IP UPDATE
Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
IP UPDATE
Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
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Munich Court Addresses Implementer’s Obligation To Provide Security in FRAND Negotiations

by and | Apr 17, 2025 | ,

The Munich Higher Regional Court issued a decision concerning the fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) negotiation process and an implementer’s obligation to provide security if a license offer for standard essential patents (SEPs) is rejected. HMD Global v. VoiceAge, Case No. 6 U 3824/22 Kart, (Judgment of 20 March 2025).

In this case, the Munich Higher Regional Court attempted to fill a gap left by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Huawei v. ZTE regarding an implementer’s obligation to provide adequate security for royalties. This obligation arises when an implementer rejects a SEP holder’s license offer and the SEP holder rejects the implementer’s counteroffer, so there is no agreement on a license.

The Munich Court found that the implementer, HMD Global, provided an inadequate security that was based on HMD Global’s lower counteroffer. The Court explained that it is the SEP holder’s, here VoiceAges, final offer (i.e., the requested royalty) that is determinative for calculating the security amount that an implementer should provide. This is because a willing licensee must accept the SEP holder’s offer if a court declares it to be FRAND and the royalties subject to this offer must be covered by the security. The Court emphasized that an implementer can only establish that it is a willing licensee by making a counteroffer and providing adequate security after rejecting the offer.

However, the Munich Court left open the issue of whether security must be provided if the SEP holder’s final offer is obviously not FRAND, noting that there may be “special cases” where the SEP holder’s final offer may not be determinative of the security without further defining those cases.

The CJEU’s Guidelines to FRAND Negotiations Are Not a Rigid Set of Rules

The Munich Court also took a critical stance in response to the European Commission’s amicus curiae brief and found that the FRAND guidelines set by the CJEU in Huawei v. ZTE are not to be viewed as a rigid set of rules but rather as a “dynamic concept for negotiation.” A court is not limited to assessing the FRAND defense by strictly examining in sequence each step of the CJEU’s guidelines, which includes the following:

  • The SEP holder must send a notice of infringement to the implementer.
  • The implementer must declare to be a willing licensee.
  • The SEP holder must make a FRAND offer.
  • If the offer is not FRAND, the implementer is allowed to reject it but must make a counteroffer.
  • The implementer must provide adequate security for royalties if the SEP holder rejects the implementer’s counteroffer.

The European Commission argued that a court must examine each step before moving on to the next one. This means that, for example, once a court has found that the implementer is a willing licensee, the court must leave the implementer’s subsequent (possibly non-FRAND) conduct out of consideration and cannot undermine the implementer’s established willingness to take a license. A court must then assess whether [...]

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The Net Is Tightening on European SEP Regulation

by and | Feb 10, 2022 | ,

The regulation of standard-essential patents (SEPs) has increasingly attracted the attention of policymakers in recent years. This includes the European Commission, which institutes multiple projects to profoundly review the European Union’s SEP and competition law framework. Some of these EU projects are still in the making, with the next public consultations coming up in early 2022.

EU review has been undertaken mainly for two reasons. The first is that the European Commission is responsible for the enforcement of European competition law. It is this set of rules that prohibits the abuse of a dominant market position in the European Union and, at least from an EU perspective, also obligates SEP holders to offer licenses on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (F/RAND terms). The second reason is the European Union’s goal to act as an international norm-setter in intellectual property (IP) protection.

In November 2017, the European Commission published an EU approach to standard-essential patents as part of its “IP Package.” The aim was to provide a clearer framework to incentivize and facilitate access to the key technologies enabling interconnection and connectivity.

These relatively narrow targets were made more concrete in November 2020 with the release of the “Intellectual Property Action Plan.” This plan sought to support the European creative and innovative industry sector in remaining a global leader. In the area of SEPs, the European Commission’s objective was to reduce friction and litigation between SEP holders and users by relying on potential regulatory reforms—in addition to industry-led initiatives—to clarify and improve the framework for SEP enrollment, licensing and enforcement. By providing incentives for good faith negotiations, the European Commission tried to reconcile the interests of SEP holders, standard development organizations (SDOs) and users of SEP-protected technologies.

In January 2021, the European Commission’s Group of Experts on Licensing and Valuation of SEPs published its contributions to the debate. This group, which consists of scholars, judges and stakeholders, proposed, inter alia, a number of principles for licensing SEPs, namely licensing at a single level of the value chain, a single F/RAND royalty, passing on F/RAND royalties downstream and establishing licensee negotiation groups. The European Commission’s next step in terms of a new framework for standard-essential patents is a public online consultation to be held in the first quarter of 2022.

Ahead of that event, on 2 February 2022, the European Commission presented its new Standardization Strategy, as well as a draft law amending EU Regulation No 1025/2012, with the aim of ensuring a balanced stakeholder representation within European SDOs and addressing the issue of agility and governance in the European standardization system. This strategy and the draft law highlight the European Union’s priority to defend its key position as a global standardization policymaker.

The EU Regulation of SEPs is also affected by the review of the EU Horizontal Block Exemption Regulation, which defines certain research and development (R&D) and specialization agreements that can be [...]

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