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CRISPR Clarity: Enablement Is Analyzed Differently Under §§ 102 and 112

In a decision underscoring the distinct standards governing enablement under §§ 102 and 112, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s finding that a prior art reference was enabling for purposes of anticipation, even in the absence of working examples. Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Synthego Corp., Case Nos. 23-2186; -2187 (Fed. Cir. June 11, 2025) (Prost, Linn, Reyna, JJ.)

The case centers on CRISPR, the gene-editing technology that has reshaped the frontiers of biology and biotechnology. Agilent owns patents that claim chemically modified guide RNAs (gRNAs) designed to improve stability and performance in CRISPR-Cas systems. Synthego filed an inter partes review (IPR) petition asserting that the patents were unpatentable. The Board found all claims unpatentable, relying on a 2014 publication by Pioneer Hi-Bred that disclosed similar modified gRNAs. Agilent appealed.

Agilent challenged the Board’s finding that the prior art was enabling, arguing that Pioneer Hi-Bred merely proposed a research plan without demonstrating which specific modifications would yield functional gRNAs. Agilent emphasized that the reference lacked working examples and disclosed numerous nonfunctional sequences, contending that a skilled artisan would not have been able to identify a successful embodiment without undue experimentation. It also argued that the nascent state of CRISPR technology in 2014 compounded the unpredictability, making the reference non-enabling. In support, Agilent relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Amgen v. Sanofi, where the Supreme Court invalidated a broad genus claim for failing to enable its full scope.

The Federal Circuit was not persuaded. The Court drew a clear distinction between enablement under § 112 (which governs patent validity) and enablement under § 102 (which governs anticipation). The Court explained that the bar is lower for the latter, and that a prior art reference need only enable a single embodiment within the scope of the claim. While Amgen involved § 112, the Court emphasized that this case turned on § 102, where the standard is less demanding.

The Federal Circuit grounded this distinction in both the statutory text and the underlying purpose of the respective provisions. Statutorily, § 112 requires that a patent specification enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to “make and use” the invention. Section 102, by contrast, contains no such requirement. This divergence reflects a difference in purpose: § 112 ensures that the patentee does not claim more than they have taught, thereby preventing overbroad monopolies. As the Supreme Court explained in Amgen, “[t]he more a party claims, the broader the monopoly it demands, the more it must enable.” But the Federal Circuit emphasized that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Amgen was rooted in the patentee’s burden to support the full scope of a genus claim under § 112. That concern, the Court explained, does not apply in the § 102 context, where the question is not how much the prior art claims, but whether it teaches enough for a skilled artisan to practice at least one embodiment without undue [...]

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Detour Ahead: New Approach to Assessing Prior Art Rejections Under § 102(e)

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit established a more demanding test for determining whether a published patent application claiming priority to a provisional application is considered prior art under pre-America Invents Act (AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as of the provisional filing date, explaining that all portions of the published patent application that are relied upon by the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) to reject the claims must be sufficiently supported in the provisional application. In re Riggs, Case No. 22-1945 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 24, 2025) (Moore, Stoll, Cunningham, JJ.)

Several inventors who work for Odyssey Logistics filed a patent application directed to logistics systems and methods for the transportation of goods from various shippers by various carriers across different modes of transport (e.g., by rail, truck, ship, or air). PTO rejected the application under § 102(e) in view of Lettich, which claimed the benefit of a provisional application (Lettich provisional), and as obvious in view of Lettich in combination with the Rojek reference.

The inventors appealed the Lettich rejections to the Patent Trial & Appeal Board, arguing that Lettich did not qualify as prior art under § 102(e). The Board initially agreed with the inventors, but the Examiner assigned to the application requested a rehearing, asserting that the Board applied the incorrect standard for § 102(e) prior art. The Board ultimately issued its decision on the Request for Rehearing, stating that it had jurisdiction over the Examiner’s request and that the Examiner’s arguments regarding Lettich’s status as prior art under § 102(e) “[we]re well taken.” The Board amended its original decision “to determine that Lettich is proper prior art against the instant claims.” The Board then reviewed and affirmed the Examiner’s anticipation and obviousness rejections. The inventors appealed.

The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the Board’s decision. With respect to whether Lettich qualified as § 102(e) prior art, the Court found that the Board’s analysis was incomplete. The Court concluded that the Board correctly applied the test set forth in the Federal Circuit’s 2015 decision in Dynamic Drinkware v. National Graphics by determining that the Lettich provisional supported at least one of Lettich’s as-published claims. However, the Court found that this test was insufficient because all portions of the disclosure that are relied upon by the PTO to reject the claims must also be sufficiently supported in the priority document. Although the PTO asserted that the Board had conducted this additional analysis, the Federal Circuit disagreed and vacated and remanded for the Board to determine whether the Lettich provisional supported the entirety of the Lettich disclosure that the Examiner relied on in rejecting the claims.




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Palette of Evidence: PTAB Must Consider Entire Record to Determine Prior Art Status

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a Patent Trial & Appeal Board patentability determination, finding that the Board failed to consider the entire record regarding the prior art status of a sample and did not explain why it did not do so. CQV Co., Ltd. v. Merck Patent GmbH., Case No. 23-1027 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 2025) (Chen, Mayer, Cunningham, JJ.)

Merck owns a patent that covers alpha-alumina flakes included in paints, industrial coatings, automotive coatings, printing, inks, and cosmetic formulations to impart a pearlescent luster. CQV petitioned the Board for post-grant review (PGR) of the patent, arguing that the challenged claims were obvious in view of prior art samples of Xirallic®, a trademarked product produced by Merck. In its final written decision, the Board found that CQV had not adequately supported its contention that the alleged Xirallic® lot qualified as prior art and therefore had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims were unpatentable. CQV appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s finding under the substantial evidence standard. The Court found that the Board erred in failing to consider the entire record and did not provide any basis for that failure. In terms of the prior art status of the Xirallic® samples, the Court found that the Board failed to consider testimony regarding the availability of Xirallic® for customer order and the length of the quality control process. The Court could not “reasonably discern whether the Board followed a proper path” in determining that CQV failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the sample of Xirallic® constituted prior art. The Court remanded, suggesting that the Board carefully consider whether the sample of Xirallic® would have been publicly available as of the alleged critical dates.




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A Lynk to the Past: Published Applications Are Prior Art as of Filing Date

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision finding challenged claims invalid based on a published patent application that, in an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding, was found to be prior art as of its filing date rather than its publication date. Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Case No. 23-2346 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2025) (Prost, Lourie, Stark, JJ.)

Samsung filed a petition for IPR challenging claims of a Lynk Labs patent. Samsung’s challenge relied on a patent application filed before the priority date of the challenged patent. However, the application was not published until after the priority date of the challenged patent. The Board rejected Lynk Labs’ argument that the application could not serve as prior art and determined the challenged claims to be unpatentable. Lynk Labs appealed to the Federal Circuit, raising three arguments.

Lynk Labs’ first argument was that the application could not serve as prior art because the publication date meant that it was not publicly available until after the priority date of the challenged patent. Pre-America Invents Act (AIA) law applied. Lynk Labs cited 35 U.S.C. § 311(b), restricting IPR petitioners to challenges “on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” While Lynk Labs admitted that the published application was a printed application, it denied that it was a prior art printed publication.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the issue de novo as a question of statutory interpretation. The Court noted that §§ 102(e)(1) and (2) carve out a different rule for published patent applications than the test for §§ 102(a) and (b) prior art. Under the statute, a patent application filed in the United States before an invention claimed in a later filed application qualifies as prior art if the application is published or a patent is granted on it.

Lynk Labs did not dispute that, under § 102(e)(2), an application resulting in an issued patent can be prior art, even if the patent is granted after an invention’s priority date, as long as the application is filed before the challenged invention priority date. However, Lynk Labs took issue with the fact that the Board applied the same principle, under § 102(e)(1), to applications that are published but do not become patents.

The Federal Circuit explained that the plain language of the statute permitted IPR challenges based on such applications and rejected Lynk Labs’ arguments that the statute should be interpreted differently. Lynk Labs argued that when Congress enacted § 311(b), it transplanted the term “printed publications” from case law, along with that case law’s “old soil” that established that the application would not be prior art.

In support of its argument, Lynk Labs cited case law that in its view suggested that patent applications are never prior art printed publications. However, the Federal Circuit distinguished those cases on the basis they were decided at a time before applications were published and therefore did not address published applications. Lynk [...]

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Bit Swap: Motivation to Modify Prior Art Needn’t Be Inventor’s Motivation

Addressing the issue of obviousness, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision, finding that the challenged patent claims were obvious because a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have been motivated to switch two specific information bits in a 20-bit codeword to improve performance. Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. 3G Licensing, S.A., Case Nos. 23-1354; -1384; -1407 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 2, 2025) (Dyk, Chen, JJ.) (Stoll, J., dissenting).

3G Licensing owns a patent concerning a coding method for transmitting a channel quality indicator (CQI) in mobile communication systems. The CQI, a five-bit binary integer (0 to 30) is sent from user equipment, such as a cell phone, to a base station to indicate cellular connection quality. Base stations adjust data rates using adaptive modulation and coding, assigning higher rates to strong signals and lower rates to weaker ones. CQI accuracy is critical for maximizing data transmission efficiency and ensuring recovery of the original message despite transmission errors.

The challenged claims of the 3G patent relate to a CQI code designed to maximize protection of the most significant bit (MSB) to reduce the impact of transmission errors. The prior art disclosed a method and a basis sequence table that provided additional protection to the MSB, minimizing root-mean-square error. However, the claimed invention differed in that it required swapping the last two bits of the basis sequence table. The Board found that a skilled artisan would not have been motivated to make this modification to enhance MSB protection, nor would a skilled artisan have deemed it desirable. Honeywell appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed, finding the claims obvious for four primary reasons. First, the Court determined that the Board incorrectly concluded that a POSITA would not have been motivated to swap the last two bits to improve MSB protection. The Court emphasized that the motivation to modify prior art does not need to align with the inventor’s motivation. As a result, the Board’s reasoning that minimizing root-mean-square error was not the patent’s primary purpose should not have been a primary consideration.

Second, the Federal Circuit found that prior art explicitly taught the importance of protecting the MSB through redundancy. A skilled artisan would have understood that swapping the two bits, as claimed, would add redundancy and enhance protection. Honeywell’s expert testimony further supported the conclusion that the prior art would have provided the requisite motivation to arrive at the claimed invention, and 3G’s expert did not dispute that the swap increased MSB protection.

Third, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Board improperly conflated obviousness with anticipation by requiring that the prior art disclose swapping the two bits. Anticipation requires the prior art to specifically disclose the claimed modification, but obviousness does not. The Court found that the Board erroneously treated the two standards as interchangeable.

Finally, the Federal Circuit found that the Board wrongly required that the claimed basis sequence table represent the preferred or most optimal combination. As the Court [...]

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Motivation MIA? Federal Circuit Sends IPR Back to the Drawing Board

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision, finding that the Board erred by failing to explain its holding and reasoning regarding a motivation to combine prior art references. Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, LLC, Case No. 23-1636 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2024) (Stoll, Dyk, Stark, JJ.)

Centripetal Networks owns a patent directed to correlating packets in communications networks, introducing an innovative system designed to enhance network security. The patent focuses on packets (small data segments that collectively form larger communications) and their correlation across network boundaries.

Palo Alto Networks challenged the patent’s validity in an inter partes review (IPR) and argued its obviousness based on three prior art references. The first reference described a system using hashing techniques to identify packets traversing network address translation boundaries and teaching how to correlate packets across such boundaries to identify hosts transmitting or receiving them. The second reference detailed methods for detecting unauthorized traffic directed to unused IP addresses, notifying administrators of potential threats, and enabling automated responses, such as blocking or filtering malicious traffic. The reference taught notifying administrators how to manage packets involved in malicious activity after they crossed a network boundary.

Palo Alto argued that combining the packet correlation techniques of the first reference with the notification mechanisms of the second addressed a key claim limitation of the challenged patent. Palo Alto contended that transmitting an indication of a malicious host, as taught by the second reference, naturally followed from the correlation system described in the first. However, the Board found that Palo Alto failed to provide sufficient evidence or argument to show that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would recognize the claimed responsiveness between the first reference’s packet correlation and the second reference’s notification mechanisms. Palo Alto appealed.

The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the Board’s decision, finding that the Board erred by failing to clearly articulate its rationale regarding the motivation to combine the prior art references and whether their combination satisfied the critical limitation of the challenged patent claim. The Court emphasized that the proper inquiry in an obviousness analysis is not whether each reference individually discloses all claim elements but whether their combination would have rendered the invention obvious to a POSITA.

Palo Alto maintained that the Board did not dispute the existence of a motivation to combine and improperly searched for a “bridge” solely within the two references. Centripetal countered that Palo Alto had not established a motivation or provided evidence of a necessary connection – or “bridge” – between the prior art and the claimed invention.

The Federal Circuit determined that the Board’s decision lacked a definitive finding on whether a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the first reference’s correlation techniques with the second reference’s notification step. The Court noted that Palo Alto presented logical and evidentiary support as to why such a combination would make sense, arguing that without a notification step, the [...]

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Plausible Alternative Understanding of Prior Art? So What?

Affirming the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s final determination that three claims were invalid for obviousness, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that a “plausible alternative understanding” of the prior art did not compel a reversal under the substantial evidence review standard. Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Vidal, Case No. 19-2447 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 2, 2024) (Prost, Reyna, Chen, JJ.)

Three computer networking companies filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) to challenge the patentability of claims of a patent for regulating access to a telecommunications network owned by Koninklijke. The challenged claims included limitations concerning devices, identified by a controller with a unique identifier, that requested access to a network. The controller allowed each device network access based on a “grant access time interval.” The petitioners argued that the challenged claims were unpatentable as obvious in view of three prior art references: Obhan, Shatzkamer, and Budka.

After considering the parties’ argument over what was disclosed by the references, the Board found that Obhan disclosed an admission control system for a wireless network that included assigning devices a “good till time.” The Board found that Shatzkamer disclosed managing a wireless network using a system to identify specific devices, add those devices to a “blacklist,” and deny network access to the blacklisted devices. The Board determined that the combination of Obhan, Shatzkamer, and Budka taught the limitations of the challenged claims. Koninklijke appealed.

Koninklijke argued that the Board erred in its determination that the prior art references taught certain claim limitations and provided motivation to combine the references.

Koninklijke first argued that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s finding that Obhan disclosed the access request limitations of the challenged claims. Koninklijke also argued that Obhan did not teach consulting a “good till time” to determine whether to allow a device to access the network. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that Koninklijke’s argument merely presented “a plausible alternative understanding of Obhan.” The Court explained that under the substantial evidence standard of review, this was not enough to conclude that the Board’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence. The Court declined to reweigh the evidence or make factual findings of its own.

Second, Koninklijke argued that the Board’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence because the Board misread and misstated one of the challenged claims. An exemplary claim of the challenged patents recited “an access operation to deny access for the terminal if the access request is received within the time period,” whereas another recited “denying the terminal access to the telecommunications network responsive to the access request being received within the time period defined by the accessed identification of at least one associated deny access time interval.” In its decision, the Board stated that second claim “requires only that the access request be denied if it is received within the time period during which access is denied.” Koninklijke faulted the Board for using the term “if” instead of “responsive to.”

The Federal Circuit did not find [...]

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Private Sale Means Public Fail

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision that a private sale of a product embodying the claimed invention did not qualify as a “public disclosure” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(B). Sanho Corp. v. Kaijet Technology Int’l Ltd, Inc., Case No. 23-1336 (Fed. Cir. July 31, 2024) (Dyk, Clevenger, Stoll, JJ.)

Sanho owns a patent directed to a port extension apparatus designed to enhance connectivity of end-user devices (such as laptops) with other devices (such as printers). Kaijet petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) challenging certain claims of Sanho’s patent, arguing that the claims were obvious based on a prior art reference. The Board found that the patent claims were invalid because of the prior art reference’s earlier effective filing date. Sanho argued that a prior sale of its HyperDrive device by the inventor of the patent should disqualify the reference as prior art. However, the Board determined that Sanho failed to demonstrate a public disclosure of the HyperDrive sale before the prior art reference’s effective filing date. Thus, the patent was invalidated. Sanho appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed, explaining that the America Invents Act (AIA) redefined prior art, shifting from a first-to-invent to a first-inventor-to-file system. Under the AIA, prior art includes patents and applications filed before the patent’s effective filing date subject to exceptions for public disclosures by the inventor. Sanho argued that the HyperDrive sale fell into this exception.

The Federal Circuit dismissed Sanho’s argument that the phrase “publicly disclosed” in § 102(b)(2)(B) should encompass all types of disclosures described in § 102(a)(1), including private sales. The crux of the issue was whether placing an invention “on sale” was tantamount to a “public disclosure” under § 102(b)(2)(B). The statute states that a disclosure is not prior art if the subject matter was publicly disclosed by the inventor before the effective filing date of the prior art. Sanho argued that “publicly disclosed” includes any disclosure, even private sales. The Court disagreed, explaining that the statute’s use of “publicly” implies a narrower scope than just “disclosed.” The Court noted that the purpose of this exception is to protect inventors who make their inventions available to the public before another’s patent filing.

The Federal Circuit also relied on legislative history in support of the conclusion that “public disclosure” in § 102(b)(2)(B) means the invention must be made available to the public. Sanho argued that as long as there are no confidentiality requirements, all disclosures, even private sales, should constitute public disclosures. Again, the Court rejected that argument, noting that the statute differentiates between “publicly disclosed” and general “disclosures,” implying different meanings.

The Federal Circuit determined that § 102(b)(2)(B) protects inventors who publicly disclose their inventions from subsequent disclosures by others, ensuring that prior public disclosure by the inventor prevents a third party’s disclosure from becoming prior art. This provision aims to encourage inventors to share their innovations with the public.

Practice Note: For a disclosure to qualify as “public” under the [...]

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PTAB MTA Pilot Program to the Rescue

On review of a final written decision from the Patent Trial & Appeal Board in an inter partes review (IPR), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that all challenged claims were obvious but left open the possibility of the patent owner amending the claims under the Motion to Amend (MTA) Pilot Program. ZyXEL Communications Corp. v. UNM Rainforest Innovations, Case Nos. 22-2220; -2250 (Fed. Cir. July 22, 2024) (Dyk, Prost, Stark, JJ.)

ZyXEL Communications petitioned for IPR challenging claims 1 – 4, 6, 7 and 8 of a patent owned by UNM Rainforest Innovation (UNMRI). The patent relates to methods for constructing frame structures in communication systems using orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) technologies. The patent describes a method for constructing a frame structure with two sections, each of which is configured for a different communication system, where the second communication system is used to support high mobility users (i.e., faster moving users).

Before the Board, ZyXEL argued that claims 1 – 4, 6 and 7 were unpatentable in light of two prior art references (Talukdar and Li), and that claim 8 was unpatentable in light of Talukdar and another prior art reference (Nystrom). During the Board proceedings, UNMRI filed a contingent motion to amend if any of the challenged claims were found to be unpatentable. As part of its motion, UNMRI requested preliminary guidance from the Board pursuant to the Board’s MTA Pilot Program. In its opposition to UNMRI’s motion to amend, ZyXEL argued that UNMRI’s amended claims lacked written description support, and in its preliminary guidance, the Board agreed. UNMRI attempted to file a revised motion to amend, but the Board rejected the revised motion and instead permitted UNMRI to file a reply in support of its original motion. It also allowed ZyXEL to file a sur-reply. The Board determined that claims 1 – 4, 6 and 7 were unpatentable, but that claim 8 was not. The Board also granted UNMRI’s motion to amend and determined that the new claims were nonobvious over the prior art of record. Both sides appealed.

With respect to the Board’s decision on the obviousness of claims 1 – 4, 6 and 7, the Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the ruling. UNMRI’s primary argument was that a person of skill in the art (POSA) would not have been motivated to combine Talukdar and Li, but the Court credited the Board’s reliance on ZyXEL’s expert, who demonstrated sufficient motivation to combine the two references.

The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s finding that claim 8 had not been shown to be obvious, however. The Court noted that while the Nystrom reference may not explicitly state the benefit of the missing limitations, “a prior art reference does not need to explicitly articulate or express why its teachings are beneficial so long as its teachings are beneficial and a POSA would recognize that their application was beneficial.”

Regarding UNMRI’s motion to amend, ZyXEL argued that the Board erred in granting the [...]

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Drawing Can Teach Claim Limitations If “Clear on Its Face”

Addressing when a drawing in a prior art reference includes a teaching that is “clear on its face,” the Director of the US Patent & Trademark Office vacated and remanded a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision denying institution of an inter partes review (IPR) petition. MAHLE Behr Charleston Inc. v. Catalano, IPR2023-00861 (PTAB Decision Review, Apr. 5, 2024) (Vidal, PTO Dir.)

MAHLE Behr filed a petition requesting institution of an IPR, challenging claims of a patent owned by Catalano. The patent is directed to a device known as a sacrificial anode that prevents corrosion in motor vehicle radiators caused by electrolysis. One of the claim terms at issue requires the anode to be “within 10 inches” of another element. MAHLE argued that a figure in a prior art reference anticipated or rendered obvious several challenged claims.

The Board denied the institution after determining that MAHLE did not establish a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. The Board cited the Federal Circuit’s 2000 decision in Hockerson-Halberstadt v. Avia Group International to explain that “[p]atent drawings do not define the precise proportions of the elements and may not be relied on to show particular sizes if the specification is completely silent on the issue.” The Board concluded that the figure relied on by MAHLE did not provide exact dimensions and thus could not be sufficient to render the claims invalid.

MAHLE filed a request for Director Review, which was granted. In its request, MAHLE argued that the Board erred in its application of Federal Circuit case law on the use of patent drawings as prior art teachings. The Director agreed, explaining that “the Board did not adequately address [MAHLE’s] arguments regarding what [the figure in the prior art] clearly shows or would have reasonably suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Federal Circuit case law established that a claim may be anticipated or rendered obvious by a figure in the prior art if the drawing clearly discloses the claim limitation. If “a person of skill in the art could derive the claimed dimensions from the patent’s disclosure, there is no additional requirement that the specification must explicitly disclose the precise proportions or particular sizes.”

The Director further explained that “the Board did not adequately address MAHLE’s arguments regarding what [the prior art figure] clearly shows or would have reasonably suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” While the prior art figure did not disclose the precise proportions or measured quantity specified in the challenged claims, the figure showed the elements being located as claimed (necessarily within the 10 inches recited). The Director explained that the Board should have considered whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the figure to disclose the claimed elements being within 10 inches of each other.

The Director vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the petition with instructions to consider both what the prior art figure [...]

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