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The Alice Eligibility Two-Step Dance Continues

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, holding that patent claims directed to abstract ideas and lacking inventive steps that transform abstract ideas into patent-eligible inventions fail the Alice two-step test and are not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Hawk Tech. Sys., LLC v. Castle Retail, LLC, Case No. 22-1222 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 17, 2023) (Reyna, Hughes, Cunningham, JJ.)

35 U.S.C. § 101 states that laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas are not patentable. The Supreme Court of the United States in Alice v. CLS Bank Int’l (2014) articulated a two-step test for examining patent eligibility: a patent claim falls outside § 101 if it is directed to a patent-ineligible concept such as an abstract idea and lacks elements sufficient to transform the claim into a patent-eligible application.

Hawk Technology sued Castle Retail alleging infringement of its patent directed to security surveillance video operations in Castle Retail’s grocery stores. The patent relates to a method of viewing multiple simultaneously displayed and stored video images on a remote viewing device of a video surveillance system using result-based functional language. Castle Retail moved to dismiss on the basis that the claims were not patent eligible under § 101. After conducting a technology briefing, the district court granted the motion. The district court ruled that the claims were abstract because surveillance monitoring is a common business practice and the claims recited little more than taking video surveillance and digitizing it for display and storage in a conventional computer system, and the claims did not limit the abstract idea to a new technological improvement in video storage/display that could transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Hawk Technology appealed.

The Federal Circuit, reviewing de novo, affirmed. Addressing Alice step one, the Court found that the patent’s required functional results of receiving/digitizing video images, converting images to selected format and storing/displaying/transmitting the images were similar to claims that the Court previously ruled as abstract. The results-oriented claim language failed to concretely recite how the claimed invention improved the functionality of video surveillance systems and was therefore abstract. Regarding Alice step two, the Court analyzed the claim elements, both individually and as an ordered combination in light of the specification, for transformative elements. The Court explained that although the claims recited the purported inventive solution and referenced specific tools/parameters, they neither showed how monitoring and storage was improved nor required anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network and display technology for gathering, sending and presenting the specified information.

Procedurally, the Federal Circuit found that the motion to dismiss was not decided prematurely because the technology briefing was purely a procedural step conducted in each patent case and there was no evidence that the district court’s decision hinged on new facts constituting matters beyond the pleadings. Hawk had argued that because the district court considered Castle’s testimony and evidence, it was required to convert the [...]

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Breach of Confidentiality Claim Survives Motion to Dismiss under Anti-SLAPP Law

The Court of Appeals of Texas (Fourth District) upheld a trial court’s order denying a motion to dismiss a breach of confidentiality agreement claim pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), which is designed to protect people from strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP). Harper v. Crédito Real Bus. Cap., Case No. 21-0212 (Tex. App. July 20, 2022) (Martinez, Chapa, Watkins, JJ.)

Crédito Real Business Capital (CRBC) leases equipment and provides financing services to companies in the construction industry. CRBC provides its services through two limited liability companies: CR-FED and CR-FED Leasing. Earl Harper previously worked for CRBC as executive vice president and was required to sign a confidentiality agreement with CR-FED stipulating that he would not share its confidential information with third parties.

CRBC advanced money and leased equipment to Ontrack Site Services, a site grading contractor and customer with whom Harper worked. As part of his employment, Harper was provided with confidential information regarding CRBC’s plans and projections for its relationship with Ontrack, including CRBC’s willingness to extend additional financing or leasing services to the contractor. Harper allegedly used this information to help Ontrack negotiate better lease rates and financing terms to CRBC’s detriment. CRBC terminated Harper’s employment. Harper subsequently joined a new company and advised Ontrack to obtain financing from that company instead of CRBC.

CRBC sued Harper for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract for misappropriating CRBC’s trade secrets and breaching the confidentiality agreement. Harper filed a motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim pursuant to the TCPA, under which a party can file a motion to dismiss a lawsuit if it “is based on or is in response to a party’s exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association.” The trial court denied the motion. Harper appealed, contending the following:

  • CRBC’s breach of contract claim related to Harper’s exercise of free speech.
  • CRBC did not establish a prima facie case of its breach of contract claim.
  • The trial court improperly considered CRBC’s amended petition.

A motion to dismiss pursuant to the TCPA is evaluated under a three-step burden shifting framework:

  • The movant must first demonstrate that the legal action is based on the movant’s exercise of the right to free speech, the right to petition or the right to association.
  • The nonmovant must then establish a prima facie case of its claim.
  • If the nonmovant satisfies its burden, the action must still be dismissed if the movant establishes grounds on which it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Texas Court of Appeals first addressed whether the trial court was permitted to consider CRBC’s amended petition when it ruled on the motion to dismiss. CRBC’s amended petition merely clarified that “CRBC” was the assumed name for both CR-FED and CR-FED Leasing, rather than just CR-FED. Because the amended petition was filed well before the hearing date and did not include any element of surprise, the Court concluded that [...]

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