reaches Foreign Defendants’ Extraterritorial Conduct

by | Nov 10, 2022 | ,

The Supreme Court of the United States agreed to review the geographic scope of the Lanham Act and the extent to which trademark owners can use US trademarks to police foreign sales. Abitron Austria GmbH et al. v. Hetronic International Inc., Case No. 21-1043 (Supr. Ct. Nov. 4, 2022) (certiorari granted). The question presented is as follows:

Whether the court of appeals erred in applying the Lanham Act extraterritorially to petitioners’ foreign sales, including purely foreign sales that never reached the United States or confused U.S. consumers.

In the underlying case, the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a damages award for Hetronic International based on its conclusion that the Lanham Act can affect conduct that substantially affects US commerce, such as the products Hetronic Germany and others sold to European customers.

The US Solicitor General suggested that the case is “a suitable vehicle” to clarify the Lanham Act’s geographic scope, noting that the Lanham Act provides a remedy for a foreign defendant’s use of a US trademark abroad only if that use is likely to cause confusion within the United States.



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Thee I Dismiss: No Love for Failure to Add Necessary Party

by | Sep 8, 2022 |

After concluding that a trademark owner’s case for failure to add a necessary party was untenable, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of the case because the necessary party enjoyed sovereign immunity and could not be added. Lee et al. v. Anthony Lawrence Collection, L.L.C. et al., Case No. 20-30769 (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2022) (Jolly, Elrod, Oldham. JJ.)

Curtis Bordenave and Paige Lee are in the business of owning trademarks. They petitioned the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) for a federal registration of the mark THEEILOVE. The phrase “Thee I Love” comes from Jackson State University, which has used the phrase for roughly 80 years. Collegiate Licensing Company is a licensing agent that handles the licensing of Jackson State’s trademarks to manufacturers that make and sell Jackson State merchandise.

Despite Jackson State’s decades-long use of the phrase, it never applied for a federal mark until after Bordenave and Lee had already done so. Jackson State did register a mark under Mississippi law in 2015 for use on vanity plates and in 2019 for use on other merchandise. It also claimed to have common-law rights to the mark under the Lanham Act.

Bordenave and Lee sued Collegiate Licensing Company and a few of the licensees in charge of producing and selling Jackson State’s merchandise for various claims related to their licensing, manufacturing and selling of “Thee I Love” merchandise, including trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act. Bordenave and Lee sought damages, a permanent injunction barring the defendants from producing or selling any more “infringing” merchandise, and a declaration that defendants infringed Bordenave and Lee’s registered marks. The defendants moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. Pro.12(b)(1) and (7), arguing that Jackson State was a required party, and because Jackson State enjoys sovereign immunity, Bordenave and Lee’s case should be dismissed. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(7). Bordenave and Lee appealed.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. First, the Court determined that Jackson State was a required party, stating that Jackson State had an interest in the action that would be impaired or impeded if Jackson State was not joined in the suit. The Court reasoned that even if Jackson State remained free to challenge Bordenave and Lee’s ownership of THEEILOVE elsewhere, it could still face challenges protecting its interest if it was not joined in this action.

Next, because Jackson State has sovereign immunity, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the case rather than proceeding without Jackson State. Jackson State enjoys sovereign immunity as an arm of the State of Mississippi. Because Jackson State had a non-frivolous claim here, the Court found that dismissal was required because of the potential injury to Jackson State’s interest as an absent sovereign.

Finally, the Fifth Circuit considered the four factors under Rule 19(b) that determine whether an action should continue without the absent party or be dismissed. [...]

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Secondary Meaning: Consumers Connect Product with Single Anonymous Source

by | Sep 8, 2022 |

Reversing and remanding a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of an accused trade dress infringer, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained that trade dress does not need to be linked to a particular company. If consumers link the trade dress to any single (even anonymous) source or company, that is enough to constitute secondary meaning. P and P Imports LLC v. Johnson Enterprises LLC, DBA Tailgating Pros, Case Nos. 21-55013; -55323 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2022) (Tashima, Lee, Cardone, JJ.)

P&P makes and sells a jumbo red-white-and-blue Connect 4 game. Johnson sells a game almost identical in color, style and size. P&P sought to block Johnson from selling its game and sued for trade dress infringement under Lanham Act § 43(a) and unfair competition. During the district court proceeding, P&P’s expert submitted a consumer survey showing that most consumers associated P&P’s trade dress with a single source or company. He also submitted evidence of intentional copying and noted P&P’s advertising efforts as support for secondary meaning. The district court granted summary judgment for Johnson, ruling that P&P failed to present sufficient evidence of secondary meaning. The district court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s 2011 decision in Fleischer Studios v. A.V.E.L.A. to dismiss the survey evidence as irrelevant because the results showed a belief that P&P’s product is from a single source or company but did not show that trade dress was associated with P&P itself. P&P appealed.

The question before the Ninth Circuit was whether a manufacturer’s red-white-and-blue jumbo rendition of Connect 4 qualified as a protectable trade dress. This required the Court to determine whether P&P’s trade dress had acquired secondary meaning. Secondary meaning exists when “in the minds of the public, the primary significance of [the trade dress] is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.”

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard for determining secondary meaning and that P&P presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. The Court explained that many factors determine whether secondary meaning exists, including “direct consumer testimony; survey evidence; exclusivity, manner, and length of use of a mark; amount and manner of advertising; amount of sales and number of customers; established place in the market; and proof of intentional copying by the defendant.” The Court also noted that in the past it had found the presence of intentional copying and survey evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment.

Turning to the evidence presented by P&P, the Ninth Circuit explained that the district court’s analysis (which required consumers to both recognize P&P’s trade dress and be able to name P&P as the source) conflicted with the Court’s “long-established precedent[] requiring association with only a single—even anonymous—source,” and thus the district court erred by requiring evidence of specific association for secondary meaning. The Court also found strong suggestions that Johnson intentionally copied the P&P game, including the fact that Johnson conducted market research, ordered a copy of the [...]

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Yes, and It Counts! Single Purchase in Forum Establishes Personal Jurisdiction over Infringer

by | Sep 1, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign online retailer for a trademark infringement claim where the trademark owner purchased the only allegedly infringing article sold in the forum. NBA Properties, Inc. v. HANWJH, Case No. 21-2909 (7th Cir. Aug. 16, 2022) (Ripple, Scudder, JJ.)

NBA Properties owns the trademarks for the National Basketball Association (NBA) and NBA teams. HANWJH is a China-based online retailer that sells allegedly infringing NBA branded products on a well-known e-commerce site. HANWJH offered 205 allegedly infringing products that were available for purchase in Illinois, the forum state. HANWJH’s only online order in Illinois was made by an investigator for NBA Properties who purchased a pair of basketball shorts for delivery to an Illinois address. The shorts were delivered to the Illinois address before NBA Properties filed suit against HANWJH.

NBA Properties sued HANWJH for trademark infringement and counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) in the Northern District of Illinois. NBA Properties sought and received a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, including a temporary asset restraint on HANWJH’s bank account. After HANWJH failed to timely answer the complaint, NBA Properties moved for default judgment. HANWJH moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing the following:

  • Operating a website is not sufficient on its own to establish personal jurisdiction.
  • A single transaction by the plaintiff cannot support the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
  • Even if the exercise of personal jurisdiction were otherwise appropriate, such exercise would offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

The district court denied HANWJH’s motion to dismiss and entered a default. HANWJH failed to object to the motion for default judgment, and the district court entered a final judgment. HANWJH appealed.

The Seventh Circuit reviewed the “minimum contacts” International Shoe criterion before turning to a more recent line of cases applying this standard to online retailers. Citing its 2020 decision in Curry v. Revolution Laboratories, the Court noted that the minimum contacts requirement is satisfied if “the defendant reasonably could foresee that its product would be sold in the forum.” The Court reasoned that allowing customers to order products from a website to the forum and then fulfilling an order to the forum can form the basis of personal jurisdiction—even when the only orders to the forum were made by the plaintiff, as long as the orders were made before filing suit. Applying these principles, the Court found that HANWJH had purposefully directed conduct at Illinois by establishing an online store, demonstrating a willingness and capacity to ship goods to Illinois and intentionally shipping an infringing product to an Illinois address. The Court explained that it was irrelevant that only a single allegedly infringing article was sold in Illinois and that it was purchased by the plaintiff, because the proper focus of the analysis was on HANWJH’s purposeful conduct. The Court also concluded that HANWJH’s [...]

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Can’t Dismiss Lanham Act Claim Based on FDCA Preemption

by | Aug 25, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed-in-part and vacated-in-part a district court ruling dismissing claims under the Lanham Act and Massachusetts consumer protection law based on statements on a website regarding compliance with the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Azurity Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Edge Pharma, LLC, Case No. 21-1492 (1st Cir. Aug. 12, 2022) (Barron, Howard, Thompson, JJ.)

Azurity is a specialty pharmaceutical company that markets a hydrochloride vancomycin drug that received pre-market approval from the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA). Edge Pharma is a drug compounding company that also markets a hydrochloride vancomycin drug that competes with Azurity’s drug but has not yet received FDA approval. In 2020, Azurity filed suit against Edge in the US District Court for the District of Massachusetts under both the Lanham Act and a Massachusetts consumer protection law based on statements that Edge allegedly made on its website. Azurity argued that these statements represented or conveyed the impression that Edge was not in violation of Section 503B of the FDCA, which authorizes drug compounders that meet certain conditions to market their drugs without first obtaining FDA approval. Azurity alleged that these statements were literally false and/or misleading and that other statements holding out Edge’s drug as superior to Azurity’s were similarly false and/or misleading. Edge moved to dismiss Azurity’s claims for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

The district court granted Edge’s motion as to Azurity’s Lanham Act claim on the ground that the FDCA precluded Azurity’s claim. The district court stated that the claim would require it to interpret the meaning of Section 503B in a way that would interfere with the FDA’s authority to administer and enforce the FDCA. The district court also ruled that Azurity’s consumer protection claim failed because it was premised on the same allegations as Azurity’s Lanham Act claim. Azurity appealed.

The FDCA requires FDA pre-approval to market any drug. However, there are exemptions for “compounded” drugs and “outsourcing facilities” that manufacture compounded drugs. The FDCA provides registration and compliance requirements to be considered an “outsourcing facility.”

Edge made several statements on its website regarding alleged FDCA compliance, FDCA registration and other commercially available options for its compounded drug. The First Circuit referred to these as compliance statements, registration statements and superiority statements, respectively. With respect to Edge’s compliance and registration statements, the Court did not find that the FDCA precluded Azurity’s claims and instead adopted the framework used by the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits. The First Circuit noted that those circuits established that, “[a]bsent a clear and unambiguous ruling from a court or agency of competent jurisdiction, statements by laypersons that purport to interpret the meaning of a statute or regulation are opinion statements, and not statements of fact,” and thus, as such, are “not generally actionable under the Lanham Act.” The Court found that Azurity’s reliance on a non-binding FDA guidance document regarding “essentially a copy” provision of Section 503B was not a [...]

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Veil Piercing Under Lanham Act Requires Specific Showing of Liability

by | Aug 18, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed a district court decision granting summary judgment of liability under the Langham Act, finding that the plaintiffs failed to apply the correct standards for piercing the corporate veil and individual liability in a false advertising and false endorsement dispute. Edmondson et al. v. Velvet Lifestyles, LLC, Case No. 20-11315 (11th Cir. Aug. 4, 2022) (Jordan, Pryor, Marcus, JJ.)

Miami Velvet operated as a swingers’ nightclub in Miami, Florida. Miami Velvet was owned, operated and managed by Velvet Lifestyles, LLC. Joy Dorfman was the president, manager and a salaried employee of Velvet Lifestyles. My Three Yorkies, LLC, was the managing member of Velvet Lifestyles, and Dorfman was, in turn, the managing member of Yorkies. She was also the president of Yorkies and received the management fees that Velvet Lifestyles paid Yorkies. Approximately 30 individuals sued Velvet Lifestyles, My Three Yorkies and Dorfman for false advertising and false endorsement under the Lanham Act. The individuals alleged that Velvet Lifestyles, My Three Yorkies and Dorfman used the individuals’ images in advertisements without their consent, without any compensation and in such a way that implied they were affiliated with and endorsed Miami Velvet.

The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, finding that Velvet Lifestyles, My Three Yorkies and Dorfman’s use of the plaintiffs’ images constituted false advertising and false endorsement. The plaintiffs’ motion treated all three defendants as effectively a single entity, and the district court made no finding that either My Three Yorkies or Dorfman had any direct involvement in the advertising. The district court did not apply the individual liability standard to Dorfman and instead treated all three defendants as a single entity as the plaintiffs’ motion had done. A jury awarded damages at trial. After post-trial motion practice, My Three Yorkies and Dorfman appealed.

The plaintiffs argued on appeal that My Three Yorkies and Dorfman had not properly preserved these issues for review on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument, finding that because the plaintiffs did not properly plead the standards for piercing the corporate veil and individual liability, My Three Yorkies and Dorfman were not obligated to raise or respond to those issues and, therefore, any procedural failures on their part were inconsequential.

Turning to the merits, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the finding of liability on summary judgment. The Court explained that in order for My Three Yorkies to be liable for the actions of Velvet Lifestyles, the plaintiffs had to show that My Three Yorkies was directly involved in the violation of the Lanham Act. The Court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that My Three Yorkies took any action regarding the management of the club or the advertisement in question, and that therefore the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the corporate veil should be pierced. The Court further explained that in order for Dorfman to be liable as an individual, the plaintiffs had to show that she actively participated as the [...]

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Single T-Shirt Sale Can’t Clothe Bare-Bones Personal Jurisdiction Claim

by | Aug 18, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a trademark infringement suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that the trademark owner failed to allege that the alleged infringer could reasonably anticipate being hauled into court in Missouri. Brothers and Sisters in Christ, LLC v. Zazzle, Inc., Case No. 21-1917 (8th Cir. Aug. 2, 2022) (Smith, Benton, Kelly, JJ.)

Brothers and Sisters in Christ (BASIC) is a Missouri-based clothing company that owns the trademark “love happens.” Zazzle is a California-based online retailer. BASIC sued Zazzle in a Missouri district court for trademark infringement, alleging that Zazzle used its nationally available website to advertise and sell goods in Missouri. BASIC further alleged that in 2019, Zazzle sold and shipped a t-shirt bearing a purportedly infringing “love happens” logo to at least one Missouri resident. The district court granted Zazzle’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). BASIC appealed.

Reviewing the issue de novo, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Court explained that because the Lanham Act does not authorize nationwide personal jurisdiction, the Court was required to apply Missouri’s long-arm statute and the federal due process clause. Given that Missouri’s long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction over defendants who engage in, among other things, the transaction of any business or the commission of a tortious act within the state, the Court’s inquiry focused on whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Zazzle comported with the due process clause. Because BASIC did not allege that Zazzle was subject to general personal jurisdiction in Missouri (i.e., BASIC did not allege that Zazzle was “essentially at home” in the forum state), the question instead turned on whether BASIC had sufficiently pled facts to support a claim of specific personal jurisdiction.

The Eighth Circuit explained that specific personal jurisdiction existed over Zazzle for the purposes of BASIC’s trademark infringement claims if Zazzle had certain minimum contacts with the forum state and BASIC’s claims arose out of or related to those contacts. For specific jurisdiction to apply, the underlying controversy must be connected to the defendant’s activities in the forum state; unconnected activities directed to the forum state, no matter how numerous or systematic, cannot convey specific personal jurisdiction. The Court used a five-factor test previously set forth in Whaley v. Esebag to conduct its analysis: “(1) the nature and quality of [defendant’s] contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) convenience of the parties.”

The Eighth Circuit found that the behavior alleged by BASIC (Zazzle’s operation of a national website that sells and ships goods to Missouri combined with a single specific instance of an allegedly infringing t-shirt being sold and shipped to a Missouri consumer) was insufficient to support a specific jurisdiction claim. Zazzle’s website availability and sales unrelated to the use [...]

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