IP UPDATE
Exploring the latest in intellectual property law
IP UPDATE
Exploring the latest in intellectual property law
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Pending Appeal Does Not Divest Board of Statutory Authority to Institute IPRs

by | May 18, 2023 | ,

In a case involving sua sponte review, the Director of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) vacated an inter partes review (IPR) decision denying institution, found that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board had statutory authority to institute IPR review of a claim that had been previously found invalid by a district court under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (but under appeal), and remanded the proceeding for the Board to consider whether discretionary denial was appropriate. Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., IPR2022-01366, -01367, -01368, -01369, -01424 (PTO May 2, 2023) (Vidal, Dir.).

Brunswick owns several patents related to marine vessels. Volvo filed IPR petitions challenging the patents, which the Board ultimately denied. Prior to the Board’s decision, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia determined that claim 1 in each of the challenged patents was directed to patent-ineligible subject matter and thus was invalid under § 101. In denying institution, the Board concluded that it lacked authority to institute the IPRs because the challenged claims were no longer in effect and the America Invents Act (AIA) only permits a petitioner to challenge a claim, noting that “when given its plain and ordinary meaning, § 311(b) provides that only claims that are in effect may be annulled.” Although Brunswick appealed the district court’s decision, the Board determined that the challenged claims were finally adjudicated. Thus, the Board lacked authority to institute the requested IPR. The Board also determined that the multi-factor Fintiv analysis for discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 214(a) was inapplicable here in view of the district court’s invalidity finding.

The Director reviewed the Board’s decision sua sponte and vacated the Board’s institution decision with instructions to analyze Fintiv factors 1 through 5 in view of the parallel district court proceeding.

The Director first addressed the Board’s § 311(b) analysis. The Director concluded that in finding the district court’s invalidity determination to be a final adjudication, the Board appeared to have borrowed from collateral estoppel principles. The Director found, however, that these principles do not apply to § 311(b) nor was there any assertion that Volvo was collaterally estopped from pursuing IPRs. The Director also determined that the challenged claims were not fully adjudicated since the district court’s decision was subject to further judicial review. Thus, the Director found that the Board had statutory authority to institute the IPRs.

Next, the Director addressed the Board’s Fintiv analysis, finding that the Board improperly interpreted Fintiv as limited to its exercise of discretion in the context of ongoing parallel district court litigation where final judgment has not yet been entered. The Director explained that the Fintiv analysis applied where, as here, the claims remain subject to further review on appeal. The Director instructed the Board to evaluate the Fintiv factors on remand and instructed that if the Board determines that these factors favor discretion to deny institution, the Board should then consider whether the case on the merits is compelling (consistent with the
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What’s Shakin’ Bacon? Not Inventorship—Contribution to Invention Can’t Be “Insignificant”

by | May 11, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court decision and found that an asserted inventor not named in the application was not a joint inventor because in the context of the entire invention his contribution was too insignificant to constitute joint inventorship. HIP, Inc. v. Hormel Foods Corp., Case No. 22-1696 (Fed. Cir. May 2, 2023) (Lourie, Clevenger, Taranto, JJ.)

Hormel owns a patent directed to precooking bacon and meat pieces. The patent claims a two-step method that involves a preheating step using a microwave oven, infrared oven or hot air, and then a higher-temperature cooking step. Prior to filing its patent application, Hormel and HIP entered into a joint agreement to develop an oven for the two-step cooking process. Hormel evaluated an HIP oven and learned, among other things, that preheating the bacon via a microwave oven prevented condensation from washing away the salt and flavor. HIP’s David Howard suggested an infrared oven (already known in the art) as a possibility for use in the preheating step. Hormel subsequently filed a patent application that did not name Howard as a joint inventor. HIP sued Hormel alleging that Howard was a joint inventor. The district court found that Howard was a joint inventor based solely on his alleged contribution of infrared preheating. Hormel appealed.

The inventors listed on an issued patent are presumed to be the only true inventors. Thus, a party must prove a claim to correct inventorship by clear and convincing evidence. A joint inventor must do the following:

  • Contribute in a significant manner to the conception or reduction to practice of the invention
  • Make a contribution to the claimed invention that is not insignificant in quality when that contribution is measured against the dimension of the full invention
  • Do more than explain well-known concepts or the current state of the art.

The Federal Circuit found that Howard’s alleged contribution of using an infrared oven for preheating the bacon was insignificant in quality when measured against the full invention, which it found to be clearly focused on preheating with a microwave oven. Preheating with an infrared oven was briefly mentioned in passing as an alternative to a microwave oven in the patent’s specification and in a single dependent claim. In contrast to using an infrared oven, the patent claims, specification and figures all prominently featured using a microwave oven for the preheating step. All the independent claims required or allowed using a microwave oven for the preheating step. The specification also repeatedly referred to preheating with a microwave oven, including in the background of the invention and the summary of the invention sections. Further, the examples and corresponding figures included procedures using a microwave oven to preheat, but no mention of using an infrared oven to preheat. Accordingly, the Court found that Howard’s infrared oven suggestion was insignificant in light of the full invention.

The Federal Circuit did not address the other requirements for joint inventorship, reasoning that since all three [...]

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Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Validity Upheld Based on Expert Separation Testimony

by | Apr 27, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision finding that two patents covering enantiomerically pure compositions of the psoriasis drug Otezla® (apremilast) were valid and one patent covering a dosage titration schedule was invalid as obvious. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. Case No. 22-1147 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 2023) (Lourie, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.)

Amgen markets apremilast, a phosphodiesterase-4 inhibitor that is used for treating psoriasis and related conditions, under the brand name Otezla®. Amgen has three patents covering Otezla®. Two of the patents are directed to orally administered pharmaceutical compositions of enantiomerically pure apremilast (composition patents), and one of the patents covers a dosage titration schedule for enantiomerically pure apremilast that ranges from a starting dose of 10 mg to a dose of 60 mg by the sixth day (dosage patent). Sandoz submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) seeking approval from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market a generic version of apremilast. Amgen filed suit against Sandoz for infringement of its three patents covering Otezla®.

Sandoz asserted that the composition patents were invalid based on prior art that had an example (Example 12) that described a 50%:50% racemic mixture of apremilast but did not disclose the purified apremilast (+) enantiomer recited in the claims. The prior art did state that apremilast could be isolated from this racemic mixture using chiral chromatography, a well-known technique. The district court rejected Sandoz’s argument, finding that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that a skilled artisan would have had reason to believe that the desirable properties of Example 12 derived in whole or in part from the apremilast enantiomer (i.e., the (+) enantiomer). The district court also concluded that Sandoz had not demonstrated that a skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in resolving Example 12 into its individual enantiomeric components. Furthermore, the district court looked to objective indicia of non-obviousness, finding that apremilast unexpectedly provided substantial improvement over previously known phosphodiesterase inhibitors in terms of both efficacy and tolerability, and a nexus existed between the unexpected potency and the asserted claims.

Sandoz also argued that the dosage patent was invalid based on prior art that taught various dosage schedules and amounts for apremilast. The district court found that it would have been within the ability of a skilled artisan to titrate apremilast for a patient presenting with psoriasis and that doing so would have been a routine aspect of treating psoriasis with a drug (such as apremilast) that was known in the art to require dose titration to ameliorate side effects. The district court therefore found that the dosage patent was invalid. Sandoz appealed with respect to the composition patents, and Amgen appealed with respect to the dosage patent.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision with respect to the composition patents, finding that Sandoz had not proven that a skilled artisan would have had sufficient motivation to purify apremilast’s (+) enantiomer from the racemic mixture disclosed in Example [...]

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Reaching New Lights: Inherent Upper Limit Enables Open-Ended Range

by | Apr 27, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed an International Trade Commission decision finding a § 337 violation. The Court concluded that the Commission correctly found that an open-ended claim was enabled since there was an inherent upper limit and correctly construed the term “a” to mean “one or more” in finding infringement. FS.com Inc. v. International Trade Commission, Case No. 22-1228 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2023) (Moore, Prost, Hughes, JJ.)

Corning Optical Communications owns several patents directed to fiber optic technology. Corning alleged that FS violated § 337 by importing high-density fiber optic equipment that infringed the patents. In assessing infringement, the Commission construed the claim term “a front opening” to mean “an opening located in the front side of a fiber optic module (e.g., the opening depicted in Figure 13 of the [asserted] patent as having dimensions H1 and W1”) and further concluded that the term encompassed one or more openings. The Commission found that FS’s products met this requirement and therefore infringed. FS argued that certain claims were invalid because they were not enabled. The claims at issue recited “a fiber optic connection density of at least ninety-eight (98) fiber optic connections per U space” or “a fiber optic connection of at least one hundred forty-four (144) fiber optic connections per U space.” FS argued that these open-ended density ranges were not enabled because the specification only enabled up to 144 fiber optic connections per U space. The Commission rejected FS’s invalidity argument. FS appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s enablement determination. The Court explained that open-ended claims are not inherently improper and may be enabled “if there is an inherent, albeit not precisely known, upper limit and the specification enables one of skill in the art to approach that limit.” The Court found that there was an inherent upper limit of about 144 connections per U space since skilled artisans would have understood that densities substantially above 144 connections per U space were technologically infeasible. The Court further found that the specification disclosed that the maximum density achievable was 144 connections per U space and expert testimony confirmed that, despite market pressure, no commercial product has achieved a density greater than 144 connections. Considering this evidence, the Court concluded that the Commission properly found that the open-ended claims had an inherent upper limit of about 144 connections per U space and the claimed open-ended range was therefore enabled.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Commission’s infringement determination. The Court explained that the terms “a” or “an” in a patent claim generally mean “one or more,” unless the patentee evinces a clear intent to limit “a” or “an” to “one.” FS argued that the recitation of “front openings” in an unasserted claim showed a clear intent to limit “a front opening” in the asserted claim to a single opening. The Court rejected that argument, finding that limiting an unasserted claim to multiple openings did not show an intent to limit the asserted claim to [...]

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PTO Requests Comments on Revisions to AIA Trial Proceedings

by | Apr 27, 2023 | ,

On April 21, 2023, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) announced that it is seeking public input on proposed modifications to the rules of practice for inter partes reviews (IPRs) and post grant reviews (PGRs) before the Patent Trial & Appeal Board to better align the practices with the PTO’s mission to promote and protect innovation and investment in the same and to provide a less expensive alternative to district court litigation to resolve certain patentability issues while also protecting against patentee harassment.

The PTO is considering promulgating rules that the Director—and, by delegation, the Board—will use to do the following:

  • Exercise the Director’s discretion to institute IPRs and PGRs
  • Provide a procedure for separate briefing on discretionary denial that will allow parties to address relevant issues for discretionary denial without encroaching on the page limit to address the merits of a case
  • Give petitioners the ability to pay additional fees for a higher word-count limit
  • Clarify that all settlement agreements, including pre-institution settlement agreements, are required to be filed with the Board.

To create clear, predictable rules where possible, as opposed to balancing tests that decrease certainty, the PTO is considering changes that would provide for discretionary denials of petitions in the following categories, subject to certain conditions and circumstances as discussed further in the Official Notice:

  • Petitions filed by certain for-profit entities
  • Petitions challenging under-resourced patent owner patents where the patentee has brought or is attempting to bring products to market
  • Petitions challenging patent claims previously subject to a final adjudication upholding the patent claims against patentability challenges in district court or in post-grant proceedings before the PTO
  • Serial petitions
  • Petitions raising previously addressed prior art or arguments
  • Parallel petitions
  • Petitions challenging patents subject to ongoing parallel litigation in district court.

The PTO also seeks comments on proposed threshold definitions that apply to one or more of these categories of petitions subject to discretionary denials. Those definitions set forth the criteria used to determine the following:

  • What constitutes a “substantial relationship” between entities sufficient to trigger or avoid discretionary denial
  • When claim sets are deemed to have “substantial overlap” with challenged claims
  • What constitutes “compelling merits” sufficient to trigger an exception to discretionary denial.

For example, one proposal with respect to the “substantial relationship” is a requirement that a patent owner and petitioner disclose anyone with an ownership interest in the patent owner or petitioner, any government funding related to the patent, any third-party litigation funding support, and any stake any party has in the outcome of the America Invents Act (AIA) proceeding or any parallel proceedings on the challenged claims.

Additional changes being considered by the PTO include the following:

  • Absent exceptional circumstances, requiring petitioners to file a stipulation that neither they nor their privy or real parties in interest have filed prior post-grant proceedings (PGRs, IPRs, covered business methods or ex parte reexaminations) on the challenged claims
  • If petitioners’ post-grant proceeding is instituted, requiring that [...]

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If Prior Art Discloses Ingredients and How to Mix Them, the “Cake” Is Anticipated

by | Apr 20, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that challenged claims were invalid as anticipated based on principles of inherency where the disclosed prior art formulations and processes necessarily met a disputed claim limitation. Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. ModernaTx, Inc., Case No. 20-1183 (Fed. Cir. April 11, 2023) (Reyna, Schall, Chen, JJ.)

Arbutus Biopharma owns a patent that matured from an application filed on March 9, 2015, that claims priority to a provisional application filed on June 30, 2010. The claimed invention provides stable nucleic acid-lipid particle (SNALP) formulations with a non-lamellar structure that function to increase the efficiency of nucleic acid entry into cells to promote the downregulation of gene expression. The non-lamellar morphology of a SNALP formulation was known to depend on two factors: the lipids incorporated into the SNALP formulation, and the process used to form the SNALPs. The patent disclosed five SNALP formulations of various compositions that can be used and incorporated by reference two US patent publications, which describe two methods that can be used to make SNALP formulations: the Direct Dilution Method (DDM) and the Stepwise Dilution Method (SDM). The representative independent claim recites a composition of SNALPs, wherein each particle in the plurality of SNALP particles comprises a nucleic acid and various lipid types. The claim also requires that at least 95% of the particles in the plurality of particles have a non-lamellar morphology (the Morphology Limitation).

Moderna filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) asserting that all the claims of the Arbutus patent were anticipated by a prior art patent. The Patent Trial & Appeal Board found that although the Morphology Limitation was not expressly found in the prior art, the claims were anticipated. The Board determined that the Morphology Limitation was an inherent property (or natural result) of the prior art disclosures. On appeal, Arbutus challenged the Board’s inherent and express anticipation findings for many of the challenged claims, including for the Morphology Limitation.

A limitation is inherent if it is the natural result flowing from the prior art’s explicit disclosure. In other words, a limitation is inherent when the limitation is a property necessarily present in the invention and not actually an additional requirement imposed by the claims. In the IPR proceeding, Moderna argued that the Morphology Limitation was inherent because one skilled in the art would necessarily obtain formulations meeting this limitation by making formulations using the five formulations disclosed by the patent and using the DDM method (from the incorporated-by-reference disclosures) to prepare the formulations.

Both the challenged patent and the prior art disclosed five formulations that can be used to obtain the SNALP formulations. Evidence showed that any differences between the formulations disclosed in these patents would not impact the Morphology Limitation. The Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported a finding that the formulations disclosed in both the challenged patent and the prior art were the same or essentially the same.

The Federal Circuit further explained that both the challenged patent and the [...]

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Context Is Key in Claim Construction

by | Apr 20, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reiterated that intrinsic evidence trumps extrinsic evidence in determining the meaning of claim terms. Sequoia Technology, LLC v. Dell, Inc. et al., Case Nos. 21-2263; -2264; -2265; -2266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2023) (Stoll, Lourie, Dyk, JJ.)

Sequoia Technology owns a patent directed to data storage methods involving storing the same data across multiple physical disk drives to make up a virtual disk drive. Sequoia asserted the patent against several companies, all based on a product sold by Red Hat. During litigation, the parties disputed the construction of the terms “computer-readable recording medium,” “disk partition” and “logical volume.” Related to the latter two claim construction issues, the parties construed the term “used or not used” in the context of an extent’s usage in an “extent allocation table.”

The district court adopted Red Hat’s construction of “computer-readable recording medium” to include transitory media (i.e., signals or waves). The district court found no clear language in the specification that excluded transitory media and found Red Hat’s extrinsic evidence to be persuasive, “particularly given the lack of any substantive rebuttal from Sequoia’s expert.” For “disk partition” and “logical volume,” the district court agreed with Red Hat and construed “disk partition” to mean a “section of a disk that is a minimum unit of a logical volume” and “logical volume” to mean an “extensible union of more than one disk partition, the size of which is resized in disk partition units.” These constructions require that a logical volume is constructed by whole disk partitions, not subparts of disk partitions such as extents. The district court also construed the phrase “used or not used” in the limitation “extent allocation table for indicating whether each extent in the disk partition is used or not used,” adopting Red Hat’s construction that “used or not used” means that an extent “is or is not storing information.”

Following claim construction, the parties stipulated that under the district court’s claim construction of “logical volume” and “disk partition,” the accused products did not infringe the asserted claims. The parties also stipulated that under the district court’s construction of “computer-readable recording medium,” certain claims were subject matter ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as including transitory media. Sequoia appealed.

The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court erred in construing “computer-readable recording medium.” Starting with the claim language, the Court noted that the claim recited a “computer-readable recording medium storing instructions” and not simply a “computer-readable medium.” The Court reasoned that an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand transitory signals to be incompatible with the claimed invention because such fleeting signals would not persist for sufficient time to store instructions. Turning to the specification, the Court explained that although the specification did use open-ended “including” language to describe a computer-readable medium, the relevant portion of the specification defined computer-readable media as “including compact disc read only memory (CDROM), random access memory (RAM), floppy disk, hard disk, and magneto-optical disk,” all of which are non-transient [...]

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Allegations in Complaint Prevail over Statements in Exhibit

by | Apr 20, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, prioritizing specific allegations in the complaint over disclosures in exhibits to the complaint, reversed and remanded a district court decision dismissing an original complaint, denying leave to file an amended complaint. Healthier Choices Management Corp. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.; Philip Morris Products S.A., Case Nos. 22-1268; -1563 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2023) (Taranto, Cunningham, Stoll, JJ.)

Healthier Choices Management (HCM) filed a complaint for patent infringement against two Philip Morris defendants in the Northern District of Georgia. The infringement allegation involved a patent for a nicotine delivery device. The relevant language from the claims focused on a heating element in the device “initiating . . . a combustion reaction . . . [with] the combustion reaction at least partially combusting the combustible material.” In its complaint, HCM alleged that the heating in the accused product resulted in at least partial combustion.

Philip Morris defended the claim by arguing that its accused product aerosolized the nicotine at a low temperature and, therefore, never combusted the tobacco. Philip Morris filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) against HCM arguing that an exhibit to the complaint “conclusively demonstrated” that the accused product did not initiate a combustion reaction. The district court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss, prompting HCM to file a motion for leave to amend its complaint to more definitively allege infringement. The district court denied the motion and granted Philip Morris’s subsequent motion for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. HCM appealed.

Since the issues raised were not unique to patent law, the Federal Circuit addressed HCM’s appeal under the law of the relevant regional circuit, the Eleventh Circuit. The Court noted that in the Eleventh Circuit, exhibits attached to a complaint can be considered and the exhibit controls in the event of any conflict with allegations pertaining to the exhibit. However, when an exhibit is alleged to be factually false in some way and the allegations in a complaint are specific and well pleaded, then the allegations in the complaint control. The exhibit regarding the accused product in this case was alleged to be incorrect, as far as it stated that there was no combustion initiated by the “heat-not-burn” method described in the exhibit. HCM contended that combustion occurred despite the assertions in that document. Relying on several cases disavowing the truth of the exhibit, the Federal Circuit found Eleventh Circuit law to be both clear and in alignment with HCM. The Court concluded that in light of the detailed allegations as to the basis underlying HCM’s disagreement with the facts asserted in the exhibit, the complaint should not have been dismissed based on the exhibit.

The Federal Circuit next turned to HCM’s amended complaint. Noting that the amended complaint “superseded” the earlier complaint, the Court found that the amended complaint removed the offending exhibit and any references to the offending exhibit and included a declaration of a technical expert to further support HCM’s allegations. [...]

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PTO to Host Listening Session on Role of AI in Innovation

by | Apr 13, 2023 |

As previously reported, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) published a Request for Comments Regarding Artificial Intelligence and Inventorship, seeking input from stakeholders on inventorship issues that may arise as artificial intelligence (AI) and emerging technologies play a greater role in the innovation process. In the wake of the request, the PTO published a Notice announcing that it is hosting a listening session to address the “current state of AI technologies and inventorship issues,” including whether AI should qualify as an inventor and whether the PTO should expand its current guidance.

The listening session will be held at the PTO’s headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, on April 25, 2023, from 10:30 am to 2:45 pm EDT. Anyone seeking to speak at the listening session must register by 5:00 pm EDT on April 20, 2023. Anyone seeking to attend, either virtually or in person, but not speak at the event must register by April 24, 2023.

Registration information is available here.



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It’s All in the Grammar: “A” Still Means “One or More,” but Single Component Must Perform All Claimed Functions

by | Apr 13, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a jury’s noninfringement verdict, finding that the district court correctly interpreted the article “a” and antecedent “said” in the asserted claims to require that a single microprocessor be capable of performing every one of the recited microprocessor functions. Salazar v. AT&T Mobility LLC et al., Case No. 21-2320; -2376 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 2023) (Stoll, Schall, Stark, JJ.)

Joe Salazar owns a patent directed to technology for wireless and wired communication, including command, control and sensing systems for two-way communications. In 2016, Salazar sued HTC, alleging that HTC infringed the patent by selling certain phones that allegedly embodied the asserted claims. A jury returned a verdict finding that HTC did not infringe. In 2019, Salazar sued AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile and Verizon (collectively, the Telecom Providers) asserting the same patent against the same HTC products. HTC intervened, arguing that the accused products did not infringe. The district court severed HTC and stayed that portion of the case.

At claim construction, the parties disputed limitations that required “a microprocessor for generating, . . . said microprocessor creating . . . , a plurality of parameter sets retrieved by said microprocessor . . . , [and] said microprocessor generating.” The essence of the dispute was “whether the claims require one microprocessor that is capable of performing the recited ‘generating,’ ‘creating,’ ‘retrieving,’ and ‘generating’ functions.” The district court answered the question in the affirmative and construed the term to mean “one or more microprocessors, at least one of which is configured to perform the generating, creating, retrieving, and generating functions.” The district court further reasoned that “at least one microprocessor must satisfy all the functional (and relational) limitations recited for ‘said microprocessor.’” At trial, the jury found that the accused products did not infringe and that the patent was not invalid. Salazar appealed, and the Telecom Providers cross-appealed.

Salazar argued that the district court erred in construing “a” microprocessor and “said” microprocessor and that the court should have interpreted the claim terms to require one or more microprocessors, any one of which may be capable of performing the “generating,” “creating” and “retrieving” functions recited in the claims. Put another way, in Salazar’s view, the correct claim construction would encompass one microprocessor capable of performing one claimed function and another microprocessor capable of performing a different claimed function, even if no single microprocessor could perform all of the recited functions.

The Federal Circuit rejected Salazar’s argument. Generally, the indefinite article “a” means “one or more” in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase “comprising.” An exception to the general rule arises where the language of the claims themselves, the specification or the prosecution history necessitates a departure from the rule. The Court found that while the claim term “a microprocessor” does not require that there be only one microprocessor, the subsequent limitations referring to “said microprocessor” require that at least one microprocessor be capable of performing each of the claimed functions. The Court further explained that [...]

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